Historia de Juventud (WIE nº 258) (Spanish Edition)

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The great Spanish empire of the early modern period had been lost to a large extent by Civil wars, military uprisings and revolutions did not permit a stable foreign policy and with a focus on internal problems colonial interests were not sufficiently addressed. The loss of Gibraltar to Great Britain in and the recovery of the territory by Spain would occupy Spanish diplomats for centuries to come. Franco-Spanish alliances were rendered null and void after the French Revolution and the Battle of Trafalgar in , which resulted in an almost complete destruction of the Spanish navy.

This made it impossible to defend a widespread overseas empire. Industrialisation had not advanced as quickly as in other European countries, making her a less attractive partner for alliances with the greater powers. Though the Spanish army managed to contain the uprising temporarily, a final insurrection broke out in and led to the intervention of the United States in the conflict.

The Spanish government, which treated colonial matters as a domestic issue, ultimately failed to respond effectively to tensions arising in the colonies. Although the Spanish-American War became known in Spain as the Disaster, it did not have any immediate political consequences or usher in an era of economic depression and financial crisis. With the repatriation of colonial capital and the expenses and insecurities brought on by the war now gone, Spain was able to join the wave of expansion other European countries had begun to experience in the mids.

Some regions of Spain even saw great industrial growth. Asturias and the Basque country especially benefited from a rise in exports and the repatriation of colonial capital which 34 Sebastian Balfour, The end of the Spanish empire, — Oxford, , pp 6—7. The defeat in simply exposed the rhetoric of imperial grandeur.

Essays in honour of Sir Raymond Carr Oxford, , pp In the aftermath of the Disaster various ideas to reform Spanish politics were gaining support and dissent against the corruption of the Restoration system was growing. The cacique system of patronage had excluded the middle classes from political participation and, as well as that, denied them any privileges.

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But at the beginning of the twentieth century they were seen as the group that would initiate change in Spain. According to Donald Shaw, Spain was in a state of ideological disorder by the time of the s. In their search for a new national identity, the intellectuals of the Generation of 98 were influenced by German philosophers such as Hegel, Krause, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. During the revolutionary period of to , freedom of the press and opinion facilitated a climate of open-mindedness which led to the importation of new ideas to Spain.

Its ideas were based in religion and a Christian rationalism which was expressed in a liberal political attitude that rejected and condemned any form of violence and injustice and instead sought to establish a society in which all individuals and groups lived together harmoniously. In Spain Krausism was seen as a way of life and a way of reforming 49 Ibid. Interdisciplinary essays on German-Spanish relations over the centuries New York, , pp This reformation was to be achieved by firstly transforming the individual.

Given this approach to societal change it is not surprising that Krausism evolved towards a pedagogical movement which attempted to established social and educational reforms. Giner de los Rios was also influenced by Krausism and his schools operated independently from the State and Church. Indeed, most reformers saw education as the main tool to regenerate Spanish society and facilitate progress.

Their conviction was that 54 Elena M. Some saw the reason for the colonial failure in the Spanish race which, they argued, was lacking a capacity to adapt to modern civilisation and showed indifference towards science and learning. Regenerationism, however, had a more positive outlook overall and hoped to achieve a transformation of the country through the introduction of educational and cultural reforms. While some, like conservative politician Antonio Maura, advocated a revolution from above, others like socialists, anarchists, republicans and Catalan nationalists, were in favour of more radical action which sought to break the dominance of the turno parties and allow a wider political participation.

The long-term reform programme was to be implemented by parliamentary means and required breaking the cacique system. Like many other reformers of the time he was convinced a focus on education was the only way to allow Spain to catch up with the development of other European nations. The uneven distribution of what social and economic change took place led to the creation of a gap between the modernised and the less developed areas of Spain, which also hindered political stability.

Regionalist tendencies in the Basque Country and in Catalonia were coming to the forefront and gathering momentum. The loss of the last overseas colonies, however, called national unity into question. In the aftermath of the Disaster the dominance of the dynastic parties in this region was in decline and Regionalists as well as Republicans were taking charge of Catalan politics. At the general elections in May a new Catalan party, the Lliga Regionalista, presented itself to the electorate for the first time.

As Sebastian Balfour argues, this was mainly due to the dominance of class issues prevalent in the two movements. According to the Republicans, a modern and democratic Spain could only be established along secular lines in a society where its citizens were able to take part in the democratic process, undermining the dominance of the traditional elites. This was facilitated by a new electoral law in and a rising urban working class which was outside the sphere of control of the cacique system. As outlined before, the Republicans were already gaining a foothold in Catalan politics and together with the Lliga challenged the dominance of the dynastic parties.

The Republican Party, however, did not present a united front and was divided by various ideological groupings. With the end of the First Spanish Republic in the Republicans had split into a number of parties and, as a result, they did not present a united political opposition. Local leaders, like Alejandro Lerroux in Barcelona, who formed and led the Radical Republican Party in , sought to reform the movement.

Another current within the labour movement was Anarcho- Syndicalism, dominant in Catalonia, Levante and Andalusia. Although the moderate Syndicalists were the dominant force within the organisation, the CNT remained more militant than the UGT, favouring direct action and rejecting parliamentarian politics. Although the Catalan regionalists were gaining in influence, they were also too weak to implement lasting changes.

Although the turno system had replaced the army as a catalyst for political change, the military still played a vital part in maintaining order in times of growing public unrest. Although initially after the war, between July and February , press censorship was imposed to ensure a respectful treatment of the military in the aftermath of the humiliating defeat, it was not until long though before the heated debates in the Cortes became public. Although reforms were attempted, the Spanish army remained poorly trained, inefficient and over-staffed. The same was true for the navy, which had lost most of its capital ships at the hands of superior US forces.

Although high-ranking officers enjoyed generous pay, lower ranking officers such as lieutenants had to content with a far smaller income. At home the ruling 85 Ibid. Its confidence in the regime had been shattered with the defeat in , for which officers blamed the government. The challenges posed to the social and economic structures of the State by the working class and regionalist movements were viewed as a great threat. Faith in the governing elite had been considerably damaged and it was doubtful whether those in power were able and willing to implement essential reforms.

The newly formed government of Prime Minister Francisco Silvela was therefore facing a great challenge in March Like his successor Maura, Silvela embarked on a conservative reform programme attempting to exact a revolution from above. The two men sought to reform local government and remove caciquismo.

Cuts in public expenditure were not welcomed by the military, which hoped for renewed investment in the Spanish army. By raising taxes, Villaverde had also angered businessmen and large parts of the middle classes who reacted with violent protests, 91 Payne, Politics and the military in modern Spain, p. Under Maura Spanish domestic politics were becoming even more strained and the Liberals, who did not believe Maura would break with the old oligarchical rule, aligned themselves with the Republicans.

Expansion of the Spanish protectorate of Morocco was seen by many as the last opportunity to add a substantial colony to the former empire. Spanish activity in Morocco intensified after but depended heavily on France and Britain, which also 95 Balfour, The end of the Spanish empire, — , p. The treaty of was seen as a humiliation and a disaster for Spain, essentially furthering the slow breakup of the Spanish colonial empire.

Established colonial empires like Britain and France had to compete with the interests of new powers such as the United States, Germany and Japan. In this intense climate of competition Africa in particular became the focus of European colonial aspirations. Smaller nations like Spain, Italy and Portugal were often drawing the shorter straw when it came to the distribution of territories. Morocco, situated at the entrance and exit to and from the Mediterranean, held an important strategic position. For the British it was vital to limit French influence in North Africa in order to protect Gibraltar and not lose control of the Straits.

In the Entente Cordiale of between France and Great Britain, French and Spanish influence in Morocco was marked out respectively after France had to give way to English pressure which insisted on a Spanish presence in the area. Band, Teil I, Nr. As Sebastian Balfour has argued, a Spanish presence in North Africa also ensured that neither France nor Britain possessed direct control over the Straits of Gibraltar, which also suited Germany.

Berlin now began to show an interest in Spain in an attempt to undermine the Entente Cordiale. This scenario was not advantageous for Germany and therefore German diplomats wished for the southern entrance to the Mediterranean to be under Spanish rather than French control. His mother, Maria Christina of Austria, had acted as regent until then. When handing over power to her son the queen was hopeful that the difficult times had been overcome and a new era of tranquillity was lying ahead of Spain.

Although his interventions were not as far-reaching as those of Wilhelm II or the Russian tsar, they were not always unproblematic. While Alfonso often did not wish to seek the approval of his ministers in military appointments, his interventions usually fell in line with the general policies of the State when it came to international matters.

He frequently negotiated directly with foreign representatives over the details of trade agreements and other treaties. A divide, which was to widen during the First World War, was already emerging between those advocating a closer alliance with Germany and those favouring the Entente Cordiale. The German government stayed neutral during the conflict, but German public opinion was sympathetic with the Spanish cause.

The late nineteenth century also saw an expansion of German activity on the world market; this included, by extension, the establishment of German companies in Spain. Krupp Werke supplied the Spanish army with canons and facilitated mining. The conference of Algeciras in recognised the sovereignty of the Sultan as well as stating shared French and Spanish responsibility to ensure stability in the region, which was becoming more and more difficult to uphold in the Spanish protectorate.

Spain was seeing its influence threatened after France occupied Fez and responded by occupying Larache and Alcazarquivir. The arrival of a German gunboat at Agadir then prompted Britain to come to the aid of France and eventually Germany had to give in to French pressure. As a concession, Germany received a part of the French Congo in return for a smaller territory in Central Africa. In the Treaty of Fez of the Spanish protectorate in the north and far south-west of Morocco was agreed, while the French protectorate now stretched over most of the country.

In the intensifying rivalry amongst the Greater Powers at the eve of the First World War, Spain was already relegated to a second position. Economically and militarily too weak to negotiate better terms for herself or to pose a serious threat to Britain and France, she was still of strategic importance to the other European powers and therefore not completely side-lined.

This position would not change with the outbreak of hostilities in Inhabited by rebellious tribes who would not succumb to foreign rule easily, the Spanish government had to engage in a colonial war which was not met with popular support at home.

After the Disaster the State was no longer able to re-establish its authority by appealing to the traditional national sentiment as it had done during the Spanish-American War, which meant popular support for any further imperial projects of expansion was difficult to find. His execution caused protest in Europe as well as in the United States. They also asked the Italian government to break off all diplomatic relations with Spain. Catalan conservatives feared the proletarian mob would destroy Spanish society and argued that the violent protests were proof that the working classes were not ready yet for democracy and needed to be restrained with force if necessary.

Like his predecessors, Canalejas reacted with repression to workers protests and strikes. In November he was assassinated in Madrid by an Anarchist. When the Romanones government fell apart in October , the Conservative party did not support their old leader Maura in his refusal to adhere to the rules of the turno and instead enabled Eduardo Dato to take over the premiership.

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The political instability created in the aftermath of the Disaster was to increase during the First World War. Spain was also not tied to any of the warring parties. Even though Carr, Spain — , p. On the side of the Allies, the Republicans, in particular Alejandro Lerroux, advocated direct intervention in the conflict.

Lerroux stated in this case neutrality was selfish and cowardly. Although Romanones denied being the author of the article, his pro-Allied stance and favouring of intervention in the war would become clear during his administration from to In his autobiography the Count admitted to having written Neutralidades que matan but the political climate in Spain at the outbreak of the war did not permit him to put his name under it at the time. As Romanones saw it, the rapid German invasion convinced many Spaniards of an equally quick German victory while he always believed in a victory of the Allies.

Nevertheless, it argued that only by siding with the Allies would Spain be able to regain a position of significance in Europe. The ideological gap between the ruling elite and its critics was now marked by their respective allegiances with one of the belligerents. These camps embodied a clash of ideals: The Spanish coastline offered an ideal refuge for submarines. The country was also able to produce and provide a wide variety of foodstuffs and military supplies vital for the war effort of the Allies and the Central Powers. In return, Spain urgently needed coal and cotton as well as other supplies which could only be obtained from the Allies.

This co- dependency was used by the British government to pressure Spain into cooperating with the demands of the Entente. Instead the German effort in Spain was focussed on enforcing strict neutrality and therefore ensuring the country would not join the Entente. As Jean-Jacques Becker pointed out, neutral states performed an essential task in keeping financial and diplomatic channels open between the warring parties.

The Allies as well as the Central Powers attempted to influence neutral European states through diplomacy, economy and propaganda. Furthermore, the neutral zones in Europe played an important part in keeping up communication by facilitating the exchange of information and propaganda material. This was of great significance in particular for the Central Powers, which had to overcome allied information blockades.

The neutral territories also provided the Allies and Central Powers with suitable posts for setting up espionage networks that would enable both sides to closely observe enemy activity. Although there cannot be a generalised explanation as to why some countries opted for official neutrality at the outbreak of the war, a closer look at them highlights some similarities.

These include, for example, a lack of military resources enabling them to take part in a large-scale conflict. The European countries which at the outbreak of the war had not been directly attacked, or were not forced by treaty obligations to come to the aid of an ally, had the opportunity to assess their options and decide what was best in the national interest. As pointed out before, neutrality during war time did not mean passivity. It is evident by looking at the examples of Spain and the Netherlands that despite their official neutrality, those countries tried to make an impact on international politics in areas other than the battlefield.

The Netherlands used their neutrality as a reflection of their national history, emphasising a moral and cultural superiority by placing their interests above power politics and military ambitions. Spanish munition factories did not want to miss out on a considerable profit and despite German protestations and boycott attempts, the arms trade between Spain and the Allies continued throughout the First World War. The International Naval Conference of London in attempted to establish laws of naval warfare which would clarify and regulate diplomatic relations during wartime.

Danish governments therefore, opted for a neutrality favourable to Germany and the Central Powers despite large pro-Allied sympathies prevalent amongst the Danish king, army, press and the Danish people. Most neutrals were unable to maintain strict and impartial neutrality during the First World War due their weak political and economic standing amongst the greater powers.

In Spain any serious considerations of entering the war were always accompanied by demands for more territory, particularly in North Africa.

The return of Gibraltar and a free hand in Portugal were also on top of the agenda when it came to negotiations with either of the belligerents. Neither the Entente nor the Central Powers could offer great enough territorial gains, though, for Spain to seriously consider joining their war effort. Efraim Karsh notes that maintaining neutrality was far more complex for smaller states than for a great power.

In a war between great powers a small neutral state is exposed to pressure from both belligerents and therefore needs to use all its resources in order to keep up a policy of neutrality that satisfies both belligerents. The position of King Alfonso XIII was especially difficult to ascertain during the war and despite his open, impulsive and emotional character, he was able to conceal his personal convictions in this matter.

His attempts to form a neutral alliance with Romania and Italy, however, did not bear fruits. To protect the rights of neutrals, the Dutch, who also had aspirations to See chapter four. Neutrals, neutrality and the First World War Amsterdam, , pp This was rejected by the Americans since they were unwilling to be tied down in any alliance. The three Scandinavian countries came together and subsequently tried to attract other neutrals to join them.

In October Norwegian, Swedish, Danish and Dutch representatives met in Stockholm to discuss neutral rights in wartime trade, in particular the effects war was having on maritime commerce. The United States declined to join the conference and the Netherlands eventually stopped participating in the joint neutral effort. However, the three Scandinavian countries drafted a declaration regarding neutral rights based on the idea of the freedom of the seas which was forwarded to the belligerent governments in November Ein neutrales Land im politischen Kalkuel der Kriegsgegner Berlin.

King Alfonso, who harboured ambitions to act as arbiter at peace negotiations, thought it best to wait for the end of the war when belligerents and non-belligerents would come together to make lasting agreements. He thought by hosting a peace conference this could be achieved. Berlin encouraged the Spanish king in his hopes, since the conservative monarch was seen to be more favourable to the German cause.

By early imports were decreasing drastically while the volume and prices of exports were rising. Economic prosperity, however, was not evenly distributed across all regions and sections of society in Spain. The sudden influx of money sparked off inflation, which was reflected in a substantial increase in the prices of essential items. A reduction in imports meant that foodstuffs were becoming scarce, which particularly affected the rural and urban workers whose living conditions were worsening.

It was the local leaders, caciques and business elites who benefited from the war and the government was not prepared to take away their privileges. Electoral fraud still persisted and ensured the dominance of the dynastic parties. In the general elections of April the Republican-Socialist coalition was not only defeated, but the predominance of dynastic politicians, who were also linked by family ties, prompted the labour movement into action.

The UGT congress in May demanded from government and parliament the introduction of immediate measures to improve the situation in Spain. If their demands were not met, the labour movement would resort to more aggressive measures against the regime. This ten-year plan sought to reform the country and Alba hoped to finance it by taxing war profits of industry and trade which brought on resistance from the Lliga Regionalista, which tried to exert pressure on Madrid in order to obtain economic concessions for Catalonia. They therefore sided Ibid. Due to their lack of action, the government allowed the economic crisis to worsen, which brought the country close to a revolutionary uprising.

The overthrow of the Tsarist regime in Russia also gave Spanish Socialists hope that an offensive against the regime might be successful and a Republic could be established. The economic crisis, however, did not only affect the working classes but also threatened the living standards and salaries of public sector workers, including the army. To protect their interests, mid-ranking army officers organised themselves into Juntas militares de defensa, modelled on trade unions.

Officers stationed on mainland Spain had watched with mounting concern how their colleagues in the colonies received promotions based on their war achievements. A military reform programme introduced in which proposed the introduction of promotion by merit, and was financed by reducing the great officer surplus, further aggravated the military. Following the sinking of the Spanish steamer San Fulgencio in April , the Count was prepared to deliver an ultimatum to Germany which could have resulted in a break of diplomatic ties and a closer cooperation with the Allies.

However, it would not come to that. Romanones felt the crusade against him was becoming more and more violent, creating a suffocating atmosphere.

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Worried about the army turning against him, he ordered the dissolution of the military juntas, to which the officers reacted with revolt. Also see chapter four. Their discontent, however, was growing and in the summer of the various groups opposing the regime came close to joining in their effort to stage a revolutionary uprising. A challenge to the oligarchy was mounted when the Lliga called for a Constituent Assembly seeking to alter political structures in Spain. On 19 July Catalan regionalists organised an alternative parliament in Barcelona which hoped to implement change by peaceful means.

Backed by the Republicans and Socialists, the assembly movement, as it became known as, sought the help of Antonio Maura, who had also been approached by the military juntas. Politics and society in Spain, — London, , pp 35—6. The actions of the army resulted in a loss of popularity which the juntas had gained as an opposition movement against the government.

In an attempt to restore their popularity, the military juntas now demanded the restoration of constitutional rights. The state of war was finally lifted and constitutional rights restored on 7 October If their demands were not met, the officers were prepared to take matters into their own hands. Under pressure from army and king the Dato cabinet collapsed on 27 October and despite the continued prominence of the dynastic parties, which were now divided into several competing factions, the turno pacifico was destroyed.

After an eight-day-long crisis, a new government, led by Garcia Prieto, was finally formed from a coalition of Liberals, Conservatives, Independents as well as the Lliga Regionalista. In January Malaga and Alicante experienced two general strikes at which several women were killed. While civil unrest initially took place in the cities, protest was spreading to the Andalusian countryside over the course of In addition to Spanish workers forced to return home from abroad with the onset of war, internal migration to the cities caused further social tension. Living conditions for migrant workers in Barcelona, for example, were especially poor.

While the PSOE leadership opted for a cautious approach, viewing the Bolshevik revolution in Russia as detrimental to the Allied war effort, the more radical party members advocated strict neutrality and began to form a separate group. The CNT, on the other hand, emerged as the leading organisation representing Spanish workers who, faced with increasing costs of living, were becoming more militant.

In foreign politics, the government continued a policy of neutrality. A possible revolution in Spain would have been especially damaging to Allied trade, therefore France and Britain limited their support for Spanish Socialists and Republicans, allowing German agents to infiltrate Anarchist groups. The minister for war, Juan de la Cierva, introduced a military reform bill which was passed by royal decree, thereby circumventing the parliament. Cierva, who argued the government should not be allowed to rule since it did not receive a majority, began to act like a dictator supported by the king and the army.

When Garcia Prieto agreed to dissolve the cabinet at the beginning of , Cierva refused to resign, leading to a continuation of the government with the concession that the military reform bill would not take effect until July Cierva was eventually forced to resign in March in the aftermath of the chaos he had created by transferring all postal services to the Ministry of War as a reaction to a strike of postal workers.

Like the military reform bill, this transfer was passed by royal decree further highlighting the anti-constitutional behaviour of king and army. The opportunity to transform Spanish society and modernise the State was missed, largely due to the incompatibility of the different opposition Ibid. At the end of the First World War Spain had not managed to gain a position of greater importance amongst the world powers, despite concessions to both belligerents.

He had hoped that a new role as arbiter of peace would allow the country to achieve some significance in a post war world order. His hopes, however, were dashed when the invitation to the Paris negotiations did not arrive. Continued efforts to expand the Spanish colonial empire during the war, also proved fruitless.

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Negotiations with Britain, France and Germany regarding Gibraltar and Tangier failed since Spain was unable to make an active military contribution to the war. While the Allies relied on their economic dominance to keep Spain on their side, Germany and the Central Powers pursued their interests on the Iberian Peninsula with a remarkable vigour. To ensure a Germanophile and neutral Spain, German diplomats and residents went after various sections of Spanish society, forging the most unlikely collaborations ranging from supporting the conservative monarchy and traditional values of the Catholic Church to working with Anarchist organisations.

The debate over Spain's regeneration, which had its roots in the nineteenth century and became more urgent after the Spanish-American War in , was further complicated with the outbreak of the First World War. Before a Europeanisation of Spain was seen as the best path for the country, but since the war also represented an ideological struggle amongst the European powers, Spanish reformers were divided over what European model to follow.

Those that publicly expressed their admiration for German culture and philosophy came under attack from reformers who favoured French and British liberalism. This was partly motivated by strong anti-clerical sentiments and a wish to diminish the influence of the Catholic Church in Spain. The Church, which had experienced an erosion of its power since the first half of the nineteenth century, paradoxically also favoured Germany in the war.

Mainly preoccupied with its internal reforms, the Spanish military did not advocate joining either of the belligerents on the frontline. The colonial war in Morocco was of greater importance than the European conflict and at home the army was frequently called upon to deal with growing civil unrest.

In its defence of the monarchy, the army sought to align itself with groups that could increase their power and ensure no restrictions were placed on the military budget. This was particularly important in light of anti-militarist feeling developing after the defeat in His diplomatic efforts were carried out with the hope of res- establishing Spain amongst the great powers which also meant extending her diminishing colonial empire. Though his true allegiances could not be pinned down, the king kept in close contact with the German administration during the war and often initiated diplomatic activity regarding colonial expansion, which could be viewed as pro-German, without the knowledge of his government.

The Catalan textile industry, which had suffered after the loss of its Cuban market, was flourishing under the demand for uniforms and other war materiel. This industrial spurt strengthened the Catalan middle class and allowed the growing regionalist movement to become a serious political power. Wartime profits, however, did not benefit all and the economic boom came at the price of a subsistence crisis and inflation which mainly affected the working classes and rural workers. Republicanism, Socialism and Anarchism were on the rise, demanding better living conditions and political participation for all Spaniards.

The working-class movement in Spain saw no merit in war to further their position and was therefore an ardent supporter of neutrality. This was exploited by Germany which began to present itself as a defender of Spanish neutrality and the Allies as interventionist powers who were trying to drag Spain into the war.

The contested issue of neutrality became the focal point of the German propaganda campaign which tried to influence Spanish public opinion mainly through the press and ensure that Spain remained neutral throughout the war. How this campaign was organised and who was involved in staging it quite successfully will be discussed in the next chapter. Marked by conflicting ideologies, the Great War also developed into a war of words in which the struggle for the opinion of the belligerents as well as the neutrals became an important factor. Spain, as an important outsider in the conflict, quickly became a battleground for both warring sides.

The 1 Eric Hobsbawm, The age of extremes. The short twentieth century — London, , p. Germany seized upon those divisions in Spanish society and sought to influence public opinion in a large scale propaganda effort which was aimed at maintaining Spanish neutrality.

How Germany and the Central Powers were able to set up a widespread propaganda network gaining control over large parts of the Spanish publishing world is worth further consideration, especially in view of the economic dominance of the Western Powers in Spain. Highlighting some of those private as well as official propaganda activities brings to light an extensive German network in Spain which also relied on the collaboration of Spanish journalists, editors, politicians and diplomats.

We will outline how the propaganda effort was organised in the initial phases of the war and what official and private institutions responsible for propaganda in Spain existed. The great majority of the others were of some Christian background, having been introduced into the imperial bureaucracy via, precisely, the devshirme -system. Recent computations set their number at almost three-quarters of all nineteen valide-sultans between ca. Inheriting traditions forged by earlier Muslim rulers of Northern India, in whose name Sunni, Shia, and Sufi notions already had been welded together, the Mughals, especially the first real Indian Mughal, Akbar —— , and his successors, claimed to be both sultan and caliph.

But the question is whether, and to what extent, these titles were really factors of cohesion. Since the fourteenth century, the Muslim rulers had started incorporating members of the Hindu aristocracy into the state apparatus. Soon, these men, commonly referred to as zamindar , adopted parts of and otherwise adapted themselves to the Perso-Islamic culture of the conquerors.

It has been said that though the third and fourth Mughal emperors, Akbar and Jahangir —— had been overtly liberal both in their own beliefs and in their policy regarding the various religions in their empire, their successors returned to Sunni orthodoxy. Yet, the situation seems to have been far more complex.

Admittedly, by the second half of the seventeenth century, a different wind was blowing at court. Domestic political motives may have played a part here. His rival half-brother, Aurangzeb, in order to gain the throne, needed to differentiate himself from his sibling. It seems that, soon, the tolerant and syncretic views of Akbar were replaced by another, more orthodox Sunni form of Sufi thought, mainly preached by the leaders of the Naqshbandi brotherhood, to which Aurangzeb belonged.

But religion was an argument in foreign policy as well. The interesting fact remains that both the sultan of Bijapur and the Mughal emperor were Sufis. And the role of Sufism in Mughal rule is both fascinating and complex. Its influence has become more obvious since, recently, attention has been drawn to a factor that at least partly explains the surprising fusion between various elements that characterized Mughal politico-religious culture but has long been overlooked: Central-Asian, traditions in Mughal state building.

Given the multi-religious nature of the polities they created, already in pre-Mughal times the Muslim dynasties of India tried to combine the tenets of true Islam, which did not allow worldly rule, with the necessities of empire. The mixture they created tended to show them almost as saints, who, through their God-given dreams, were called upon to realize their empire in the way dictated by Allah. Being, apparently, illiterate, he had the Akhlaq-i Nasiri recited to him regularly and ordered his officials to study it as well. For the people of Hind, the idiom of Hindi is praiseworthy, for the people of Sind, their own is to be praised.

And, conversely, the first Muslim emperors introduced Hindu rituals at court. Last but not least, they identified with Vishnu, with the Sun, the major deity of the Rajput rulers of Northern India. Analysing these trends in Mughal policy, it is interesting to note that the emperors themselves only infrequently publicized their power by building mosques. Rather, huge tombs were built by or for them—Humayun, Akbar, Jahan, Jahangir—, as if to say that not their piety but their greatness as sovereign proved their right to rule. Interestingly again, they did not favour traditional holy men but, rather, Sufis.

The extent to which the non-sectarianism of the first Mughal emperors was practised beyond the court and the ruling elite is difficult to gauge. Indeed, even at court this policy had its adversaries. But when he wrote: In short, though the later Mughals did not profess their Sufi variant of Islam as publicly as Akbar, giving preference to a more obviously traditional, Sunni Islamic regime, they did not revert to the kind of Sunni Islamic fanaticism they usually are credited with.

Admittedly, on the one hand, some Hindu temples were destroyed—but others were given grants by the sadr. And yes, the Islamic religious tax was re-imposed on the Hindu population, but Hindu nobles seem to have entered imperial service at an increasing rate. Conversely, if such success and its concrete rewards for the elite failed to materialize, cultural differences might disrupt imperial cohesion after all.

Yet, Ismail thought of himself as a being even more unique and, therefore, more powerful. Over the past decades, scholars have been studying the surviving—manuscript—poems written by, attributed to, or later associated with Ismail. They reveal an astonishing world of religious-mythical images with clear political implications. He was born the son of, and, eventually, heir to the hereditary leader of the Safaviyya. This Sufi-brotherhood had been founded in the fourteenth century in Ardabil, then the capital of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan, by his ancestor Safi al-Din — , he himself the heir and son-in-law of a famous Sufi teacher.

With their help, or, more precisely, using their Sufist devotion to him as their master, he defeated the then ruler of the Ac Quyunlu. Ismail soon conquered parts of modern Iraq, and felt he now had re-established the ancient Iranian Empire, after centuries of foreign dominion—by Arabs, Mongols, and Turks. Indeed, he considered himself the heir of the Achaemenid and Sassanid emperors: Obviously, Ismail had to overcome the major obstacle to kingship in a Muslim state, i.

The seventeenth-century French traveller Jean Chardin identified the problem: On the one hand, he exploited the so-called murshid-murid relationship that, within Sufi brotherhoods, existed between a saintly master and his disciple: This religious-spiritual ideology and the rhetoric that went with it was combined very effectively with the prestige and power or, one might also say: Thus, he created a fundamental identity: Finally, as self-proclaimed padishah-i Iran , he also used the pre-Islamic, ancient Persian notion of the divine right of kings.

Moreover, the ancient Persian poetical tradition now was geared to the needs of the new theocracy as well: Yet, rhetoric alone—however powerfully worded—does not create cohesion and compliance. This, of course, posed a problem since his conquest of Iran and what is now Iraq made these mostly Sunni regions the heartland of his empire. Historians disagree about the policy he actually pursued and the ruthlessness with which he did so.

Of course, the policy was not without its dangers. Inevitably, however, the group developed its own power dynamics, which Ismail and his successors then sought to control by appointing the successive sadr from—in the end—three families closely related to the imperial dynasty. Judging the complex process of Safavid state building, it also is difficult to measure the effect of the apparently large-scale introduction of hundreds of thousands of families from the various regions of the Caucasus who, originally Christian, either had converted to Islam in the past or were now induced to do so with the promise of military and other jobs and, inevitably, became loyal to the shah and his faith.

During his first years, Ismail had set up a polity and created a society that were divided along ethnic lines: Organized in artificial tribes, the former became the political-military and, through the rewards they gained, also socio-economic elite of the early Safavid state. However, soon Ismail himself, as well as his son and successor, Tahmasp, decided that the Qizilbash tended to become an over-mighty group.

The ideological instruments used by Ismail as well as the actual policies he and his successors pursued led Chardin to note: In one of his poems he exclaims: Come now, o blind man who has lost the path: Obviously, the rulers in Istanbul in this were guided by religious preoccupations as well: Present-day India, although the largest democracy in the world is, of course, not a society without its problems, some of them created by religious differences and, given the huge economic inequality, the ensuing religious intolerance and, even persecution.

He found him in the person of Emperor Akbar. Nor does Sen acknowledge that what we know of Akbar is, by and large, the idealized version created by his biographer and trusted adviser, Abu l-Fazl! The problem is compounded since it seems that neither Indo-Islamic texts nor Hindu ones offer us all the information we seek; actually, it is the European sources that allow us to narrow our interpretations. Using all these, I propose the following analysis.

Secondly, he also wanted to further extend what formerly had been the Mughal Empire not only on the Indian subcontinent, especially in the Gangetic plains and the states of the Rajputs, even down to the Arab Sea in Gujarat, but also to the north-west, in the region of Kandahar—which led to disputes with the Safavid rulers of Iran—and the north where, beyond Kabul, the Uzbek tribes challenged him. Thirdly, he therefore was a man much on the move—which not only gave him a better idea of the variegated peoples and cultures he ruled over but also may have convinced him that cohesion and stability could be had only through some sort of cultural accommodation, of syncretism, even.

By the s and s, his far-flung state was inhabited by Muslims both of the Shia and the Sunni persuasion as well as by a vast majority of Hindus. Marrying daughters of the Rajput royal houses was a known expedient amongst the Mughals, and Akbar took a Rajput wife, too. However, to overcome the continuing political and religious-cultural animosity, he decided that rather than insist on their conversion, both the ladies and their families should be allowed to keep their faith and, moreover, were to be treated on an equal footing with the Muslim members of his harem and court.

Akbar thus finalized the policy of his ancestors that had Hindus introduced also into the higher echelons of Mughal bureaucracy, which, of course, tied them to the interests of the new state. Moreover, one may assume that Akbar also hoped to somehow counterbalance the until then overwhelming influence of the Mughal nobility that in a sense always was a threat to his own supremacy: He now allowed Hindus who had been forced to convert to Islam—if only to avoid paying this tax—to return to their own faith as well. He even forbade the slaughter of cows, which not only endeared him to the Hindus, but also to the smaller but economically influential group of the Jain, in whose views of god and creation Akbar showed great interest, too.

To even more openly show his intentions, Akbar asked Brahmin priests to conduct their ceremonies at court, and he personally participated in the major Hindu feast of Divali. At least publicly he renounced the consumption of beef, allowed solely vegetarian dishes on certain weekdays, and drank water from the holy Ganges, only. Obviously, we cannot judge the extent to which these actions were meant for the public eye or reflected new-found convictions.

Indeed, if anything this Akbar-nama was a piece of splendid propaganda.

Introduction: On the Relationship between Religious and Secular Power

Accommodating the Hindu population did not mean Akbar forgot his own, Muslim, background. However, this part of his cultural make-up was complex, to say the least. Though his family is believed to have been Sunni, amongst his childhood tutors were two Irani Shia scholars, for his mother had been the daughter of a Persian shaykh.

Precisely because he was fully aware of the dangers of Muslim sectarian dissension in an empire as complex as his, Akbar declared he would no longer tolerate sectarian disputes disrupting the public order. Obviously, this piece of legislation—also termed an infallibility decree —greatly diminished the power of the religious-legal establishment in favour of secular government and, indeed, Akbar himself. While this policy certainly helped to somewhat stabilize the religious situation in the empire, the more traditional Sunni circles inevitably argued that the emperor veered towards heresy.

As part of this policy, between and Akbar annually sent large contingents of pilgrims to Mecca and Medina, headed by members of the imperial family carrying sumptuous gifts—a policy continued by his successors. In order to do so, he needed the help of the Portuguese who, though the Mughals now dominated inland Gujarat, had captured its major seaports. Akbar, on the other hand, thus could increase his standing among the wider Muslim community, both in India and abroad. The emperor certainly made an effort not only to defuse the tensions in the Muslim community but also to reduce inter-religious strife—between Muslims and Hindus.

He certainly felt that, specifically amongst his Hindu subjects, grave social and emotional issues were at stake, too: Akbar definitely also wanted to diminish religious influences in politics, as shown, for example, in the suppression of Mahdavism—a militant and at times millenniarist movement whose leaders claimed caliphal and imamate status—in the s.

Yet, Akbar seems to have had a genuine interest in the pretensions put forward by various religions: Sunni and Shia Islam, Hinduism, Jainism, Zoroastrianism, and, also, Sikhism that, precisely in these decades, was gaining influence. He even wanted to know what Christianity had to offer. Thus, not only did the emperor order one of his—orthodox! Quite perceptively, Badauni wrote about his master as follows:.

From his earliest childhood to his manhood, and from his manhood to old age, his Majesty passed through the most diverse phases and through all sorts of religious practices and sectarian beliefs, and collected everything which people can find in books, with a talent of selection peculiar to him and a spirit of inquiry opposed to every Islamic principle [italics added]. On the other hand, I suggest that pandering to the Jain leaders did help Akbar to improve his hold over their economically important part of his empire.

Though sources do not agree about the actual statements made during the debates, it yet seems that the bitter words and, indeed, invectives the various priests and scholars used against each other soon convinced Akbar that no easy reconciliation was possible. On the other hand, these discourses may have given him a better idea of his own religious preferences.

The two basic positions seem to be that it either was a genuinely new religion or a re-working of notions available in the many traditions of Islam, both orthodox and heterodox. Obviously, this is a false opposition. What seems new is, mostly, the result of a process of conscious or subconscious syncretism and of the changed political or propagandistic use of old elements.

He certainly incorporated the celebration of the Sun into the Din-i Ilahi —a very old element also in Hinduism and, even, partly pre-Vedic—, and told his courtiers that its light was the emanation and, indeed, beginning of everything that existed, of creation. When he lifted it, the courtiers exclaimed: As part of that notion, Akbar re-established the old Iranian feast of Nowruz that celebrated the evening of night and day in Spring, and was held in high regard as perhaps the most venerable moment in the relationship between the Divine and Man—by Shia Muslims and, specifically, Sufis.

However, the far more interesting and, indeed, most important question obviously is what role Akbar saw for himself in this complex of older religious ideas and metaphors? Significantly, the origin of the ritual lay in the showing of divine images to the believers during temple ceremonies. Maybe we will never know: Meanwhile it is, of course, quite significant that Akbar never seems to have contemplated making the Din-i Ilahi into a public, let alone a preferred or even compulsory cult.

Only a handful of noblemen, courtiers seem to have participated in the rituals. This also explains why, on his death, the cult seems to have lost any import it may have had. Maybe interpreting the set-up of the Din-i Ilahi as a Sufi brotherhood comes nearest to what Akbar had in mind. Yet, as always in this culturally mixed world, one also thinks about the Hindu concept of a teacher and his chela , his devoted disciple: Tradition has it that Akbar founded the city because on its site used to live the Sufi saint Salim Chishti, who had foretold the emperor that he yet would have a son; indeed, soon after, the much-longed for heir was born and named Salim—the later emperor Jahangir.

The town, which stands on a high ridge overlooking the plain of the Gambhir River, presents itself as a beacon of faith: Its architecture, though, is a decided mixture of Islamic and indigenous Indian elements. This extreme stance, however, was not continued by his successors, who seem to have taken a more moderate position, though they certainly did try to retain the centralized political power Akbar had helped create for the Mughal imperial institution. The role of the ideology commonly called Confucianism in China, Korea, Japan, and, indeed, also parts of South-East Asia has been both long and, to some extent, lasting.

However, it is all too easy to conflate these worlds with the culture of Confucianism, alone. It became intertwined with a religion and, moreover, one originally alien to the Sinosphere: Buddhism, which was introduced from India. Though the two came to constitute a complex whole, for the sake of analysis I will have to present them separately, though this will cause some overlap. Actually, we know as little about Confucius as we do about Jesus of Nazareth and Muhammad: Nor can we be sure that all the words attributed to him were, in fact, ever spoken by him.

Reading the words Confucius allegedly spoke, we do know that the Chinese sage who, certainly, did revive and reassemble a number of older moral and political notions partly going back to the first millennium BCE. This central function of the emperor definitely dated to a pre-Confucian, indigenous shamanist culture wherein the ruler himself had been a shaman.

By that time, it had amongst other things, been more specifically geared to the needs of political, imperial power: Civility, duty, human-relatedness were still part of this form of Confucianism, but all these were to be guaranteed by the imperial government and, of course, the emperor. However, this re-working of earlier ideas did help give the elite who actually upheld the state, recruited through the rigorous system of state examinations, a tighter grip on society and, indeed, even on imperial power.

As to the other major influence on Chinese life and culture, like Confucianism Buddhism, too, at least in its earliest stages, was not a religion. It did not stipulate a trans-human reality and a divine grace people might invoke to achieve salvation—if their own efforts, too, were geared to that end.

What seems certain is that he warned his disciples that a deistic-fideistic view of the supernatural powers that were supposed to rule the world—and, hence, a belief in the words of the Brahmin priests who pretended they could interpret the will of these powers—detracted from their prime responsibility as human beings towards themselves and that world. Following the path suggested by the Buddha without believing in him as a, or the, saviour, will lead to salvation, though not as an existence to be lived in an otherworldly afterlife, such as the Christian and Islamic heavens; in that sense, Buddhism is a soteriology, too.

Perhaps because the latter were far too difficult to practise for the common man and, also, because of the continued power of the Brahmin clergy, Buddhism largely disappeared from the Indian subcontinent. Soon, in most cultures where Buddhism was introduced, he merged with, or became part of a pantheon of earlier gods and, indeed, goddesses—the goddess of mercy prominent among them.

This situation also has influenced the ways rulers of Buddhist states have used him to legitimize their own power, resulting in a great many varieties of Buddhist political ideas. This ruler, the c h akk r avati , took care of the temporal realm, while a bodhisattva , a person who, through his general compassion, had attained buddhahood in his own lifetime, would be the leader in matters spiritual.

Ideally, the two should reinforce one another. Inevitably, of course, this notion caused rivalry between men who claimed to be the one or the other. It soon became a religion that was practised widely by the general population. Given the rather abstract, highly moral, and in many ways aristocratic tone of Confucianism, it was not at all surprising that many of its nominal followers also needed a belief in a god, or, rather, multiple gods—and, indeed, goddesses and were willing to accept priests who would intercede for them.

Thus, peoples in East Asia began adopting the deistic views of the historical Buddha, and of bodhisattvas already developed elsewhere, too. Alternatively, many held on to certain older, popular notions of man, nature, and cosmos such as, in China, the one dubbed Daoism or, in Japan, Shintoism.

In China, members of the imperial court were attracted to it as well. However, the imperial authorities also adopted it for another reason: Thousands of temples dotted the country, tens of thousands of men and, to a lesser extent, women sought ordination. Though many may have done so to express their piety, it is quite obvious most professed a vocation because entering a monastery gave them a secure existence: Consequently, by the eighth and early ninth centuries, some of the Tang emperors decided the power of Buddhism had grown too great—also economically—and needed to be curbed.

Though they did not extirpate it, they definitely reduced its might. Yet it grew again, especially during the Mongol—and Buddhist—Yuan dynasty. Indeed, Buddhism had come to stay. Over the centuries, it merged with or at least took over elements from both Confucianism and from folk religion, which has led many scholars to speak of a tripartite religious situation.

Obviously, a ruler always fears the competition of other charismatic men who will use the religious power they claim and which their followers attribute to them to challenge the authority of government, of the Crown. In this, China was no different from any other Eurasian state. One might argue that precisely to contain and, perhaps, even prevent this from happening, the political and societal notions that go by the name of Confucianism had been first developed.

Nevertheless, the emperor was not divine, nor did he rule unconditionally. Whenever, in thought and deed, he showed that, in his own person, he did not exemplify the virtue and hence harmony that constituted the cosmic order, his subjects might rebel. Although this notion never was stated in so many, unequivocal words, it yet can be culled from the Lunyu. Combined with strongly legalistic notions of government, this vision of rightful rule has proven an abiding element in Chinese society and politics.

The resulting mixture both served and was made to serve the imperial position. However, since this syncretism occurred on all levels of society, it led to a proliferation of religious sects, mostly with Buddhist overtones; especially in times of economic and political problems, this process always threatened the existing order by presenting alternative solutions. Actually, Zhu Yuanzhang —— , the founder of the Ming dynasty, himself had risen to power as the leader of the so-called Red Turban organization, which opposed the Yuan.

The son of a poor farmer, he learned to read and write only when he entered a Buddhist monastery. Later, he joined and subsequently led a rebel group who associated with the Buddhist-heterodox movement of the White Lotus. Not surprisingly, however, once he had ascended the throne as Emperor Hongwu, he shed his heterodox ideas for the neo- Confucian notions that promised societal and political stability and tried to forbid all potentially dissident sects.

However, this policy failed. By the end of the fifteenth century, the number of monks, which he had set at some 37,, had grown to ca. In a nutshell, these reproofs seem to reflect the traditional views of society held by staunch Confucianists. Interestingly, however, in the specific case of the nunneries, the dowager-empress and other members of the inner court were able to withstand the clique who opposed their continuation.

During the very long reign of the last powerful Ming emperor, Wanli —— , the then empress-dowager actively sponsored Buddhism too, financing the reprint of the Buddhist canon and the re- building, both in Beijing and in the region surrounding it, of many temples—aided therein by her son. From the s and s onwards, the Qing amalgamation of China and its northern and western neighbours—all to some extent and in their own way Buddhist societies—once more increased the power of Buddhism.

The Qing not only felt Buddhism to be part of their own legacy, they definitely saw its cultural-political importance, its potential for creating cohesion, within the wider, Mongol world. It seems that both at court—but in restricted circles, only—and in the Buddhist worlds of Mongolia and Tibet, the emperors of the non-Han Yuan dynasty and, much later, of the equally non-Han Qing not only were portrayed—in texts as well as visually—but also revered as mortals in whom bodhisattva metempsychosis had occurred.

Already Abahai, or Hong Taiji —— , the first Manchu ruler to conquer parts of China, started constructing Buddhist temple complexes and, moreover, like Kublai, was identified as a reincarnation of the bodhisattva Manjusri—thus, in a sense, setting himself up as an equal of the major Lamaist-Buddhist monk in Tibet, who was considered a reincarnation of the bodhisattva Avalokitesjvara. His influence allowed this image to be widely spread both in Tibet and Mongolia.

This, of course, was precisely what the Qing rulers wanted: Thus, they could counter the increasing number of potentially rebellious monk reincarnations in Buddhist Mongolia, for an emperor-bodhisattva was, indeed, almost unbeatable. They endowed monasteries, sometimes on a grand scale, and subsidized the printing of Buddhist texts, also on a grand scale.

They frequently visited the huge complex of—largely Tibetan—Buddhist sanctuaries on holy Mount Wu. Moreover, they were very critical of certain aspects of the Lamaist Buddhist clergy, who they felt to be worldly, avaricious, and, even, a danger to their military power, viz. Thus, while almost surreptitiously spreading the idea of their bodhisattva state, the early Qing emperors still developed a decidedly anti-clerical policy towards institutionalized Buddhism.

China was only part of his prospective conquests. Their conquests resulted in a Qing Empire that was multicultural and, indeed, multi-lingual. While Manchu and Chinese were the preferred languages and a necessary skill for any person who wanted to serve the emperor, Mongol, Tibetan, Uighur, and even Arabic were spoken as well by, sometimes, very large groups indeed.

Last, but not least, those who were conquered and entered the empire no longer were barbarians, but Qing subjects. In short, the Qing drew upon and combined two traditions, Confucian-Han and Buddhist Inner Asian Mongol, each with their own cosmological notions. From a religious point of view, the latter also included the fiction that the Imperial House, the Aisin Gioro-clan, descended from a virgin deity.

Converting to Buddhism, later, they created a complex amalgam of the two cosmologies. Thus, this oldest part of the Qing tripartite ideological make-up remained hidden to the public eye, which accepted only Buddhism and Confucianism. Yet, persist it did, though in intricate, ever changing forms. In short, forms of syncretism developed, fusing Confucian, Buddhist, and shamanist rituals.

At times, each of these was performed within its own, cultural context, a separate element of the threefold Qing identity. Yet, they also began permeating one another, resulting in a more complex, unitary form, the more powerful because of its multiple meanings. The early Qing court was peripatetic and incorporated, far more than under the Ming, not only the sacred sites of the Confucian world but also those holy to the other traditions the emperors wanted to embody.

They all were Buddhist, and they all mirrored famous shrines from all over the empire. Even more interesting, all these structures had been subtly altered to denote Qing supremacy: From the late s onwards, the leaders of the newly-subdued tribes of Mongolia were ordered to assemble there: They finally had married the steppe to the sown. In Japan, the position of the emperor was different from the conditional one accorded by the Mandate of Heaven concept to the Sons of Heaven.

The origins of the Japanese rulers lie in their role, probably originating in the first centuries of the Christian Era, as political leaders who also were magico-religious shamans: But the emperors also are deemed to be the descendants of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu omikami—interestingly, in Japan the Sun, that brings growth, is female, unlike in many other cultures. Much of this is reflected in the Daijosai , the age-old imperial accession ceremony which, due to its sacrality and the secrecy surrounding it, even now is not scholarly analysed.

As far as we know, the present emperor, too, may have lain down, as did his forebears, on a sacred bed and, in one way or another, have communed with the Sun Goddess. Last, but symbolically not least, a banquet followed, during which the new emperor and his guests ate together. In a sense, the Japanese emperors did supremely embody the Divine that according to traditional belief permeated every form of creation on earth or, at least, in the land created by the gods, Japan.

This does not mean that the Japanese people believed the emperor to be a god in the Western sense of possessing powers of control over natural phenomena or, even, superior human qualities. He was not, therefore, worshipped. Therefore, he was uniquely sacred, and more of a god than any other man. In short, though Japan was hugely indebted to Chinese culture, this did not influence the traditional roles of the Son of Heaven. Both the mysterious union, or, if one wants, sacramental communion with the Sun Goddess that constituted the central element in the imperial initiation and included remnants of a shamanistic fertility ritual, and the periodic food and renewal ceremonies at Ise were conducted beyond the public eye.

However, the imperial family even now continues to provide a saio to Ise. At the end of the seventh century, the powerful noble family of the Fujiwara cleverly started marrying into the imperial family, launching a tradition that lasted into the early twentieth century. The imperial role increasingly became a ceremonial and ritual one, only. The emperor symbolized what we would now term the cultural identity of Japan—which inevitably meant: Few emperors actually tried to rule themselves. Arguably, it was precisely the strange combination of sanctity and relative passivity that explains the continuity of the imperial house.

Japanese culture owed much to China, not least through the introduction, from the mid-sixth century onwards, of at least some elements of the complex ideology of Confucianism. During the reign of the first female emperor, Suiko —— —who, significantly, had become a Buddhist nun before she ascended the throne—and her nephew, the strong regent Shotoku, Buddhism began to flourish. Despite their divine status and inviolability, the emperors of Japan—mostly though not exclusively male since the eighth century—, realized that their position was not uncontested.

The aristocratic clans who possessed the land always posed a real and constant threat. If only for that reason, during the eighth century developments set in which in many ways mirrored what happened in Europe at the same time. Though, obviously, coevality is irrelevant to explain the similarities between Europe and Japan, the conditions yet were comparable. Just as in Europe the Pippinids began to use the papacy and the servants of the Church to deal with the exigencies and the problems attendant on the formation of their state, so the imperial house in Japan started using the dominant religious institution in their realm.

The Yamato emperors decided that what by then had become the Buddhist Church, with its many temples and monasteries, might be turned into a very useful ally, since, assumedly, the priests would not harbour imperial aspirations. Shinto could not fulfil this function because, essentially, it was not a Church, not an organization easily harnessed to imperial needs.

Soon, Buddhist clerics came to counterbalance power-seeking aristocrats. Again as in Europe, the Buddhist priesthood provided the imperial government with the educated men it needed to create an effective bureaucracy. Last, but not least, in Japan, too, the Buddhist Church was seen as an instrument of cultural and, hence, political cohesion. Thus, given all its potential uses, no wonder the Church was economically favoured, by the imperial family as well as by many other believers. Consequently, it acquired great riches.

For precisely in these centuries, the emperors, gradually losing their power to rule, appointed shoguns to do so in their stead. Since the seventeenth century, every Japanese family had to belong to the Buddhist Church, and its clergy presided over—and were paid for—every funeral up to the nineteenth century. Also, the Tokugawa shoguns and their advisers and clients developed an eclectic cultural context to strengthen their rule to an extent no previous shogunal dynasty ever had.

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