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Heider and Simmel, Rhesus monkeys that cannot throw themselves are nevertheless able to understand a throwing action by responding correctly to it Wood et al.
Second , the direct-matching model does not distinguish between action and goal mirroring. As Csibra criticizes, in order to understand an action, one has to consider that often there are different means to achieve the same goal. Thus, action and goal mirroring cannot be achieved through the same mirror mechanism. Discussing the critique of the direct matching model, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia now link action understanding not to action, but to goal mirroring: By coding visual and motor acts that belong together without being identical, broadly congruent mirror neurons seem to mirror the goal underlying different actions.
However, as Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia recognize, action understanding can occur through different mechanisms, making goal mirroring not necessary for action understanding. Humans are able to understand that a dog is barking although there is no activation in parietal-frontal mirror areas Buccino et al. As barking does not belong to the human motor repertoire, action understanding cannot exclusively be achieved by mapping the goal of the observed act onto one's own motor repertoire.
In order to test the primacy of a motor-based action understanding, not only must understanding be tested see section Taking Mirror Neuron Activity As A Proof For Action Understanding Interpretation , but the presumed gradation must be tested, too. Amazon Second Chance Pass it on, trade it in, give it a second life. A valid experiment, however, must operationalize the independent and the dependent variable. English Choose a language for shopping. New models can be developed in Windows with [ If mirror neurons are the answer, what was the question?
As a consequence, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia modify their concept of action understanding by introducing a gradation in their definition. This activity is interpreted as an indicator for action understanding. With reference to previous studies about mirror neuron activity in the human brain, the results are generalized on humans.
The goal mirroring model revised concludes the primacy of a motor-based action understanding. The argumentation can be broken down into the following 4-step structure:. In the following section, we will present three points why testing monkey's mirror neuron activity and making statements about human action understanding is incorrect. All cited experiments only test the independent variable, mirror neuron activity, by conducting single cell recordings on monkeys.
A valid experiment, however, must operationalize the independent and the dependent variable. Variations in the independent variable, then, are ideally the causes of variations in the dependent variable. Instead of operationalizing the dependent variable, action understanding, the authors infer from the neural activity in mirror areas that the monkey has understood the action.
First , such an inference reduces the monkey on his brain. This form of brain-reading is inaccurate because there is no one-to-one-correspondence between neural areas and their function in cognitive processes. As neural plasticity shows, cognitive processes can be associated with different neural areas. In philosophy of mind, this issue has been discussed 50 years ago: Second , taking mirror neuron activity as an indicator for action understanding is a tautological argumentation: If mirror neuron activity indicates action understanding, then action understanding has to occur if mirror neuron activity appears.
A tautology is not falsifiable and therefore disqualifies as a scientific theory Popper, This tautology is fortified in the latest version of the goal mirroring model by Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia The motivation for this appendix remains unclear. In order to show that its purpose is not only to save the own theory, it has to be justified.
Even if mirror neuron activity was a proof for the monkey's action understanding, it would not be justified to make statements about human action understanding. The narrow definition of action understanding already masks the historical and cultural dimensions of human understanding, but it does not imply an equalization of monkeys' and human action understanding.
Such equalization is not proven and not provable: Monkeys cannot be asked about their understanding in an experimental test. Thus, the relation between results, interpretation, and conclusion is methodologically incorrect. Suppose equalizing monkeys' and human action understanding was justified and the results on monkeys could therefore be generalized on humans. But intuitive plausibility is not a scientific criterion. Musical knowledge or the communicative content are part of a broader concept of understanding that has not been tested experimentally. In order to test the primacy of a motor-based action understanding, not only must understanding be tested see section Taking Mirror Neuron Activity As A Proof For Action Understanding Interpretation , but the presumed gradation must be tested, too.
Changing definitions in order to account for incompatible results is not a scientific act. It is therefore incorrect to conclude a primacy of a motor-based action understanding. In this paper we argue that—contrary to what is postulated in many articles—mirror neuron activity is no proof for action understanding. All cited studies test monkey's mirror neuron activity and make statements about human action understanding.
We discussed three points why this is incorrect. First , a valid experiment must test both the independent variable mirror neuron activity and the dependent variable action understanding. Taking mirror neuron activity as an indicator for action understanding is a tautological argumentation and an inaccurate reduction of the monkey to his brain. Second , even if mirror neuron activity was a proof for action understanding in monkeys, in order to generalize the results on humans, an equalization of monkeys' and human action understanding has to be presumed. Such equalization is not proven and not provable.
Third , even if mirror neuron activity in monkeys was a proof for action understanding in humans, this would still not prove the primacy of a motor-based action understanding. In support of the goal mirroring model revised , Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia do not present experimental results, but a modified yet still tautological definition of action understanding. We do not conclude that mirror neurons cannot have important social functions. We criticize that the existing experimental results do not support the conclusions. They might be intuitively plausible, but this is not a scientific criterion for a theory to be true.
Future studies should measure understanding if they make a statement about it. We conclude that there is no proof that mirror neuron activity leads to action understanding. We thank Pierre Jacob Institut Nicod, Paris for the insightful critical discussions on the function of the mirror neuron system during his visiting professorship at the University of Heidelberg.
The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. For the broken mirror theory of autism see Cattaneo et al. National Center for Biotechnology Information , U. Journal List Front Hum Neurosci v. Published online May Author information Article notes Copyright and License information Disclaimer. Received May 22; Accepted May 2.
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