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Amazon Rapids Fun stories for kids on the go. Certainly if there is money in your computerized bank account then you yourself have certain status functions.
And you are a real, physical entity, and so we can understand in what these status functions are based. But what of the money itself?
In what are its status functions based? The money itself is nothing physical. But what then is it? It is [he tells us] a mistake to treat money and other such instruments as if they were natural phenomena like the phenomena studied in physics, chemistry and biology. The recent economic crisis makes it clear that they are products of massive fantasy There are no such entities; rather, it is as if the persons involved — which is to say you and me, and all human beings engaged in complex social interactions — trick ourselves into believing that there are such entities in order to be able to go about their business.
Cdo s do not, after all, cease to exist when their value collapses. Certainly total collapse in value for an entity of this sort may lead to some sort of institutional winding down which would in due course imply loss of existence. For in some cases we do indeed successfully make it the case by Declaration that a Y status function exists in a context C — the President really does have the powers assigned to him in the Constitution.
In other cases, however — for example when we make it the case by Declaration that a Cdo 3 exists, and that this new entity is based on Cdo 2 outcomes of earlier Declarations — then neither the result of this Declaration nor the entities on which it is based, really exist; rather, those involved are in some complicated fashion tricking themselves. As Searle himself puts it:.
Certainly it is true that the passage back from Y the social to X the physical goes smoothly when we are dealing with a single human being — for example with Searle alone in a hotel room. Here there is only one physical object, but many social objects a husband, an employee of the state of California, an American citizen, a driving license holder.
But how, Ferraris asks, are we to deal with entities such as the Italian stock market? But how, Ferraris asks, is collective intentionality to provide an account of those free-standing Y terms which have no foundation in any physical object? As Derrida observed in this essay — and this may be one of the very few places where Monsieur Derrida may have come close to a coherent thought — most speech acts are in fact inscribed acts — for without records of some sort there is no way in which performatives could produce highly complex social objects such as conferences, marriages, graduation ceremonies, or constitutions.
The point is simple, if we imagine a graduation or a wedding or a coronation ceremony in which there are no distributed and signed and countersigned plans and bookings, acts of registration and signed testimonies, then it is difficult to maintain thereafter that a graduate, or a husband and a wife, or a king have been produced. Recall our remark, above, to the effect that, through the rise of documents private memory traces inside human brains became prosthetically augmented.
For actually, of course, the entire world of physics and chemistry and biology exists outside the text, and independently of every recording.
Indeed this world existed for billions of years before texts or recordings or people existed at all. Trivially, however, if Ferraris and De Soto are right, the same cannot be said of social objects. The latter depend intimately on the records created by human beings to sustain them in existence, and on the social agreements about what the documents mean and about who has authority to interpret this meaning. Against this background, Ferraris advances an innovative approach to social ontology that starts out from the recognition of the important role played by documents in social objects of many sorts, such as money, marriages, divorces, joint custody arrangements, years in prison, tax codes, the Nuremberg Trial, the Swedish Academy of Sciences, economic crises, research projects, lectures and scientific degrees.
These are objects which determine the affordances in our environment, today, no less than do stones, trees and coconuts, and they are of greater significance not least because a good part of our happiness or unhappiness depends on them. Of course we do not always pay attention to them certainly not when advancing philosophical theories of the Lebenswelt , and even more rarely do we ask what, for example, computer programs or national constitutions are made of, or what it is which sustains them in being over time.
We take them seriously only when they do not work — when the program does not run on the computer, for example, or when provisions in the constitution are suspended through a declaration of martial law, or when we lose our passport or credit card — and we set to searching, paying, phoning, writing emails and queuing in all sorts of offices. In what sorts of ways using what sorts of technologies are documents disseminated in a society that is sustained through acts of recording?
Taken literally, the latter does not make sense.
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For all the reasons presented above, it does not make sense to assert, for example, that the US Constitution is made of tiny oxidising heaps of ink marks on parchment, and matters are helped only slightly if we add together all the printed and digital copies of the US Constitution and assert that the US Constitution is the set or mereological sum of all these multiple inscriptions. In this, however, his very doctrine of Documentality seems to be deprived of much of its force — and of its originality — since it would imply that Austin, when he spoke of speech acts was in fact already talking about documents albeit of only one type: Ferraris seeks to employ this counterintuitive generalization as a basis for solving one central problem in the theory of speech acts, namely: Ferraris talks in this connection of what he calls the grand divide between strong documents inscriptions of acts , which make up social objects in the full sense, and weak documents recordings of facts , which are secondary derivatives and of lesser importance.
His idea seems to be that strong documents inscribed on the brain provide the key to answering questions such as what it is that makes us subject to laws or liable for our debts because laws, or debts, are themselves made of inscriptions — they are, as social objects, nothing beyond the text. Such acts bring about specific sorts of changes in the abstract world of obligations because they are rooted in systems of mnemonic codes prevailing in the relevant social groupings 43 , and these in turn, of course, are dependent on the right sorts of evolved traced in the brains of those involved.
But how these traces bring about actual obligation, rather than associated feelings, seems still not to have been explained. I am thus far from confident that a solution along the lines proposed by Ferraris — to the degree that I understand it at all — can be made to work. At the same time, however, it is also not clear to me that there is thus far any contribution to social ontology that is in a.
Proceedings of Fois , Amsterdam, I Press: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of John R.
Parution le 23 septembre In the circumstances that preceded the Lehman bankruptcy, however, the relevant chain of documentation could not be reconstituted, so that those involved were not able to rely upon legally authenticated written statements to get the facts about the underlying assets. Parution le 13 septembre In what sorts of ways using what sorts of technologies are documents disseminated in a society that is sustained through acts of recording? A Child Learn to Read and Write. Indeed some of the document forms that people have created have had far-reaching damaging effects, as we shall see in our discussion of the ontology of toxic assets below. Through the performance of document acts acts of filling in, registering, conveying, validating, attaching we change the world by bringing into being ownership relations, legal accountability, business organizations, and a variety of other institutional orders of modern societies.
Searle , Berlin — New York, de Gruyter: From speech acts to social reality , in B. The new ontology of the social world , in B. An essay on social ontology , in L. My own role in the development of the new, applied ontology had its seeds in collaborations with Italian philosopher-ontologists such as Roberto Casati, Maurizio Ferraris, Achille Varzi, and especially Nicola Guarino an ontological dottore in ingegneria , who in the early s first opened my eyes to the possibilities of a new discipline at the frontiers of philosophy and computing.
Indeed some of the document forms that people have created have had far-reaching damaging effects, as we shall see in our discussion of the ontology of toxic assets below. The New Science of Ontology. From Speech Acts to Document Acts. Download best sellers ebooks free Places of the Soul: Download free books for iphone Langenscheidts Handworterbuch: Electronic ebooks download Qinghua Hanyu Zonghepian: Free computer ebooks to download pdf The Beginners' Choice: Ebook online shop download Hello Beijing: Electronic e books free download Mechanical Engineering: Problems and Solutions Mechanical Engineering: