Neue ambulante Maßnahmen nach dem Jugendgerichtsgesetz im Zeichen des KICK (German Edition)

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One can argue that criminal proceedings do not deal primarily with a person but with an action. However, to communicate this aspect of separation between offense and offender, victimization and victim is not achieved. Obviously I cannot judge the mentioned Kachelmann case but in general it has to be said: We need to offer the accused to admit wrong-doing without automatically leading to being sentenced and we need to give the sufferer of wrong-doing also an opportunity to admit own contributions which possibly may have brought the incident forward.

Relying on Zehr once again we can ask three different questions which would represent a system of restorative justice: Who suffers from the harm of the incident? Which are the negative consequences? How and by whom can the problem be solved, the damage be restored? It may be that he faces loss, too, but the questions focus primarily on the direct and indirect victims this includes probably also relatives and friends of the offender and on the community of all these persons. Our perspective is directed at the future. It is not centered on sentencing but deals primarily with support, healing and restitution, to which the offender but also other participants may contribute.

Therefore we need the support of the c. This question was open at the time of the presentation. After the acquittal it can be confirmed that the criminal justice system is more than struggling with these kind of conflicts, see also the case of Strauss-Kahn former president of the ICF but on the other hand a 5-year prison sentence of a teacher from Hesse, who is now labeled innocent and has been released in the meantime after serving the full sentence Frankfurter Rundschau vom.

However, it must be taken into account that some forms of harm, most notably the so-called invisible wounds, e. Concept, Ideas And Impediments To do this our principle intention is to invite victims to participate more, to emphasize their needs, to promote the dialogue, meaning to bring together the conflict parties, and to orientate them towards a respectful social behavior.

Conflicts also matter for communities that became apparent recently in Grefrath. We would like to intensify the impact on the offender, support sustainable learning processes in regard to preventive effects and social peace. We are convinced that the communication in court or outside with professional lawyers may be improved, that an understandable everyday language may be used and that informal procedures may help life world actors to take their own affairs into their own hands 10 Referring to a child-murder case in early which according to media reports affected a whole town whose inhabitants show signs of uncertainty and express sympathy with the lot of the parents and relatives of the victim but also of the offender who originated from a neighboring community.

See Christie s conflicts as property and Braithwaite s demand for a democratization of social control. To achieve this goal the empowerment of the structurally weaker people is needed, we must look for the positive. And finally we want to help implementing European and international framework decisions, guidelines and recommendations.

The latter will be outlined in section The philosophy of restorative justice I have already outlined many aspects of the RJ philosophy between the lines, now I will give a definition of the term which was invented by Eglash Restorative Justice is a process to involve, to the extent possible, those who have a stake in the specific offence and to collectively identify and address harms, needs and obligations, in order to heal and put things right as possible.

Like always in science there are of course many different nuances. Zehr links RJ only with criminal justice I would like to name this the narrow position different authors, however, extend the concept and propose to apply this philosophy also in other fields of life e. Zehr takes a very moderate position: This shall happen to a maximum possible extent, which means on a voluntary basis and only in so far as there are no opposing reasons e. He defines the tasks for this group: All participants are demanded to the same extent. The future being at the center: What can be done to repair harm?

How can a wound including psychological wounds, e. Prior to dealing with these questions the group must agree upon which harms need to be addressed and which needs can be claimed legitimately by every participant and the Concept, Ideas And Impediments community. These are not only related to the offender but include every single actor involved and the community. Thus, we will get a discourse about moral issues and justice related to concrete persons and actions. This seems to be exactly what once used to be the core idea of public trials?

We will not reach all participants and not every offender and victim will be prepared to undertake this effort. This aspect of RJ points to another component beside the narrow business of conflict solving: It could be an important contribution to social peace. Social peace means more than just peace under the law see Papier RJ assumes three perspectives in a conflict: In addition to the victim and offender-perspectives we must consider and involve the community concretely because there is hardly any conflict which affects only two individuals.

People live in social settings. An individual will only exist through experiencing being part of a social group or structure. It is hard to look at a son as the offender without taking his parents or caring others into account. His friends and further significant others are important for him. The same is true for the victim. There is a partner, friends, relatives, neighbors and colleagues who could be considered as co-victims or who might take up the victim status themselves. From a victimological point of view we must conclude that the final court decision definitely constructs peace under the law but this does not necessarily imply an improvement of the victim s situation.

Disturbed or destroyed social relationships are not restored automatically by the verdict. Social peace emerges from healing of the wounds. It is not always possible to restore all damages, not every wound will heal completely. Especially the so-called invisible 11 Here the difference between subjective and objective perspective is mentioned.

Realistically we must assume that different people would perceive the same phenomenon differently. What appears to be a tolerable exertion of the body for one actor will be classified as playing foul by another one. For all big matches referees will solve this difference in accordance with the logic of the c. In a spare time-match in the life world there is usually no referee and a match has to be interrupted for a time to discuss sub jective perceptions. Sometimes the game might end because there is no consensus. Or single players drop out because there is no longer a shared rule.

Both solutions are unsatisfactory. A soccer match based on RJ has to offer a settlement procedure without referee who possess the power to decide finally but with an instruction for a peace-finding process based on consensus according to the needs of all participants. He is the first theore tician who stressed the positive consequences of something that causes so much suffering as a crime, namely the opportunity for the community to clarify their norms and values at this occasion collective consciousness.

This implies certain publicity, a position which can be understood but is problematic given the rule that for reasons of protection criminal proceedings against minors are not in public. However, holding it in public at least to certain extent will be in the interest of both the offender for whose pretended protection it is excluded since a couple of years this protective regulation is also applicable for certain types of victims on their demand and the public.

It was already Beccaria in the early modern age who demanded public proceedings again in the interest of the offender! Until that time it has been customary to hear the case secretly even to prepare a charge was done without letting the accused know about allegations and leading to grave impediments for an accused person to prepare his or her defense and to collect exculpatory evidence. Going back to the narrow understanding of our theme we can see that judges and prosecutors get a break in dealing with the case. Instead of them, judicially untrained mediators are mandated to arrange a secure process for the dialogue which will proceed in accordance with the above mentioned definition.

Contrary to judges, mediators do not possess power. They focus on a good atmosphere for talking and a structured process and they guarantee the safety for every participant during the mediation process. The responsibility for a successful outcome in the sense of constructive and sustainable solutions and entailed agreements in detail etc. A lot of efforts are required but on this way suitable agreements are almost guaranteed.

The participants themselves know best which measures would be helpful and supportive to solve their problem. What is the meaning of restoration? It is very difficult to translate the term RJ into German. I will stick to the original term thinking of justice as a subjective moral experience of the participants not an objective category defined in commentaries of legal acts. The prefix re must not necessarily be interpreted in the sense of going back to the previous status.

Imagine a relationship between a wife who is suppressed by her husband like it is mentioned in caricatures or more frequently as a prejudice claimed to be true for Turkish migrant families. Let us assume a conflict has escalated and the man has beaten his wife and we convene a mediation procedure afterwards. In this case it makes no sense to interpret to restore the relationship in a way to get back to the previous situation avoiding only physical violence, but restoration points to a new equilibrium which is characterized by a comprehensive showing of respect, by equal rights and needs.

Restoration of the social relationship can imply the restoration of the previous relationship if it was just and balanced or it can mean a new way of interaction being on a par with each other. Concept, Ideas And Impediments Figure 3: A circle represents perfectly the core democratic idea of conferencing as a life world tool. The three circles vary everyday perspectives on Restorative Justice at a maximum: Not every program or intervention-form involves all three dimensions, e. VOM often excludes the community and a conflict is individualized.

The resulting classification allows for an overview on the restorative potential of different concrete forms of intervention. To sum up I would like to emphasize some differences of restorative justice and the prevailing traditional c. In criminal justice, the principal collective agent is the state, while collectivity in Restorative Justice is mainly seen through the community.

The response to crime is not ruled by a top-down imposed set of procedures, but by a deliberative bottom-up input from those with a direct stake in the aftermath. Contrary to the formalized and rational criminal justice procedures, Restorative Justice processes are informal, including emotions and feelings. The outcome in view is not the infliction of a proportionate amount of pain, but a socially constructive, or restorative, solution to the problem caused by the crime.

Justice in criminal justice is considered objectively, based on legality, while justice in Restorative Justice is seen mainly as a subjective-moral experience. Restorative Justice in Germany and other countries Starting briefly with a view on the history and the legal framework of Restorative Justice in Germany: My colleague Arthur Hartmann, who is a lawyer, wrote last year that VOM is the quasi-official German term for restorative justice and victim-offender-mediation Although I disagree with him in this narrow conception, because of my own conferenc ing project see Hagemann ; ; ; and that Hartmann himself also emphasizes that there is no legal restriction to a particular form of mediation I have to admit that quantitatively seen, he is absolutely right.

On average calculated by the Federal VOM statistics 1. In Germany everything started in the s with some pilot projects. See Bannenberg ; Marks et al. Another milestone was Bannenberg s research on VOM in partnership conflicts published in see Bannenberg et al. Both German empirical research projects of Sessar and Bannenberg refuted often stated prejudices concerning a supposedly general need for punishment on the side of victims 17 or inadequacy of RJ-proceedings in cases in which violence against females has occurred see also Bals Already in these early years standards for VOM have been developed by the VOM Service Office which have continually been revised and further developed currently it is the sixth revision from which constitutes a quality standard.

In nearly every federal state there is a consortium of mediators Landesarbeitsgemeinschaft TOA for professional exchange and other purposes see contribution of Stibbe in this book. We are not in a competition of Federal States but it must be said that the practice of RJ in Germany differs a lot between the Federal states. Information on cases from the Federal VOM-statistics in brief: A structural stability over the years can be observed. About half of the cases involve bodily harm although almost no severe cases and each fifth case deals with psychological or material harm exclusively.

Concerning outcome the result is slightly better for the more severe cases see also Aert sen Most successfully were robbery cases! Above all the development in the South Pacific region must be mentioned which lead to the introduction of Family Group Conferenc ing FGC in the criminal law for juveniles in New Zealand in This means that FGC is mandatory and that by now New Zealand has more than 20 years of experience. Research concludes that the FGC has positive effects if done well: It established a system of dealing with child offenders through However, the age span covers only teenagers from age 14 to Only cases where the death of a victim is involved and cases where there is no agreement achieved in FGC are treated by the courts.

This means that participating in FGC is not voluntary. If the offender rejects the FGC e. A FGC will be held within four weeks after notification of the incident by the police that seems to be good as far as the educational impetus referring to the accused minor is concerned but it leads to a non satisfying direct participation rate of victims prior to a reform in only in about two of three cases.

Results of working with prolific offenders who are often members of youth gangs are very impressive: In Wellington the number of charges that needed to be addressed dropped from to The number of individuals had dropped from 93 to The multi recidivist offenders dropped from 30 to 2 and the community was able to restrict their activities.

Results for the second biggest city Christchurch are similar see MacRae n. Concerning RJ in advanced partner countries more specific information is provided by the articles of Walgrave and Emerson in this book. Belgium and the United Kingdom deserve an avant-garde-status. Apprehension rates which are highest for the year olds per of the population followed by year olds , then youth have been falling. The rate for 10 to 13 years old children is These cases are carried out by the NGO Neustart 20 according to uniform standards.

Many of the German speaking practitioners will be familiar with Ed Watzke s equilibristic dance between worlds, a little but neverthe less rich book. It teaches us a whole range of different procedures of mediation which extend our tool kit but which predominantly allows an inside in the spirit of RJ. At a very early point of time they have discussed gender related questions of mediation in criminal law and thanks to Christa Pelikan have carried out research on that issue. Due to the limited space I will only briefly mention that our neighbors in the north, particularly Norway, have much to offer.

CEP aims to promote the social inclusion of offenders through community sanctions and measures such as probation, community service, mediation and conciliation. Since bi-annually conferences take place, the next one is scheduled for in Helsinki. The EF carries out research on its own and publishes research results and other important information electronically or in form of books e. Nearly all of these cases have been carried out in the classical 3-persons VOM setting.

The proportion of juveniles was slightly higher than that of adults. This has not to be misunderstood as a means to save state money it is questionable indeed if volunteers need less money than professionals. On the contrary, I would like to extend the discussion by the aspect regarding the life world or lay element in the c. Furthermore, I got the impression that mediation is not carried out by youth welfare offices because there are supposedly more important tasks which require the work energy. Facing this alternative the Norwegian model could be interesting as long as there is no realistic way to affect the local authorities to set new priorities.

It provides advice for politicians both regarding the European commission as well as the Council of Europe. Whereas recommendations and guidelines of the Council of Europe and the United Nations 22 to implement and promote RJ cannot be claimed in court, the framework decision 23 which calls upon all member states to implement RJ procedure according to article 17 into binding national law until The preamble refers to a report of a commission which was presented already on 14 th July and was ratified officially by the governments on 15 th June It deals primarily with an improvement of the position of victims but already article 1 refers to mediation in penal matters.

In article 10 it is stated explicitly that penal mediation in the course of criminal proceedings shall be promoted No 1 and the state shall ensure that any agreement between the victim and the offender can be taken into account. Aims of our project Our project will promote the use of RJ in Schleswig-Holstein and the partner countries that is to promote further development in a qualitative sense and to expand in a quantitative sense. In the context of an international project it is about learning from the partners.

It is possible that some aspects will not be transferable because of specificities in legal base, administrative structures and local or regional traditions. Each region must check for itself which procedure is best to be used in which situation. Qualitative aspects It is about the best point in time to use RJ, e. Furthermore, it is about the inclusion of various actors, namely the police, the Public Prosecution Office, the courts, social work, communities or informal networks and it is also about specific approaches for youngsters or adults, females and males, types of 22 See Recommendation No.

UN Economic and Social Council. Although this UN guidelines are also non-binding it is referred to them to indicate that the introduction of Restorative Justice in penal matters is also demanded there and that guidelines exist which can be traced for example in the VOM standards of the German VOM Service Office.

Taking all this into account our former Attorney General Erhard Rex has formulated a very useful request: He asked us to examine and carry out experiments to see whether a departure from the current monoculture of VOM or a widening of the RJ measures offered, would be successful, and to find out what would be the best solution for which client in which kind of conflict. Shall we limit ourselves to the prevailing types of VOM and conferencing or implement peace circles or something completely unknown yet? Shall we establish mandatory time-limits for carrying out RJ-measures as in New Zealand?

Quantitative aspects While the latter are qualitative questions we also have to ask why are RJ-programs used as infrequently as they currently are? Probably achieving the Austrian rate implying an increase of five to seven times the given number of cases could constitute a first sub-goal on the way to accomplish a situation as in Northern Ireland see Doherty or even New Zealand in the long run? In a global perspective the conferencing procedure is nearly as widespread as VOM why not in Europe?

Another aim is the improvement of the co-operation between justice and social work or other non-juridical professions which are often offering RJ programs. I do not want to be misunderstood as classifying the current co-operation as poor or loaded with conflict. However, despite these cases there is still enough room for improvements to support our clients better than they are now. This topic will form a working task at our third conference in England. Furthermore we have promised our sponsors to reflect about possibilities to use modern electronics for communication and as tools to support these processes.

Another aim of our efforts is to find out how, and in which way, RJ is helping victims best, including which victims do not benefit enough and thus can be improved. It will also be a target to involve victim support agencies which are partly skeptical concerning our vision of social peace. We have to find out about possible misunderstandings, to clarify what has to be discussed and to win more supporters from victim support. Much too often we experience that victims, offenders and their caring others have never heard of VOM or other forms of RJ.

Sometimes this is even true for lawyers and social workers. And sometimes wrong or misleading information is even coming from the highest level like on the 12 th of January this year in the most popular Concept, Ideas And Impediments German news broadcast. In the course of a cabinet-decision concerning a law on mediation it was stated that mediation is a promising method to solve conflicts for various aspects of life, but not suitable and not legally grounded for criminal matters.

The consequences of this kind of adverse publicity on victims, offenders and communities, are devastating. Challenges and impediments Quite often it is stressed that we are living in a punitive age; it is spoken about the desire of punishment sometimes even the term lust may be appropriate see Garland s term punitive turn ; Sack Some experts derive this directly from the new complexity of life in a postmodern world where feelings of non-safety and anxieties are increasingly dominating our lives. Intuitively I understand that fear and insecurity may transform into aggression and punitivity or that the latter may result from them.

Obviously such a societal climate may bring forward the deterioration of the social fabric or the disintegration of social groups. Punitivity is always directed at others, be them so-called foreigners or so-called social parasites or at least people who do not belong to the circle of trust.

There is no attempt to become acquainted with strangers, no dialogue across social borders and no interest in the life of these others. Nowadays we are able to delegate our problems to service agencies, for example to place an order with a lawyer who takes care, to get one s own interests through. The more urgent it seems to be to include all elements based on reason and scientific evidence in a constructive dialogue to counter these horror visions and their causes.

The sometimes sub-optimal co-operation between actors from the c. Questions of funding belong to that category. From my understanding it is problematic to compare costs for RJ based conflict resolutions with traditional c. If done, the RJ programs seemed to be better see Shapland et al. A country like New Zealand which has witnessed big cuts in the social security system of its population and has to sell public property in the second half of the s at the time when RJ was introduced would not have implemented a RJ based juvenile criminal 24 As a reaction towards my protest at the editorial staff a dialogue between practitioners and the Minist ry evolved.

And it has not led to an erosion of safeguards for the accused. From my observations I am convinced that a higher proportion of juveniles is supported by an attorney than here in Germany. A main obstacle to use RJ more effective is the low rate of tapping the full potential of suitable cases. This had been constant over many years. He analyzed referrals which equal 3.

It evolves from these figures that the first threshold lies prior to the referral and the second has to do with the motivation of participants. If we could get over these barriers, we would have a very high chance of a successful result in this case approx. Conclusion We are facing the following challenges: How can we preserve the accomplishments of our criminal justice systems, but nevertheless do more for the benefit of victims, include communities and increase the impact on offenders concerning accountability and empowerment?

We should avoid the tendency that life worlds and the system continue to drift apart and thus reduce the effectiveness of the c.

We must build on the needs of the participants because they know their life situation, problems, requirements etc. Probably informal procedures will be more effective see Braithwaite Punishment as pain delivering Christie is no adequate method on the way to restore victims, social relationships or the offenders.

On the contrary, RJ based procedures can bring improvements and are focused on this aim by a variety of social and legal means. Restorative Justice embedded in the community, captures the resources of the extended family and the community at large to address the issues. It can produce very comprehensive plans. It is more effective and cost efficient. It is a more rewarding way to work. It is very 25 His further analysis revealed that in Against the above outlined dilemma a dialogue is needed at several levels: Nomos, pp Arnold, B. On Crimes and Punishments.

Australian Institute of Criminology, pp Braithwaite, J. British Journal of Criminology, 42, pp Braithwaite, J. Criminology, 43 2 , pp Christie, N. Restitution in Criminal Justice. Lexington Books, pp Frehsee, D. Kriminologisches Journal, 23, pp Foucault, M. University of Chicago Press. Public Judgement about Sentencing. Thiel , Herbolzheim: Centaurus, pp Hagemann, O. Victimology, Victim Assistance and Criminal Justice.

Fachhochschule Niederrhein Verlag, pp Hagemann, O. British Journal of Community Justice. Ministry of Justice and Law Contemporary Crisis, 10, Pp Hulsman, L. Alternative Crime Policies; in: Israel Law Review, 25, pp Kelly, R. The Russ Kelly Story. Justitielles Entscheidungsverhalten zwischen Sachzwang und lokaler Justizkultur.

Prepared for the Law Commission of Canada,. Youth Justice in New Zealand. Hart, pp Maxwell, G. Towards a Restorative Society. Institute of Policy Studies, pp Maxwell, G. Willan, pp Morris, A. British Journal of Criminology, 42, pp Morris, A. A decade of public opinion research in Belgium. European Journal of Criminology, Vol. From Crime to Community. Versuch einer Bestandsaufnahme aus Sicht der staatsanwaltlichen Praxis. Reality and Myth, in Bazemore, G.

Repairing the Harm of Youth Crime. Criminal Justice Press, pp Shapland, J. Restorative Justice in Everyday Life: Concept, Ideas And Impediments In: Forum Verlag, pp Watzke, E. Criminal Justice Press, pp Wright, M. Willan, pp Wright, M. Verbrechensopfer, Sozialarbeit und Justiz. Das Opfer im Spannungsfeld der Handlungs und Interessenkonflikte. It is made up of representatives of the judiciary, non-governmental agencies from offender support, social services of the judiciary, the Ministry of Justice, and the Youth Welfare Office.

Parallel to the establishment, social workers from non-governmental agencies were educated in conflict resolution and mediation in criminal matters. Ostendorf, who was the prosecutor general at the time, his successor Mr. Rex and his representative Mr. Since the implementation of VOM in Schleswig-Holstein, it is being successfully applied in close cooperation between social services of the judiciary and non-governmental agencies NGO. The creation of jobs at NGOs by the Ministry of Justice has created an extensive structure for mediation in adult cases.

The German Code of Criminal Procedure 3 Section a [Provisional Dispensing with Court Action; Provisional Termination of Proceedings] 1 In a case involving a misdemeanor, the public prosecution office may, with the consent of the accused and of the court competent to order the opening of the main proceedings, dispense with preferment of public charges and concurrently impose conditions and instructions upon the accused if these are of such a nature as to eliminate the public interest in criminal prosecution and if the degree of guilt does not present an obstacle.

In particular, the following conditions and instructions may be applied: In appropriate cases they are to work towards such mediation. An agreement may not be accepted against the express will of the aggrieved person. Youth Courts Law 4 Section 10 Instructions 1 Instructions shall be directions and prohibitions by which the youth can conduct his life and which are intended to promote and guarantee his education.

Instructions must not place unreasonable demands on the way the youth conducts his life. In particular, the judge may instruct the youth to: If the youth is more than sixteen years of age, such condition should be imposed only with his consent. Section 23 Instructions and conditions 1 The judge should exercise a supervisory influence on the youth s conduct during the probationary period by the issuance of instructions. He may also impose conditions on the youth.

He may also make, vary or revoke such orders subsequently. Section 10, section 11, subsection 3, and section 15, subsections 1, 2 and 3, second sentence, shall apply mutatis mutandis. An attempt by the youth to achieve a settlement with the aggrieved person shall be considered equivalent to a supervisory measure. The decision shall be handed down as an order of the court. That order shall not be subject to appeal. If the youth complies with the conditions, instructions or supervisory measures, the judge shall discontinue the proceedings.

Section 11, subsection 3, and section 15, subsection 3, second sentence, shall not apply. September Revised version of the circular decree becomes applicable on Joint decree of the prosecutor general and the State Investigation Bureau in regard to Victim-Offender Mediation within the framework of prosecutor decisions on Germany is organized in a federal system composed of 16 states. Legal frameworks are regulated on a federal level but the regulations for execution differ between the states. Furthermore, social workers have special training in mediation in criminal matters DBH.

Three non-governmental agencies have three half time positions. Members of the consortium report that the number of VOM cases has been going down in the last couple of years, but the exact number is difficult to qualify. In the course of a survey, questions have also been asked regarding the numbers of juvenile VOM cases. According to a representative of the Ministry of Social Affairs the results from the juvenile research remains unpublished. Referral of Cases The greatest amount of VOM cases are referred by the prosecution before accusation, when the investigation procedure is still ongoing.

A smaller amount is referred by the courts, either before the main trial or during the trial the trial is then suspended. Some are also directly reporting to the VOM Services, if for instance their lawyer or the court assistance have drawn attention to that possibility. In that case, a VOM is suggested to the public prosecution office or the court. In single cases detainees also report to the VOM services. Offences Most referred cases are of minor severity. The main offence is bodily harm and grievous bodily harm, followed by threat, assault and insult. Further offences are criminal damage, theft, resistance to executing officers and sometimes robbery or sexual assault.

A Case Study The index offence was severe extortion under the threat of violence. The accused, another young adult and two other juveniles raided a gambling hall. The victim, an employee of the hall, was requested to hand over the cash whilst being threated with a firearm. The masked offenders left with the money, which was then divided amongst them.

The accused drove the getaway car. In the preliminary interview, the accused stated that the time in remand custody has made him think about the offence and that he would not want to re-offend. In custody he realized what he has done to his parents, his girlfriend and himself. He had never thought about the consequences before committing the offence. He did however not show much empathy and concern during the preliminary interview. As an explanation, he said that he was not aware of his feelings; neither had he been able to show much emotion. In the interview the consequences for the victim were discussed and that the accused will prepare an apology letter for the mediation.

The accused showed serious interest to carry out mediation and was willing to reach an agreement and compensation. The injured victim also states that he is still suffering from the psychological consequences of the raid and that he has financial difficulties as he has lost his job as a result. Since the raid, he has had difficulties to sleep and is scared to leave the house by himself at night. As he is still suffering from the psychological consequences, it was agreed that further psychological help shall be taken into consideration.

After the incident the injured person lost his job and received a three month prohibition by the Job Center. The victim is not able to work at night anymore. Therefore, he does not have the possibility to get a financially more attractive job. At the time of the VOM the injured party was still unemployed. He showed interest in the mediation process. During the mediation meeting, the injured party tells how he was scared to death when Furthermore he expressed the psychological consequences and the financial damage caused by the offence.

In response to the statements of the victim, the offender responded with understanding and said that he is sorry for what he did and that he regrets his participation. Contrasting this with the situation in the preliminary interview, the accused did show emotions and it became clear that he had been prepared for the mediation and began to show empathy. The accused made an apology. The victim accepted and said that it is clear that the offender honestly regrets his behavior. The accused expressed his respect to the victim, because the victim encountered him with such great openness which he himself would not have been able to, if he was in his position.

The accused repeated several times that the mediation was very helpful to him, perhaps even more than to the victim. The victim then said that the personal dialogue was also very helpful to him. After consulting the judge and a lawyer ordered, compensation of 3. The accused borrowed the money from his father and his uncle.

Generally, there is a possibility for offenders to borrow compensation money from a victim fund. In that case, the victim received the money immediately and the offender has the possibility to pay off his depts in monthly rates. Subsequently, the court was informed about the procedure and the result. After the successful VOM, the sentence was mitigated and the offender was placed on probation for two years. There is a further project in Kiel, in cooperation of police and court assistance. After a crime has occurred and before the investigation procedure has been finished, VOM is carrying out at the police station Kieler Modell.

Acceptance Victim-Offender Mediation is not very well known amongst the public. The majority of the injured parties and victims do not know the method. After they have been informed through I would like to cite a study by Sessar, who examined a representative sample of citizens in Hamburg and their position in regards to compensation. This problem of acceptance is reflected in referral rates.

The available results on recidivism show that VOM has a positive influence. In regards to recidivism the results show that VOM is much more effective in comparison to fines and custody for adults, as well as custodial sentences for juveniles Keudel, Conclusion and Prospects Mediation in criminal matters in Schleswig-Holstein has been approved as an efficient and sustainable instrument with good reason, since it recognizes victims and their needs and deals with the criminal act and its consequences, reduce fears and makes sure the victims receive quick compensation if required through Victim Fund.

Offenders become aware of the suffering of the victim as a consequence of their acting. They can take responsibility for the act and offer material and immaterial compensation. Other than agreement and The structure for juveniles should be extended and thoroughly adapted, following the example of adult cases in the country, since the numbers of juvenile cases decreased in the last years. It seems to be very useful to implement a conflict resolution center in all four court districts, as to the concept developed by the consortium. Accordingly, only small financial support would be required, as already employed mediators would work in these centers and synergy effects could be used.

In a further step, it would have to be discussed, whether such a concept could be extended by a lawyers conciliation authority e. Therefore the future goal must be to refer more suitable cases, as well as to refer more serious crimes, and to extended application of further Restorative Justice methods, such as Family-Group Conferencing. If this shall be reached in the long term, it is necessary to implement legal frameworks and structures, in order to ensure that VOM is offered in every suitable case.

VOM is established in the criminal justice system of Schleswig-Holstein and a Steering Group shall use the results gained through the EU-Project for further developments in the field of Restorative Justice within the state. We are hoping for continuous good cooperation between the Ministry of Justice and the future Prosecutor General, the public prosecution offices, the courts, political institutions, the Schleswig-Holsteinian Association for Social Responsibility in Criminal Justice, Victim and Offender Treatment, the court assistance and NGOs, in order to stimulate the development 6 Draft concept of project to carry out and coordinate VOM for adults and juveniles as part of an integrated conflict resolution center.

Mediation at the Waage is regulated according to official standards of the Ministry of Justice. Forum Verlag Godesberg, Bonn , S. Scotland has an entirely separate legal system which does not have RJ forming a significant part of its legislative framework. There are some RJ initiatives in Scotland however these will not be described in this paper.

Developments in Northern Ireland will be described briefly, followed by a description of the state of RJ in England and Wales in some more detail. This document only describes RJ that takes place within the criminal justice process, including the adult and juvenile systems. It does not include RJ taking place in schools, workplaces and other settings which is a rapidly growing area of work.

In the UK there is a problem of definitions and terminology in relation to Restorative Justice. The term Restorative Justice can be used to mean a whole range of approaches including: RJ conferences in which the victim and the offender, their families, friends and supporters and anyone else affected by the incident meet with a skilled facilitator and discuss what happened, who was affected and how and what can be done to repair the harm.

Victim Offender mediation Face-to-face Victim Offender mediation Shuttle mediation Indirect mediation which may include the preparation of a letter of apology Victim awareness programmes VAPs with proxy victims Direct reparation Indirect reparation The performance of Community Service Victim empathy exercises We know there is an evidence base to support RJ Conferences and this is the preferred method in Thames Valley Probation, although other methods are used where the victim does not wish to participate in a face to face meeting.

This approach is based on the conference model referred to above. The unique context of Northern Ireland The State of Restorative Justice in Emgland and Wales with its lengthy experience of paramilitary violence, accompanied by extensive efforts at peace making at a local and regional level, led to legislation based on Restorative Justice RJ Conferencing. This legislation Youth Conferencing in Justice Northern Ireland Act provides the most extensive and systematic delivery of RJ on a conference basis within the UK, although it does not extend to use with adults.

England and Wales History The Home Office sponsored a number of pilot projects in the s to test the potential for RJ methods to be used as part of the Criminal Justice process. Despite some success, they reported in the early s at a time when more punishment based methods were seen to be required to tackle the growing level of crime. Whilst a small number of the projects continued in a limited way on a local basis, there was no Government support for the adoption of RJ methods.

In the mids the Thames Valley Police adopted RJ as a method to improve the effectiveness of the cautioning process for young offenders. This approach was informed by work in Australia and New Zealand where RJ Conferences had been used to deal with crime amongst young people.

Australian research had demonstrated that RJ conferences could reduce re-offending amongst young people who had committed violent offences. The success of the RJ cautioning initiative and growing international evidence of the value of RJ led the Labour Government, which came to power in , to introduce legislation The Criminal Evidence Act into the Youth Justice system which facilitated Referral Order Panel meetings 1. The victim could be included as part of the Panel Meeting and the offender could be required to undertake activities which could include reparation and suitable activities to make amends.

Subsequent legislation has introduced the Youth Rehabilitation 1 A way of dealing with young people between the ages of 10 and 17, who have appeared in court for the first time and have pleaded guilty. The young person and their parents are ordered to appear before a Referral Order Panel, which includes specially trained volunteer members, Youth Offending Team Officer and often the victim of the offence.

For further information visit: It involved the RJ Conference model described above being delivered at three different sites in the UK.

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Two of those sites were operated by the Police and one was a multi-agency operation led by Thames Valley Probation. The research sites operated between and and were reported on by Professor Joanna Shapland in In essence, the research demonstrated that RJ with adults and more serious offences of violence and burglary, had the potential to reduce re-offending and promote high levels of victim satisfaction, when compared with the traditional court based criminal justice process Shapland et al.

Over the last five years RJ with adults has developed on a piecemeal basis. Whilst the Government gave its general support and facilitated the delivery of RJ with adults in the Criminal Justice Act of , resources were not provided to deliver RJ to adults. Consequently two of the three Justice Research Consortium ceased to operate. The Thames Valley Probation led site has continued to operate at a reduced level of capacity within the Act legislation.

A small number of other Probation areas have begun to deliver RJ, using a range of different methods, as part of Intensive Community Supervision programmes. It is replacing nine old sentences and will combine 18 requirements e. It gives specially trained police officers on-the-spot discretion. It is about apologizing and examining why the offence took place. Where appropriate, a plan is made.

It does not give the young person a criminal record. ISP emphasizes control of the offender in the community. It requires regular formal reporting to a probation officer and possibly other conditions placed on the offender. Most of this work does not involve scripted conferences 6 and is sometimes described as street RJ although in some instances conferences can be facilitated by the Police to deal with neighbourhood problems. The Police have also been involved in very limited use of the Conditional Caution for adults. RJ has now become fully embedded within the Youth Justice process, although the nature and extent varies from one Youth Offending Team 7 multi-agency to another.

With the advent of the new Coalition Government a Green Paper 8, on all sentencing matters youth and adult as well as custodial and community sentences has been published see below. This document envisages a much greater use of RJ, in a wide range of forms and at different points in the UK Criminal Justice process, principally before sentence. The UK visitors see this conference in Kiel as presenting an opportunity to identify European best practice and use it to inform responses to the Green Paper before the consultation period ends at the beginning of March Recently, the best practice guidance for practitioners, offered by the Restorative Justice Council has been revised and it is expected they will be published in February Which methods are being applied?

As mentioned above RJ in the UK is bedevilled by the problems of terminology and definition. Whilst some adhere to Marshall s definition requiring RJ to involve those with a stake in the incident of harm to come together Face-to-Face to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath, many others use the term RJ to any activity or approach which seeks to address the harm caused by a crime or incident. This leads to all the following activities 6 The Handbook of the U. USA, UK this is applied as a standard. Each team has a manager who coordinates the work of the youth justice service.

Scripted conferences with all parties present Scripted conferences with some parties present Victim offender mediation Victim. Are there legal instruments? The young person is assessed to determine the causes of their offending behaviour and a programme of activities is identified to address them See Footnote 1 12 See Footnote 2 13 Cautioning is the term used in some countries for a formal police warning used as a diversion from prosecution. Often conditions are imposed on the offender, and in restorative cautioning those may include meeting with willing victims or community representatives, making apologies, paying restitution or performing community service.

Restorative Justice Online 14 The order is intended to make the defendant compensate the victim of the crime. Probation a small number of Probation Trusts have included RJ conferencing methods as part of a Community Sentence or an intensive supervision programme. How many cases are referred? As you will appreciate it is not possible for me to gather and aggregate the figures across a wide range of agencies Young Offender Teams, Police, Probation, Prisons and voluntary agencies such as the Sycamore Tree Project and the SORI Programme and projects across the UK and Northern Ireland in both the adult and youth justice systems.

The figures below relate simply to the Thames Valley Probation Specified Activity Requirement which is but one of a small number of initiatives in the adult CJ system which takes place within one region. How many cases per year and method? How many people are employed in the sector? In the face of stagflation the Keynesian order gave way to a stricter macroeconomic policy framework centred on economic stability, hard currencies, low inflation, sound budgets, and debt reduction, culminating in the introduction of the European Monetary Union EMU. Also countries that have decided to stay out of EMU have moved towards hard currency regimes with increasingly independent central banks, modelled after the ECB.

In the field of wage policy, a reorientation took place in the s in favour of marketbased wage restraint in order to facilitate competitiveness, profitability, and employment under conditions of growing economic internationalization. The rediscovery of a jobs-intensive growth path in Denmark, Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands, by way of a first generation of new social pacts, has also allowed the social partners to strike deals over productivity, training, and job opportunities for less productive workers. In the s, the. Stiller ; Korthouwer EMU entrance exam has played a critical role for a second generation of national social pacts in the so-called hard-currency latecomer countries, like Greece, Italy and Portugal In the area of labour market policy, in the s, the new objective became maximising employment rather than inducing labour market exit.

The main policy trend here is a shift from passive financial transfers for those participating in the labour market towards activating measures in order to reduce dependency rates and increase the tax base.

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In the process, we witness notable increases in spending on active labour market policies, mobilizing women, youth, older workers, less productive workers, based on early intervention, case management and conditional benefits With respect to labour market regulation, several European countries have moved towards greater acceptance of flexible labour markets on the condition of strong matching social guarantees. Together with active labour market policies for the unemployed, flexicurity is intended to help bridge the gap between insiders and outsiders in mature welfare states and permit more flexible family models and individual life courses, with a view to preventing long-term dependency on income support In the s, both the Danes and the Dutch critically deregulated their labour markets and strengthened job seeking with a series of active labour market policy measures.

Classical measures of job security for labour insiders have been reformed only at the margin. Within the sphere of social insurance, we can observe how benefits generosity has been curtailed: At the same time, most countries have been strengthening a basic non-contributory safety net, such as the French RMI. Different strategies, based on national preferences, have experimented with constraints and opportunities, such as traditional means-testing,. Great Britain, where income guarantees and unemployment benefits are modest, has, over the past decades, shifted to work conditional tax credits to support low-wage workers and their families.

In Continental Europe, the main problem is that heavy social contributions price less productive workers out of the market. In the face of the relative weakening of traditional male breadwinner social insurance programs, policy makers in these countries have turned towards strengthening minimum income protection functions of the welfare state, coupled with strong activation and reintegration measures.

This is also captured by the shift from out-of-work benefits to in-work benefits in many European countries. Access to benefits has been generally made more restrictive and conditional, but at the same time new networks of public and private employment services have been set up in order to promote and facilitate the labour market re-integration of workers without jobs. The Hartz IV reforms in Germany stand out as a case in point, involving a drastic shortening duration of benefits, tighter requirements to accept suitable jobs, simplification of insurance regulations, wage insurance for elderly unemployed, and the merger of unemployment assistance and social assistance.

In the area of old-age pensions, the most important trend is the development of multipillar systems, combining PAYGO and fully funded methods with a tight actuarial link between pension benefits and contributions. The common thread is the shift toward defined contributions and changes in the assessment of pension accruals, together with postponing the retirement age.

PAYGO and funding as methods of financing. Virtually all other European countries have also introduced fiscal incentives to encourage people to take up supplementary private pension insurance, fairly successfully in Austria and Spain. In the s, a number of countries, notably Belgium, France, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal, have started to build up reserve funds in order to maintain adequate pension provision when the baby-boom generation retires.

Also changes in indexation rules have helped to reduce future pension reliabilities. In Austria, Germany, Italy and Spain restrictions have gone hand in hand with attempts to upgrade minimum retirement guarantees. Measures to combine work and retirement via partial pension benefits have been introduced in Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Germany. In Western Europe, one of the most profound reforms was enacted by Sweden in the mids, which introduced a small mandatory funded element and transferred an important part of the risk associated with aging to retirees.

The latter was done by indexing future benefits to the life expectancy of the retiring cohort and by linking future benefits to net wages. Benefits will be lower if life expectancy continues to increase and net wages continue to grow slow, but the reform also continued to ensure a universal guaranteed pension for low-income pensioners The Swedish legislation has also heavily influenced reforms in other countries, like Italy, Latvia and Poland And while Germany and the United Kingdom are about to raise the retirement age, Finland has developed policy approaches to improve occupational health, work ability and well-being of aging workers, in order to keep older workers in the workforce as long as possible Social services have experienced a comeback lately.

Spending on childcare, education, health, and elderly care, alongside training and employment services, has increased practically everywhere in Western Europe over the past decade. Almost a fifth of all jobs created in the EU between and occurred in the health and social services sector as aging and longevity make demands on professional care that working families can no longer meet. Social services and family policies have also witnessed some innovation in both substantive and organizational terms, with a view to responding to the rising needs of the elderly population, the changing gender division of labour and new forms of poverty and exclusion All welfare states have indisputably been weakening their traditional male breadwinner bias.

In Scandinavia the expansion of services to families began in the s in tandem with the rise in female labour supply. It was in large part this policy of socializing caring responsibilities that catalysed the dual-earner norm. In most other European countries,. In Southern Europe it is only during the past decade that we have seen a sharp rise. Throughout the EU, leave arrangements for working parents have also been expanded, both in terms of time and in the scope of coverage, to include care for the frail elderly and sick children.

Here, governments have pushed for increased spending and more flexible opening hours in order to spur the number of available and affordable childcare places A final reform trend involves financing welfare provision. We have already mentioned the promotion of funding as opposed to PAYGO in the area of pensions, with a double purpose: Another important development on the financing front has been the attempt at reducing charges on business and labour, particularly those in the form of non-wage labour.

Over the past two decades, as the above inventory of reform shows, many European welfare states have — with varying success, but also failure — pushed through adjustments in macroeconomic policy, industrial relations, social security, labour market policy, employment protection legislation, pensions and social services. In the process, these policy areas have been brought into a new relationship with each other. The character of the relationship changed from loosely coupled policy responsibilities in the shadow of Keynesian macroeconomic policy, to one of tightly coupled interdependencies between employment and social policy repertoires under more austere macroeconomic conditions.

In terms of performance, it became evident that active service-oriented welfare states were in a stronger position than passive, transfer-oriented systems to achieve employment growth. In the process towards activation, the avoidance of early retirement, the promotion of part-time work, lifelong learning, gender mainstreaming, balancing flexibility with security and reconciling work and family life, practically all European welfare states are.

Moreover, most welfare reform endeavours have remained deeply embedded in normative notions of equity and solidarity, shared cognitive understandings of the efficiency-enhancing effects of well-designed social and labour market policies. And while many reforms were unpopular, it is important to highlight that a fair amount occurred with the consent of parties in opposition, trade unions and employer organizations. Conjecturing Regime Change under Low Growth Prospects In democratic systems, it is ultimately politics that decides over matters of social and economic governance.

Once again, the current economic crisis is fundamentally redrawing the boundaries between states and markets, calling into question many issues of economic policy, ranging from central banking, fiscal policy, financial regulation, global trade, welfare provision, economic governance and assumptions about human behaviour and rationality. Many observers, experts, and policymakers are seeking new answers, and looking for solutions to the new questions posed by the crisis. Thus far, intellectual and policy attention has focused on immediate crisis management, especially with respect to financial sector risk management.

Little systematic thinking has been devoted to the question of whether and to what extent the crisis creates momentum for more fundamental welfare regime change. To be sure, it is still too soon to draw conclusions about the future economic, social, cultural, and political consequences of this momentous economic shock.

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On the other hand, these questions are among the most politically and intellectually pressing of our times. Any tentative exploration of these questions has to start with a diagnosis of the crisis. Does the current credit crunch bear any similarity to the Great Depression or is it more similar to the s crisis of stagflation?

Barry Eichengreen and Kevin H. In , industrial production, trade, and stock markets plummeted even faster than in However, whereas after the crash, the world economy continued to shrink for three successive years, in the wake of the crisis, policy responses were much better, and led to a swift upswing in trade and stock markets in the first half of This suggests that the biggest difference between this crisis and the one in the s was timely, effective and coordinated crisis management to arrest economic collapse.

In short, policymakers today have been able to avoid the deflationary, protectionist, and nationalistic policy responses that aggravated the decline in the s. This can in part be attributed to the fact that policymakers in developed countries learned from the mistakes of the s, and are now firmly committed to open economies.

A second related factor, perhaps is that international economic interdependence has progressed so far especially in the EU that protectionism is simply no longer a viable option. The crisis indeed revealed how much the world economy has fundamentally transformed over the past three decades, and this makes the crisis circumstantially different from any historical precedent. The swift global fallout after the US sub-prime mortgage crisis demonstrates the stark reality of 21st century global economic interdependence — hardly any country in the world has remained unaffected.

The fast response of public authorities, national governments and central banks in concert attests to effective crisis management, which was so sorely lacking in the s. Of course, earlier crises may offer interesting analogies but the present circumstances are radically different to previous crisis situations.

But conspicuous consumption and greed are not new. As such, they cannot explain the speed or the depth of the global crisis after What then are the deeper, more structural and systemic causes of the crisis? Why did academic economists fail to anticipate the coming crisis? In retrospect, three factors can be identified that began to merge in the early years of the 21st century, and eventually created an unforeseen but lethal combination: In addition to these, a fourth contributing factor was the theoretical bias that developed in the academic profession towards the economics of market efficiency and human rationality.

When the Fed realised that US aggregate demand was falling sharply and had the potential to throw the entire economy into a full-blown recession, it responded by radically lowering interest rates to one percent. Initially, as the US housing sector remained stable, there were no signs of overheating. However, after another interest rate cut by the Fed, a housing bubble began to expand. With lower interest rates, people could afford much larger home mortgages.

This cheap money created a very competitive environment for financial institutions, which could only get high returns if they made ever-riskier investments. Global imbalances Macro imbalance in trade has accelerated dramatically over the past ten to fifteen years, partly as a result of loose US monetary policy. Asian emerging economies and the oil-exporting countries accumulated large current account surpluses, and these were matched by large current account deficits in the US, as well as the UK, Ireland, and Spain.

A key driver of these imbalances was the high savings rates in countries like China. The run-up to the crisis should actually be traced back to the Asian financial market crash. Following this disaster, Asian governments and citizens felt increasingly insecure and ramped up their reserves — primarily in US dollars — in order to avoid becoming vulnerable to such a scenario in the future.

This exacerbated the US debt burden, further perpetuating the trade imbalance. Lax financial regulation Loose monetary policy and the international trade imbalance were compounded by a third factor: With the liberalisation of capital markets, finance became global, but regulation remained national. In addition, throughout the neo-liberal epoch, even domestic financial markets were systematically deregulated, allowing financial innovations to evolve unchecked.

As the financial sector grew and became truly global, insufficient latitude was reserved for domestic government regulation and international supervision Financial sector deregulation allowed the macro-imbalances in savings rates to stimulate a massive wave of financial innovation, focused on the origination, packaging, trading and distribution of derivatives, credit default swaps, and other securitised credit instruments. Since the mids there has been huge growth in the value of credit securities, an explosion in the complexity of the securities sold, and a related explosion of the volume of credit derivatives, enabling investors and traders to hedge underlying credit exposures.

As securitisation grew in importance from the s on, this development was lauded as a means to reducing banking system risks and to cutting the total cost of credit intermediation. The politics of international deregulation, together with computer-based finance mathematics, finally extricated the capacity to produce money by credit from public control — which to some extent at least had tied it to production and consumption.

The financial industry thus acquired the capacity and the licence to make money out of money, generate claims to resources at a rate so rapid that the real economy cannot possibly follow. It could even be argued, that money ceased to a public institution directing economic activities into productive endeavours. Instead, it was reduced to being a commercial commodity itself, decoupled from its previous function for the real economy, no longer bounded by any national base or interest or regulation, or by any other direct or indirect requirement to commit itself to any other productive function beyond itself Why were so many economists so blind?

To be sure, a small minority of eminent members of the economics profession, notably Robert Shiller, Raghuram Rajan and Nuriel Roubini37, did point to the great risks of an unchecked housing bubble. Dani Rodrik and Barry Eichengreen warned against the negative fallout potential of the global imbalances Yet the majority of mainstream economists failed to recognise what was going on. Intellectual inertia and mathematic sophistication has adversely affected both academia and economic institutions, as this led to significant blind spots for deeper structural economic problems in the run-up to the crisis.

If nothing else, economists will be going through a long period of sobering up. The theory of efficient markets operated by rational actors was the dominant intellectual economic paradigm from the early nineteen eighties onward. It led to a refinement of macro-economic models and gave economics the aura and authority of an exact science. It yielded a spectacular series of Nobel Prize winners who performed pioneering work in the mathematization of economic behaviour. The crisis has disposed of this dogma. Human behaviour, informational inconsistencies, and irrationality must be reintroduced to economic.

Shiller ; ; Rajan ; Roubini Rodrik ; Eichengreen It will have to become more modest too. But this is easier said than done — an entire generation has been brought up to believe in the concept of the efficient market. Institutions will continue to cling to this concept, and a paradigm shift will be more difficult than recent revelations would justify, especially since alternative constructs are not readily available. Paul de Grauwe intimates that perhaps the root cause of this academic oversight was the error of modern mainstream economics in believing that the economy is simply the sum of microeconomic decisions of rational agents.

The profession of economics was so caught up in this rational actor and market efficiency paradigm that it completely forgot some of the most elementary dynamics of economic crises: Fundamental to Keynesian economics is the idea that instead of rational actors, much economic activity is governed by animal spirits, best understood as waves of optimism and pessimism Left to their own devices, capitalist economies will experience manias, followed by panics. It is the function of the modern state to sail into the wind of these excesses: In the evolution of the paradigm shift from Keynesianism to monetarism and rational expectation macroeconomics, the study of animal spirits has almost completely disappeared from mainstream macroeconomics, and the economics of finance.

When expectations are assumed to be rational, intellectual models little room for waves of pessimism and optimism to exert an independent influence on economic activity. As time went on, more and more professional economists were drawn onto the bandwagon of passive acceptance of the dominant intellectual paradigm. Most academic economists shied away from probing the underlying vulnerabilities of loose macroeconomics, financial deregulation, mortgage and pension markets, and distorted incentives and bonus schemes in the big financial institutions that exacerbated economic instabilities.

Moreover, the high level of sub-disciplinary specialisation in the field of economics made it difficult for any single academic to put together all the pieces. This intellectual inertia and sub-specialisation blinded academic economists to the underlying causes of the crisis. In this respect, the current crisis is a wakeup call, re-introducing the concepts of animal spirits, imperfect information, cognitive limitation, and heterogeneity in the use of information, back into macroeconomic and financial market modelling and analysis.

The above three features of loose monetary policy, the savings and trade imbalance, and lax regulation ultimately exacerbated the pro-cyclical and self-reinforcing nature of the downturn. For the past two decades, increase in US debt came from the financial innovation, rather than the real economy. Once, a home owner took out a mortgage, and household debt increased. But since the late s, mortgages could be used to secure mortgagebacked securities, and those securities could in turn be used to secure a collateralised debt obligation.

The end result was more borrowing, but no more real economy activity. Moreover, when assets, driven by cheap money, came to be bought not because of the rate of return on investment but in anticipation that such assets and securities can be sold at a higher price, the stage was set for an asset bubble of overvalued stocks in relation to real economy fundamentals.

The history of the current crisis is therefore perhaps less a tale of greed or improvident borrowing than it is a tale of profligate lending. Examining the supply of credit provides a far more telling analysis than looking at its demand by ordinary consumers. Maier40 claims that while governments adopted the imperatives of balanced budgets, inflation targeting, deregulation, and privatisation thus constraining the money supply , the private financial sector was allowed to use financial innovation to create as much money as it saw fit.

It was thus not greed, but rather the necessity and availability of credit that led to the overwhelming indebtedness of American citizens. In retrospect, it can be argued that the compression of incomes in the US throughout the neo-liberal period was compensated by a reduction in household savings and mounting private indebtedness, which allowed spending patterns to be kept virtually unchanged.

At the same time, limited social safety nets forced the government to pursue active macroeconomic policies to fight unemployment, which increased government indebtedness as well. Thus, growth was maintained at the price of increasing public and private indebtedness, adding to the already existing macro imbalance. Privatized money production on a hitherto unknown scale can be understood as a response to the general stagnation of growth and profitability after the s. In the era of neo-liberalism, structural inequalities were allowed to persist and widen further, both within and between countries.

In macroeconomic parlance, increased inequality implies weak domestic demand: In addition, global demand contracted even further in the wake of Asian financial crisis, when Asian emerging economies started to hoard reserves so as not to become dependent on IMF loans in hard economic times. Fitoussi42 argues that the crisis is rooted in the problem of reverse income distribution, both in the United States and Europe, fatally depressing global demand. Looking beyond the aftermath of the crisis, he proposes new indicators of social and economic progress and prosperity, considerably expanding the narrow focus on GDP as the foremost figure of economic vitality.

The Contours of Embedded Globalization The core lesson that has emerged from the crisis is that economic markets are not selfcreating, self-regulating, self-stabilising, and self-legitimising. While this important lesson is certainly not new, in the past decades of neo-liberalism policymakers do seem to have forgotten the fundamental truth that the benefits of global economic interdependence rely heavily on robust domestic and supranational, social and political institutions, reminiscent of the era of embedded liberalism.

Domestic and supranational institutions must be able to bind, bond, and bridge advanced polities, economies, and societies. Unfortunately, however, once the genie is out of the bottle, it is far more difficult to re-regulate an economy than to deregulate it. And as deregulation brought concentrated wealth to sectors that benefited from even further deregulation, accumulated wealth was efficiently translated into a strong financial lobby in London, New York, and Washington.

The financial sector effectively bought political power. Therefore, the failure of politics lies in part in its inability to resist being hijacked by financial interests. The excesses of deregulation have hit society hard. Public institutions and authorities matter, in fact, they have proven to be indispensable.

This ideology elevated the free market to the status of an ultimate goal and an enlightened ideal, rather than one of many possible means by which society can increase its prosperity and well-being. The crisis seems to have debunked this ideology: Re-establishing the rules of the game and the relationship between the market and the public authorities has.

Even free market zealots have been forced to concede that if not government than at least governance has a role to play in the economy. The neo-liberal era may have come to an end, but whether the crisis indeed marks the ascendance of a new regime is an open question. Some of the rules of economic regulation and policymaking will be rewritten. The economic crisis has brought the world to a new policy crossroads, but it also needs to be acknowledged that the room for manoeuvre and institutional innovation may be fairly restricted, not only because of the likelihood of low economic growth, but also because of domestic and international political constraints.

As a consequence, some policy recipes that were successful before including currency devaluations and trade protectionism are no longer available to national policymakers, in part due to European and WTO economic integration. In this respect, concerted coordinated action at the international level is essential to effectively governing the global economy.

The question of institutional choice and regime change, for present purposes, encompasses two key dimensions. Internationally, the task will be to devise a stable and sustainable system for international cooperation and regulation, which addresses the diverse needs of advanced, developing, and the least-developed economies. At the domestic level, institutional change requires recalibrating the role of the state in shaping a stable economy by combining economic dynamism with a more equitable distribution of life chances.

Walking the fine line between protectionism and protecting domestic policy space will be difficult under the likelihood of low growth. Discussion is ongoing when and how to withdraw anti-recession spending programs that are expected to increase the EU public debt by 20 percentage points in the three years from and But the biggest problem consists of rising long-term pension costs and other age-related expenditure.

Though the debt and deficit increases are by themselves quite impressive, the projected impact on public finances of ageing populations is anticipated to dwarf the effect of the crisis many times over. The fiscal cost of the crisis and of projected demographic development compound each other and make fiscal sustainability an acute challenge. In principle, this adjustment could take place via both an increase in revenues and cuts in expenditures.

Effective solutions to the current global crisis require international cooperation, but no government is able to go ahead with an internationally coordinated plan without taking into account issues of domestic legitimacy. Any solution to the crisis has to be both effective and legitimate at level of supranational economic institutions as well as at the level of the nation-state. Most markets must remain primarily embedded at the level of the nation-state, as long as democratic governance and political identities remain nationally embedded.

Economic relations between states should be structured with the aim of opening up trade and investment flows subject to the proviso of maintaining heterogeneous national arrangements. Meanwhile, poor nations should be enabled to position themselves to benefit from globalisation through economic restructuring.

All nations must be given the space to create financial systems and regulatory structures attuned to their own conditions and needs. To this effect, substantive policy concerns would be brought to the table of international economic negotiations. The global crisis has laid bare important changes in the global distribution of wealth and power. The power of the US is on the wane, and emerging economies such as India and China have meanwhile become key global economic players. However, their economic prowess is not yet reflected by their share in international bodies.

At the same time, the EU is faced with a plethora of internal problems in the wake of Eastern enlargement. Quite surprisingly, the international community is already adjusting to this new multilateral reality. Whereas existing institutions usually continue to reflect the international distribution of power of the status quo ex ante, the IMF and the World Bank have recently allowed for far more domestic heterodoxy than ever before.

The crisis has changed these institutions practically overnight. In terms of substance, the Washington Consensus rules no longer govern, and Dominique Strauss-Kahn, director of the IMF, realised that without change, China and other emerging economies would not stay engaged and therefore demonstrated flexibility in reform. In order for these global organisations to recover, they must reform by, firstly, fully integrating the emerging countries, and secondly, promoting equitable and sustainable models of globalisation.

By , in institutional terms, the elite club of rich industrial nations, known as the G7 — Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States, has been permanently, replaced by the group of 20, including China, Brazil, India and other fast growing developing countries, as a global forum for economic policy. The rise of the G20 marks an instance of profound institutional change. It is not clear why these 20 specific countries were appointed to represent the world.

From a social justice perspective as well, G20 insufficiently represents the poorest countries. One way of rationalising these arrangements would be by moving to a Group of 24, based on representation in the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the IMF. Of the twenty-four representatives in this committee, five represent individual countries, whereas the others represent groups of countries.

All this makes it a far more effective structure to supersede the G The EU should come to recognise that two seats — one for the euro area and one for the rest of the EU — is sufficient. This would streamline decision-making, both within the G20 and the IMF, while freeing up seats at the table for currently underrepresented developing economies and regions. A final geopolitical international challenge is that this economic crisis coincides with a major environmental crisis, whose solution requires a complete transformation of our modes of production and ways of living.

Regardless of the institutional changes following the crisis, the imperative to act on issues such as climate change, energy insecurity, and water scarcity will remain paramount Climate change policies can play an important role in revitalising economic growth. Averting climate change should be an important policy goal when prioritising stimulus spending. Investments should go towards clean energy and the adaptation of green technologies should be given prominence.

Thanks to the crisis, substantive global issues, such as climate control, water management, renewable energy, and other long-term concerns of sustainable development are now high on the world political agenda. This is a welcome correction. The crisis has affected different economies differently, as a result of their relative vulnerability to endogenous and external economic shocks and also because of the differing institutional capacities they were able to mobilise to address the economic duress.

The smaller economies of Western Europe, which have been unable or unwilling to muster fiscal stimulus packages on par with those of Germany and France — for example Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden — are behind the curve of recovery. Ballooning budget deficits in Ireland, Greece, and Spain raise severe doubts about recovery. In August , the Bank of England surprised everybody with another round of quantitative easing of 50 billion British pounds, admitting that the recession appears to have been deeper than previously thought.

Many of the new member states of Eastern and Central Europe have been disproportionately damaged by the crisis. Wade Jacoby44 argued that former communist countries made the transition to the market economy at the height of the neo-liberal era,. Now they are suffering more than other countries, as a result of this irrational exuberance. The Baltic states, which predicted GDP declines between 13 and 17 per cent in , have already been forced to introduce tough retrenchment programs in public finances. Emerging economies, specifically Brazil and India, are expected to do much better in the post-crisis period.

According to Nancy Birdsall45, this is partly due to the extent to which they were able to decouple themselves from financial globalisation. By contrast, lower-income developing countries, which traditionally have relied heavily on trade, will suffer severely from the crisis. Sub-Saharan countries surely and sorely lack the economic resources and institutional capacities to implement counter-cyclical fiscal policies. The temptation to focus on the incipient recovery of the more advanced OECD countries, as well as on the so-called emerging BRIC — Brazil, Russia, India, China — runs the risk of glossing over the far more devastating effects the crisis has had on developing countries, which cannot muster the resources for a counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus.

Even gas- and resource-rich Russia is likely to suffer a steep fall in GDP. Compared to the US, European countries were slow in recognising the severity of the crisis. As a consequence, monetary easing and fiscal stimulus measures were implemented less aggressively than in the US. One reason why fiscal stimulus programs were less expansive in Europe is due to the fact that the EU is made up of many small open economies. This creates free-rider problems, with the benefits of fiscal stimulus spilling over into neighbouring economies. While the US is more indebted, it has the advantage of being an immigrant economy with flexible labour markets, which will make it relatively easier to mobilise labour and other resources than in the ageing European and Japanese economies.

Under conditions of low growth, China as well as European export-oriented economies will no longer be able to rely primarily on industrial exports to drive their economies. As much as we can anticipate the policy debate about competing models to reach new levels of intensity in the near future, it is our contention that it is useless to couch policy responses to the current crisis in terms of a battle between warring alternatives. Moreover, models come and go. Europe at a Crossroads Political factors play a key independent role in the selection of policy responses and domestic institutional adjustments.

Previous crisis episodes have revealed how hard times exacerbate existing tensions, invariably decreasing satisfaction with existing governments. If the crisis results in an extended period of high unemployment, the voting public may grow disenchanted with the prevailing policy regime, which they identify with economic liberalisation. Facing the likelihood of relatively low growth, the key challenge that political leaders will face is therefore not so much how to manage growth, but how to manage expectations.

Even before the economic crisis there was no evidence that citizens were shifting allegiances away from the nation-state. In Europe, the referenda on ratification of the European constitution demonstrated the strength of nationalism. Various public opinion polls overwhelmingly reaffirmed that citizens held their national governments accountable for their security and wellbeing, and felt betrayed by the globalising ambitions of the EU. The economic crisis intensified these sentiments, thus bringing the centrality of the role of the nation-state back into the limelight.

The European welfare state, following this line of reasoning, was introduced as a way of re-establishing this legitimacy and rebuilding the capacities of the state.

Whereas in good times the hand of the state may have been hidden, in hard times it re-emerged visibly and powerfully. A new welfare edifice custom-tailored to the realities of economic internationalization, post-industrial social change, post-crisis austerity, and intensified European integration is needed. Is the new social policy agenda — the social investment paradigm — the best safeguard for social progress, delivering on the promise of equality of opportunity, in combination with a strong commitment to basic social citizenship? Will the strong emphasis on social promotion in the recent literature produce a satisfactory response to the current global economic downturn?

Or, should traditional social protection come back into the equation? The need for resilient employment and social policy is greater than ever today. Now is the time to modernize social services, safeguard pensions, and narrow the gap between rich and poor, while simultaneously consolidating state revenue. This precarious juncture, as we teeter on the verge of recession, creates a number of policy temptations.

There is the obvious temptation of completely abandoning fiscal discipline to save jobs and maintain, as much as possible, the welfare status quo. Strengthening the social dimension of domestic Then there is the short-sighted seduction of retrenching current welfare commitments to foster financial and budgetary stability. Equally ineffective is the alluring strategy to fight unemployment by reducing labour supply through early retirement schemes, which many European governments fell for in the s and s.

Worse still is the nationalist and protectionist temptation that proved so disastrous in the s, which could be revived today if governments pay direct subsidies to failing domestic industries. There is a real danger of adopting incoherent policy combinations that may actually deepen the economic downturn, worsening job losses, reducing state revenue, eroding pensions, and widening the gap between rich and poor.

Historical mistakes, like deflationary contraction in the s, and labour supply reduction in the s and s, should not be repeated. In these uncertain times, we must not lose sight of the overall aim of creating employment-friendly, fair and efficient, welfare systems. Short- to medium-term macroeconomic measures are necessary to respond to immediate needs, but such measures should be consistent with the ongoing recalibration efforts to prepare domestic welfare states and EU social policy for the 21st century challenges that lie ahead. Here are our prescriptions for the major policy priorities at stake: Let automatic stabilizers work To prevent a global economic abyss, it is necessary to let automatic stabilizers work, to protect citizens from the harshest effects of rising unemployment, while at the same time serving to safeguard economic demand.

In the longer run, confidence in the economy relies on sound public finances. Today we can observe, in sharp contrast to the Great Depression, how a fierce anti-deflationary macroeconomic policy response has rapidly come to fruition in the OECD area. There is a clear policy consensus that a Keynesian crisis should be met by an expansionary policy of anti-cyclical macroeconomic management across Europe.

This kind of European policy coherence was surely lacking in the s and 80s era of stagflation. The global nature of the crisis triggered a co-operative, albeit timid, response from the 15 countries of the eurozone plus the UK, in the fall of Subsequently, 27 EU leaders agreed on an economic stimulus package of about billion euros, or 1.

The ECB is cutting interest rates. And the stability of the euro should not be underestimated, in that a common currency forestalls any policy of competitive devaluation. The internal market, enhanced in scope and strength by the addition to the EU of ten new member states from Central and.

Eastern Europe, surely puts a break on competitive protectionism. The switch to public spending in order to re-inflate the economy is likely to generate additional fiscal pressures in the foreseeable future, which should not be forgotten. We have to find a way to prioritize social investments without undermining the principles of sound public financing. Taking social investments out of SGP rules could be a step in the right direction.

Strengthen long-term attachment to the labour market The overriding policy lesson in our advanced economies is that in the face of demographic aging and a declining work force, nobody can be left inactive for long. The present economic crisis is likely to incur new forms of labour market segmentation to the detriment of more vulnerable workers, such temporary agency workers, fixed term employees and the unemployed, while labour market insiders have less to fear.

Hence, risks and capabilities to adapt are distributed unequally across the work force. Impending layoffs should be mitigated by temporary and short-term unemployment benefits, combined with additional training measures. Any kind of job, be it short term, part-time or subsidized, is better than no job at all at forestalling unemployment hysteresis and deskilling. With demographic aging, labour markets will be tight in the long run.

Relaxed hiring and firing legislation is best combined with generous social protection, active training and labour market policies to maximize employment. The ability to balance careers and family-life is also crucial for removing gender biases in the labour market. Constricted female labour market participation widens the gender gap, hampers economic growth, and reduces fertility. Policy makers tasked with writing a new gender contract should look to generous parental leave, employment security, and above all else, high quality childcare.

These provisions can positively affect long term productivity by boosting female earnings,. Since life chances are so strongly determined by what happens in childhood, a comprehensive child investment strategy is imperative. Inaccessible childcare provokes low fertility, while low quality care is harmful to children, and low female employment raises child poverty.

Increasing opportunities for women to be gainfully employed is a key step.

But the concept of early childhood development needs to go beyond the idea that childcare simply allows parents to reconcile work and family life. Rather, we must adopt the position that early childhood development is the best way to ensure that children will be lifelong learners and meaningful contributors to their societies.

Invest in human capital In the new, knowledge-based economies, there is an urgent need to invest in human capital throughout the life of the individual. Considering the looming demographic imbalances in Europe, we cannot afford large skill deficits and elevated school dropout rates. Education systems design makes a difference. Inequality and extreme educational differentiation reinforce cognitive poverty, early stratification, and social segregation.

Delay retirement and increase its flexibility As life expectancy increases and health indices improve, it will be necessary to keep older workers in the labour market for longer. Sustainable pensions will be difficult to achieve unless we increase employment rates of older workers and raise the retirement age to at least 67 years. Delaying retirement is both efficient and equitable. It is efficient because it implies more revenue intake and less spending at the same time. It is also intergenerationally fair because retirees and workers both sacrifice in equal proportions. In the future, older workers will be much better positioned to adapt to new labour market conditions, with the aid of retraining, lifelong learning, quality jobs, and flexible retirement.

Integrate migrants through participation Priority should be given to problems of participation and integration of migrant groups, whose rates of unemployment in the EU are, on average, twice that of nationals. Economic exclusion and physical concentration ghettoization reinforce educational underperformance, excessive segregation and self-destructive spirals of marginalization. Maintain minimum income support We cannot assume that the measures described above will remedy current and future welfare deficiencies. Hence, it is impossible to avoid some form of passive minimum income support.

It is, therefore, necessary to have an even more tightly woven net below the welfare net for the truly needy to meet minimum standards of self-reliance. The key lesson of the Great Depression of the s eventually ushered in Keynesian demand-side policies and, after a devastating World War, firmly established the need for some sort of safety net in every major industrial democracy.

This lesson to match social promotion with social protection continues to stand tall. Reach a globalization compromise We should take an activist approach to social policy beyond the borders of the member states of the European Union, not just for the coordination of a timely global fiscal stimulus and an agreement on financial markets regulation, but also to establish some minimum levels of protection without protectionism for vulnerable citizens everywhere.

In the interests of fairness and political sustainability, we need a new sort of embedded globalization compromise at the supranational level, something analogous to the embedded liberalism compromise of the post-war era, with the EU acting as a unified player. The new embedded globalization compromise should not only account for issues of fair trade, work and welfare, but also include substantive agreements on sustainable development, climate change, energy, food and biodiversity. Regime Change without the Punctuated Pendulum Swing People make history by constructing and transforming institutions that both constrain and constitute their social action.

New institutions are hardly ever designed from a tabula rasa. Just as institutions shape the conduct of human actions, human conduct, in turn, reshapes institutions. Crisis management today may be critically informed by previous crisis experiences. Just as neo-liberalism did not lead to a return to the roaring Twenties of unfettered capitalism, the current crisis is equally unlikely to bring about a restoration of the post-war regime of the embedded liberalism of national political economies.

Just as the current crisis is unlikely to trigger a swift pendulum swing of institutional design, it should be noted that neo-liberalism also did not attain institutional hegemony overnight. While the elections of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan may retrospectively have marked the beginning of the neo-liberal era, it was only with the fall of the Berlin Wall that this doctrine achieved global influence.

The neo-liberal rise to dominance was largely evolutionary; it emerged gradually through a series of institutional transformations and policy changes over a long period of time. In contrast to the traditional belief that institutional changes are always marked by rapid changes at critical junctures, it can be expected that future institutional shifts are likely to follow the logic of incremental transformative change through institutional evolution.

By comparison, the rise of embedded liberalism indeed represented a far more punctuated process of institution building. With this in mind, it is interesting to speculate about how the observed policy changes in the wake of the crisis will contribute to such a scenario of gradual institutional evolution. Specifically, five key policy changes warrant such an examination: The crisis has pushed central banks into a broad range of new interventions, aimed at safeguarding financial stability.

One intellectual lesson that has emerged from this crisis is that economists have to redefine what global and domestic financial macroeconomic stability means. Macroeconomic and financial stability is a much wider concept than price stability, and sometimes the two even conflict. Stephen Roach47 advocates a new mandate for the Federal Reserve; it should lean against the winds of financial excess and asset bubbles. Similarly, Willem Buiter, Paul De Grauwe, and Barry Eichengreen48 all argue that the ECB will in the near future be required to perform a variety of new functions, including undertaking liquidity and credit enhancing measures, becoming a lender of last resort, and.

However, in order to achieve financial stability, the ECB must be allowed to deploy new instruments, such as counter-cyclical adjustment of capital ratios for banks and minimum reserve requirements, which should be used to limit excessive credit creation by banks. However, if the ECB is to play a significant financial stability role, it cannot retain the degree of operational independence it was granted in the Treaty over monetary policy in the pursuit of price stability.

Changing this will be difficult, because the ECB is based on the European Treaty, which is extraordinarily tough to amend all twenty-seven member countries must agree to any changes. As the crisis lengthens and deepens, the absence of close cooperation between the European fiscal authorities on the one hand, and the ECB bankers on the other, will make both groups progressively less effective. The ultimate litmus test of effective macroeconomic regime change lies in the establishment of a new systemic risk regulator.

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Banking should be subject to a capital regime entailing more and higher capital requirements, more capital against trading book risk-taking, and a counter-cyclical framework with capital buffers built up in periods of strong economic growth that would be available in downturns. Ultimately, Europe must establish a powerful EU-level authority to which national supervisors report and whose instructions they carry out, in a manner analogous to the relations between the ECB and national euro area central banks Nonetheless, at the Pittsburgh summit of the G20 on September 25, some agreement was reached on timetable for regulatory reform, serving to reign in executive compensation, to raise capital requirements and leverage ratios for financial institutions, and to reduce the imbalances between consuming countries like the US and export-dependent China, Germany and Japan.

Moreover, the G20 came together on new IMF voting rules with more power and authority of the developing economies. In many advanced economies, welfare policies are being re-assessed and re-calibrated. In Europe, the crisis has been, in many ways, a stress test for the welfare state. Although the crisis may put a strain on many redistributive institutions, this can also have positive consequences, as Tony Atkinson50 acknowledges.

For one, social policy has resurfaced at the centre of the political debate. The crisis has reminded many Europeans of the importance of social programs to support the unemployed, the disabled, and the others most negatively affected by the crisis. In this respect, the economic crisis may reinforce, rather than undermine, the legitimacy of the welfare state.

In China, the government has recently realised that internal consumption could be a new driver of growth, but they have yet to. In the US, on the other hand, the social debate since the onset of the crisis has focused almost exclusively on healthcare reform. There are significant political hurdles to achieving such reform, as the bitter and even violent debates on the issue in the US demonstrate. Future productivity growth is likely to come from sources like green energy and low carbon path investments.

Going beyond welfare state recalibration and sustainable development as separate phenomena, Jacques Delors, Tony Atkinson, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi52 underscore the need for different set of indicators of social and economic progress exceeding the traditional measure of GDP growth. In fact, the crisis is partially the result of the exclusive focus on economic growth. The formulation of a new portfolio of social and economic indicators including, for example, various dimensions of adult numeracy and literacy, access to public services, poverty, and environmental health and climate control is especially politically opportune in the face of a period of lethargic and drawn-out recovery.

To address this issue, in early , Nicolas Sarkozy put together a committee of leading economists, chaired by Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, to rethink GDP as an indicator of economic performance and to consider alternative indicators of social progress. In other words, the Commission renders more prominence to the distribution of income, consumption and wealth, in correspondence with sustainability indicators Delors ; Atkinson et al.

Delors ; Fitoussi ; Atkinson et al. Periods of unsettled beliefs can thus inspire new politics. This we have learnt from the experience of the Great Depression in the s, as well as the crisis of stagflation in the s and s. After two decades of neo-liberalism, a critical re-imagining of economy and society, including the role of public authority and political sovereignty, is underway.

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Even in the realm of international coordination, any sustainable solution to the global crisis continues to rely heavily on domestic legitimacy. Nowhere is this political challenge more apparent than in Europe. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Adapting post-war social policies to new social risks. The EU and Social Inclusion. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Is Social Europe Fit for Globalisation? A study of the social impact of globalisation in the European Union. National Diversity and Global Capitalism. European Economic Review, Vol.

Would you like to shrink the welfare state? A survey of European citizens. Economic Policy 32, April , pp. Structural Reforms without Prejudices. Past Developments and Reforms. Lessons from the global crisis for social democrats. Background paper for the Dr. Den Uyllezing, 22 December The Future of the Welfare State. Crisis Myths and Crisis Realities. Reforming European Welfare States: Germany and the United Kingdom Compared. Pension Security in the 21st Century. Redrawing the Public-Private Debate. Diverse Responses to Common Challenges. The Breakup of the Euro Area.

Stress Test for the Euro. Finance and Development, http: A Tale of Two Depressions. IZA Discussion Paper The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union. Governing Work and Welfare in the New Economy: European and American Experiments. The Problem of Social Deflation. Economic Crisis and Institutional Choice, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Pension reform in central and eastern Europe: Emerging issues and patterns.

International Labour Review, Volume , No. The Politics of Climate Change. Economic Action and Social Structure: American Journal of Sociology, Volume 91 Number 3, pp. Animal Spirits and Monetary Policy. Monetary Policy and International Finance. The Political Power of Economic Ideas: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage.

Oxford University Press Inc. From Vulnerability to Competitiveness in Comparative Perspective. Talking the Talk and Walking the Walk: The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Party Politics as We knew It? Electoral failure, intraparty dynamics and welfare reforms in continental Europe. After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America. Survival of the European Welfare State. The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of The State after Statism: New State Activities in the Age of Liberalisation.

Harvard University Press, Boston. In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy. Cambridge University Press, New York. Cambridge University Press, Monetary Integration and the European Model of Society. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Inaugural Address, 21 January The State After Statism.

Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Features of the Swedish pension reform. Irresistible Forces, Immovable Objects: The New Politics of the Welfare State. Beacon Press, Boston, Massachusetts. A Failure of Capitalism: Leadership Imperative for a Post-Crisis World. One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth. International Finance, Volume 9, Issue 1, pp. International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.

The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century.

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