Escape of the Guilty & Extortion of the Innocent

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They tied Cream to the notes and arrested him for blackmail, until they found enough evidence to charge him with murder. Ted and Mary Roberts were a San Antonio couple who had three kids and both worked as attorneys. They were not likely candidates to mastermind an elaborate blackmail scheme, but the seeds were planted in when Mary had affairs with five different men. While Ted was initially angry, he ultimately decided to use the situation to his advantage. Ted used his legal knowledge to exploit an obscure Texas provision called Rule , which allows an attorney to file a deposition for any civil suit.

When Mary presented these documents to her former lovers, Ted shook them down for money in exchange for not filing the alleged petitions. The couple was charged with blackmail and extortion. Ted received five years in prison, and Mary received 10 years of probation. To prove he was serous, Mr. Brown even directed the authorities to an airport locker containing another bomb. The airline agreed to pay the ransom, which Mr. Brown collected in front of their head office in Sydney. Qantas later received a phone call from the perpetrator, telling them there was no bomb aboard the plane.

The threat had been a hoax. Months later, authorities tracked down a suspect named Raymond Poynting, who had attracted attention with his lavish purchases. British criminal Peter Macari. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison and eventually deported back to Britain. However, there are still a few unresolved mysteries in this case.

And after receiving the ransom, Macari took over the identity of a British man named William Day, using his name to buy a Jaguar and open numerous bank accounts. In fact, the FBI kept a page file on Elvis, detailing the numerous complaints, death threats, and extortion attempts that he faced throughout his life. In , Elvis was serving in the military and stationed in Bad Nauheim, Germany. He had seen an ad where Griessel-Landau advertised his expertise as a skin specialist and decided to hire his services. Griessel-Landau showed up in Bad Nauheim on November 27 and spent the next month performing his specialized skin treatments on Elvis.

This prompted Griessel-Landau to attempt an extortion scheme. Griessel-Landau soon reneged on their original deal and demanded more money. No one knows for sure if Griessel-Landau actually had any dirt on Elvis or what kind of arrangement was ultimately made with him, but after departing on a plane to London in January , he was not heard from again. Instead of a cash ransom, Sally demanded Tesco Clubcards, which would be specifically coded to make constant cash withdrawals from ATMs.

Approximately one month later, an elderly couple was injured by a letter bomb after finding a package outside their Bournemouth home. Injuries inflicted in the course of initiation or religious ceremonies may be justified by consent only if they are of a relatively minor nature and do not conflict with generally accepted concepts of morality. Sexual assault may be committed with or without the use of force or the infliction of injuries. Consent may operate as a justification for the act if no injuries are inflicted. Where injuries are inflicted, it has been held that consent may not be pleaded as a defence.

Snyman has averred, however, that in such cases it would "seem to be more realistic" to enquire into whether the act is contra bonos mores or not. If the injury is slight, it is conceivable that the law may recognise consent to the act as a defence. Where consent is obtained by means of fraud or deception, it is not genuine consent.

Fraud or deception may take the form. However, not all forms of fraud or deception will necessarily vitiate consent. Essentially, fraud or deception will only vitiate consent if it is material in nature: In the case of sexual acts, it has long been the accepted rule that consent will only be vitiated by a fraud or deception that induces either error in negotio or error in personae:. To consent to an otherwise unlawful act, the person consenting must have the ability to understand the nature of the act and to appreciate its consequences. This ability may be lacking due to. In Du Preez v Conradie , [] the court held that a parent has the right and the power to chastise minor children.

This includes the right to impose moderate and reasonable corporal punishment. A step-parent to whom a divorced parent of the children is married may exercise the same rights if requested to do so by the other parent, subject to the same limitations as on that parent. The parent and step-parent are not entitled to molest their children or to exceed the bounds of moderate and reasonable chastisement. Section 35 1 of the Interim Constitution provides expressly that the rights entrenched in it, including section 10—"every person shall have the right to respect for and protection of his or her dignity"—and section 11 2 —no "person shall be subject to torture of any kind, whether physical, mental or emotional, nor shall any person be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"—shall be interpreted in accordance with the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality.

In determining, then, whether punishment is cruel, inhuman or degrading within the meaning of the Constitution, the punishment in question must be assessed in the light of the values which underlie the Constitution. The simple message to be taken from this, according to the Constitutional Court, in S v Williams , [] is that the State, in imposing punishment, must do so in accordance with certain standards; these will reflect the values which underpin the Constitution.

In the present context, this means that punishment must respect human dignity and be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution. The caning of juveniles in casu was accordingly ruled unconstitutional. The Abolition of Corporal Punishment Act [] abolished judicial corporal punishment. The South African Schools Act [] abolished corporal punishment in schools. In Christian Education v Minister of Education , [] a private Christian organisation administered a private school and believed that, in terms of its Christian principles, the physical chastisement of children at school was lawful.

The organisation applied for an order exempting the school from section 10 of the Schools Act, arguing that the constitutional right to religious freedom allowed it to be so exempted. The Constitutional Court held that the requested order could not be granted. Even if one assumed that section 10 infringed upon parents' right to religious freedom, such infringement was justified, since even private schools exercise their functions for the benefit of the public interest. Relevant considerations in adjudicating on the chastisement of children were laid out in Du Preez v Conradie: In R v K , [] a charge of murder was brought against a child of thirteen.

The presumption, which applies for adults, that he had intended the probable consequences of his actions was not here applicable. The State failed to prove that the child knew that his act stabbing and thereby killing his mentally ill mother was unlawful. In Director of Public Prosecutions, KZN v P , [] the respondent, a fourteen-year-old girl, had been convicted of the murder of her grandmother. The passing of sentence was postponed for a period of 36 months, on the condition that the respondent complied with the conditions of a sentence of 36 months' correctional supervision in terms of section 1 h of the Criminal Procedure Act.

It contended that, despite the young age of the respondent, direct imprisonment should have been imposed. The test for interference by an appeal court is whether the sentence imposed by the trial court is vitiated by irregularity or misdirection or is disturbingly inappropriate. The strongest mitigating factor in favour of the respondent in casu was her youthfulness: She had been twelve years and five months old at the time of the offence.

A second factor was that she had no previous conviction. The aggravating factors, however, were overwhelming. The postponement of the passing of sentence was therefore inappropriate in the circumstances, and caused a sense of shock and a feeling that justice was not done. Among the purposes of the Act is.

The common law pertaining to the criminal capacity of children under the age of fourteen years was thereby amended. In terms of section 11, dealing with proof of criminal capacity, the State must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that a child who is ten years or older, but under the age of fourteen years, had the capacity. In order to determine whether or not the minimum age of criminal capacity as set out in section 7 1 should be raised, the Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice must, not later than five years after the commencement of this section, submit a report to Parliament.

The CPA replaced these, however, with sections 77 to 79, which were implemented largely on the recommendation of the Rumpff Commission: The criterion in Stellmacher identifies as mental illnesses as opposed to mental defects only those disorders which are. To be endogenous is to be of internal origin. Section 78 1 of the CPA provides that a person whose act or omission constitutes an offence, and who suffers at the time from a mental illness or defect which makes him incapable.

The difference between the first contingency and the second is between the cognitive and the conative respectively:. S v Mahlinza [] lays out the general principles relating to criminal capacity and mental illness. One night, the accused in casu , a devoted mother, had taken off her clothing and placed it on a fire.

She had then placed her baby and her six-year-old daughter on the fire, and stood at the door of the kitchen to prevent them from escaping. The baby was burnt to death; the six-year-old escaped with burns. The psychiatrist who examined the accused reported that she was laughing and was generally very rowdy, and could not give an account of herself or of her behaviour; she was disorientated and had no insight into her condition.

The psychiatrist diagnosed a state of hysterical dissociation.

She was charged with murder but found to be insane, and thus not guilty. Should the investigation show that she did not have criminal capacity, the necessity for an investigation as to fault in the technical sense, and as to the voluntariness with which the offence was committed, falls away. The decision in each case depends on the particular facts and the medical evidence.

In accordance with the recommendations of the Commission, section A of the CPA now provides for the declaration of certain persons as dangerous criminals, and section B for the imprisonment, for an indefinite period, of such persons.

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Even before the Booysen Commission, however, the courts were not prepared to accept psychopathy, in and of itself, as exempting an accused from criminal liability, or even as warranting a lesser sentence on account of diminished responsibility. In S v Mnyanda , [] the accused was convicted of murder. In an appeal, he argued that his psychopathy should have been regarded as a mental illness, and thus as a mitigating factor. The court found that the mere fact that an accused may be regarded as clinically a psychopath is not a basis on which he may be found to have diminished responsibility.

Only when, in respect of a particular misdeed, it can be said that the psychopathic tendency was of such a degree as to diminish the capacity for self-control to such a point that, according to a moral judgment, he is less blameworthy, will the law recognise his diminished responsibility. Whether or not the verdict in insanity cases is tantamount to an acquittal, from which no appeal is allowed, and whether the State may appeal against a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness or defect—these conundrums have not yet been answered by the courts.

The court held that he was not criminally responsible for the killing. The South African Law Commission, recognising this injustice, proposed that such a person be committed to an institution only if he has not recovered or continues to pose a danger to himself or to society. Sections 46 to 48 of the Mental Health Care Act [] provide for periodic review of the mental-health status of State patients, application for their discharge and various provisions governing conditional discharge. South African law has adopted English law on the onus of proof in these matters: In terms of section 78 1B , whenever the criminal responsibility of an accused is in issue, with reference to a commission or omission which constitutes an offence, the burden of proof will be on the party who raises the issue.

In S v Kalogoropoulos , [] the court held that an accused person who relies on non-pathological causes in support of a defence of criminal incapacity is required in evidence to lay a factual foundation for it, sufficient at least to create a reasonable doubt on that point. Section 78 7 of the CPA provides that, if the court finds that the accused, at the time of the commission of the offence, was criminally responsible, but that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the act, or to act in accordance with an appreciation of that wrongfulness, was diminished by reason of mental illness or mental defect, the court may take that fact into account when sentencing him.

The accused acted with diminished responsibility in S v Mnisi. The fact that he had acted with dolus indirectus had also not been taken into account. Deterrence was of lesser importance in this case, the SCA held, because the evidence did not suggest that the accused had a propensity for violence; he was unlikely to commit such an offence again. Non-pathological criminal incapacity must be distinguished from mental illness. A person may suffer from mental illness, and nevertheless be able to appreciate the wrongfulness of certain conduct, and to act in accordance with that appreciation.

In R v Bourke , [] the accused was charged with rape; he was acquitted as a result of intoxication. The court held that absolute drunkenness is not equivalent to insanity. The essential difference is that the drunk person, as a rule, voluntarily induces his condition, whereas the mentally ill person is the victim of a disease: It would follow that the regular drunkard would be more immune from punishment than the sober man. In S v Johnson , [] the leading decision on intoxication prior to S v Chretien , [] an accused was found guilty of culpable homicide despite the fact that the court accepted the psychiatric evidence that the accused was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing at the time of the offence.

This case therefore reaffirmed the principle in Bourke that voluntary drunkenness is no excuse. In Chetrien , the Appellate Division reconsidered Bourke and Johnson , and eradicated the traditional approach to voluntary intoxication. It firmly adopted a course based on legal principle. The facts were these: While under the influence of alcohol, Chetrien had driven his car into a crowd of people standing in the street.

One was killed; five were injured. On charges of murder and attempted murder, the trial court found the accused guilty of culpable homicide, but acquitted him of attempted murder. The issue on appeal was whether, on the facts, the trial judge, Friedman J, had been correct in law to hold that the accused, on a charge of attempted murder, could not be convicted of common assault where the necessary intention for the offence had been influenced by the voluntary consumption of liquor.

Friedman J had accepted that, in his drunken state, the accused had expected that the people would move out of his way. There was some doubt, therefore, as to whether he had the requisite intention for common assault. Friedman J found that he was bound by Johnson. Friedman J thus brought to issue the question of whether, subjectively, the accused had the requisite intention for common assault of the five injured persons.

The majority of the Appellate Division concluded that even common assault requires intention to assault. If this intention is lacking due to voluntary intoxication, there can be no conviction. It was found that Chetrien had had no such intention. Rumpff CJ held that the rule in Johnson was juridically impure, and that voluntary intoxication could be a complete defence to criminal liability.

The latter would have no defence; the former would be acquitted if he was so drunk that his conduct was involuntary, making him unable to distinguish right from wrong, or unable to act in accordance with that appreciation. Voluntary intoxication was thus removed from the direct influence of policy considerations, and placed firmly on the basis of legal principle.

The result is that it can now affect criminal liability in the same way, and to the same extent, as youth, insanity, involuntary intoxication and provocation. Intoxication of a sufficient degree, therefore, can serve to exclude the voluntariness of conduct, criminal capacity or intention. Should a person who commits a prohibited act while extremely intoxicated escape all criminal liability?

In January , after receiving extensive comment on a working paper, the Commission published a report and a draft Bill. After its passage, it came into operation on March 4, The Act [] contains two short sections, the first of which provides that. In S v Vika , [] the appellant was convicted in a regional court on two counts of contravening this section. The prohibited acts were murder and attempted murder.

Regarding the appropriate punishment, the magistrate applied the provision that such a contravention could attract the same penalty as that which might be imposed for the unlawful act itself. When the appellant appealed against the sentence, arguing that it was startlingly inappropriate, the High Court held that the magistrate seemed not to have appreciated the difference between the offences of which the appellant had been convicted, and the offences of murder and attempted murder. These amounted to misdirections, and entitled the court to interfere with the sentence.

It is important to remember, therefore, that to be convicted of an offence in terms of section 1 1 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act is to be convicted of a unique statutory offence, described in detail above, and not of the ordinary common-law offence. Section 2 of the Act provides that, whenever it is proved that the faculties of a person were impaired by the consumption or use of a substance when he committed an offence, the court may, in determining an appropriate sentence, regard as an aggravating circumstance the fact that his faculties were so impaired. The Law Commission was not in favour of this provision.

Section 1 1 does not specify voluntary consumption. Under the Act, such a person would escape liability on the basis that he did not know that the substance he was drinking would have the effect it did. Another problem is that the Act refers only to a lack of criminal capacity. What about involuntary conduct and intention? Chetrien had criminal capacity, but he was acquitted on the ground that there was reasonable doubt as to whether he possessed the requisite intention to commit the crimes wherewith he was charged.

He would also escape liability under the Act, because his intoxication did not lead to lack of criminal capacity, but rather to lack of mens rea. There is, finally, a problem in respect of onus. According to general principles, the burden of proving the presence of all the elements of the crime, beyond reasonable doubt, rests on the State. The state thus bears the burden of proving the opposite of what it normally has to prove. The difficulty arises when the two offences are used in the alternative.

Snyman posits the following:. If X is charged with assault and the evidence shows that he was only slightly drunk at the time of the act, he will not escape the clutches of the criminal law, because he will then be convicted of assault and the only role the intoxication will play will be to serve as a ground for the mitigation of punishment. If the evidence shows that at the time of the act he was very drunk [ In this way the section could undoubtedly lose much of its effectiveness.

In S v Mbele , [] the accused was charged with theft in a magistrate's court. It was insufficient, therefore, for the State to take matters only so far as uncertainty as to whether his faculties were impaired to the necessary degree. The court found that the State had not proven impairment of the accused's faculties. He could not be convicted, therefore, of the offence of contravening section 1 1. The conviction and sentence were accordingly set aside. In S v September , [] the appellant stood trial in a Provincial Division on charges of murder, assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm, theft and malicious injury to property.

The trial court found. On appeal, the appellant argued that the evidence was indeed of such a nature as to cast doubt on his criminal capacity, and that the trial court had correctly found that he could not be convicted of the charges laid against him.

It was, however, further argued that positive proof was absent of a lack of criminal capacity, and that the appellant ought accordingly not to have been convicted on section 1 1.

The court stressed the fact that it was the task of the trial court, in every case, to decide whether the accused indeed lacked the requisite criminal capacity. Three psychiatrists had testified as to the appellant's alleged state of intoxication. They differed widely in their opinions. The trial court had accepted, without furnishing reasons for so doing, the evidence of the psychiatrist whose opinion it was that the appellant had lacked criminal capacity. This indicated that the trial court had not examined the question of the appellant's criminal capacity to the requisite extent.

The evidence as a whole, therefore, had to be assessed anew. After reassessing the evidence, the court found that no reasonable doubt had been cast on the appellant's criminal capacity. The evidence was furthermore sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the appellant, beyond reasonable doubt, was guilty of contravening the original counts. The court therefore set aside the convictions on section 1 1 , and substituted convictions on the original charges.

Roman and Roman-Dutch law did not regard anger, jealousy or other emotions as defences for any criminal conduct; they were only factors in mitigation of sentence, and even then only if they could be justified by provocation. Section of the Transkei Penal Code of influenced the adoption by the courts of the view that provocation could never be a never be a complete defence to a charge of murder; at most it could be a partial defence.

The Code provided that killing which would otherwise have constituted murder could be reduced to culpable homicide if the person responsible acted in the heat of the moment, as a result of passion occasioned by sudden provocation. S v Mokonto [] saw a change from the objective to a subjective test.

The accused believed that the death of his two brothers had been brought about by the evil powers of a witch. He was convicted of murder. Holmes considered section of the Transkeian Code, with its provision that "homicide which would otherwise be murder may be reduced to culpable homicide, if the person who causes death does so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation. Any wrongful act of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive any ordinary person of the power of self-control may be provocation, if the offender acts upon it on the sudden, and before there has been time for his passion to cool.

This did not correlate, Holmes found, with the Roman-Dutch notion that provocation is not a defence. It is judicially recognised that intention to kill is purely a subjective matter. Since the test of criminal intention was now subjective, and since earlier cases of provocation applied a degree of objectivity, it might be necessary, he thought, to consider afresh the whole question of provocation. On the other hand, he noted, the facts of a particular case might show that the provocation, far from negativing an intention to kill, had actually caused it.

The crime would then be murder, not culpable homicide. The test for intention being subjective, it seemed to Holmes that provocation, which bears upon intention, must also be judged subjectively. In crimes of which specific intention is an element, therefore, the question of the existence of such intention is a subjective one: What was going on in the mind of the accused? Provocation, Holmes held, is relevant to the question of the existence of such intention.

Subjectively considered, it is also relevant to mitigation.

S v Laubscher [] dealt with the defence of temporary non-pathological criminal incapacity. He was charged with and convicted of murder and attempted murder. His defence was that he had acted involuntarily, since he had lacked criminal capacity at the time of the commission. To be criminally liable, a perpetrator must, at the time of the commission of the alleged offence, have criminal liability. The doctrine of criminal capacity is an independent subdivision of the concept of mens rea.

In the present case, the defence was one of non-pathological incapacity. Where a defence of non-pathological incapacity succeeds, the accused is not criminally liable; he may not be convicted of the alleged offence. He must be acquitted. Because he does not suffer from a mental illness, or from a defect of a pathological nature, he may not be declared a State patient either. Laubscher had experienced a considerable amount of stress in the period leading up to the incident.

He was an emotionally sensitive year-old with the intelligence of a genius. He and his wife had married young, when she was pregnant, and had struggled financially; he was still a student. Her parents had contributed R80 per month toward their rent, and had taken every opportunity thus afforded them to meddle in the couple's affairs.

Laubscher and his parents-in-law did not get along; he feared his father-in-law. Nor did things improve when the baby was born. The wife did not return to the appellant afterwards—nor did the baby—and, upon reaching majority, began to institute divorce proceedings. When he arrived at the farm to pick them up, however, she had apparently changed her mind, so he made arrangements to see his family the following week.

The appellant travelled with a loaded gun, since he was driving alone. He arrived at the farm to be told, again, that he would not be leaving with his wife and child. He went to a hotel, checked in, misspelled his name and other words on the necessary forms, and did not have dinner, although he did have a rum and coke.

He went back his in-laws' house and demanded to see his child. His mother-in-law told him he could not. The appellant could recollect nothing after this point. He was woken up the following morning in hospital, with no recollection of what he had done. The appeal court agreed with the convictions on the first four counts. His actions were goal-directed and purposeful—before, during and after the shooting.

Altogether he had fired some 21 shots into various rooms of the house, requiring him to reload his gun at least twice. He had also managed to drive away from the house immediately afterwards, in an attempt to escape. This was not consistent with automatic behaviour. As to the fifth count attempted murder , the court held that the State had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Laubscher had the necessary intention, in the form of dolus eventualis , to kill his child—especially in view of the fact that the whole object of his visit to the farm that evening had been to collect his child.

As regards sentence, the court held that the appellant had without doubt been suffering from severe stress, and so his sentence was mitigated. The defence of psychogenic sane automatism was first raised successfully in the Cape Provincial Division, in S v Arnold , [] where Arnold had shot and killed his wife, Tina, one day at their home. At his trial for murder, it emerged that, like Laubscher, he had been under severe emotional stress at the time of the incident. Having taken a gun with him for protection, he returned home and went into the living room to put it away.

Tina was in the living room; an argument broke out between them.

At one point, Arnold banged his gun on the back of the sofa. It went off accidentally, but no-one was harmed. At this, he fired upon and killed her. He claimed later that he had no recollection of aiming and pulling the trigger. In answer to these questions, the court held that it was not satisfied that the State had passed the first hurdle: Even if it had, though, the court was not satisfied that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Arnold had criminal capacity at the relevant time.

He was therefore acquitted. After Arnold , there were a number of murder trials in which the accused claimed that he, too, had acted involuntarily or had lacked criminal capacity as a result of severe emotional stress, coupled with provocation.

Although the defence enjoyed a measure of temporary success in the then-Supreme Court, [] there has thus far been only one case in which it has succeeded in the Appellate Division or in the Supreme Court of Appeal: For a long time it was unclear that the defence of temporary non-pathological criminal incapacity was at all different from the defence of sane automatism, and if so what the difference was. He had been drinking heavily. He raised the defence of temporary non-pathological criminal incapacity, but this defence was rejected.

On conviction, he appealed to the SCA. He concluded that they are one and the same thing. He went on to hold that a normal person can only lack self-control, and hence criminal capacity, if he is acting in a state of automatism. He also indicated that, although the test of capacity might still remain, in principle, essentially subjective, the application of this test is to be approached with caution.

The courts must not too readily accept the ipse dixit of the accused regarding provocation or emotional stress. Both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal drew a pragmatic distinction between loss of control and loss of temper. Persons who may in the past have been acquitted in circumstances where they had killed someone who had insulted them will find that courts will scrupulously evaluate their ipse dixit in the context of objective standards of acceptable behaviour. Rather than suggesting that the Court replaced the subjective inquiry into capacity with an objective evaluation it is possible to suggest an interpretation of the Eadie case that involves a middle course: Capacity should be both subjectively and objectively assessed.

M]ere passivity will not be enough. Strong judicial action is required. Fault is an element of every crime. It may take one of two forms: All common-law crimes require intention except for culpable homicide and contempt of court committed by an editor of a newspaper for which negligence is sufficient. Statutory crimes require either intention or negligence. Fault refers to the legal blameworthiness of the reprehensible state of mind or careless conduct of a criminally accountable person who has acted unlawfully. It is a firmly established principle of criminal justice that there can be no liability without fault, a principle generally expressed in the maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea the act is not wrongful unless the mind is guilty.

In other words, the general rule is that, in order for an accused to be held liable, in addition to unlawful conduct or actus reus and capacity, there must be fault or mens rea on the part of the accused. The requirement of fault as an element of liability means, among other things, that fault must exist in respect of each and every element of the crime with which the accused has been charged. This is so whether fault is in the form of intention or of negligence. The only exception to the rule is where the Legislature expressly provides that fault need not exist in respect of each element of a crime but, even in this eventuality, there is a presumption of statutory interpretation that the Legislature intended some form of fault to be required.

Murder, by way of illustration, is the unlawful, intentional killing of a human being. In terms of the rule, a person who kills another will be guilty only if he knows or at least foresees the possibility that what he has done is unlawfully to kill a human being. Fault must exist in respect of each of the elements of the crime; if it is absent for any one of them as where the killer believes he is acting lawfully, or does not know or foresee that death will be the consequence of his conduct, or does not know or foresee that what he is killing is a human being , there can be no fault.

Dolus directus , or direct intention, is intention in its ordinary grammatical sense: The accused meant to perpetrate the prohibited conduct, or to bring about the criminal consequence. For instance, the accused in R v Kewelram [] set fire to certain stock in a store. His objective was the destruction of the stock dolus directus in order to obtain the insurance money, but he foresaw the destruction of the store as a substantially certain, or inevitable, consequence of the burning of the stock dolus indirectus.

In brief, the accused directs his will towards an event or result, but foresees that, in so doing, he may cause another event to ensue. Nevertheless he proceeds with his conduct. The facts of R v Jolly [] provide a clear illustration of the meaning of dolus eventualis. The appellants had unlawfully and deliberately derailed a train. No-one was seriously injured.

The appellants argued that there was no desire to injure anyone; they had chosen a spot where the train was moving slowly up a rising gradient with banks on either side of the line. Assault with a biological agent on animal, fowl or honey bees. Fine and term of imprisonment for summary offense. Power to initiate criminal proceedings. Seizure of animals kept or used for animal fighting. Civil immunity for licensed doctors of veterinary medicine, technicians and assistants.

Civil immunity for humane society police officers. Representation of humane society by attorney. Exemption of normal agricultural operations. Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance. Wire, Electronic or Oral Communication. Interception, disclosure or use of wire, electronic or oral communications. Exceptions to prohibition of interception and disclosure of communications. Possession, sale, distribution, manufacture or advertisement of electronic, mechanical or other devices and telecommunication identification interception devices. Exceptions to prohibitions in possession, sale, distribution, manufacture or advertisement of electronic, mechanical or other devices.

Seizure and forfeiture of electronic, mechanical or other devices. Order authorizing interception of wire, electronic or oral communications. Grounds for entry of order. Issuance of order and effect. Emergency hostage and barricade situations. Recording of intercepted communications. Sealing of applications, orders and supporting papers. Service of inventory and inspection of intercepted communications.

Investigative disclosure or use of contents of wire, electronic or oral communications or derivative evidence. Interception of communications relating to other offenses. Unlawful use or disclosure of existence of order concerning intercepted communication. Service of copy of order and application before disclosure of intercepted communication in trial, hearing or proceeding. Suppression of contents of intercepted communication or derivative evidence Repealed. Evidentiary disclosure of contents of intercepted communication or derivative evidence.

Report by issuing or denying judge. Annual reports and records of Attorney General and district attorneys. Civil action for unlawful interception, disclosure or use of wire, electronic or oral communication. Action for removal from office or employment. Injunction against illegal interception. Unlawful access to stored communications.

Disclosure of contents and records. Requirements for governmental access. Retention of certain records. General prohibition on use of certain devices and exception. Application for an order for use of certain devices. Issuance of an order for use of certain devices. Assistance in installation and use of certain devices. Reports concerning certain devices.

Prostitution and related offenses. Obscene and other sexual materials and performances. Public exhibition of insane or deformed person. Firearms and Other Dangerous Articles. Short title of subchapter. Crimes committed with firearms.

10 Outrageous Extortion Schemes

Persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms. Restoration of firearm rights for offenses under prior laws of this Commonwealth. Relinquishment of firearms and firearm licenses by convicted persons. Firearms not to be carried without a license.

Carrying loaded weapons other than firearms. Prohibited conduct during emergency. Carrying firearms on public streets or public property in Philadelphia. Persons to whom delivery shall not be made Repealed. Possession of firearm by minor. Possession of firearm with altered manufacturer's number. Sale or transfer of firearms. Firearm Records Check Fund. Retail dealer required to be licensed. Loans on, or lending or giving firearms prohibited. False evidence of identity. Altering or obliterating marks of identification. Limitation on the regulation of firearms and ammunition. Proof of license and exception.

Waiver of disability or pardons. Distribution of uniform firearm laws and firearm safety brochures. Abandonment of firearms, weapons or ammunition. Purchase of firearms in contiguous states Repealed. Purchase of rifles and shotguns outside this Commonwealth. Locking device for firearms. Carrying explosives on conveyances. Straw Purchase Prevention Education Program. Legislative findings and declarations. Powers and duties of Attorney General. Straw Purchase Prevention Education Fund. Transfer for initial funding.

Sale or lease of weapons and explosives. Sale of starter pistols. Sale and use of air rifles. Furnishing cigarettes or cigarette papers Repealed. Use of tobacco in schools prohibited. Misrepresentation of age to secure liquor or malt or brewed beverages. Purchase, consumption, possession or transportation of liquor or malt or brewed beverages. Safe harbor for violation of section a. Representing that minor is of age.

Inducement of minors to buy liquor or malt or brewed beverages. Selling or furnishing liquor or malt or brewed beverages to minors. Manufacture or sale of false identification card. Carrying a false identification card. Restriction of operating privileges Repealed. Selling or furnishing nonalcoholic beverages to persons under 21 years of age. Tattooing and body piercing. Sexual abuse of children. Sentencing and penalties for trafficking drugs to minors. Selling or furnishing butane to minors. Selling or furnishing certain stimulants to minors.

Unlawful contact with minor. Solicitation of minors to traffic drugs. Sexual exploitation of children. Transmission of sexually explicit images by minor. Access of minors to dextromethorphan. Posting advertisements on property of another. Discarding television sets and tubes. Proprietary and Official Rights.

South African criminal law

Wearing of uniforms and insignia and misrepresentation of military service or honors. Sale of veterans' flowers. Dealing in military decorations. Fraud on association having grand lodge. Use of containers bearing owner's name Repealed. Use or possession of stamped containers Repealed.

False registration of domestic animals. Retention of library property after notice to return. Use of union labels. Unauthorized use of registered insignia. Retention of military property after notice to return. Use of carts, cases, trays, baskets, boxes and other containers. Extension of water line. Willful obstruction of emergency telephone calls.

Railroad employee abandoning train. Interfering with railroad employee. Nails and other hard substances attached to utility poles. Erection of crossing signboards. Lights obstructing view of signals. Unauthorized sale or transfer of tickets. Fraudulent entry of horses in race. Administering drugs to race horses. Pool and billiard rooms. Theater operators to require proof of age. Unlawful actions by athlete agents. Distribution of samples of medicine, dyes, etc. Sale and labeling of solidified alcohol. Sale or illegal use of certain solvents and noxious substances.

Illegal sale or use of certain fire extinguishers. Sale of gasoline in glass container. Out-of-state convict made goods. Unlawful advertising of insurance business. Unlawful coercion in contracting insurance. Furnishing free insurance as inducement for purchases. Unlawful collection agency practices. Unauthorized disposition of donated food commodities. Accessories in conduct of bucket-shop. Maintaining of premises in which bucket-shop operated. Attaching advertisement without consent of publisher.

Demanding property to secure employment. Discrimination on account of uniform.

Unlawful sale of dissertations, theses and term papers. Discrimination on account of service, guide or support dog or other aid animal. Disclosure of confidential tax information. Storage, consumption and sale of alcoholic beverages on unlicensed business premises. Operation of certain establishments prohibited without local option. Prohibition of certain types of entertainment on bottle club premises.

Internet child pornography Repealed. Unlicensed mortgage loan business. Worldly employment or business. Trading in motor vehicles and trailers Repealed. Selling certain personal property. Selling or otherwise dealing in fresh meats, produce and groceries. Trading in motor vehicles and trailers. Removal of mobile home to evade tax. Failure of mobile home court operator to make reports.

Interest of certain architects and engineers in public work contracts. Appointment of special policemen. Violation of governmental rules regarding traffic. Violation of rules regarding conduct on Commonwealth property. Breach of privacy by using a psychological-stress evaluator, an audio-stress monitor or a similar device without consent. Drug trafficking sentencing and penalties. Operation of methamphetamine laboratory. Municipal housing code avoidance Repealed.

Control of alarm devices and automatic dialing devices. Criminal use of communication facility. Restriction on alcoholic beverages Repealed. Operating a motor vehicle not equipped with ignition interlock Repealed. Greyhound racing and simulcasting. Commemorative service demonstration activities. Hacking and Similar Offenses. Unlawful use of computer and other computer crimes.

Distribution of computer virus. Duty of Internet service provider. Application for order to remove or disable items. Order to remove or disable certain items from Internet service provider's service. Report to General Assembly. Unlawful Use of Computers. Computer-assisted remote harvesting of animals. Unlawful transmission of electronic mail. Owning, operating or conducting a chop shop. Alteration or destruction of vehicle identification number. Disposition of vehicle or vehicle part with altered vehicle identification number.

Loss of property rights to Commonwealth. Procedure with respect to seized property subject to liens and rights of lienholders Repealed. Criminal History Record Information. Other criminal justice information. Information in central repository or automated systems. Duties of criminal justice agencies. Disposition reporting by criminal justice agencies. Correction of inaccurate information. Dissemination of Criminal History Record Information.

Petition for limited access. Clean slate limited access. Order to vacate order for limited access. Effects of expunged records and records subject to limited access. Employer immunity from liability. Use of records by licensing agencies. Use of records for employment. Security requirements for repositories. Individual Right of Access and Review.

Right to access and review. Individual rights on access and review. Responsibility of Attorney General. Duties of the Attorney General. Requirements of repositories relating to public notice. Criminal penalties Deleted by amendment. Authority and Duties of Independent Counsel Repealed. Office of Victim Advocate. Conduct of preliminary investigation. Determination that further investigation not warranted.

Determination that further investigation is warranted. Authority and Duties of Independent Counsel. Compensation and travel expenses. Assistance of Pennsylvania State Police. Referral of other matters to independent counsel. Reports by independent counsel. Independence from office of Attorney General. Custody of records of independent counsel.

Cost controls and administrative support. Removal of independent counsel and termination of office. Relationship with office of Attorney General. Definition of Specific Offenses. Unless otherwise noted, the provisions of Title 18 were added December 6, , P. Special Provisions in Appendix. See sections 2, 3 and 4 of Act of in the appendix to this title for special provisions relating to offenses committed prior to the effective date of this title, severability and applicability of Statutory Construction Act.

Part I was added December 6, , P. Chapter 1 was added December 6, , P. This title shall be known and may be cited as the "Crimes Code. Act 44 amended subsec. Section is referred to in sections , of this title. Subject to additional definitions contained in subsequent provisions of this title which are applicable to specific provisions of this part, the following words and phrases when used in this title shall have, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the meanings given to them in this section:. Act amended the defs. Act 66 added the def. Act 53 amended the intro.

The act of June 18, P. The general purposes of this title are:. The provisions of this title shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing constructions it shall be interpreted to further the general purposes stated in this title and the special purposes of the particular provision involved. The discretionary powers conferred by this title shall be exercised in accordance with the criteria stated in this title and, in so far as such criteria are not decisive, to further the general purposes stated in this title.

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