Religion im Focus - dem modernen Nachrichtenmagazin (German Edition)

---

A second group of papers addressed scholarly networks and discourses at different sites. Levi analyzed how plans to integrate Arab or Muslim scholars into the institute clashed with the political realities of nationalist ideologies and the declared Zionist purpose of the Hebrew University in the context of military and political conflicts in Palestine and Israel.

Ausgewählte Reihen

In response to her argument that Maltzan voiced a cautious criticism of colonialism regarding the French occupation of Tunisia, a number of participants emphasized that it is important to distinguish between the critique of individual colonial projects on one hand and the colonial gaze on the other. She asked about the rationale that was organizing the display of objects and the activities of the museum as well as the choice of the various topics for the articles of the journal.

Importantly, she drew attention to how "economic supremacy" has formed part of Orientalist forms of knowledge and power — a point that is well worth asking regarding our contemporary present.

Bruckmayr asked how the take on "Islam" by the Catholic priest, scholar and Professor of biblical studies Hermann Stieglecker differed from those of his mostly Protestant colleagues at secular universities. Another group of papers addressed the German Federal Republic. Prestel traced a conceptual shift that was, as he argued, brought about by certain political events in the late s, especially the Lebanese civil war He explained that whereas the concept of "Third World" solidarity, understood as a shared struggle against imperialism, was dominant during the s and s, conceptualizing the Middle East in terms of "religion" and "Islam" became stronger in the s.

Instead, one should look at "liberal" regulative imperatives as productive of new practices, spaces, and hermeneutics. His point was that these calls in fact create a "liberal Other" — a "modern", "secular", "tolerant" Islam — that conforms to, rather than questions politics of liberal and national discourse that powerfully define what counts as tolerable, as the same, and as different.

Reihen | Cornelsen

In conclusion, Rebekka Habermas pointed out that the conference was successful in providing a more precise picture of how "Islam" as an epistemic field emerged in the German-speaking world. She emphasized among other things that Islamwissenschaft was apparently made by many, that it came into existence as a Protestant discipline, even though it is yet unclear how Protestant it is, that its emergence was firmly located in a colonial and secular field, and that many places were involved the creation of what came to figure as Islamwissenschaft. Second, she pointed to the challenge of relating the emergence of Islamwissenschaft to broader spaces of knowledge such as the empire, gender, and magic, as well as the emergence of religious studies — in order to not separate the analysis of the production of "Islam" as an epistemic field from debates of colonial history.

In the ensuing discussion, the question what Islamwissenschaft actually "is" was fiercly debated. It made particularly clear how important it is to ask about the specificities of German Islamwissenschaft , Islamkunde , Arabistik , and Orientalistik in comparison to other disciplinary formations of knowledge and international debates on the history of area studies. Moreover, going beyond common temporal, spatial, and thus epistemic and political framings of modern German history proved useful to elucidate the often paradoxical place of "Islam" and "the Orient" in German-speaking worlds, past and present.

Managing Muslim Bodies in the Colonies: Colonial Debates and the Politics of Religion. Robert Terrell Syracuse, NY: Oriental Professors and German Orientalists in s Berlin: Improbable Communities, Transnational Imaginaries, and Networks. The Case of Hermann Stieglecker. Islam and the West German Radical Left in the s. Iskandar Ahmed Abdalla Berlin: Time, Space and The Imperative of Intelligibility. German historians were slow to pick up on the term Moderne. For one thing, they used a centuries-old and internationally accepted system of periodization, dividing Western history into three eras: Altertum antiquity , Mittelalter the Middle Ages and Neuzeit the modern era.

Unlike nowadays, German history was generally viewed as a seamless development well into the twentieth century: For disciplines with a positivist orientation, however, this approach was just as abhorrent as the historical-philosophical answers proffered by Oswald Spengler [20 ] and later by Arnold Toynbee, [21 ] both of whom violated accepted standards in their fields.

And yet the winds were changing, and this in multiple respects. For one thing, Germany had undergone a successful revolution and this alone made thinking in discontinuities more plausible than ever before. Second, an alternative epistemological agenda gained traction in the humanities as a consequence, military defeat and its aftermath having given rise to new political and cultural achievements, namely the attempt, dating back to the tradition of idealism, to offer in response to an unloved present an intellectually valid understanding of reality and a corresponding normative conception of history.

From the perspective of conventional historians, developing an alternative, dichotomous concept of recent history was the mark of being an outsider, even in the interwar period. Both tendencies viewed the present as the result of a world conspiracy beginning in , a style of thinking that became exceptionally popular. Both groups promised salvation by means of a counterrevolutionary act of violence.

The similarities between their conception of history and that of their fiercest political opponent, Marxism, are therefore no coincidence, despite their opposing political agendas, for they had a common foe: They conceived of this past as being radically different from the present — as static, ordered and fundamentally good, until the revolution put an end to it.

They thus made an indirect contribution to the theory of modernity, their alternative to the then historiographic mainstream pointing the way to future developments. Purged of its political content, this concept of history proved quite adaptable after It was only then that the two big antagonistic historical periods were given workable names.

There are two further foundations, however. First there was Hans Rosenberg, the representative of an earlier phase who had fled to the United States, but returned to Germany as a visiting professor beginning in Rosenberg acquainted his students with modern social history in the spirit of Max Weber, and a decade later with a revitalized sociology, the new leading discipline in the s which popularized modernization theory as practiced in the United States.

The latter offered a new reading of Max Weber, stripped of his skeptical resignation about the price paid for progress. To be sure, a conception of history based on discontinuity and a method offering macrohistorical models of progress raised questions that could not be answered with the tools of conventional historians. The explanations they offered, however, yielded a sometimes quite formulaic picture of historical progress, as a number of no less methodological critics bemoaned. It was right about this time that the Germans — and of course not just the Germans — began to recognize that yet another era was coming to a close: The end of the postwar economic boom [32 ] and the subsequent implosion of the communist system caused Western society to enter a deep and lasting crisis of orientation, marked by ongoing attempts to repair the industrialized world, salvage the welfare state and other familiar institutions, as well as to reach a new understanding of the present and its ailments and put an end to profound cultural uncertainties.

The term Postmoderne , common until then only in literary criticism, suddenly spread like wildfire, expressing as it did this sense of discontent, and thus opening at least a back door for the reception of the Moderne by historians. Moderne modernity , as used below, is not just another word for Neuzeit the modern era , but is linked with attempts to understand and diagnose the times.

We have long been accustomed to assigning the grand historical epochs to different centuries, but this mechanical method, initially a didactic artifice, neither overlaps with any meaningful measure of experience nor does it determine our sense of time. The Moderne is an epoch that differs from all previous ones in its being acknowledged and named as such by those living in it. This is something new. Its earliest known usage is dated to ; it was first used by historians in , [34 ] and it entered common usage around the year , [35 ] making it about as old as Moderne.

Moderne , it is evident here, cannot be equated with progress; rather, it is what it is: The actual processes underlying the forward march of history are controversial. But a so-called project of modernity, much talked about now in sociology and philosophy, can hardly satisfy the demand of historians for causal complexes as an explanation for historical change, even after the linguistic turn. Reconstructing a historical trajectory into the present day requires two hypotheses to identify and sort through the numerous driving forces of history and assign them their specific roles.

First, we have to assume that society has undergone a fundamental transformation due to the rise of modernity. This involves long-term evolutionary processes and trends, each of which evinces specific trajectories but which essentially apply to all societies. These will be referred to in the following as basic processes, understood as affecting different levels: In this regard there are essential points of intersection with conventional modernization theory. The cultural-studies-influenced theory of modernity offers the alternative view that the self-perception and -description of societies changes over time, and that this process in particular is a reliable indicator of when a society has become modern.

Patterns of perception, experiences, discourses and language are hence by no means subordinate phenomena of structural transformation but are interdependent with the basic processes. Referred to collectively as patterns of order, societies use them to observe themselves and guide their development.

The search for better patterns then gives rise to a cultural threshold leading to a new era. This controllability increased dramatically in the Moderne , which means that the variety of modern manifestations increased along with it. There are therefore just as many variations of modernity as there are societies. When examining the process of history, it is helpful to begin with the self-understanding of a society or significant parts of it , which is why this article began with a brief look at the career of the catchword Moderne.

This is why the transitions, the cultural thresholds are so interesting; by taking a closer look at them we gain a deeper insight into the history of modernity. The Enlightenment marked the beginning of modernity. It led to a fundamental shift in language and discourse, ending a mode of self-observation dating back to antiquity.

Stöbern Sie hier in unserem Programm

The cultural threshold known as the saddle period led to a new era, though opinions were divided about what it should be called. In the long run this contradicted the prevailing zeitgeist and therefore proved ephemeral. A consensus over what to call the new era was only reached in the new century, when the revolution that Napoleon declared dead in periodically reappeared. Every era has its patterns of order. Since these are communicated by way of language, the era of revolutions subjected these patterns to its own novel dynamics.

The Great Schism of premodernity, for all its conflict, left political-social semantics untouched; it was only the Revolution that destroyed this unity. This watershed event made discursive peace unthinkable in the future, forcing people to choose between being for or against it; there was no longer any other alternative. Hence, people in the nineteenth century had two opposing patterns of order at their disposal: It was a child of the revolution itself and its concepts were therefore structurally modern.

No less convincing were the promises of various strains of socialism which, lacking any real opportunity, were spared the trouble of putting their ideas into practice. Thus, the first characteristic was the juridification of promises rooted in natural law. The terms, boundaries, and contents had to be negotiated in each individual case, so that specific freedoms not only varied from case to case but were fundamentally different from the abstract, more general concept of freedom.

The debate about freedom is therefore an intrinsic part of the freedom agenda. Things were no different with equality. This second characteristic was just as paradoxical.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

The state could no longer content itself with controlling strategic centers but had to become territorial, organizing itself more extensively and permanently. The rule of law and liberty therefore took the form of an administrative state with a monopoly on legitimate violence and a trained, often privileged and hierarchically organized bureaucracy that conducted its work in writing according to uniform criteria, dispensed justice, and extended to the remotest village. The greater protection and provision for the welfare of citizens went hand in hand with their loss of autonomy, a growing tax burden and compulsory military service, with the state increasing its control as well as its means of repression.

The third revolutionary promise, fraternity, was even more paradoxical. The brotherhood of nations was never a guiding principle of action; rather, it was precisely the assertion of revolutionary aims that gave rise to the nation-state — first in France, then in response to this or at least to the idea of it , wherever there happened to be revolutionaries. It took decades, however, to establish this new type of state. The nation as a new model of order was ultimately successful on account of its dual appeal, the opportunities it afforded for participation and concerted aggression, and because it could easily be combined with older identities, denominational religion and monarchy, as well as with the new achievements of the constitutional state.

Even the old empires could not avoid making concessions to nationalization military conscription, official languages, public displays of power. The integration of nation-states into the concert of powers set up in may have been unexpected, but the subsequent creation of the Kingdom of Italy and the German Empire had downright revolutionary features. Nascent industrial modernity can be understood as the era in which the dissolution of boundaries, made possible and conceivable as a result of revolution, was radically expanded and became a viable option.

Quite the opposite, in fact, and Burckhardt himself offered a multitude of proofs for the exponential advancement of what had been set in motion. Indeed, by the s technical-scientific innovation and the dynamics of industrial production had already become a force of transformation. This was followed by the process of subjugating the rest of the world which would catapult Europe in its forward march and whose costs were not immediately evident, as well as by structural transformation in the political sphere due to the rise of the media, to the masses entering politics, and the emergence of the first career politicians.

Finally, the tangible effects of social differentiation, palpable in everyday life — not least of all the arts, which broke free from its aesthetic canon — led to a new understanding and a new experience of time. These new actors were ready at hand in the form of social experts. All of these processes led once again around to a widespread sense of an acceleration of time, which attentive observers interpreted as the sign of a transition period, [49 ] a cultural threshold not only in retrospect, [50 ] perceived by some as a crisis, [51 ] by others as a sign of hope.

First, the history of intellectuals and of cultures of expertise in Europe evinces specific features found throughout Europe. The most significant is their proximity to the state — a not entirely coincidental reciprocity is evident here, for the European state is unique in the world — but their close ties to the economy and society are also rather conspicuous. The attempt to implement expert-guided concepts of order is therefore much more widespread in Europe than it is in other modern societies. The net of legal regulations, social security and market regulation, but also the selection of socially desirable persons and the weeding out of undesirable ones are much more pronounced and finely knit here than elsewhere.

Only after did liberalism concede to some extent to the trend of state interventionism, securing its modest recovery. Most European societies, however, had by that time undergone decades of totalitarian, authoritarian or in the case of Sweden social-democratic state interventionism and learned to manage with it.

Newsletter abonnieren

It should not be forgotten that in the early phases of modernity it was the most progressive communities that ventured the step towards welfare-oriented interventionist policies, yielding to the interests of the general public. But the specifically modern concepts of order encountered since the s were, third, not only anti-liberal, but due to the inherent logic of knowledge-based planning had a tendency towards totalitarianism.

More recent scholarship has shown, however, that social-democratic and social-liberal governments can also be repressive — typically in their dealings with families, since the latter have only been effectively shielded from state intervention by the civil codes that were introduced in the age of revolution. Inclusion and exclusion thus prove to be essential steering elements of modernity. This is also true of the fourth characteristic, the leading role of the nation-state. Contrary to a frequent claim in the literature, the nation as a model of order has lost none of its importance — even after , when mass murder and forced expulsion made many European nations more homogeneous than ever before.

To be sure, with the decline of ideologies after , the institutional nature of this model of order eventually became more apparent. The European Economic Community was all but powerless with respect to all of these issues, and this was of course no coincidence. The temporalization of thought and the acceleration of time, by contrast, are a universal phenomenon of the modern era. It is therefore worth taking a closer look at them. Hartmut Rosa has explained why these tendencies are still on the rise, [59 ] and not just at the level of our perception.

They result in classes of time consumers as well as different spaces of consumption. This, in conjunction with the notion of progress popular ever since the Enlightenment, leads to a new pattern of order whose declared task is the creation of simultaneity.

Dipper moderne v2 en 2018

Geographic-based development policies were a feature of the young Italian nation-state, which faced the problem of an incomparably backward South ever since the s. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the creation of uniform or equal standards of living has even been anchored in the constitution since with subjective legal character, meaning these constitutional rights can be enforced in court.

On the whole these examples indicate a more or less pragmatic concept of catch-up acceleration. This new pattern of order was everywhere strengthened by the First World War. Whereas after most national economies, with the exception of the agrarian sector, were at least in principle subject to the market as a regulating instrument, criticism of this being left to international theoretical debate, a hitherto unknown culture of planning was prevailing in business management Fordism , urban planning the Athens Charter and the new field of youth policy e.

Totalitarian regimes took a fundamentally different approach in their attempts to implement their visions of utopia. The use of violence not only served to keep internal enemies at bay but also as a means to achieving utopia. A characteristic feature of all modern utopias is their attempt to bring time to a halt — to create the ultimate, ideal state which would last for all eternity.

Naturally, for reasons of political legitimation, this had to be done as quickly as possible.

• Something Strange in the Cellar (Lou Elliott Mystery Adventures Book 3)
• To Be Men (Ultra Gay XXX)
• La cuisine grecque
• Die Kraft des Wassers - nutzen Sie diese Kraft und heilen Sie sich selbst (German Edition)
• Snap Justice
• Global Warring and the Land of Zinj