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Paperback , pages. Published June 1st by Presidio Press first published April To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. To ask other readers questions about On Strategy , please sign up. Lists with This Book. Apr 18, Mike Hankins rated it it was ok Shelves: This book, like many war books, is more interesting as an artifact of historiography than it is as actual history. It's important to read it, only because so many other people have read it and it exerts a large influence on the literature. That said, its not a particularly good book.

Its analysis is simplistic and seems a bit under-researched.

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Calling it a work of history is a bit misleading. If you're new to studying the conflict, you might want to start with a more generic book to give you the context and chronology that Summers explores here. The book is divided into two sections, the first dealing with issues relating to the American people, morale, protest, etc.

The second deals directly with military operational questions. Through both of these sections, Summers analyses the war in the context of Clausewitz's famous work, 'On War. Summers points to several problems, the two main ones he identifies as a failure to galvanize public support for the war, and a failure to recognize the true nature of the conflict. By this, he means that the insurgency in the south, the guerilla-style war which is so synonymous with the Vietnam, was essentially a smoke-screen, blinding us from the true nature of the conflict, which was a traditional military engagement.

He notes that South Vietnam was not defeated by an insurgency, but by a division, highly organized, highly mechanized military force. Thus, America was fighting the wrong war in the wrong place. This analysis has some truth to it to be sure, but using Clausewitz in this way is problematic. One could probably easily use other Clausewitz quotes to disprove some of Summers' points. More problematic is the sense that 'On Strategy' as a whole seems to be an attempt to save face, showing that there were a few simple steps that could have been taken for America to win the war.

Summers thus saves, or atleast excuses, the reputation of the American military. However, it's easy to say that we could have won the war by taking an all-out military approach. But what would have been the consequences of that? How would the North Vietnamese have responded?

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How would the Soviets have responded? Where would China be in all of this? If America increased its resources and commitment in the area, the game would have changed completely, in a way thats impossible to predict. The book is still a good read, and worth the time. It's also short and goes quick--it's engaging and very readable. It's also such a cornerstone for literature on the Vietnam conflict that it should probably be read by anyone interested in studying the conflict.

This is a book that everyone read at the time, and had a large influence on writers that came after. However, it should be taken with a handful of salt. Something as messy as war doesn't always fit into the box that Summers makes for it. Sep 23, Michael Burnam-Fink rated it liked it Shelves: On Strategy is the cornerstone of the 'revisionist school' of Vietnam War historiography-those who argue that the war was ultimately winnable with a greater degree of military commitment. Summers uses Clausewitz to castigate the civilians responsible for Vietnam, President Johnson and Secretary McNamara's systems analysts, for failing to set objectives with a chance of victory.

Army senior leadership is close behind, for failing for the siren lure of counter-insurgency and failing to hold to tra On Strategy is the cornerstone of the 'revisionist school' of Vietnam War historiography-those who argue that the war was ultimately winnable with a greater degree of military commitment. Army senior leadership is close behind, for failing for the siren lure of counter-insurgency and failing to hold to traditional strategic arts in a nuclear era.

Summers' argument is dressed up in a lot of Clausewitzian jargon, but the core is fairly simply. Vietnam was a war fought in 'cold blood' without a mobilization of the population, which separated the American people from the military mission, as color TV brought the savagery of war to everyone's living rooms for the first time. American posture was a strategic defensive, which require endurance and the hope that the situation of the war will turn in your favor.

Tactical successes at Ia Drang, in the Tet Offensive, and the Christmas Bombings were rendered irrelevant by a refusal to bring the war to North Vietnam, and strike directly at their political leadership, their military logistics, or their alliances with China and Russia. American leaders took counsels of their fears of turning the Cold War atomic hot, and bought into North Vietnamese propaganda of a people's war.

In the one sense, Summers isn't wrong. Vietnam was fought without clear objectives beyond the continued existence of the Republic of South Vietnam. But he misses some key points. As a battalion level officer in Vietnam, Summers should have something to say about the tool of ambush and mines, and the difficulty in bringing communist guerrillas to battle. The American people were not comprehensively mobilized, but it's hard to think of a strategic US interest at issue in Indochina, both in terms of contemporary superpower politics and with the benefit of historical hindsight.

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Finally, for the "well if you're so smart, you do it" question, Summers' suggestion for how to fight the war involves a cordon of US troops stretching across Laos from the Vietnamese DMZ through to the border with Thailand, and heavy ongoing air strikes against Hanoi and Haiphong.

I can't see this being easy, or avoiding a massive escalation of the Cold War. My final assessment is that Summers wants to have his cake and eat it to. If Vietnam is a limited war, then the relatively paucity of American interests in the region against the absolute interests of the North Vietnamese leadership to reunify their country must be accepted.

Either way, Summers isn't wrong but he isn't yet right. This is an important book on the Vietnam War, but one that must be read carefully and in context. Nov 19, Richard Quis rated it it was amazing. A strategic examination based on the classic principals of war that provides insight into how a superpower with overwhelming conventional superiority can exhaust itself against a militarily sophisticated third world country.

Clausewitz's theory and Summers explanation of "friction"in war Summers makes clear there is no such thing as a "sple A strategic examination based on the classic principals of war that provides insight into how a superpower with overwhelming conventional superiority can exhaust itself against a militarily sophisticated third world country. Summers makes clear there is no such thing as a "splendid little war," "a war fought on the cheap," or "a slam dunk war. The enemy always has havens, political sanctuaries and brutal responses in every war: Apache Indians skillfully used Mexican territory to avoid capture, the North Viennese used tunnels and neutral countries to move troops and supplies, the Taliban hides in remote mountain caves, Al Qaeda rules from the lawless tribal regions of Pakistan and Iraqi insurgents use IED's and suicide bombers.

Arrogance, superpower status and wishful thinking don't win wars If you want to know how to use an army wisely and understand the need to manage political expectations, On Strategy will get you started. May 07, Fred rated it liked it Shelves: Started out so strong and interesting and after a while I felt a little like the author was repeating the same thoughts over and over and just changing up how he presented them in each new chapter.

It's still worth reading, but this will never be considered a comprehensive history of the war, or a comprehensive anything for that matter. Make this an auxiliary compendium to go along with some other books on the subject.

Apr 14, Theodore rated it really liked it. Colonel Summers offers a critical analysis on the pursuit of the war in Vietnam, strictly from a military strategy standpoint he stays out of the "ideological" arena. It's focus is on what went wrong, what went right, as well as what needed to improve. In his analysis, he uses the standards of Clausewitz as stated in "On War".

Nov 13, Dustin rated it really liked it Recommends it for: This is better than anything I've ever read about the Vietnam War. He shines in communicating what the theater looked like and how politics shaped the actions of the players. Feb 09, Ben B rated it it was amazing Shelves: The best analysis of the Vietnam War I have read. Harry Summers, who was there, takes a birds-eye view of the overall strategic situation, and explains exactly what the USA did wrong.

Sep 19, Harry rated it it was amazing. The single most impressive account of Vietnam from the strategic, not political, standpoint.

On War (Penguin Classics)

The Essential Clausewitz: Selections from On War (Dover Military History, Weapons, Armor) - Kindle edition by Carl von Clausewitz, Joseph I. Greene. www.farmersmarketmusic.com: Principles of War (Dover Military History, Weapons, Armor) ( ): Carl von Clausewitz: Books. Why is ISBN important? ISBN . Author Carl von Clausewitz fought against the armies of the French Revolution and.

A must read if you are a student of military history. This review has been hidden because it contains spoilers.

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However, non-state societies lack the political mechanisms to stop the local feuds, vendettas, and vicious cycles of revenge-killing that plague them. Just a moment while we sign you in to your Goodreads account. Your display name should be at least 2 characters long. American military organizations, however, have evolved for the purpose of fighting global wars. Such systems are inherently dynamic. Games can represent one-off encounters or be a part of a series of battles, perhaps even a narrative campaign where the units you and your fellow gamers come up with develop over time. The other option that the book contains is a two player narrative campaign between the Baron and whichever gang feels that it is brave enough to try to stop him.

Hollingsworth "Any damned fool can write a plan. It's the execution that gets you all screwed up", p. Summer also works on making the reader understanding the complicated nature of the topic "They aim at fixed values; but in war everything is uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities.

They direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, whereas all military actio Quotes from people like Lieutnant General James F. They direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, whereas all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects.

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