Effets de lEuropeanisation des Politiques dImmigration (French Edition)

Europe besieged

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As expressed by a Moldovan civil servant interviewed: Because of their privileged position on the field and with Brussels, they play an active part in the socialization processes of the local actors part of the network of migration governance and in the Europeanization of norms and standards related to migration management. Most of the larger scale projects falling under both Mobility Partnerships have been implemented by an international organization with the help of member states and the relevant national authorities.

If we look at the case of the IOM in Moldova, their involvement in the Mobility partnership goes back to the negotiation phase, where they assisted the Moldovan government in formulating their priorities for cooperation. Consequently, they have supported both the European Commission and the local authorities in designing projects that would fall under this new framework of cooperation and were then in a privileged position to successfully answer the calls for projects.

Working closely with the national authorities, the local branches of the ICMPD and the IOM diffuse beliefs, principles and values related to migration management through the implementation of projects related to mainstreaming migration into development, reinforcing migration and border controls, building the capacities of state authorities and facilitating the return and reintegration of migrants into their home countries.

Numerous local political discourses concur with this idea, insisting that the modernization of their country will happen through the European model, rather than the Russian alternative, and that by doing so, will become increasingly attractive destination or transit states for potential migrants. In that line of thoughts, adopting restrictive measures on immigration is necessary to proactively address this eventuality Wunderlich, The EU has engaged in considerable efforts in the region to consolidate the capacities of their border regime, supporting a border assistance mission between Ukraine and Moldova, 1 as well as the border authorities in the South Caucasus.

By perpetuating discourses now internalized on the need to reinforce border and migration control with the assistance of the EU, national authorities are signalling that they share common issues with the European political community and that they are conforming to the dominant scheme of thoughts on the issue.

Thus, it is with no surprise that the initiatives that received the most attention so far under the Mobility Partnership for both countries are those centred on the fight against irregular migration and border management. The willingness of the partner countries to adopt migration control measures, led by the belief that their rapprochement with the EU will inevitably lead to an increase number of immigrants into their land, coincides with the strategic interests of the EU in its cooperation with third countries.

And within this frame, in the area, it worked really well, they have many more things happening in the area than before. Through the use of positive conditionality, the Mobility Partnership can be perceived as a soft power policy instrument preparing the field for the conclusion of more legally-binding agreements. Hence, the Mobility Partnership can be used as a stepping-stone by partner countries to engage in deeper cooperation frameworks with the EU, while allowing the European interests to descend in their registries of practices through mechanisms of positive conditionality.

In that context, the political instrument of the Mobility Partnership did not receive much resistance in the implementation of initiatives falling under the migration control pillar of its structure since both Georgia and Moldova were keen on adopting reforms in that domain, while at the same time seizing the opportunity offered by the European Union for increased cooperation. Only one complete evaluation of the Mobility Partnership has so far been conducted.

Initiated by the IOM, the European Commission and the government of Moldova, the evaluation of the Moldovan Mobility Partnership revealed some of its lacunae as perceived by the stakeholders. The facilitation of legal migration and the international protection pillars of the Mobility Partnership received insufficient attention according to those surveyed.

Moldovans admitted being disappointed by the limited mobility opportunities offered to their nationals. Even though the concept of circular migration appears as a top priority from the partner countries in all of the Mobility Partnerships, the member states have been reticent, to say the least, to propose such schemes. Most of their objectives are focused towards the return of migrants and their social and economic reintegration, the reinforcement of the national employment services capacities and the diffusion of information on the possibilities to legally migrate to the EU and of the risks of irregular migration.

In the context of the Mobility Partnership, even though circular migration schemes were initially identified as one of the benefits from this cooperation, only the short-term mobility of selected categories of individuals students, tourists, researchers and business people has been included in the framework, notably through the visa facilitation agreement linked to the conclusion of the community-wide readmission agreement.

The pursuit of the long-term objective of rapprochement to the Union and of the opening of further frameworks of cooperation with the EU have prevented the local authorities from Moldova and Georgia to be more assertive with their demands for short-term mobility opportunities for their nationals through their Mobility Partnership. As for the international protection pillar, by looking at the matrix of initiatives in all of our study cases, we can only notice the weak support towards this dimension of migration management.

Through the entire region of the South Caucasus, only one project was directed towards international protection, and consisted in a quality analysis of the national asylum systems for all three countries. However, this logic does not seem to be reflected in the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood, as shown by the weak support to projects related to the international protection pillar of the Mobility Partnerships.

Taking a deeper look into the implementation of the Mobility Partnerships relativizes the discourses conveyed by the European Commission on this policy instrument. When overviewing the implementation of the legal migration and international protection pillars of these policy instruments, one can wonder what place is left for the actual migrants. To quote a Moldovan public servant interviewed: Interestingly, the migration and development pillar has led to significant developments in both of our study-cases, demonstrating the internalization of the migration and development discourse among the local actors.

The migration and development nexus stems from a consensus between policy-makers, consolidated over the years in the numerous trans-governmental forums on migration, that perceives migrants as central actors for the development of their country of origin. Most of our Moldovan interviewees have enthusiastically recalled that representatives from this country have been invited on numerous occasions to share their experience, notably in the Global Forum on Migration and Development.

Most of the initiatives in both of these countries mainly focus on the involvement of the diaspora in the development of the country through support for the creation of start-up businesses, job-matching, skills development, recognition of qualifications and the simplification of procedures for the sending of remittances.

However, our interviews with the local actors revealed that the difficulties in the implementation of the projects related to migration and development were, according to their opinion, to be attributed to a lack of consideration of the local context, to insufficient attention paid to the needs expressed by the migrants themselves and to frequent misunderstanding with the government and local officials on the objectives of each initiative.

As expressed by a Moldovan project officer interviewed: I mean this is ridiculous! Projects are discussed at the local cooperation platforms reuniting the network of governance on migration issues in rather vague terms. The regular interactions among the actors, the implementation of projects designed in Brussels or in the member states of the Union, the presence of European experts in the national ministries, along with the prominent role played by international organizations on the field are all elements contributing to the learning processes of the national authorities on the know-how and the development of knowledge related to the perception of efficient migration management.

While we can attest of top-down Europeanization processes through mechanisms of conditionality and through the imposition of reforms related to border and migration management in the partner countries, it also appears that more subtle forms of transfers are at play. Socialization and learning mechanisms are put in place to diffuse ideas, knowledge, norms and practices related to migration and their internalization is made visible through the discourses relayed on those issues by local policy-makers.

From our fieldwork experience in the Eastern neighbourhood countries that have agreed to sign up for Mobility Partnerships, some conclusions can be drawn on this new form of cooperation. Reflecting on the realizations achieved through the Mobility Partnership, we must highlight the role it has played in placing the issue of migration onto the national political agendas of the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood. In both Moldova and Georgia, the State institutions had until then provided little administrative support to their migrants. The reflection around this topic has led to the formulation of development projects that, for example, addressed the question of the recognition of qualifications acquired abroad, the care for the children and the elderly left behind and the outreach to the diaspora.

Numerous studies have been conducted under the framework of the Mobility Partnership, in order to understand the characteristics of the migration flows emerging from this area, to interrogate migrants on their needs and to provide recommendations to the local administrations. To quote one of the interviewees from the Georgian civil society: Unlike the Visa liberalization action plan, the Mobility Partnership, as a non-binding instrument of soft power, does not have an end result that serves as a strong incentive.

Rather, it has been perceived by the Georgian and Moldovan authorities as a stepping-stone to engage with the EU on the dialogue for a visa-free regime and for closer cooperation. Nonetheless, even if these strategic interests motivated the Moldovan and Georgian authorities to embark on this new cooperation framework, the preferences of the actors have been gradually transformed according to those of the EU. For countries like Moldova, presenting a priori little interest for deepened relations with the member states, the Mobility Partnership has represented a truly unique opportunity to gain more visibility and to open a privileged dialogue with the EU.

Both countries have achieved one of their top national objectives through their implementation of the Mobility Partnership, the liberalization of the Schengen visa for their citizens. The Mobility Partnerships, entangled in the web of cooperation deployed by the EU and its member states in the region, cannot be analysed separately from the other instruments of cooperation. Nonetheless, its implementation, when deemed satisfactory by the European Commission, can deepen the relations, leading to an ever-increasing approximation of the national policies and practices to the EU norms and standards.

The experiences of the Mobility Partnerships in the Eastern neighbourhood present numerous limits. First and foremost, the analysis of the existing partnerships reveals that it is after all an empty shell, and that its content will inevitably depend from the level of interest and engagement of the participating member states, the European Commission and the third country. For those reasons, we can question whether it has been used as an entryway to push for the conclusion of more constraining agreements, such as the community-wide readmission agreements.

Member states have also demonstrated incoherence in their support for the Mobility Partnerships. Consequently, 3-day study visits of detention centres in a member state for a handful of civil servants from the partner country could symbolize the engagement of a signatory member state into this instrument of cooperation.

This example illustrates in our opinion the gap between the rhetoric surrounding this framework of cooperation, its stated objective of coherence and comprehensive action, and its actual implementation. Most of the Moldovan and Georgian officials interviewed have agreed on the lack of visibility and comprehension of this instrument, unsure at times of its purpose or added value besides leading to some proximity with the EU and paving the way for the Visa Facilitation and readmission agreements. They have also attributed the implementation gaps of the Mobility Partnership to an insufficient consideration of the local context in the conception of the programs of action.

Both countries appear after all to have little ownership over their migration policies, mainly influenced by the direction imposed by the EU. Since both countries were previously inexperienced in the field of migration management and acknowledged that migration is a priority issue for the EU in its foreign relations, the governments of Moldova and Georgia have welcomed the opportunity represented by the Mobility Partnership, and have strived to perform with this policy instrument.

In the end, implementation gaps reveal the lack of attention paid by the initiators of the projects to their outcomes and the lack of comprehension of the local context when designing initiatives. Intersecting mechanisms of Europeanization are involved through the implementation of the Mobility Partnership. Cognitive Europeanization is achieved through socialization and the learning of new knowledge made possible through the network of governance set up by this political instrument.

At the same time, more coercive measures are taken by the EU to ensure that the national legislation of the partner countries is aligned to its acquis and border and migration control objectives are conform to the European interests. The principle of conditionality is fundamental, ensuring that even with soft-power instruments, the question of migration is addressed in order to unlock further dialogues related to trade, development and so forth.

Instead, few and vaguely formulated development objectives and legal migration possibilities have emerged and appear diluted when compared to the control-oriented measures. This reality exposes the gaps that subsist between the hegemonic security-oriented vision shared by the authors of this policy and the illusion of a transparent and harmonious collaboration proposed to third countries.

Altogether, the interviews with the Moldovan and Georgian actors of the Mobility Partnership have revealed the progressive appropriation of a European belief system related to the good governance of migration through processes of Europeanization and have also informed of the strategic use that partner third countries can pull from this cooperation to pursue their own political objectives of getting closer to the economic and political community of the Union.

The Moldovan and Georgian governments have transformed their legislative framework in order to approximate their laws in the field of migration to those of the European Union and have adopted into their registries of practices the measures of migration-control requested by the EU through its various policy instruments. Even though the implementation of the Mobility Partnerships has at times been a complex task, with local implementers unsure about the purpose of the projects and their coherence with the local reality, in both cases, the European Commission perceives them as achievements, even if no proper evaluation mechanisms have been set to monitor their consequences.

It is with the objective to fill this informational vacuum that we have attempted to summarize the outcomes of the Mobility Partnerships concluded with the Republic of Moldova and Georgia. The author would like to thank Olivier Clochard CR. The author also conducted the interviews, analysed the data and wrote the manuscript. The author read and approved the final manuscript.

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. It is a technical and consultative mission, whose principal objective is to improve the capacities of the border services from both countries. National Center for Biotechnology Information , U. Published online Mar Author information Article notes Copyright and License information Disclaimer.

Received Feb 23; Accepted Dec 5. Associated Data Data Availability Statement The data set supporting the results of this article is available upon request to the author, to preserve the anonymity of the interviewees. Abstract This research wishes to contribute to the understanding of the migration policy regime of the European Union EU , by considering an analytical perspective that privileges the standpoint of the countries of its neighbourhood.

Introduction According to the European Commission, the Global Approach to Migration, which came into force in , represents the transition from a previously security-oriented migration policy to a more transparent and exhaustive strategy, that would be driven by a better understanding of all aspects related to migration, and considering mobility as a positive force for development European Commission, The following table shows the repartition of the interviews conducted across countries and the occupation of the interviewees: Open in a separate window.

Tracing the origins of the mobility partnerships Since the reformulation of the Global Approach to Migration in , the focus of the external dimension of the European migration policy has strategically moved from the Eastern border to the South of the Mediterranean European Commission, and the Mobility Partnership seems to have gained in importance to become a key mechanism of cooperation for the European Commission. The emergence of the need for a balanced approach to migration management From the Tampere Summit held in , the government heads of the EU recognized the importance of cooperating through partnerships with third countries in order to achieve their migration control objectives Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Defining the content of the mobility partnership The communications of the European Commission on the Mobility Partnerships have done little to demystify what the latter would contain.

Beyond the discourse, an overview of the implemented initiatives Having looked at the way the first Mobility Partnerships were elaborated and with the objective to interrogate how the guiding principles on migration management of the Global Approach to Migration are diffused through this instrument, we now propose to take a deeper look at the implementation of the initiatives falling under this framework of cooperation. A mix of horizontal and vertical processes of Europeanization to transform the management of migration in third countries The model of migration control proposed by the EU through the Mobility Partnership to the Eastern Neighbourhood countries coincides for the most part with their stated national interests Interviews with Georgian public servants, What future for the mobility partnership?

Discussion on the outcomes and limits of this instrument From our fieldwork experience in the Eastern neighbourhood countries that have agreed to sign up for Mobility Partnerships, some conclusions can be drawn on this new form of cooperation. On the positive outcomes of the mobility partnership Reflecting on the realizations achieved through the Mobility Partnership, we must highlight the role it has played in placing the issue of migration onto the national political agendas of the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood.

On the limits of the mobility partnership The experiences of the Mobility Partnerships in the Eastern neighbourhood present numerous limits. Availability of data and materials The data set supporting the results of this article is available upon request to the author, to preserve the anonymity of the interviewees. Notes Ethics approval and consent to participate Not applicable.

Consent for publication Not applicable. Competing interests The author declares that she has no competing interests. Europeanization and national political societies]. The Transformation of European Border Controls. Les migrations internationales en Tunisie et au Maghreb: Migratory recomposition and new roles]. Research report for the obtention of the "hability to supervise research" HDR.

Management of asylum and international issues]. Migrations et asile en Tunisie depuis Towards new migratory features]. Towards mobility or insecurity partnerships? CEPS working document No. Vers une politique publique internationale des migrations? Political networks and the process of the transfer of models]. The state of migration in Georgia. On a community immigration policy COM final.

Dossier IMMIGRATION / MIGRATION

This ignores the reality of migration, as many want only to pass through Greece or Italy. Retaining this rule is absurd, as northern states rarely send refugees back to Greece or Italy. Spain was in the front line in the early s, as people from sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb tried to cross the Straits of Gibraltar or get into the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa.

Since and the Arab Spring, most crossings have had these three states as destinations. These countries bear a double burden: Greece, under pressure to comply with austerity programmes, is poorly equipped to fulfil such a role. Turning one of its most fragile members into its guard dog would be a formidable challenge for the EU.

But as with monetary policy, solidarity is not evenly distributed. Several northern countries are keen for the problem to be contained in the south, where countries are fighting each other over who should bear the heaviest burden. According to Italy, responsibility lay with Malta, host of the mission.

Nicolas Sarkozy, then president, suspended French rail links with Italy. The negotiations are often blackmail in disguise: Even if Turkey tirelessly pursued migrants, the agreement would not solve the problem but merely displace it, perhaps to Libya, where traffickers have been unchallenged since the fall of Gaddafi.

There is no reason to think that the flow of migrants will cease. Such a dynamic harms the European project, founded on free movement since the Treaty of Rome in The Schengen agreement, eliminating national borders, was signed in by France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and its primary aim was not to allow citizens to travel freely but to tackle a year-long crisis in the common market.

Événements

French and Italian customs employees, unhappy at their workload because of increased trade between European nations, worked to rule and checked all lorries at border crossings. HGV drivers responded with roadblocks, which caused huge traffic jams, especially in the peak holiday season. When the dispute ended, the Benelux Secretariat investigated the free movement of people and goods in Europe.

Germany encouraged the project, as its manufacturing- and export-led economy was held back by the restrictions of the European road network. Since the s, trade within Europe has increased enormously. Cars assembled in France are made from foreign-produced parts that may have passed through several countries before reaching the production line. Every day, hundreds of thousands of heavily laden lorries cross the continent on delivery schedules that will not accommodate lengthy border checks.

For the past 20 years, hundreds of thousands of people have taken advantage of the freedom of movement to work in a neighbouring country. France had , such commuters in , and now has over , The staunchest defenders of the single market repeatedly warn of this. Abandoning the Schengen area would end industrial subcontracting and social dumping, and might mean that some companies relocated to their major markets, with environmental benefits.

Les effets de l'européanisation des politiques d'immigration by Virginie Guiraudon PDF

But it will not solve the refugee crisis. Re-establishing French borders will not prevent boats landing in Spain. If migrants find their way blocked at the Pyrenees, they will pay traffickers to take a clandestine route as used in the s and 60s when the Salazar dictatorship forbade legal emigration from Portugal. The French government may propose a wall, as Hungary is currently building along its border with Serbia, replicating the same vicious circle as the US: Other than Germany, which proposes bringing tens of thousands of migrants from Tunisia to Europe, and Sweden, no government will risk backing less rigid visa controls.

Even parties on the radical left keep quiet for fear of alienating public opinion, easily spooked by immigration. Since the Paris attacks, the idea that the flow of migrants is unmanageable has been treated as a given in France. Yet, in , France, which had scarcely recovered from the economic crisis of and was preparing for war, took in more than , Spanish republicans.

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