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Lessons and Implications Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Begin-Sadan CSS, , See also Joshua R. See also Brian A. Johnson, Learning Large Lessons: Progress and Prospects Washington, DC: Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror: Kosovo to Libya Barnsley, UK: Columbia University Press, ; Davis, et al. Department of Defense, , ; Watts, The Evolution. This requires new organizational structures, new techniques, tactics and procedures and new doctrines — including at the inter- and intra-service level.
For the sake of coherence, we discuss all these aspects in the next section related to ISR drones. Here, suffices to highlight that the only two countries in Europe that have adopted LAMs, Germany and the UK, are also the only two that have been able to radically transform their armed forces in the direction of Clarence A.
See also footnotes and In the future, drones are likely to conduct missions like Airborne Early Warning and Control, or to serve as communication relays. However, this case is not only methodologically relevant, but also substantively salient: D Dissertation Florence, IT: Cambridge University Press, , For similar concerns, see Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Chicago University Press, However, the program was later cancelled because of technical problems, time delays and — especially — cost overruns it was 3 to 5 times the cost of a For an exceptional account, see Richard Whittle, Predator: Henry Holt and Co.
China and the United Arab Emirates are developing some programs, allegedly intended for export: Aeronautics Industry Brussels, BE: Switzer and Michael A. A Step Forward — Or Back? This argument completely ignores the infrastructural and organizational support that the employment of ISR drones requires. First, learning how to fly and operate drones takes extensive time and resources. For a first-hand account, see Matt J. Martin with Charles W. The Quarterly of Human Factors Applications 21, no. D Dissertation Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University, The US experienced similar differences.
See Sherrill Lingel, et al. Center for Military Studies, Thus, translating the intelligence they gather into a marked combat advantage requires complex and expensive C4 architectures along with the support of other military platforms. However, without satellites and line-of-sight systems transferring imagery and video intelligence, Combined Air Control Centers CAOC processing and distributing data-packages to the different deployed assets, and jet fighters striking enemy targets, the Global Hawk would not have delivered any tangible advantage.
Brookings Institution, ; online appendix. For an opposite view, see Work and Brimley, 20yy Preparing War, 8. The case of the Hunter in Iraq is particularly insightful. Congressional Budget Office, The MIT Press, Ehrhard and Robert O. Work, Range, Persistence, Stealth, and Networking: Lead in Unmanned Systems: National Defense University, The US experience is telling. Converging forces are building that could re-shape the entire industry New York, NY: A Compendium Berlin, DE: Vickers and Robert C. First, like LAMs and ISR drones, in order to deliver a marked and enduring combat advantage, they require modern battle-networks, C4 architectures, organizational codes, appropriate bureaucratic structures, specific military doctrines, skilled personnel, and the support of other manned combat aircrafts, among others.
This is going to trigger some peculiar challenges. Thus, traditional development and procurement approaches, based on full-path regression, are unfit. National Research Laboratory, January Van Dyke Parunak and Sven A. Federico Bergenti, et al. Kluwer Academic Publishing, In , the Defense Science Board already highlighted the need of appropriate regulatory frameworks in this respect. Primarily, onboard anti-collision systems are lengthy, difficult and expensive to develop.
European countries have faced similar obstacles in the integration of UAVs into their national air space. First, we want to stress that we do not claim that all drones are inherently difficult to produce and to operate. Our argument is that combat-effective unmanned platforms, i. Such challenges, in turn, constrain diffusion.
Second, some may argue that basic UAVs that entail only limited platform and adoption challenges i. Assuming this is correct, drones will not revolutionize close combat but, at best, will just reinforce decades-long trends in modern warfare that have increasingly favored weaker actors in close engagements.
As a result, there is little reason to believe that the proliferation of these drones will have destabilizing effects on international security. Last but not least, there are strong reasons to doubt that such diffusion will swift, cheap and easy. As mentioned already, technological dynamics vary significantly across industries: The reason is that data about drones is generally opaque and often lacking.
We cannot say whether China will be able to field and employ combat-effective and reliable UAVs in the near future. Our analysis suggests, however, that this process will be far from quick and easy. Over the past few years, China has invested significant resources in UAVs. Such a remarkable effort corroborates, prima facie, the underlying argument of this article: National Defense University Press, We have tested our argument on the diffusion of three types of UAVs.
Our analysis questions the consensus among scholars and analysts on the ease of building and employing drones, and hence on the apocalyptic views on the coming diffusion of drone warfare. Second, their employment has raised many salient challenges that these countries have struggled to address — from bandwidth constraints to organizational and doctrinal challenges related to the exploitation of real-time information in modern warfare.
Since these countries possess the financial resources, some of the most capable armed forces in the world and extensive experience, we conclude that poorer and less developed countries are unlikely to fare any better in any of these two realms, and likely are going to experience even more daunting problems. At the theoretical level, our analysis speaks not only to the case of drones but to military innovations more in general.
Second, consistent with the work of Posen, we have argued that infrastructural support plays a critical role in enabling or constraining the diffusion of some military innovations. Third, and consistent with the works of Horowitz and Goldman, organizational factors can affect the adoption of some weapon systems, ultimately slowing down their proliferation or compromising their operational effectiveness.
In this respect, however, our work suggests that accumulated experience, rather than penalizing incumbents, may represent a costly entry-barrier for newcomers. These considerations have important implications for the broader research agenda on the diffusion of military innovations. In particular, our work suggests that the speed and width of diffusion of military innovations is a product of the interaction between platform and adoption challenges — two aspects that the existing literature in IR has significantly underestimated by assuming that the imitation of military technology is relatively easy or even neglected infrastructural requirements.
At the policy level, our work has three main implications. First, many scholars are calling for a new legal and normative framework, including amendments to the MTCR, to handle drones proliferation. Insufficient because despite its clarity, in the past countries have violated the regime when their commercial interests were at stake.
Second, the US must resist the calls to halt investments in unmanned and autonomous capabilities. Conversely, it should increase them further — and complement them with investments in counter-measures — in order to preserve its technological lead over friends and foes. In the age of budgetary austerity within NATO, the US should promote efficient spending among its allies, not provide them with further incentives to duplicate capabilities.
On the other, through a well-calibrated policy, the US could prevent the emergence of potential commercial competitors and, eventually even lock its allies into in its weapon systems — de facto strengthening its security commitment. European Defense Agency, Global Politics and Strategy 46, no. Jon Caverley, Dennis Gormley, Robert Jervis, Stephanie Neuman, Costantino Pischedda, Anne Sartori, the anonymous reviewers and the editors provided extremely helpful comments and suggestions on various drafts of this article.
The authors are responsible for any remaining errors and are listed in alphabetical order to reflect equal contribution to this article. Andrea Gilli would like to thank the several individuals who accepted to be interviewed during the initial stages of this research as well as the institutions where part of this study was conducted: According to the mainstream academic view, military technology the hardware spreads easily and quickly, and globalization — along with the information, communication and technology ICT revolution — further accelerates and facilitates this process.
Our research has also relevant implications for IR theory and the diffusion of military innovations more in general. The existing literature does not provide concluding evidence that military technology is easy to produce and that it diffuses easily; moreover, this claim is in contradiction with the literature in economics, economic history, management and sociology.
Second, a country must also be able to provide or to ensure access to the required infrastructural and organizational support 28 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sea Power and World History: On the one hand, cutting-edge technologies inevitably give rise to compatibility problems that are difficult to anticipate, 31 Andrea Gilli, The Ecosystem Challenge and the Diffusion of Military Innovations book manuscript in preparation.
The more demanding the technology is, the more 33 Eric A. For example, naval tankers are relatively unsophisticated ships, since they do not rely on any advanced system: For instance, according to Horowitz and Goldman, high unitary costs and organizational challenges account for the slow diffusion of aircraft carriers.
Importantly, while the existing scholarship has focused on the organizational 45 Andrew W. As discussed in the case of organizational challenges, the key question is whether a country already possesses the infrastructural support required to adopt an innovation, whether it has to acquire some capabilities, or whether it needs to develop the 49 On bureaucratic resistance, see Terry Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Ryan Hilger USN suggests that drone technology would potentially enable any actor, with extremely limited resources, to close 60 Footnotes In the online appendix we provide extensive evidence suggesting that the opposite is true.
However, in order to translate this capability into a marked and enduring combat advantage, armed forces must be first able to locate and track relevant targets, conduct battle-damage assessments, and then direct and organize rapid force movements in order to exploit tactical, operational and strategic gains. Here, suffices to highlight that the only two countries in Europe that have adopted LAMs, Germany and the UK, are also the only two that have been able to radically transform their armed forces in the direction of net-centric warfare.
In the medium-altitude long-endurance MALE UAV segment, although the first platform entered into service in , only three competitors exist: However, the program was later cancelled because of technical problems, time delays and — especially — cost overruns it was 3 to 5 times the cost of a comparable platform. Such resources are scarce, require years of practice and education and complex and expensive training facilities. First, like LAMs and ISR drones, in order to deliver a marked and enduring combat advantage, they require modern battle-networks, C4 architectures, organizational codes, appropriate bureaucratic British Ministry of Defence, Defence Industrial Strategy: Even if this trend took place, the current generation of ISR drones cannot withstand basic countermeasures such as rifle shots or hacking through off-the-shelf software.
The adoption challenges we have discussed in this article will represent the biggest constraint to the proliferation of drone warfare and suggests that changing the MTCR is hence unnecessary. Military Innovations and the Ecosystem Challenge. Many scholars and policy-makers are concerned that the emergence of drone warfare — a first step towards the robotics age — will promote instability and conflict at the international level. According to the mainstream academic view, military technology the 2 Andreas Lorenz, et al.
Industrial, Organizational and Infrastructural Constraints Many scholars and policy-makers are concerned that the emergence of drone warfare — a first step towards the robotics age — will promote instability and conflict at the international level. First, we argue that production challenges are directly related to the capabilities of a military platform: We find that even wealthy, advanced and militarily capable countries such as the US, the UK, Germany and France have struggled to produce or adopt such drones.
We conclude that concerns about the diffusion of drone warfare appear significantly exaggerated, as do claims that globalization redistributes military power at the global level. The authors can be contacted at aa. Andrea Gilli would like to thank the several individuals who, anonymously, accepted to be interviewed during this research and the institutions where part of this study was conducted: Mauro Gilli would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Smiths Richardson Foundation World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship, grant number According to the mainstream academic view, military technology the hardware spreads easily and quickly, and globalization — along with the information, communication and technology revolution — further accelerates and facilitates this process.
Drawing from the literature in management, we argue that IR scholars have largely underestimated both the 2 Andreas Lorenz et al. Palgrave-MacMillan, , pp. These drones are substantively relevant because they can significantly affect modern warfare at the operational and strategic level. Methodologically, these platforms enable us to test, under particularly favorable conditions, different causal mechanisms underpinning the conventional view in IR theory about the rapid proliferation of military technology. Our results thus warn skepticism about apocalyptic views on the coming diffusion of drone warfare and more generally on the consequences of the robotics age on global peace and stability.
Second, our work highlights a missed dimension in the current scholarship — infrastructural 8 See Ron Adner, The Wide Lens: Our framework then suggests that the interaction between challenges at the platform and adoption level affects the proliferation not only of drones, but also of military innovations more in general.
Third, we illustrate the substantial and methodological reasons behind our case selection and then we present our research design. However, they still agree with the conventional view in the literature. The existing literature neither provides concluding evidence that military technology is easy to produce and that it diffuses easily nor explains why this should be the case. Oxford University Press, ; Stephen G. Public Affairs, , p. Second, a country must also be able to provide or to ensure access to the required infrastructural support and to implement the necessary organizational changes adoption challenge.
Such capacity depends on whether a country possesses the qualified workforce as well an advanced technological and industrial base laboratories, testing and production facilities, and accumulated experience and know-how. Commercial shipbuilders do not possess the facilities and expertise necessary for their production; only defense shipbuilding yards do.
In order to deliver its benefits, any hardware requires, on the one hand, a set of appropriate codes, practices and doctrines for its employment and, on the other, a competent workforce organized in suitable structures. Military organizations may resist doctrinal change or adoption of new practices and procedures because of bureaucratic or cultural opposition — the cases of the French and British Army rejecting the Blitzkrieg before World War II are particularly famous in the literature.
Logically, the higher the gap between requirements and existing capabilities, the more difficult and costly adoption will be. Gilroy and Cindy Williams ed.
Second, over the past decades, communication systems have come to play a central role, also at the tactical and operational level, because of progress in information technology: As for organizational challenges, the key question is whether a country already possesses the infrastructural support required to adopt an innovation, whether it has to acquire some capabilities, or whether it needs to develop the entire package anew. While the US is still working on fielding the entire package, no other country has managed to imitate even its initial steps.
In order to provide a preliminary test of our theoretical framework, we have investigated the diffusion of unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs , also known as drones. First, there is a broad consensus among analysts as well as IR scholars that drones are proliferating quickly and widely because they are easy to produce and to operate.
Second, drones permit to test the conventional view among IR scholars about the diffusion of military technology under particularly favorable conditions and, at the same time, they permit to test the platform challenge under particularly unfavorable conditions. With our analysis, we fill this gap. In this way, we can assess the mainstream view among IR scholars under particularly favorable conditions and, at the same time, put our 68 Lt.
Work and Brimley, 20yy Preparing: DOD, , p. Conversely, if our argument finds support here, we feel confident it will succeed under more favorable conditions. Finally, unmanned combat aerial vehicles UCAVs represent an evolution of modern jet fighters. There is a second problem with debate about drones: For our empirical inquiry, we have primarily focused on wealthy and technologically advanced countries like the US, its NATO allies and Israel, with a long history of employing traditional airpower capabilities, net-centric warfare equipment and, also, UAVs.
Second, the employment of the UAVs under consideration requires complex infrastructural and organizational support — often beyond the reach of wealthy and developed countries like the US, France or the UK. Suffices here to highlight two aspects. John Sutton, Technology and Market Structure: This is not surprising, given that her industry has been struggling with advanced technologies — electronics in particular — since the s.
Columbia University Press, ; Lynn F. This case is not only methodologically relevant, but also substantively salient: European University Institute, In the high-altitude long endurance HALE segment, there is in contrast only one available platform worldwide: For instance, Israel has been using drones since the s. However, such resources are scarce. For an opposite view, see Work and Brimley, 20yy Preparing, 8. Work Range, Persistence, Stealth, and Networking: Converging forces are building that could re- shape the entire industry New York, NY: Fifth, the development of UCAVs has so far required over one million man- hours of work and an estimated 25 years' worth of research — a timeframe analogous to manned jet fighters.
Since autonomous systems interact with a dynamic environment in a non-deterministic manner, new testing methods and procedures must be established given the unfitness of traditional approaches based on full-path regression testing aimed at validating every individual requirement. Peterson Institute for International Economics, Our argument is that combat- effective unmanned platforms, i. Two considerations are in order. Assuming this is correct, drones will not revolutionize close combat but, at best, will just reinforce existing decade-long trends in modern warfare that have increasingly favored weaker actors in close engagements.
Some considerations are in order. Last but not least, there are strong reasons to doubt that such diffusion will take place at all. The reason is that data about drones in general are opaque and often lacking. Such a remarkable effort corroborates, prima facie, the underlying argument of this article. Available data shows, first, that even wealthy and advanced countries like the US and its NATO allies have struggled and in some cases even failed in designing, developing and manufacturing the three types of UAVs we have analyzed.
Second, their employment has raised many salient challenges that these countries have not been able to easily address — from bandwidth constraint to organizational and doctrinal challenges related to the exploitation of real-time information in modern warfare. Many studies have criticised US espionage for relying too much on electronic methods, when what they really need are good old fashioned human spies. A good lesson here is Northern Ireland.
At the start of the IRA campaign in the s, British intelligence was very poor. Interestingly China is putting huge resources into spying on the US, principally to steal technology. I still think motivation is a massive factor in military outcomes. North Vietnam defeated the US with mostly low-tech weapons, partly because it was prepared to suffer massively higher casualties 1. Anatoly, IMO it is rather a technological fantasy about possible future world than a feasible scenario of future development. Constellation Project revisiting Moon by Americans have been scrapped. Funds for Space Shuttle replacement are canceled.
Further work on F Raptor is canceled and cheaper, lower tech crafts are under development. Supersonic passenger travel have been terminated. We are not heading towards high tech fantasy world. We are instead heading towards global bankruptcy, disassembling major military forces in scenario comparable with chaotic collapse of Soviet conventional forces.
All your war dreams may well fulfill themselves as a relatively short global war with significant nuclear exchange which is going to leave ailing technological civilization dysfunctional for good. The US is running out of money. Not so much China.
The four examples you cite are all hi-tech white elephants. Having humans go to the Moon again is totally pointless. There are cheaper and more effective ways of blasting payloads space than using a Space Shuttle e. F in favor of cheaper craft? Agreed on first two. Caveat about points is that current the neo-colonial powers are hamstrung by restrictive rules of engagement and laws of war.
In the age of scarcity industrialism, I expect that concern for human rights will dissipate away over time. Modern armies should in principle have little difficulty utterly wiping out low-tech guerrilla resistance once the above legal and ethical restrictions are lifted. I have to comment on the BMD. First you need to ask yourself how much a dollar gives you in terms of nuclear warheads or missile defenses. If the former is more cost-effective than the latter, then BMD as currently projected is doomed.
There are many strategies that could be used to circumvent the shield: The only limit seems to be the human imagination. The mere possibility that a significant number of warheads will be able to reach their target will make deterrence succeed. The question of costs is a valid and important one. Beyond the initial, high, fixed costs of setting up the Missile Defense Ground Environment MDGE , the marginal costs of adding additional interceptor missiles become very low.
Nuclear warhead-tipped ballistic missiles are much more relatively expensive, since the production of highly-enriched uranium is a much more complex enterprise and quantities are constrained by the size of the national nuclear infrastructure. Also, as I noted, further down the line there may emerge laser-based missile defenses, which will make the whole debate — to the extent there is one even today — about relative defensive-offensive costs entirely moot.
I agree that there are counter-measures and that nukes will remain an important factor the nukes per se will remain as valuable as ever, the delivery systems will have to be reworked. To implement the latter, i.
This deterrence succeeds in an age of abundance industrialism, when all countries know that growth can be attained through peaceful, market-based means of resource acquisition, making nuclear warfare very counterproductive. These calculations may change in an age when the survival of any national industrial system becomes critically dependent on a shrinking stock of resources that are competed over. Something has just struck me re-reading your article. What effect would this have on the large Russian scientist population of USA? If these hardships last for more or less a decade as you yourself believe , they will lead to reverse brain drain where Russian and Chinese scientists return, creating an equilibrium.
I think many of the Chinese scientists will return. China has been rising at a very rapid pace throughout their entire careers. I doubt that will be the case for Russian scientists.
Many of them view Russia with outright bitterness and have a diasporic mentality. With the economy projected to grow, this sum will only increase. Interestingly, tests of laser weapons or laser applications which demonstrate a weaponization potential still are conducted under strictly controlled conditions, and make little allowance for actual atmospheric conditions. Lasers, like any form of energy, suffer drag and attenuation from the atmosphere they pass through.
Compensation for this effect has taken the form of massive power, but we see that this, too, has its limitations, while there remains a trade-off in physical size. Initial tests of infrared IR homing missile systems inspired similar jubilation, until they proved to be significantly affected by rain and fog. Evading detection always has most of the advantage on its side; when you know what the enemy is going to be shooting at you or looking for you with, determine what it uses to search and ensure you are not what it sees.
Even when the radar has found you, prediction circuitry takes over which updates the target where it expects it to be based on maintaining direction and speed. Any errors introduced that way force it into reacquisition. Of course, as you correctly point out, a ballistic missile is not agile by nature, and would be unlikely execute evasive maneuvering. In that case, large numbers of cheap ballistic projectiles that contain no warhead or midcourse guidance package would be a valid option — slightly faster than the actual missiles and launched so as to appear earlier, sucking in the defense systems and exhausting them.
It might only work once, but it might only need to. Dear yalensis and Anatoly, Sorry to post something totally not relevant at all to the above topic. I believe he has blocked me from his blog. I do hope I am completely wrong about Medvedev. I have a refutation nearly 4 pages!
Would be appreciative if you could convey this. I would be also grateful if you could send my best wishes to Mikhail and thanks for his many interesting and enlightening posts. You are of course, under no obligation, to convey those messages but would be grateful if you do.
I also hope that Anatoly will allow this final post from me , which, he being so tolerant with my idiosyncrasies, I believe, would do so. To yalensis and Anatoly — thank you for tolerating me. Where I disagree with anyone, I hope none take it personally! And I wish all the best to Russia!
As you will see if you go there, your comments went into the spam filter, from which they were retrieved. I have pointed out before this that lengthy posts such as yours, which is almost a dissertation which contain a lot of links are often perceived as spam by the filter program, which uses criteria into which I have no input.
Anatoly has been an occasional victim as well. I thought the Chinese were supposed to be a patient people. Having to wait overnight to be heard is, I submit, not a particularly trying ordeal. Even Boris Nemtsov managed to stay in jail for 15 days without crying too much. I doubt that lasers are the coming superweapon simply because you have to follow the target and range is limited in the atmosphere.
However, they can rock in space.
If you want to weaponize light you better use a large mirror in space that can be turned on and off and change position. One soultion would be using mercury on a rotating surface to form the reflecting mirror and afterwards shut it off again and go into hiding. Such space mirrors can also help solve the civilian energy supply problem day and night by burning down in desert on solar energy using installations for electricity production.
But stratospheric airships with a transparent ballon and stealth gliders would be a convenient replacement because these gliders can be quite resilent targets that are difficult to locate. The Unz Review - Mobile. An Alternative Media Selection. All None Exclude Blogs. The Transition 20 Years On: Teasers Russian Reaction Blog.
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Unmanned Robotic Warfare (Lance Winslow Future Military Weapons Series) - Kindle edition by Lance Winslow. Download it once and read it on your Kindle. the future of mankind and the Military Technology research is being done to protect the before he delivers it to you" - Lance Winslow
Show 18 Comments Leave a Comment. February 18, at 9: ICBM's by definition follow a ballistic trajectory and accuracy has not been a major issue since the 's. But weapons always had a tendency to become more complex, it's just that the benefits outweighed the costs. Industrialism at the global level can be sustained with gas and coal for another generation, and one thing we can be quite sure about is that the military-industrial complex will be one of the state's most favored sectors for distributing stagnating or falling revenues.
Just because a shell can blow up within an artillery piece didn't stop people from using them. As I mentioned, there needs to be an optimal balance between hi-tech and "guerrilla" philosophies of war. The old designers from the Soviet era are retiring, they are not being replaced, and in general it seems that Russia's development of the RMA and of future-generation weapons systems lags NATO by a huge margin. February 19, at 1: I'm sorry for my ignorance of the subject, but I just cannot visualise your projects, Mr Karlin. Surely the 'peak oil and collapse' you speak of will come much sooner. I cannot imagine the consequences of mistakes and mishaps which will undoubtedly occur whilst wielding it they happen with RPG-7s, I'm sure they can happen with state-of-the-art plasma shields.
If they are all inter-connected, surely managing your secret information and protecting it from the ''information war'' will become a nightmare! I'm sorry I cannot back up my arguments with serious facts, Mr Karlin, this is just how I feel. February 19, at 8: February 19, at 9: A few random thoughts: Anatoly Karlin Agreed on first two. February 19, at 6: Anatoly Karlin The US is running out of money. And due to natural technological progression, the costs of these systems is going to fall over the years, especially for those in which computers and electronics make up the bulk of the cost Moore's Law.
I don't envision future warfare as a robotized one fought exclusively with very expensive toys; it will be one in which mass-produced, cheap platforms will play an important role since their effective strength will be multiplied by being networked and made intelligent. February 24, at 6: We are going to run out of money and no, printing press won't do February 24, at 7: I can't see a direct "resource war" between the US and China any time soon unless one side sets out to starve the other of some vital resource.
Even if resources are declining, the US and China will be powerful enough to get big shares of what's left. It's other places, like Europe and Africa, that will get squeezed first. So I think a direct US - China confrontation is still some way off. I have this funny feeling the real push for more "green" policies isn't going to come from the tree-huggers and Friends Of The Earth, but from the generals. The US never caught Bin Laden, and if he's still alive, I'm sure he never ever uses a cellphone or email. I think, in a US-China war not directly threatening the home territory of either country, I'd bet on Chinese soldiers being more motivated, though I have no evidence for this.
March 4, at 5: Anatoly Karlin The question of costs is a valid and important one. Also, as I noted, further down the line there may emerge laser-based missile defenses, which will make the whole debate - to the extent there is one even today - about relative defensive-offensive costs entirely moot. Teddy Suhren, Ace of Aces: Develop strategies and plans for securing information assets on IT systems in the face of cyber attacks. The indicator or recorder may be locally or board mounted, and like modifiers and transmitters this information is indicated by the type of symbol used.
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