Dimensions of Dignity: The Moral Importance of Being Human

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Other things have authority over us and the respect they are due includes acknowledgment of their authority and perhaps obedience to their authoritative commands. Other forms of respect are modes of valuing, appreciating the object as having an objective worth or importance that is independent of, perhaps even at variance with, our antecedent desires or commitments.

Thus, we can respect things we don't like or agree with, such as our enemies or someone else's opinion. Valuing respect is kin to esteem, admiration, veneration, reverence, and honor, while regarding something as utterly worthless or insignificant or disdaining or having contempt for it is incompatible with respecting it. Respect also aims to value its object appropriately, so it contrasts with degradation and discounting.

The kinds of valuing that respect involves also contrast with other forms of valuing such as promoting or using Anderson , Pettit Indeed, regarding a person merely as useful treating her as just a sexual object, an ATM machine, a research subject is commonly identified as a central form of disrespect for persons, and many people decry the killing of endangered wild animals for their tusks or hides as despicably disrespectful of nature.

Respect is sometimes identified as a feeling; it is typically the experiencing of something as valuable that is in focus in these cases. Finally, respect is generally regarded as having a behavioral component. In respecting an object, we often consider it to be making legitimate claims on our conduct as well as our thoughts and feelings and are disposed to behave appropriately.

Appropriate behavior includes refraining from certain treatment of the object or acting only in particular ways in connection with it, ways that are regarded as fitting, deserved by, or owed to the object. And there are very many ways to respect things: One can behave in respectful ways, however, without having respect for the object, as when a teen who disdains adults behaves respectfully toward her friend's parents in a scheme to get the car, manipulating rather than respecting them.

To be a form or expression of respect, behavior has to be motivated by one's acknowledgment of the object as calling for that behavior, and it has to be motivated directly by consideration that the object is what it is, without reference to one's own interests and desires. On the other hand, certain kinds of feelings would not count as respect if they did not find expression in behavior or involved no dispositions to behave in certain ways rather than others, and if they did not spring from the beliefs, perceptions, and judgments that the object is worthy of or calls for such behavior.

The attitudes of respect, then, have cognitive dimensions beliefs, acknowledgments, judgments, deliberations, commitments , affective dimensions emotions, feelings, ways of experiencing things , and conative dimensions motivations, dispositions to act and forbear from acting ; some forms also have valuational dimensions. The attitude is typically regarded as central to respect: That it is the nature of the object that determines its respect-worthiness, and that there are different kinds of objects calling for correspondingly different responses has led many philosophers to argue that there are different kinds of respect.

In what follows, three sets of distinctions will be discussed. Its objects are dangerous things or things with power over the subject. It is respekt that woodworkers are encouraged to have for power tools, that a city dweller might have for street gangs, a new sailor might be admonished to have for the sea, a child might have for an abusive parent. Respekt contrasts with contemptuous disregard; it is shown in conduct that is cautious, self-protective, other-placating. It involves regarding the object as making a rightful claim on our conduct, as deserving moral consideration in its own right, independently of considerations of personal well being.

It is observantia , Feinberg maintains, that historically was extended first to classes of non-dangerous but otherwise worthy people and then to all persons as such, regardless of merit or ability.

Observantia encompasses both the respect said to be owed to all humans equally and the forms of polite respect and deference that acknowledge different social positions. Feinberg sees different forms of power as underlying the three kinds of respect; in each case, respect is the acknowledgment of the power of something other than ourselves to demand, command, or make claims on our attention, consideration, and deference.

Human Dignity: A Way of Living

Hudson draws a four-fold distinction among kinds of respect, according to the bases in the objects. Consider the following sets of examples: The respect in a , evaluative respect , is similar to other favorable attitudes such as esteem and admiration; it is earned or deserved or not depending on whether and to the degree that the object is judged to meet certain standards. Obstacle respect , in b , is a matter of regarding the object as something that, if not taken proper account of in one's decisions about how to act, could prevent one from achieving one's ends. The objects of c directive respect are directives: One respects a directive when one's behaviors intentionally comply with it.

The objects of d institutional respect are social institutions or practices, the positions or roles defined within an institution or practice, and persons or things that occupy the positions or represent the institution. Institutional respect is shown by behavior that conforms to rules that prescribe certain conduct as respectful. These four forms of respect differ in several ways. Each identifies a quite different kind of feature of objects as the basis of respect.

Each is expressed in action in quite different ways, although evaluative respect need not be expressed at all, one can have institutional respect for an institution e. Evaluative respect centrally involves having a favorable attitude toward the object, while the other forms do not. Directive respect does not admit of degrees one either obeys the rule or doesn't , but the others do we can have more evaluative respect for one person than another.

Hudson uses this distinction to argue that respect for persons is not a unique kind of respect but should be conceived rather as involving some combination or other of these four. To Hudson's four-fold classification, Dillon a adds a fifth form, care respect , which is exemplified in an environmentalist's deep respect for nature. Care respect involves regarding the object as having profound and perhaps unique value and so cherishing it, and perceiving it as fragile or calling for special care and so acting or forbearing to act out of felt benevolent concern for it.

This analysis of respect draws explicitly from a feminist ethics of care and has been influential in feminist and non-feminist discussions of respecting persons as unique, particular individuals. Darwall distinguishes two kinds of respect: Recognition respect is the disposition to give appropriate weight or consideration in one's practical deliberations to some fact about the object and to regulate one's conduct by constraints derived from that fact.

Appraisal respect, by contrast, is an attitude of positive appraisal of a person or their merits, which are features of persons that manifest excellences of character. Individuals can be the objects of appraisal respect either as persons or as engaged in some pursuit or occupying some role. Evaluation is always done in light of some qualitative standards, and different standards can apply to one and the same individual.

Thus, appraisal respect is a matter of degree, depending on the extent to which the object meets the standards so, we can respect someone more or less highly and respect one person more highly than another , and it can co-exist with some negative assessments of an individual or her traits judged in light of other standards. We can have appraisal respect for someone's honesty even while thinking her lazy, and we can highly respect someone else as altogether a morally fine person; we can respect an individual as an excellent teacher or carpenter yet regard her as far from a moral exemplar.

Darwall distinguishes appraisal respect, which is based on assessment of character traits, from esteem, another attitude of positive assessment whose wider basis include any features in virtue of which one can think well of someone. If it is, then it should encompass the other distinctions although some fine-tuning might be necessary. And indeed, evaluative respect and perhaps reverentia for morally good persons are essentially the same as appraisal respect, while respekt , obstacle respect, observantia, directive respect, institutional respect, and care respect can be analyzed as forms of recognition respect.

Neither reverentia for the moral law nor the felt experience of reverential respect for the sublimity of persons as such Buss are forms of appraisal respect, yet because recognition respect is analyzed, first, as holding only in deliberative contexts, and second, as not essentially involving feeling, reverentia seems also not to be a form of recognition respect.

Moreover, while valuing the object is not part of Darwall's analysis of recognition respect—and it is not essential to some forms of recognition respect e. In particular, valuing persons intrinsically is widely regarded as the heart of the respect that all persons are thought to be owed simply as persons.

However, it is not sufficient simply to gloss recognition respect as recognizing the value of the object, for one can recognize the value of something and yet not value it, as an insurance appraiser does, or take the value of something, say, a person's child, into account in deliberating about how best to revenge oneself on that person.

Respect for some categories of objects is not just a matter of taking the object's value into consideration but of valuing the object, and valuing it intrinsically. Analyzing appraisal respect as just the positive assessment of someone's character traits as good is similarly problematic, for one can evaluate something highly and yet not value it. For example, one can appraise someone's moral performance as stellar and hate or envy her for precisely that reason.

Respect in the appraisal sense is not just evaluating but also valuing the object positively. Appraisal respect is a form of valuing respect, but recognition respect includes both valuing and non-valuing forms. There are, of course, different modes of valuing, and at least three distinctions are relevant to respect: A complete account of respect would need to work out a taxonomy that incorporates these valuing distinctions.

In everyday discourse, the valuing sense of respect, especially when used about people, most commonly means thinking highly of someone, i. However, philosophical attention to respect has tended to focus on recognition or, sometimes, reverential respect that acknowledges or values the object from a moral point of view. These discussions tend to relate such respect to the concepts of moral standing or moral worth. Moral standing, or moral considerability, is the idea that certain things matter morally in their own right and so are appropriate objects of direct fundamental moral consideration or concern Birch , P.

Some form of recognition respect is, on some accounts, a primary mode of such moral consideration. Discussions that focus on moral standing or moral worth address questions such as: What things fall within the domain of basic moral consideration or have this distinctive moral worth? What confers moral standing on objects, or what is the basis of their moral worth? Are there different levels of moral standing and, if so, do objects at different levels warrant different modes of moral respect? And what sorts of treatment are constitutive of, express, or are compatible with such moral respect?

In modern philosophical discussions, humans are universally regarded as the paradigm objects of moral respect; if anything has moral standing or dignity and so warrants respect, it is the individual human being. Although some theorists argue that nature or, all living beings, species, ecosystems or societies or, cultures, traditions also warrant the moral consideration and valuing of respect, most philosophical discussion of respect has focused on respect for persons.

People can be the objects or recipients of different forms of respect. Thus the idea of respect for persons is ambiguous. In the literature of moral and political philosophy, the notion of respect for persons commonly means a kind of respect that all people are owed morally just because they are persons, regardless of social position, individual characteristics or achievements, or moral merit.

The idea is that persons as such have a distinctive moral status in virtue of which we have special categorical obligations to regard and treat them in ways that are constrained by certain inviolable limits. This is sometimes expressed in terms of rights: And it is a commonplace that persons are owed or have a right to equal respect. It is obvious that we could not owe every individual evaluative respect, let alone equal evaluative respect, since not everyone acts morally correctly or has an equally morally good character.

So, if it is true that all persons are owed or have a moral right to respect just as persons, then the concept of respect for person has to be analyzed as some form or combination of forms of recognition or reverential respect. For a variety of reasons, however, it is controversial whether we do indeed have a moral obligation to respect all persons, regardless of merit, and if so, why. There are disagreements, for example, about the scope of this claim, the grounds for respect, and the justification for the obligation.

There is also a divergence of views about the kinds of treatment that are respectful of persons. One source of controversy concerns the scope of the concept of a person. This is because some of the reasons that have been given for respecting persons have the logical consequence that non-human things warrant the same respect on the very same grounds as humans. Consequently, one question an account of respect for persons has to address is: Who or what are persons that are owed respect? Different answers have been offered, including all human beings; all and only those humans who are themselves capable of respecting persons; all beings capable of rational activity, whether human or not; all beings capable of functioning as moral agents, whether human or not.

The second, third and fourth answers would seem to exclude deceased humans and humans who lack sufficient mental capacity, such as the profoundly retarded, the severely mentally ill and senile, those in persistent vegetative states, the pre-born, and perhaps very young children. The third and fourth answers might include artificial beings androids, sophisticated robots , spiritual beings gods, angels , extraterrestrial beings, and certain animals apes, dolphins.

In trying to clarify who or what we are obligated to respect, we are naturally led to a question about the ground or basis of respect: What is it about persons that makes them matter morally and makes them worthy of respect? One common way of answer this question is to look for some morally significant natural quality that is common to all beings that are noncontroversially owed respect for example, all normal adult humans. Candidate qualities include the ability to be moved by considerations of moral obligation, the ability to value appropriately, the ability to reason, and the ability to engage in reciprocal relationships.

Some of these apply only to humans, others to other beings as well. Even regarding humans, there is a question of scope: Are all humans owed respect? If respect is something to which all human beings have an equal claim, then, it has been argued, the ground quality has to be one that all humans possess equally or in virtue of which humans are naturally equal, or a threshold quality that all humans possess, with variations above the threshold ignored.

Some philosophers have argued that certain capacities fit the bill; others argue that there is no quality possessed by all humans that could be a plausible ground for a moral obligation of equal respect. Some draw from this the conclusion that respect is owed not to all but only to some human beings; others conclude that the obligation to respect all humans is groundless: But the last view still leaves the questions: And is it conferred on all humans?

Yet another question of scope is: Must persons always be respected? One view is that individuals forfeit their claim to respect by, for example, committing heinous crimes of disrespect against other persons, such as murder in the course of terrorism or genocide. Another view is that there are no circumstances under which it is morally justifiable to not respect a person, and that even torturers and child-rapists, though they may deserve the most severe condemnation and punishment and may have forfeited their rights to freedom and perhaps to life, still remain persons to whom we have obligations of respect, since the grounds of respect are independent of moral merit or demerit.

Beyond the question of the ground or basis of respect for persons, there is a further question of justification to be addressed, for it is one thing to say that persons have a certain valuable quality, but quite another thing to say that there is a moral obligation to respect persons. So we must ask: What reasons do we have for believing that the fact that persons possess quality X entails that we are morally obligated to respect persons by treating them in certain ways?

Another way of asking a justification question seeks not a normative connection between qualities of persons and moral obligation, but an explanation for our belief that humans and perhaps other beings are owed respect, for example: What in our experience of other humans or in our evolutionary history explains the development and power of this belief?

Our actual felt experiences of reverential respect play a significant role in some of these explanatory accounts; what justifies accepting our experience of respect for humans or other beings as grounds for an obligation is its coherence with our other moral beliefs Buss , Margalit , Gibbard Finally, there are questions about how we are supposed to respect persons, such as: What standards for conduct and character give appropriate expression to the attitude of respect?

Some philosophers argue that the obligation to respect person functions as a negative constraint: For example, we ought not to treat them as if they were worthless or had value only insofar as we find them useful or interesting, or as if they were mere objects or specimens, or as if they were vermin or dirt; we ought not to violate their basic moral rights, or interfere with their efforts to make their own decisions and govern their own conduct, or humiliate them, or treat them in ways that flout their nature and worth as persons.

Others maintain that we also have positive duties of respect: And some philosophers note that it may be more respectful to judge someone's actions or character negatively or to punish someone for wrongdoing than to treat them as if they were not responsible for what they did, although requirements of respect would impose limits on how such judgments may be expressed and how persons may be punished. Another question is whether treating people with respect requires treating them equally.

One view is that the equality of persons entails equal treatment; another view is that equal treatment would involve failing to respect the important differences among persons. On the latter view, it is respectful to deal with each individual impartially and exclusively on the basis of whatever aspects of the individual or the situation are relevant Frankfurt The most influential position on these issues is found in the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant , , Indeed, most contemporary discussions of respect for persons explicitly claim to rely on, develop, or challenge some aspect of Kant's ethics.

Central to Kant's ethical theory is the claim that all persons are owed respect just because they are persons, that is, free rational beings. To be a person is to have a status and worth that is unlike that of any other kind of being: And the only response that is appropriate to such a being is respect.

Respect that is, moral recognition respect is the acknowledgment in attitude and conduct of the dignity of persons as ends in themselves. Respect for such beings is not only appropriate but also morally and unconditionally required: Because we are all too often inclined not to respect persons, not to value them as they ought to be valued, one formulation of the Categorical Imperative, which is the supreme principle of morality, commands that our actions express due respect for the worth of persons: Our fundamental moral obligation, then, is to respect persons; morally right actions are thus those that express respect for persons as ends in themselves, while morally wrong actions are those that express disrespect or contempt for persons by not valuing them as ends in themselves Wood In addition to this general commandment, Kant argues that there are also more specific duties of respect for other persons and self-respect, to which we'll return.

For now, we must address the question, What is it to be an end in itself and to possess dignity? The concept of an end has several meanings for Kant. In one sense, to be an end is to have some kind of value or worth. Most things have value as the objects of our desires, interests, or affections; they are the ends we pursue or produce, our subjective ends.

But the worth of an end in itself is worth that is not relative to, conditional on, or derived from being the object of anyone's desires or affections. Rather, its worth is intrinsic to it, unconditional, incomparable, and objective. Kant argues that rational beings are the only entities that are ends in themselves and that all rational beings are ends in themselves.

In arguing for respect for the dignity of persons, Kant explicitly rejects two other conceptions of human value: Against the aristocratic view Kant argues that although individuals as members of some social community or other may have or lack meritorious accomplishment or status or may deserve honor or evaluative respect to different degrees or not at all, all persons as members of the moral community, the community of all and only ends in themselves, are owed the same moral recognition respect, for the dignity that they possesses as rational is unconditional and independent of all other facts about or features of them.

Dignity is also incomparable worth: And dignity is absolute or objective worth, which means that it is a value that everyone has compelling reason to acknowledge, regardless of their antecedent desires, interests, or affections. This brings us to a second sense in which persons are ends in themselves. In particular, they must never be treated merely as means, as things that we may use however we want in order to advance our interests, and they must always be treated as the supremely valuable beings that they are.

Note that it is not wrong to treat persons as means to our ends; indeed we could not get along in life if we could not make use of the talents, abilities, service, and labor of other people. What we must not do is to treat persons as mere means to our ends, to treat them as if the only value they have is what derives from their usefulness to us.

As the Categorical Imperative indicates, it is humanity in persons, strictly speaking, that has dignity; that is, it is in virtue of the humanity in them that people are and so ought to be treated as ends in themselves. Commentators generally identify humanity that which makes us distinctively human beings and sets us apart from all other animal species with two closely related aspects of rationality: The capacity to set ends, which is the power of rational choice, is the capacity to value things through rational judgment: It is also, thereby, the capacity to value ends in themselves, and so it includes the capacity for respect Velleman The capacity to be autonomous is the capacity to be self-legislating and self-governing, that is, a the capacity to legislate moral laws that are valid for all rational beings through one's rational willing by recognizing, using reason alone, what counts as a moral obligation, and b the capacity then to freely resolve to act in accordance with moral laws because they are self-imposed by one's own reason and not because one is compelled to act by any forces external to one's reason and will, including one's own desires and inclinations.

The capacity to be autonomous is thus also the capacity to freely direct, shape, and determine the meaning of one's own life, and it is the condition for moral responsibility. But why does the possession of these capacities make persons ends in themselves? Kant argues that moral principles must be categorical imperatives, which is to say that they must be rational requirements to which we are unconditionally subject, regardless of whatever inclinations, interests, goals, or projects we might have.

But there could be categorical imperatives only if there is something of absolute worth. Only persons have this kind of worth, and they have it because the capacity to set ends, or to confer value on things, is the source of all objective value as Korsgaard and Wood have argued , and the capacity for autonomy is the source, on the one hand, both of the obligatoriness of moral law and of responsible moral actions, and on the other, of all realized human goodness.

As the sources of all value and of morality itself, then, these rational capacities are the basis of the absolute worth or dignity of rational beings. Kant maintains that all rational beings necessarily attribute this value to themselves and that they must, on reflection, acknowledge that every other rational being has the same value and on the same grounds: It is thus not as members of the biological species homo sapiens that we have dignity and so are owed moral recognition respect, but as rational beings who are capable of moral agency.

There are several important consequences of this view regarding the scope of recognition respect for persons. First, while all normally functioning human beings possess the rational capacities that ground recognition respect, there can be humans in whom these capacities are altogether absent and who therefore, on this view, are not persons and are not owed respect.

Second, these capacities may be possessed by beings who are not biologically human, and such beings would also be persons with dignity whom we are morally obligated to respect. Third, because dignity is an absolute worth grounded in the rational capacities for morality, it is in no way conditional on how well or badly those capacities are exercised, on whether a person acts morally or has a morally good character or not. Thus, dignity cannot be diminished or lost through vice or morally bad action, nor can it be increased through virtue or morally correct action.

Because personhood and dignity are not matters of degree, neither is the recognition respect owed to persons. Once a person, always a person barring, say, brain death , and so individuals cannot forfeit dignity or the right to recognition respect no matter what they do.

It follows that even the morally worst individuals must still be regarded as ends in themselves and treated with respect. Of course, wrongdoing may call for punishment and may be grounds for forfeiting certain rights, but it is not grounds for losing dignity or for regarding the wrongdoer as worthless scum. Recognition respect is not something individuals have to earn or might fail to earn, but something they are owed simply because they are rational beings. Finally, because dignity is absolute and incomparable, the worth of all rational beings is equal.

Thus the morally worst persons have the same dignity as the morally best persons, although the former, we might say, fail to live up to their dignity. What grounds dignity is something that all persons have in common, not something that distinguishes one individual from another. Thus each person is to be respected as an equal among equals, without consideration of their individual achievements or failures, social rank, moral merit or demerit, or any feature other than their common rational nature.

However, the equality of all rational beings does not entail that each person must be treated the same as every other persons, nor does it entail that persons cannot also be differentially evaluated and valued in other ways for their particular qualities, accomplishments, merit, or usefulness. But such valuing and treatment must always be constrained by the moral requirement to accord recognition respect to persons as ends in themselves. As thinking and acting beings, our lives are fragile and constantly under threat.

In our constantly endangered lives, it is important to stand our ground with confidence. Thus a dignified way of living is not any way of living: It is also a particular way of answering the question: What kind of life do we wish to live? This beautifully written reflection on our most cherished human value will be of interest to a wide readership.

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Dimensions of Dignity: The Moral Importance of Being Human, by Dan Egonsson

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Dimensions of Dignity: The Moral Importance of Being Human, by Dan Egonsson

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