Combination Pack: Brotherly Bond and Indecent Intent

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Subdivision H—Special rules for young people 14 to Subdivision B—Preventative detention orders. Subdivision C—Carrying out preventative detention orders. Subdivision D—Informing person detained about preventative detention order.

Subdivision E—Treatment of person detained. Subdivision A—Object and definitions. Subdivision B—Continuing detention orders. Subdivision C—Making a continuing detention order. Subdivision D—Review of continuing detention order. Subdivision E—Provisions relating to continuing detention order proceedings. Subdivision C—Crimes against humanity. Subdivision E—Other serious war crimes that are committed in the course of an international armed conflict.

Subdivision F—War crimes that are serious violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and are committed in the course of an armed conflict that is not an international armed conflict. Subdivision G—War crimes that are other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in an armed conflict that is not an international armed conflict. Subdivision B—Offences relating to trafficking in persons. Chelsea dumped her boyfriend, Nick, for reasons she really does not want to dwell on.

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She can barely contain her excitement as she finds out Nick just got dumped. Not one to waste an opportunity, Becky brings him back to his apartment. His roommate also recently got dumped? Things just got doubly interesting. This book is intended for adults and contains harsh language with vivid descriptions of sex including oral, anal, double penetration, and more. Read more Read less. Kindle Cloud Reader Read instantly in your browser. Note that these raw numbers do not reflect whether prosecutions for a particular offense type increased or decreased as a percentage of the federal caseload.

For that information, see infra Tables 2 to 6.

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This indicates that prosecutors are, by and large, uninterested in the latest and greatest anti-crime legislation as a means of reaching new forms of conduct. For example, for the following offense types the raw number of prosecutions has remained more or less stable since , in spite of the enactment of additional statutes:. In , federal prosecutors commenced homicide cases against defendants; in , federal prosecutors commenced homicide charges against just defendants. Note that there was a decrease in the number of prosecutions in spite of the fact that Congress enacted at least five new homicide statutes since Congress enacted at least five new homicide statutes in In , defendants were charged in federal court with bribery; in , there were federal bribery defendants.

This decline occurred in spite of the fact that Congress enacted at least six new bribery statutes during that period. Post, Congress enacted six additional bribery statutes. These are just two examples of a trend that can be traced throughout most offense categories within the caseload data. In reality, most major offense categories have actually decreased, both in terms of raw numbers and as a percentage of the caseload since , in spite of a vast increase in the number of available statutory grounds for bringing prosecutions.

When considered in conjunction with population growth, this translates into an actual declining rate of prosecution for these offense categories. The following additional examples Table D-2, , supra note 14, at 84—87; Table D-2, , supra note The statistics for the larceny, forgery, and regulatory offense examples discussed below come from this source.

In , 2, prosecutions were commenced, down from approximately 4, in At first glance, larceny and theft appear to be the types of conduct typically regulated by states, but note that in , 1, of these prosecutions in federal court were for theft of U. In , there were nearly 2, prosecutions; in , there were only 1, During this period, there has been a significant decline in the annual number of regulatory crime prosecutions—down to 2, in from 2, in An enormous number of new regulatory crimes were enacted in the period —, so many that we were unable to count even a fraction of them; yet this increase appears to have had virtually no impact on the annual number of regulatory prosecutions.

If we look at specific laws within the regulatory offense category, there is a more-or-less even distribution of prosecutions throughout different sub-categories in the caseload, with the most frequent types of prosecutions being brought for game and conservation violations prosecutions, down from in ; reporting of monetary transactions prosecutions, level since ; violations of postal service regulations prosecutions, down from in ; customs prosecutions, level since ; and national parks regulations prosecutions, down from in On the low end, just forty-nine defendants were prosecuted for Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act violations in , while sixty-one were prosecuted for copyright infringement and fifty-four were prosecuted for antitrust violations level since Table D-2, , supra note 14, at See infra Chart of Commonly Used Federal Criminal Statutes for particular laws included in various regulatory subcategories.

There were only such agreements between and Thus, most types of regulatory laws are being criminally enforced at an equal or less frequent rate than in decades past. This is in spite of enactment of many new regulations. A few other offenses Table D-2, , supra note , at 79; Table D-2, , supra note 14, at 84— The data in these tables provides the statistics for the below RICO, carjacking, mail and wire fraud, and financial institution examples.

The offense categories identified below represent those few areas other than drugs and immigration that have experienced increased levels of prosecution in the past thirty years. While we do not wish to overlook the significance of these areas of growth, we would note three things: For example See Table D-2, , supra note 14, at 84— The statistics for the below sex offense, firearm, and fraud examples come from this source. But a closer examination reveals that almost the entirety of the increase in sex offense prosecutions at the federal level consists of interstate child pornography offenses, sexual abuse of minors offenses in geographic regions of exclusive federal jurisdiction, and offenses related to failure to complete National Sex Offender Registry requirements.

I. The Numbers: An Exploration of the Federal Criminal Code and Annual Caseloads

See Table D-2, , supra note 14, at 84— The strong interstate and international components involved in trafficking of child pornography, particularly via the Internet, indicate that it is a legitimate subject for federal enforcement. Finally, a national registry of sex offenders can only be accomplished at the federal level. See Act of Nov. The provisions in 18 U.

A substantial chunk of the sexual assault cases that find their way into federal court come from Indian reservations and federal land parks and bases. The incidence of sex crimes on American Indian reservations is higher than the national average, and numbers continue to rise. We express no opinion here as to the value of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act SORNA ; we merely note that no state or even combination of states could create or maintain a national registry.

Most prosecutions within this category are for weapons possession by prohibited persons e. Many are brought by Operation Triggerlock, consisting of task forces comprised of federal, state, and local officials. See Project Triggerlock , 40 U. This is an area where national sentiment, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, has called for the stricter enforcement of federal laws. Like alien reentry cases, most federal weapons prosecutions are triggered by an underlying prior state felony conviction.

Within the fraud category, the most frequently used statutes in were those reflecting undeniably strong federal interests: Also strongly represented are tax fraud, health care fraud, and Social Security fraud, all of which are protective of federal interests or target interstate criminal activity. But note that the violent offense category overall is shrinking as a percentage of the caseload, down from 7.

Moreover, the increase in violent racketeering and terrorism prosecutions is small—violent racketeering rose from prosecutions in to prosecutions in ; terrorism prosecutions rose from 25 in to 65 in According to the National Security Division, the federal government has prosecuted terrorism cases since Unlike the statistics from the Administrative Office of the U.

Courts, these statistics also include non-terrorist offenses such as passport fraud and perjury so long as the case is related to international terrorism. Obviously terrorism offenses are of critical national concern, and violent racketeering offenses generally involve multi-state or international organizations of a sophisticated nature, making federal involvement imperative.

We pause here to note that the absolute number of terrorism prosecutions annually, which continues to be quite low, certainly does not reflect its importance in the federal criminal justice system. In fact, the federal focus on anti-terrorism enforcement is much greater than the small number of cases reflects. The goal, of course, is to identify risks and prevent terrorist attacks, and there is no way to quantify how many attacks were thwarted and cases not filed due to the diligence of our federal agents.

The foregoing data illustrates that, beyond immigration and drug trafficking, few offenses are experiencing increased rates of prosecution at the federal level. Those that are such as fraud, firearms, sex offenses, and terrorism represent and protect federal interests. Table D-2, , supra note 81; Table D-2, , supra note 14, at 84—87; see also infra Tables 2, 6-B.

To a much lesser degree, caseload increases are being driven by increased prosecutions of fraud involving the federal government, weapons offenses, trafficking in child pornography, and other offenses devoted to defending national interests and resources. In spite of the expanding number of federal criminal statutes in many major offense categories most notably, regulatory offenses , other major offense categories have actually experienced notable declines in both the rate and raw number of annual prosecutions. Federalization of criminal law is often cited as an unnecessary drain on federal judicial, prosecutorial, and prison resources.

Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System 63—84 citing the federalization of criminal law as a major driving factor behind prison overcrowding. It is true that federal courts are busier than ever with criminal matters, and federal prison populations are at peak capacity, with more than , inmates. Critics of federalization may evoke sympathetic images of unwitting offenders rotting in federal prisons, having been unlucky enough to violate some obscure federal regulation.

Are we really spilling our coffers to jail nonviolent regulatory and white collar offenders? The answer, again, is a resounding no. Sentencing data and prison population data reveal that our limited federal resources are being expended primarily to prosecute and imprison those who have offended federal interests, and not to punish those who have committed trivial offenses, or who have engaged in conduct traditionally regulated by states. In fiscal year , the United States Sentencing Commission reported that 83, individuals were sentenced in federal court. For a summary of this data, see infra Table 13, which shows average sentences in federal court by offense type.

In the following offense categories, Sourcebook , supra note 87, at tbl. The above-referenced offense categories, and specifically the number of statutes criminalizing regulatory infractions, are often cited by critics of over-federalization as proof that Congress and federal prosecutors have gone too far. However, it is apparent from the statistics above that these prosecutions are not actually a significant drain on federal resources. Regulatory prosecutions, specifically, are relatively few in number; See infra Table 6-B. For example, of sixteen antitrust defendants sentenced in , fifteen entered guilty pleas; of eighty-four food and drug offenders sentenced, eighty pled guilty.

Sourcebook , supra note 87, at tbl. Commentators who attempt to connect the dots between over-federalization and prison overcrowding would perhaps be surprised to learn that many federal offenders convicted of regulatory offenses, and even some white collar offenses, frequently receive probation and criminal fines instead of prison time. For example, offenders in the following offense categories Id. Likewise, many costs of prosecution may be offset by imposition at the sentencing stage of fines payable to the government and restitution payable to victims.

We were unable to find statistics on the percentage of these court-ordered fines and restitution that was actually paid.

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Forfeitures and seizures also help pay for law enforcement efforts. Federal prison resources are being consumed primarily by drug, immigration, and firearms offenders. Consider the following data from Tables 12 and Whereas immigration sentences are relatively low, a few other major offenses carry very heavy average sentences, including drug trafficking Increases in the federal prison population are undoubtedly striking and alarming. In light of the caseload increases described previously, it is not hard to see why federal prisons are now crowded with drug, firearms, and immigration offenders.

Additionally, the imposition in of the now-advisory Sentencing Guidelines, and the trend during that same period toward statutory mandatory minimum sentences, has resulted in harsher sentences for many classes of offenders. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism , 32 Cardozo L. Justice, Supreme Court of the U. In light of the fact that most federal prison resources are consumed by just a few types of offenders, the criticism of over-federalization and the growth of the federal criminal code as a driver of booming prison populations loses much of its steam.

In Part I, we established that the growth of the federal criminal justice system is being driven primarily by increased prosecutions of immigration and controlled substance offenders and, to a much lesser extent, weapons and fraud offenders. A substantial percentage of federal law enforcement resources are now devoted to counterintelligence and otherwise preventing terrorism offenses, though this allocation is not reflected in the number of terrorism cases or defendants.

The plethora of federal criminal statutes on the books is largely irrelevant to federal law enforcement activities, prosecutorial charging decisions, and the constituency of the federal prison population. The argument from the ABA, the Federalist Society, and others that the federal criminal law enforcement system is encroaching on state systems and endangering the balance between state and federal law enforcement is clearly mistaken. For more recent data, see also infra Tables 9-A and 9-B. In fact, the proportion of federal criminal prosecutions, as a percentage of all criminal prosecutions in this country annually, has been more-or-less stable since , with a brief spike in the number of federal prosecutions during the Prohibition Era.

This pattern holds true even in those areas where jurisdiction is concurrent, such as possession of controlled substances, fraud, and weapons offenses. The federal law enforcement apparatus remains limited, both in size and scope, relative to its state law enforcement counterpart. States can thus continue to fruitfully experiment with different substantive criminal laws, procedures, and penalty schemes.

A more nuanced over-federalization critique advanced by serious scholars, and one that therefore deserves a more thoughtful response, is that concurrent federal and state criminal jurisdiction results in unfairness to those defendants unlucky enough to be chosen for federal criminal prosecution—an unfairness that may rise to constitutional dimensions. This is not truly an over-federalization critique at all.

The inequity attacked here is not that there are too many federal criminal laws, but rather that a particular federal law may overlap with an almost identical state law barring the same misbehavior. A close reading of this literature reveals that the critique is directed not so much at the vast size of the federal criminal code, but rather at the harsher procedure and penalties imposed in the federal system in instances of concurrent jurisdiction and the alleged arbitrariness of the selection between fora.

The argument is directed particularly toward cases involving drug trafficking, weapons offenses, and fraud.

Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of Criminal Law |

Several well-known and well-respected scholars claim that federal prosecutors, using a plethora of federal criminal statutes that duplicate and overlap similar state criminal statutes, routinely bring criminal charges in federal district court that could and perhaps should have been brought in state court. While federal prosecution affects only a small fraction of criminal defendants, See infra Table 9-B. The losers of this lottery thus face serious disadvantages compared to their state-charged compatriots.

These significant prosecutorial advantages, combined with sky-high conviction rates in federal court For example, in , federal courts disposed of around 99, defendants. Of those defendants who did not receive outright dismissal, Of those defendants who went to trial, just were acquitted. D-4 March 31, Professor Beale notes that defendants, while facing serious jail time under state law, face harsher penalties and loss of the possibility of parole in the federal system when prosecuted for the same conduct.

Neither Beale, nor Clymer, nor Smith examines any of the anecdotal examples of disparate federal—state sentencing that they discuss in their articles to determine why the cases that were brought federally might have been so selected. In our admittedly cursory review of those cases, we noticed plausible distinguishing features between ostensibly similar cases.

For example, the federal case examples included defendants with long criminal records and those who refused to cooperate in the investigation. Finally, none of the scholars who make this criticism appear to have considered the fact that this imbalance could shift direction, and federal criminal defendants could end up the winners of this jurisdictional lottery. The United States Attorneys Manual the Manual does contain some general standards for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, but they are written so broadly that they provide little guidance.

Professor Beale is referring to a manual that guides the discretion of all trial attorneys at the Department of Justice and Assistant U. Attorneys at the ninety-five U. Scholars such as Sara Sun Beale and Stephanos Bibas have roundly criticized this aspect of federal prosecution and have called for a reevaluation of the U.

Other scholars, including Professors Smith and Clymer, have demanded a judicial outlet to challenge seemingly arbitrary prosecutorial charging decisions. We are not particularly sympathetic to these complaints and see no need for a legislative or judicial fix. We offer two responses. First, we believe that even if selection for federal prosecution were completely arbitrary as determined by the flip of a coin , such a choice between federal and state jurisdiction should not unduly concern us. Certainly there is no constitutional problem with such a procedure, nor do we see an issue of equity. Second, we question whether criminal defendants are actually faced with a lottery—that is, the kind of arbitrariness that should trouble those interested in fair treatment of all individuals.

First, let us assume that a particular defendant is randomly selected for prosecution by federal rather than state prosecutors. When such an individual engages in misconduct that violates both federal and state law, she has violated the law of two independent sovereigns and each has a legitimate interest in deterring such behavior in the future, expressing its moral condemnation of the behavior, and exacting punishment. She has no cognizable legal right to choose which jurisdiction will charge or punish her, so long as each decision to prosecute is not motivated by a constitutionally invidious reason such as race or gender, or is not otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

Illinois , U. It noted that over one hundred years earlier, in Fox v. Ohio , 46 U. The same act may be an offen[s]e or transgression of the laws of both. Bartkus and Fox involved situations in which only one sovereign actually punished the defendant. This is the prevailing view of those scholars who have written on the subject. Restoring a Workable Balance , 78 N.

Herman, Double Jeopardy All over Again: United States , U. This is particularly true in a case like Abbate , where the defendant received only a three-month prison sentence in state court for conduct that could result in a five-year federal penalty. The Court has shown no inclination to back away from the historically accurate position that the federal government and each state are sovereign in the fields of defining and punishing crimes against their peace and dignity, instead extending the dual sovereignty doctrine wherever possible.

Alabama , U. Likewise, the Court held that the Navajo Tribe is an independent sovereign from the federal government for purposes of the dual sovereignty doctrine. If the primary criticism of this so-called lottery system is indeed that defendants are punished twice for a single offense, critics should rest assured that such successive prosecutions are quite rare. Those defendants concerned about the possibility could easily negotiate a global settlement. Their failure to do so is primarily attributable to the lack of any real risk.

When successive prosecutions do occur, there generally exists some unique circumstance warranting both state and federal prosecutions. In the typical case, a defendant is extremely unlikely to be charged by the federal government once he has been prosecuted by a state, regardless of whether that first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or a conviction. The times the Department makes an exception to the policy are rare enough to make national headlines. Lawrence , Punishing Hate: Likewise, those defendants prosecuted first by one state need not be overly concerned about a second trial in another state because state jurisdictional authority is tied to a territoriality principle.

Heath , U. Finally, the converse of the Petite Policy situation—where a defendant is tried first in federal court and second in state court—is also highly improbable.

A number of states have statutes that bar a second prosecution if the defendant has been tried by another government federal or state for a similar offense. According to a well-known treatise, about half of the states have, since Bartkus , adopted statutes prohibiting state prosecution for offenses that relate to a previous federal prosecution, though these vary considerably as to the extent of the prohibition.

Kerr, Criminal Procedure —63 3d ed. Thus, in practice the vast majority of defendants can expect to be prosecuted one time, or more likely not at all. See Criminal Justice Info. The crime problem for most people is that no perpetrator is ever found, not that the perpetrator might be convicted twice by separate jurisdictions.

Thus, the Court has opined, and we agree, that there is no constitutional issue under the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses with successive prosecutions or multiple punishments by federal and state jurisdictions. If we assume that the selection of jurisdiction for criminal defendants is truly random, and therefore once caught, two similarly situated suspects have an equal chance of being charged federally, we see no constitutional violation of any kind, or any intuitive sense of unfairness about this lottery.

Several of our colleagues suggested to us that being given a longer or shorter sentence based upon the fortuity of being haled into federal or state court is unfair in the same manner that it is unfair for federal criminal defendants to get longer or shorter sentences depending upon which federal district judge they draw at their plea or sentencing hearing. This lack of uniformity at the sentencing stage was the primary rationale behind the once-mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The argument against what they consider our cavalier attitude toward those unfortunate losers of the federal lottery is this: Furthermore, fairness depends not only on uniform sentencing policy that is, a uniform approach by judges making sentencing decisions , but also on uniform sentencing outcomes resulting in more or less the same sentence for similarly situated defendants.

We find unconvincing the comparison between selection for federal prosecution on the one hand and lack of uniformity in federal sentencing on the other. While we agree that it is unfair and unwise to treat similarly situated defendants differently once they are before a single jurisdictional authority, such is simply not the case here.

Introduction

The very nature of federalism requires independent law enforcement systems to vindicate their own respective interests—limited only by their resources, policies, and the requirements of federal and state constitutions. Where each sovereign has its own individual set of law enforcement priorities and values, this necessarily means that prosecuting a particular defendant may be a low priority for the state, but a high priority for the federal government and vice versa.

We have no central repository for all criminal suspects that would allow us to sort all suspects for state or federal charging and punishment and therefore to rationalize sentences nationally across all jurisdictions.

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Perhaps if there were such a sorting system in place, then defendants could be separated according to the presence and strength of the national interest or lack thereof in prosecuting a particular case, given all of the facts and attendant circumstances. For several reasons, this is unworkable. It would require the sharing of mountains of information between federal, state, and local actors, thereby adding an enormous bureaucracy with its resultant inefficiencies to multiple justice systems already strained by lack of resources. Ignoring momentarily the practical difficulties, such a system would fly in the face of federalism by denying each sovereign the independence to make the ultimate decision to charge or not to charge.

Finally, some basic sorting of suspects into federal or state law enforcement systems is already happening on an informal basis. Federal law enforcement agents are not interested in small cases—they limit themselves to investigations that bear on federal interests or carry national significance. Federal agents refer cases that fail to meet monetary or other thresholds to state actors, and state actors in turn call in their federal counterparts when a case appears to have ties to organized crime or terrorism, or is otherwise too complicated or multi-jurisdictional to handle.

In reality, then, selection for federal prosecution is not truly random. Losers of the federal lottery did not have their names picked out of a hat. Though no single agency examines each suspect and labels him a federal or state subject, the funneling of defendants into state or federal court rests in largest measure on objective, neutral factors, such as which law enforcement agency catches the suspect and develops the case file.

Generally, where federal law enforcement agents investigate a crime over which there is concurrent jurisdiction and apprehend suspects, those suspects frequently wind up in federal court. Where state law enforcement agents investigate an incident and turn over a case file to the local assistant district attorney, that suspect, should he become a defendant, is usually prosecuted in state court. In some instances, the identity of the investigative agency is a matter of chance—do the victims or witnesses to a fraud or drug transaction call the FBI or their local police department after they suffer or witness a crime?

Is the surveillance team that observes the suspects selling drugs on a street corner made up of local officers or DEA agents? In those situations, there is rarely a conscious decision made regarding whether to investigate, or which jurisdiction should handle a particular matter. At the federal level, the majority of case files also start in a reactive manner. The bank examiner making such a call selects a federal agency rather than a state one because he realizes the stakes.

Other than in planned undercover operations, which are more prevalent at the federal than state level though they still certainly comprise a minority of federal cases filed , the decision is first whether to prosecute or not, and then whether to prosecute at the state or federal level.

Case files rejected by federal prosecutors may be handed off and brought instead at the state level. Some cases that start at the state level are transferred to federal law enforcement authorities for the entirely legitimate reason that the case is related to an ongoing federal investigation, or the crime committed is clearly a federal one the van the cops stopped near the border is full of undocumented immigrants. Other times, the state officials are part of a formal or informal state—federal task force or otherwise request federal assistance.

The more difficult question arises where a suspect is apprehended by state law enforcement and is later turned over to federal law enforcement for federal intervention precisely because of the increased punishment that will probably ensue. Case files eventually land on the desks of federal prosecutors around the country after traveling through what seems to us the entirely fair and rational process of being compiled by law enforcement agents. Again, some come directly from federal law enforcement officials, some were created by the federal prosecutors themselves overseeing federal undercover investigations, some come from formal and informal federal—state—local task forces, and some come by request from state or local law enforcement agents or assistant district attorneys.

That happens if the case is too big, too complex, or appears to implicate weighty federal interests. Among these case files, some criminal defendants are in fact selected for criminal prosecution at the federal level. That is, federal prosecutors must affirmatively decide to indict and prosecute a matter, or they must instead decline to prosecute that file. Such declinations are supposed to be recorded, though this does not always occur.

Some cases are so obviously inappropriate for federal concern that they can be disregarded within an hour. In , federal prosecutors were presented with just over , suspects for possible prosecution by federal investigators. Federal prosecutors declined to pursue cases against 29, of those individuals, or approximately However, that year the percentage of cases disposed of by U.

A good portion of those defendants whose cases are dismissed federally will be brought up on state or local charges instead. Available evidence suggests that federal prosecutors have legitimate criteria in mind when they select defendants for prosecution or dismissal. This figure is essentially unchanged from the data, showing a 1. See Motivans, Statistics , supra note , at tbl. Again, these figures are relatively unchanged from the data.

Motivans, Statistics , supra note , at tbl. Federal prosecutors also frequently dismiss cases when the mens rea required for the offense includes a specific intent usually the intent to injure or deceive —a very difficult element to prove. Motivans, Statisics , supra note , at 10 tbl. How do federal prosecutors decide which cases to pursue and which to decline? They first consult the U. Attorneys Manual, which provides both general and specific rules. A prosecutor should decline a case if the defendant is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction.

In addition to these general guidelines, there are many more specific ones pertaining to particular statutes, some requiring approval or at least consultation with Main Justice before charging. Attorney consult with state officials before initiating a federal prosecution under the carjacking statute ; id. Very little empirical work exists regarding the crucial question of how prosecutors implement these guidelines. The agreement is on file with the author. This project with Stefanie Lindquist seeks to examine all such data in an attempt to document how and why federal law enforcement agents and prosecutors select cases for federal prosecution.

Frase conducted a well-designed study of federal criminal prosecutors in the Northern District of Illinois in He found that the most frequent reasons why federal prosecutors declined to bring charges, in order of how frequently each reason was selected, were by our count as follows: One experienced analyst found in a empirical study of national drug prosecutions that those cases with the lowest drug weights were more likely to be declined by federal prosecutors.

The empirical data we do have demonstrates sensible reasons for declinations. Richman has noted that while the overlap between federal and state jurisdiction in criminal codes is substantial, there are unwritten boundaries between the two systems resulting from negotiations between state and federal prosecutors in each jurisdiction as to the kinds of cases that each should handle.

Professor Klein found the existence of similar general agreements during her time as a trial attorney with the U. Department of Justice and as a Special Assistant to the U.

Drug Enforcement Agency , www. See Interagency Law Enforcement, U. These investigations target the very worst national and international traffickers, and each task force consists of state and local officials who endorse these federal prosecutions. In many cases, the state and local law enforcement agencies working alone lack the resources to efficiently prosecute interstate or international drug trafficking organizations.

Drug Enforcement Agency , http: Such figures suggest that the selection of these narcotics defendants for federal criminal prosecution is appropriate. We offer two responses to this criticism. First, it has little to do with the problem of over-federalization. Very few of the laws promulgated by Congress since the s were enacted to quell state or local experimentation with criminal justice policy, and few have that effect.

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