Treatise 8: God’s Grace (Faith Seeking Understanding Book 1)

Faith Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology

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Want to Read Currently Reading Read. Refresh and try again. Open Preview See a Problem? Thanks for telling us about the problem. Return to Book Page. Daniel Migliore's Faith Seeking Understanding has been a standard introduction to Christian theology for more than a decade. The book's presentation of traditional doctrine in freshly contemporary ways, its concern to hear and critically engage new voices in theology, and its creative and accessible style have kept it one of the most stimulating, balanced, and readable gui Daniel Migliore's Faith Seeking Understanding has been a standard introduction to Christian theology for more than a decade.

The book's presentation of traditional doctrine in freshly contemporary ways, its concern to hear and critically engage new voices in theology, and its creative and accessible style have kept it one of the most stimulating, balanced, and readable guides to theology available. This second edition of Faith Seeking Understanding features improvements from cover to cover. Besides updating and expanding the entire text of the book, Migliore has added two completely new chapters. The first, "Confessing Jesus Christ in Context," explores the unique contributions to Christian theology made by recent theologians working in the African American, Asian American, Latin American, Hispanic, feminist, womanist, and mujerista traditions.

The second new chapter, "The Finality of Jesus Christ and Religious Pluralism," addresses the growing interest in the relationship of Christianity to other religions and their adherents. Migliore's three delightful theological dialogues are followed by a new appendix, an extensive glossary of theological terms, making the book even more useful to students seeking to understand the history, themes, and challenges of Christian belief.

Paperback , pages. Published June 14th by William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company first published To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. To ask other readers questions about Faith Seeking Understanding , please sign up. Be the first to ask a question about Faith Seeking Understanding. Lists with This Book. What an amazing theological entry point. We just completed a spiritual journey through FSU as a church and oh, how enriching it was to locate ourselves within a theological framework in community.

Feb 23, Matthewfryeinsightbb. This book is a good read for those who want to understand some of the basic principles and beliefs of Christianity. Many major topics are covered, examining multiple approaches to those topics, and giving criticism. The focus of the book, rightly describing Christianity, is on a Christ centered belief system, where the causes for the poor, the discriminated, and alienated are held at high importance. Reading and understanding the material was easy, as it was organized and presented in a user-fri This book is a good read for those who want to understand some of the basic principles and beliefs of Christianity.

Reading and understanding the material was easy, as it was organized and presented in a user-friendly format. There was a nice mixture of common words along with religious terminology, which again, aids in understanding. With this said, it is not a quick read as the material is hefty. All in all, I learned a lot from this book, and the author did not seem to present too much bias, that is, until the last chapter.

I cannot make up my mind concerning the chapter of eschatology. I liked the unique approach that was taken, which went beyond defining views such as amillenillism, post-tribulational, and such. The main focus of the chapter was a discussion on the basic, universal Christian hopes and reaction to those hopes. But I am also really troubled with this last chapter, as he readily dismisses those who believe in the Rapture, but does not give any explanation to defend his argument.

Then, he talks about essential symbols of Christianity, such as hell, questions them, and states that they are only symbolic, and should not be taken literal. I was very discerned by this. I almost knocked the book down to a four-star rating on this one rough chapter. Ultimately, if you want to learn, through unbiased explanation, the basic beliefs behind Christianity, and how it should be conducted, this is a good book.

But if you are looking to expand you knowledge about specific books of the Bible, or about apocalyptic beliefs, this book does not aid in these areas. Aug 13, Pamela rated it it was amazing. The first theology text I read all the way through and enjoyed while I learned, and I am not saying that because I am friends with the author. I read it before the Presbyterian ordination exams in ish, and really loved it.

I have often said that this subject needs two courses. But those are too large for single courses. But in the case of a single course introduction, one is really strapped to find good smaller introductions. Thomas and Wondra's Introduction to Christian Theology, a more liberal Anglican introduction, which the course I teach currently uses, is well researched, but often skips right into very abstract topics without giving a simple overview of the doctrinal basics.

An Introduction is good, but it is like sipping wine through a fire house, cramming so much in such a small space. Finding Daniel Migliore's Faith Seeking Understanding, especially this newer addition, has deeply impressed me. Migliore is able to present topics in a succinct yet comprehensive manner. He is ecumenically minded and global-minded. His theology displays a sensitivity to Black and South American liberation theology, feminism, and Asian theological conversations that are often ignored by mainstream western, male-dominated theology.

His chapter on dialogue with other religions, notably Judaism and Islam, is just the thing that needs to be in an introduction. Migliore is a good writer that gives a certain richness to topics that are often very dry. I don't know what I would have done differently. I am not the master Migliore clearly is. I thought his section on the atonement was a bit too short for how important the topic is. On every chapter, there was, of course, much more he could have gone into, but A good introduction delivers substance but does not overload.

It wets the proverbial whistle, which Migliore definitely does. Each chapter informs the reader, but also invites them in deeper.

Treatise on Faith

Aug 02, Andrew rated it really liked it. Easily the best 'introduction to theology' that I've ever read.

Having taught the class myself once or twice in years past, I would unquestionably use this book again -- even in an environment where English is a second language. Jan 17, Ray rated it it was ok Recommended to Ray by: I have to wonder if the folks who wrote the first reviews read the same text that I did! This was my basic text for an intro. He is classically trained, very disiplined, and a real gentleman. But, as this book demonstrates, he can't be termed a great theologian. While he claims to be a Barthian, and he does use Barth's categories, he would not be recognized as such by Barth.

He might be described as more a "string of pearls" t I have to wonder if the folks who wrote the first reviews read the same text that I did! He might be described as more a "string of pearls" thinker -- he takes things he likes from a variety of contradictory sources, with no apparent anchor or controling principle. What you get is more of a "mood" than a tangible response to God's voice in Scripture. This is a very weak, very inconsistent, very frustrating work.

I hardly ever score things poorly on Amazon, but I had to comment on this when I saw the other glowing reviews. There are all kinds of good theology texts, both to the "left" and to the "right" of Migliore. Louis Berkof, for example, is a classic that is clear and helpful. Dec 26, Michaelpatrick Keena rated it did not like it Shelves: Reading this book is as refreshing as drinking from a muddy river.

This neo-orthodox writer is promoted as major defender of the Reformed Church and Christian orthodoxy. Occasionally backing Biblical soundness, Migliore undermines the very Word he is describes and investigates. I have read better from the papers used to line the bottom of parrot cages Mar 02, Kate Wester rated it did not like it. An ok introduction into systematic theology. Migliore offers up a kind of Christocentric liberation theology. Like some liberation theology, it occasionally paints in broad brushes and lacks discretion.

Migliore definitely wants to have his cake and eat it too. But this rhetorical mo An ok introduction into systematic theology. Often I will look to sell books after class, but this one I will keep and I have even jotted some things down that might be good to explore in sermons. In fact, I have quoted from this book in a sermon already. Migliore's writing is quite beautiful and is also well organized. I like the use of numbered points with italicized statements. It makes the book easy to work through and digest. He presents a lot of information on different theologies around key doctrines, discusses weaknesses and streng Often I will look to sell books after class, but this one I will keep and I have even jotted some things down that might be good to explore in sermons.

He presents a lot of information on different theologies around key doctrines, discusses weaknesses and strengths of them, and presents his improvements upon them. Improvements might be a strong term, but I'll leave it there. May 16, Sparowhawke rated it really liked it. The impetus for reading this book came after listening to a thought-provoking sermon, one that drew on a more contemporary view of Reformed theology. Each of the theological virtues has God for its end and its object. The object of the act of faith is the First Truth insofar as it is not seen, i.

So the First Truth is related to the act of faith in the manner of an end that is unseen. Consequently, this end is hoped for "the substance of things hoped for". And it is in this way that the First Truth is the object of the will, i. On the other hand, the relation of the object of the act of faith to the object of the intellect is that it is an "argument" argumentum of things that are not evident. For an argument is something that induces the intellect to adhere to some truth.

In this case, it is the authority of God which prompts the intellect of the believer to adhere to things that it does not see clearly. Thomas sums up his discussion by proposing the following formal definition: This article focuses on the proper immediate ontological subject of faith, and helps us to better understand the interplay between the cognitive and affective dimensions of the act of faith.

Even though faith involves will and volition, as we have seen, it is properly an intellectual virtue having the true as its object, and hence it has the intellect as its immediate subject. Still, because the assent of the intellect is prompted by the command of the will, both principles need to be well-disposed in order for the act of faith to be perfect. Thomas's example of the act of sawing a piece of wood--both principles, the saw and the one who uses it, need to be well-disposed in order for the act to be 'perfect'. Also note the analogy he draws between reason and the passions, on the one hand, and the will and the intellect, on the other.

Just as both the passions and reason need to be habituated in their own right prudence is the relevant virtue in the case of reason in order for, say, an act of courage to be perfect, so too, it is not enough just for our intellective appetite to desire and command an act of faith; our intellect must be well disposed--that is, open to receiving God's word--as well. This good disposition is the habit of faith itself. This is a common enough phenomenon with regard to all acts of faith in general.

There is often something we sincerely want to take on someone's word but find it difficult to because of various "intellectual" obstacles or objections. We want to avoid gullibility, but by the same token, we want to avoid a pathological mistrust in the word and character of others.

Recall Augustine's intellectual difficulties with the Catholic Faith. Part of his intellectual problem had to do with disordered affections for instance, his initial disdain for Sacred Scripture , but part of it was his genuine inability to see the possible truth of certain doctrines. In any case, the object of the act of faith is the First-truth-qua-hidden and so faith is a properly intellectual virtue, even though it intimately involves affective considerations.

Those considerations come to the fore in the next article. Charity is the 'form' of faith in the sense of prompting and providing motivation for the exercise of the virtue of faith. As with every other action, the act of faith takes one species from its object and one from its end or motive see notes on ST , , and like every other action by one who has God's gift of habitual grace, the motive for acts of faith is the supernatural love of God, or charity. The next question is about the relationship between faith formed by charity and faith not formed by charity, which is how the relevant habit exists in one who has, through sin, repudiated the filial relationship with God established by the gift of grace.

Is it the same virtue or habit that was once formed and is now unformed. This is an important question for the life of the believer, since it describes one dimension of the condition of a believer who has turned his back on God through serious mortal sin. At least at the beginning of the state of mortal sin, the sinner seems to have the very same disposition to acts of faith.

This is especially clear in the case of one who repents of his sin almost immediately. Thomas accepts this datum of experience and holds that the very same infused habit which was previously formed can become unformed through sin. In doing so, he rejects a the opinion that formed and unformed faith are distinct habits infused separately by God as appropriate to the believer's condition, and b the opinion that formed and unformed faith are distinct habits always present in the believer, the one operative only in the state of grace and the other operative only in the state of mortal sin.

Still, in article 5 St. Thomas makes clear that unformed faith does not count as a virtue, because by definition "a virtue is a kind of perfection. The next three articles concern faith's status as a virtue. Formed faith is a virtue because it is a habit that is invariably the principle of a good act. The habit of formed faith invariably gives rise to a good act, because through it the intellect is invariably and infallibly guided toward its object, the true, and the will affected by charity is invariably directed toward its authentic final end, union with God, and as such commands the assent of the intellect.

But just as the habit of a passion is, though moderate, not a virtue unless it is directed by prudence, so too unformed faith is not a virtue because it is not motivated by charity. Thomas also makes the distinction between the virtue of faith on the one hand and the gifts of knowledge and understanding on the other.

First, as we learn in art. Second, the object of faith includes both eternal and temporal matters, the latter insofar as they relate to something eternal. On the other hand, the gift of knowledge is concerned specifically with temporal matters, since this gift is a disposition to respond quickly to the Holy Spirit's promptings to see particular temporal affairs from the perspective of faith, whereas the gift of understanding is a similar disposition to respond quickly to the Holy Spirit's promptings to discern eternal matters, and most especially what does and does not belong to the despotism of faith.

Questions of this form often give very interesting descriptions of the relations among the virtues. The first thing to understand--and this is clear if one reads the treatise on virtue very carefully--is that from the perspective of faith the only virtues in an unqualified sense are the theological virtues and infused moral virtues. This is because only these virtues order us properly toward our genuine final end of filial union with God. With this in mind, it is easy to understand St. Thomas's claim that faith is properly speaking the first of the virtues.

Note the claim that "natural cognition cannot attain to God as the object of that beatitude that [the virtues of] hope and charity tend toward. On the other hand, there are fixed acquired dispositions virtues in the improper sense that prepare the way for faith--e. Notice, by the way, that in ad 5 St. Thomas distinguishes the disposition of will required for an initial act of faith from the disposition of the will viz.

The next article gives St. Thomas the opportunity to distinguish two different types of certitude. In other places he characterizes this as a distinction between certitude of adherence and certitude of evidentness. The first type derives from the cause of the cognition: Thomas asserts unabashedly that because God is a more reliable source of truth than our natural cognitive faculties, the certitude of faith is greater than the certitude of the natural intellectual virtues of intellectus understanding of evident first principles , scientia grasp of conclusions evidently derived from evident principles , and sapientia wisdom combining the other two.

The idea, articulated in ad 2, is this: We all know what it is like to be in a position where it is better to trust the word of an expert than our own grasp of a particular matter. That is, even though I might not be able to grasp fully the matter at hand, I can be more certain of the truth concerning that matter if I trust someone who knows.

In the matters of faith especially as regards the mysteries of the faith, which in principle surpass our grasp by natural reason I am always in this position in the present life. Thomas puts it in ad 2: On the other hand, what faith does not give is the evidentness that is possible with respect to objects proportioned to our intellects.

This is why "cogitation" is not terminated by an act of faith, as it is with acts of intellectus and scientia. Nonetheless, the light of faith is like the sun compared to the watt light bulb of our cognitive faculties. Hence, faith is more trustworthy than intellectus and scientia. Of course, this does not preclude considerations, of the sort raised by Locke, about our ability to identify sources of cognition worthy of our trust and about the degree of assent we should give them. It is clear, however, that on St. Thomas's view our degree of assent does, and should, in the case of faith exceed even our certitude about the created mediators used by God to convey his revelation.

We are, after all, talking about the faith of the martyrs. More on this later in the course. Even the demons have the habit identified with faith, though in them this habit is not a virtue. For their wills are not directed to the good. Instead, they are practically compelled to assent to the mysteries of the faith by the various evident signs of the trustworthiness of God's revelation, even though they are displeased by this. Thomas makes clear that this habit is not a "gift of grace. The next article is interesting, given the times we live in and also for the further light it sheds on the notion of the formal object of faith.

It asks whether a heretic who rejects one article of the faith can have unformed faith with regard to other articles. To put it tersely, St. Thomas's answer is no. His argument is a simple and, to my mind, effective one. The formal object of faith is the First Truth "as manifested in Sacred Scripture and the teaching of the Church," so that in the act of faith one is assenting to whatever is so manifested "as an infallible rule. Thomas puts it, "he is adhering to his own will" instead. At best, then, such a person is of the opinion that certain other doctrines are true.

But this is not faith, not even unformed faith, because it lacks the fundamental stance of faith, which is to assent to whatever it is that God has revealed. In the last article of this question, St. Thomas discusses both the quantitative and qualitative extent of faith.

As for the quantitative extent of faith, there are two points. Since every believer has the same formal object of faith--viz. However, some have a more explicit, sophisticated, or profound grasp of some doctrines, and so in this respect there can be differences among believers. Now for the qualitative extent, or intensity, of faith.

In his treatment of virtue in general, St. Thomas noted that one person or subject may participate in a given virtue to a greater degree than another. Likewise, here he notes that in the case of faith such participation has two elements, one intellectual i. In this article he provides a few more details about the causes of faith. First of all, we must be informed of what it is that God wants us to assent to by faith. This can happen either immediately by a direct revelation or much more commonly through the mediation of teachers and preachers of the faith, but in both cases God is the principal cause.

Second, we must assent to that which is revealed, and this requires internal principles. Thomas rejects the heresy of the Pelagians, according to which human free choice is the sole cause of our initial interior preparation for faith, so that all we need from God is to be informed of what specifically we are to assent to. Thomas asserts that God is the principal cause even of our preparedness to assent, since in the assent of faith we are elevated "beyond our nature. Here we broach the mystery of grace and freedom, about which much ink has been spilled in the history of Christian theology.

Furthermore, even unformed faith is a gift from God, although it lacks charity. For unformed faith, as we saw above, is an intellectual habit by which we assent to God's revelation, despite the fact that we lack, at least for the time being, the love of God which should move us to the act of faith. It is faith prescinding from charity that causes servile fear and faith with charity that causes filial fear.

In reply to the objection obj.

Faith Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology by Daniel L. Migliore

Thomas has this to say: But when it is quickened by charity, then it is incompatible with any kind of impurity, because 'charity covereth all sins' Prov. As for understanding, we must first distinguish natural understanding intellectus from the supernatural gift of understanding, even though there is a root meaning in common, viz. Consequently, we need an added power of insight that brings our natural power to fulfillment. This is the gift of understanding. Thomas makes this more explicit: For we reason by proceeding from things that are understood, and discursive reasoning is completed when we arrive at an understanding of what we were previously ignorant of.

Thus, what we reason to discursively proceeds from something previously understood. But the gift of grace does not proceed from the natural light of reason; rather, it is added to that light and, as it were, perfects it. This addition is called 'understanding' rather than reason, because the added light is related to what is supernaturally known in the way that the natural light is related to those things that we know as first principles. Further, the gift of understanding is compatible with faith, even though the notion of understanding implies insight and comprehension, whereas faith implies that what is assented to is in some sense not comprehended.

Thomas draws two distinctions. The first is between the central mysteries of the faith e.

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The second distinction is between perfect and imperfect understanding. There are lots of everyday examples of this sort of thing, many having to do with interpersonal relationships. Thomas agrees with the objectors that we cannot have perfect understanding of the central mysteries of the faith, though we can have such understanding in principle of some truths subordinate to them the preambles of the faith. On the other hand, we can have imperfect understanding of them; that is, we can understand that we should not back away from them just because we do not see how they cohere with external appearances.

And it is clear that this sort of imperfect understanding is compatible with the epistemic limitations involved in faith. In the next article, St. Thomas argues that the gift of understanding is not just theoretical or speculative but also practical, at least in the sense that the theoretical truths which are its primary object provide the stable framework within which we live our lives and carry out our good works, since our works are ordered to the end of union with God and regulated by the eternal law, which guides us toward that end.

But our knowledge of our final end and of the eternal law is theoretical knowledge that provides a framework within which practical reason operates. Thomas next claims that the gift of understanding is had by everyone in the state of grace. For to be in the state of grace is, first and foremost, to have charity, i. But some understanding of the truth about God and salvation is necessary in order for us love God and seek our salvation. Thomas makes clear that this level of understanding, which is common to all in the state of grace, does not mean that every such person understands fully plene the mysteries of the faith.

Well, just what do they understand beyond those things that are absolutely necessary for salvation? Thomas replies as follows: Conversely, and this is again important for grasping the interplay of affective and cognitive elements in faith, no one who is not in the state of grace has the gift of understanding. As the objections point out, this seems contrary to appearances. First of all, there are those who seem to have a relatively deep understanding of the deposit of faith and yet lack the will to follow it.

Again, in the Gospels we hear of people who have prophesied in Christ's name which, presumably, takes understanding , but whom the Lord will disown on the day of judgment.

More generally, we have already seen that it is possible to have the habit of faith without habitual grace unformed faith. So why hold that the gift of understanding is had only by those in the state of grace? Thomas first recalls the nature of a gift of the Holy Spirit. It is a disposition to respond expeditiously to the promptings of the Holy Spirit.

Thus, understanding is an intellectual disposition to respond to the Holy Spirit's giving us intellectual illumination that makes us see more clearly what it is that we believe and ought to believe by faith. But our response itself presupposes a due orientation to our ultimate end: Thomas next explains the difference between the gift of understanding and the six other gifts to wit, knowledge, wisdom, counsel, piety, fortitude, and fear of the Lord.

First of all, understanding is a gift of the cognitive faculty and thereby differs from piety, fortitude, and fear of the Lord, which are gifts of the appetitive faculty. But the distinction among the gifts of the cognitive faculty, viz.

Thomas has this to say:. Hence, it is necessary for some things to be proposed to man for belief not as seen, but as heard, and to these he assents by faith. Now faith is primarily and principally related to the First Truth, secondarily related to certain considerations concerning creatures, and extends beyond that to directing human actions as well, in so far as it works through love--as is clear from what was said above 4, 2, ad 3. Therefore, two things are required on our part with respect to things proposed to faith for belief. The first is that the intellect penetrate or grasp the objects of belief both theoretical and practical , and this pertains to the gift of understanding.

The second is that man must have correct judgment concerning them, so that he might determine that he should adhere to these and withdraw from their opposites. With respect to divine things, this sort of judgment pertains to the gift of wisdom ; with respect to created things, it pertains to the gift of knowledge ; and with respect to its application to individual actions, it pertains to the gift of counsel. So understanding has to do with the grasp of the doctrines of the faith, whereas the other with making good judgments about a the central mysteries of the faith wisdom , created things knowledge , and particular actions counsel.

Thomas makes the connection between the gift of understanding and the beatitudes. More specifically, understanding is connected to the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God. Thomas's discussions of the gifts and the beatitudes in the treatise on virtue. The reason for this connection should be fairly clear by now. This sort of cleanness results from the virtues and gifts of the appetitive power.

In a second sense, however, cleanness is a trait of the intellect insofar as it is purged of error and false imaginations and open to grasping the truth and rejecting heretical falsehood. This is the cleanness that results from the gift of understanding. In the next life, the gift of understanding finds its perfection in the face-to-face vision of God, whereas in this life it helps us to grasp that the more perfectly we know God in our present state, the more we realize that he surpasses all that our mind comprehends.

Lastly, we turn to the relation between the gift of understanding and the fruits of the Holy Spirit, specifically, the fruits of faith and, ultimately, joy. In the context of the fruits, the fruit of faith is the certitude of faith , which perfects the intellect. This, in turn, engenders joy , which brings the appetitive power or will to completion. Note the reply to obj. The objection was that faith precedes understanding and hence cannot be its fruit: For a man could not assent to things proposed for belief unless he understood them in some way or other.

Further, in ad 1 we learn that the gift of knowledge gives us a share in God's own simple and non-discursive knowledge of created things. And in reply ad 2 to the objection that many holy people seem to be unlearned in matters of faith, he gives the following interesting reply that helps us to distinguish the gift of knowledge, strictly speaking, from the sort of knowledge of the faith that faithful intellectual inquirers have:.

The first is a knowledge by which a man knows what he ought to believe, distinguishing what is to be believed from what is not to be believed. Knowledge in this sense is a gift [of the Holy Spirit], and it belongs to all holy persons. The other is a knowledge concerning matters of belief by which a man not only knows what he ought to believe, but also knows how to explain the faith, induce others to believe it, and refute objectors.

Knowledge in this sense is numbered among the graces given to the already graced gratiae gratis datae , which are given not to all, but [only] to some. Hence Augustine, after the words quoted [in the objection], adds: The next three articles revisit the specific subject matter of the gift of knowledge see 8,6 above.

Thomas says, it seems that the gift of knowledge has created things as its subject in the sense that by it we are prompted to assess created things correctly and order them to God instead of putting them before God in some way: This is the knowledge of holy things, according to Wis.

The upshot, as I understand it, is that the gift of knowledge gives one the sort of theoretical perception of created things which enters directly into practical reasoning art. This is why it corresponds to the third beatitude, "Blessed are they who mourn, for they shall be consoled. So by this knowledge we are led to God as the highest good and the fulfillment of what we seek in all created goods. In simple non-believers unbelief is a punishment for original sin rather than a punishable sin in itself. In other words, if simple non-believers are damned, they are damned because of sins other than active unbelief.

As for the origins of active unbelief, St. Thomas identifies pride, "through which it happens that a man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules of faith and to the sound understanding of the Fathers. The argument for the claim that active unbelief is the greatest of sins is that faith is necessary for our having the correct orientation to our final end. Thomas accepts this argument in part. On his view, carefully laid out in the treatise on sin and vice in ST , every sin involves both a a turning away aversio from God, which constitutes the formal character of a sin, and b a simultaneous turning toward conversio some created good in preference to God.

Active unbelief constitutes the maximal turning away and distancing oneself from God, since one who has a false conception of God "does not approach him but is instead distanced from him" and "cannot have any cognition of him at all, whence what he thinks about is not God. So active unbelief is in itself or by its nature or genus the greatest of sins. Still, circumstances might mitigate the degree of guilt incurred by this sin. And, indeed, Augustine "hesitated to decide between an evil Catholic and a heretic who is not otherwise sinning, since, even though it is more grave by its genus, the heretic's sin can be mitigated by some circumstance--and, conversely, the Catholic's sin can be aggravated by some circumstance" ad 1.

Thomas elaborates on this by pointing out that with respect to sins other than active unbelief, the Catholic, other things being equal, sins more grievously than an unbeliever because of the knowledge of the truth he has from faith i. Furthermore, it is not the case that an unbeliever's every act is sinful just because of his unbelief. Thomas reiterates his claim, made in the treatise on sin in ST , that mortal sin and original sin, for that matter does not completely destroy "the good of [human] nature.

Note, though, that St. Thomas takes for granted what he argued in the treatise on grace in ST , viz. Here the reply to the 3rd objection is interesting, since St. Thomas takes the occasion to clarify the status of Cornelius Acts 10 before his conversion. Cornelius had been mention in the sed contra: Therefore, not every action of an unbeliever is a sin. Thomas comments that this consideration is beside the point, since Cornelius was not in fact an unbeliever before his baptism; otherwise his acts would not have been accepted by God i.

Thomas here divides active unbelief into various species. One sort of active unbelief consists in rejecting the faith without ever having embraced it. This is the unbelief of the "pagans and gentiles. There are two cases here: There are some interesting points made in ad 1. Once again we can consider the "formal object" of a sin to be either the good to which the sinner turns conversio or the good away from which the sinner turns aversio.

It is the differences in the former that give us various species of sin under a given genus. In the case of faith, the species can be considered either by looking at the various general ways in which the faith is rejected, and this is what was done in the previous paragraph, or by looking at the various false beliefs that unbelievers adopt in rejecting the faith--and in this case there is no determinate number of species of unbelief, since there are infinitely many possible false opinions and combinations thereof. As we might expect, St.

Thomas holds that from the perspective of its relation to the faith, heresy is a more serious sin than the unbelief of the Chosen People, and their unbelief is a more serious sin than the unbelief of pagans and heathens. That is, to reject the faith once accepted either in its explicit or prefigured forms is a worse sin, generically speaking, than to reject it without ever having accepted it in any way.

On the other hand, heathens and pagans are worse off, even if their sin is less grievous, because they are farther from the saving truth. Thomas goes on to examine various questions having to do with the relations between believers and non-believers including, but not limited to, active unbelievers. These questions are interesting and, in part, reflect the historical context in which St. However, our main interest in them has to do with what St. Thomas assumes or says about certain theoretical topics concerning a the modus vivendi of a missionary community the Church composed of both inquirers and non-inquirers and b the relations of that community to individual non-believers and communities of non-believers.

Remember that he has already divided unbelievers into a heathens and pagans Muslims seem to count as heathens , b Jews, who fall into a separate category because of their status as the People of God under the Old Law, and c heretics and apostates, i. Some of the things he says apply to all non-believers and others to just some of them. In article 7 the relevant problem is whether believers ought to engage in disputes or exchanges with unbelievers.

The answer is that this depends on circumstances. In particular, the main question is whether or not the Christians in the audience are "well-instructed and firm in the faith. In all other circumstances such disputations can confuse and undermine the faith of simple believers and ought not to be engaged in. Note right away that St. Thomas assumes that only a proper subset of believers are fit to be either participants in or hearers of such disputations without danger to their faith.

In essence, they are the children of the family of the Church. His view is thus "paternalistic," i. We will later have the opportunity to contrast this approach with Mill's liberalism. In article 8 St. Thomas agrees with the objectors that non-believers should not be compelled i. However, they can legitimately be compelled not to hinder the faith by blasphemy, false persuasions, or persecution. Of course, the context here presupposes that the political regime is openly Catholic; article 10 addresses the other possibility, though even here what St. Thomas says can be adapted to the question of what the Church should sponsor within its own purview.

As for heretics and apostates, St. Thomas has no problem with their being compelled them, even "corporeally," to fulfill their promises and hold to what they at one time accepted. Physical punishment would be carried out by the political power, and its justification would be preservation of the common good. Though this sort of thing is repulsive to those of us who live in liberal democracies, it has its roots in the Socratic idea that care of souls is much more important than care of bodies.

The problem is to say what the reasonable limits of this care are. In a sense, that is the issue that St. Thomas is addressing in these articles. Article 9 addresses the question of whether or not believers should "communicate with," i. Once again, when we are talking about those who have never received the faith, the Church does not forbid believers from communicating with non-believers, as though these non-believers were being punished by the Church with excommunication.

For the Church does not have the authority to exercise spiritual judgment over them.

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