Two Dogmas of Empiricism: Eine kritische Betrachtung (German Edition)

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The crucial moment, as it is well known,15 was the takeover of American philosophy by the flee- ing Logical Positivists e. Lewis and Sellars, who openly resisted the agenda of the Logical Positiv- ists. In the same period, a number of phenomenologists also immigrate to the United States and became a part of the American academic scene but their impact on the course of philosophy was less noticeable. Any yet, they too, despite their marked sympathy for Classical Pragmatism, had a role in undermining the pragmatist legacy of American philosophy.

Part of this story will be told in the next volume, which will also dis- cuss the noticeable marginalization of the discussions of pragmatism in the United Kingdom and in Europe, a trend that continued until very recently. The chapters are ordered chronologically starting with the early encoun- ters between some of the founders of the tree traditions and their immediate heirs Part I , moving to the generation that followed them in the decades of the war and its immediate aftermath Part II.

In this way, the volume also offers the reader an account of key intellectual preoccupations that shaped philosophy in the twentieth century. Needless to say, much else could have been included or treated from a differ- ent angle, and we are well aware of the perspectival character of the collec- tion. The following chapter summaries give a clearer indication of what is ahead. Between and , Max Scheler—after Husserl the most influential early phenomenologist—developed, on occasion, a carefully thought out but also occasionally a crazy philosophy of empirical science and common sense as well as a philosophy of philosophy which incorporates and develops many claims to be found in Pragmatism.

One aspect of this relation is the interdependence between human bodies, drives, action, and perception. This interdependence, Scheler argues, was first cor- rectly analyzed by philosophers and psychologists of a pragmatist persua- sion and it is an interdependence which he vigorously develops and defends.

His version of the second concession is that the objects of science are also existentially relative, not to human beings but to living beings. His first disagreement with Pragmatism is the claim that truth and knowledge are neither relative nor relational but absolute and that pragmatic accounts of meaning are misguided. His final disagreement with Pragmatism concerns philosophy itself. The objects of philosophy are not relative but absolute and there are non-contingent, essential, philosophical truths.

Among these, he argues, is that the beginnings of Pragmatism and Analytic Philosophy alike involve a contestation with the then-dominant Ide- alisms in philosophy. The pragmatic evasion of Idealism was most prominent in the writings of William James. Jamesian strategies for avoiding Idealism, Koopman argues, bear comparison with similar themes prominent in the middle and late writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The conduct-centered and problem-oriented approach of James and Wittgenstein offers a fecund path forward for Analytic Pragmatisms today, especially in light of recent attempts by the likes of Robert Brandom, as well as much older attempts, by Peirce and Dewey, to redirect Pragmatism toward a renewal of Hegelian Idealism.

Button demonstrates how Schiller, but not James, is liable to this charge, pointing to a radical departure between their two versions of Pragmatism. Peirce and William James is often thought to be opposed to the Analytic tradition. But in the s, the young Frank Ramsey was taking a serious interest in the neglected Peirce. Ramsey took his cue from Peirce to argue that belief is a disposition to behave and that the evaluation and truth of belief is linked to success.

Both Peirce and Ramsey hold that all there is to truth is what we can get out of belief and assertion. And hard on the heels of the thought that truth is related to our practices of assertion comes the thought that truth is also related to inquiry, reason-giving, evidence, and standards of good belief. If we unpack the commitments we incur when we assert, believe, or inquire, we find that we have imported all these notions. This is the Analytic Pragmatism of Peirce and Ramsey and it will well repay our renewed attention. Although this is the first time that Wittgenstein refers to Pragmatism in writing, these lines have not received the attention they deserve.

Boncompagni concludes the paper by broadening its scope to include useful references to some of the better-known remarks of Witt- genstein on Pragmatism in his later work. The chapter highlights two critical episodes: Lewis — and Wilfrid Sellars — Since Quinean epistemology is always an epistemology of justification, he could not be happily viewed as a member of the pragmatist tradition. Influenced by James, Husserl rejects the Brentanian model of object-intentionality in favor of horizon-intentionality.

Husserl and Heidegger were both familiar with some of the key texts of early Ameri- can Pragmatism. Moran traces how this pragmatic interpretation of Heidegger is taken up by thinkers as diverse as Charles Taylor, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom. Notes 1 A seminal reconstruction of the early encounters between Analytic and Conti- nental philosophy and of the subsequent parting of the ways has been offered by Michael Friedman The Interpretative Tradition ed.

Schacht and After Kant: The Analytic Tradition ed. Elliott —where, interestingly enough, Pragmatism falls within the analytic camp as one constitutive and live aspect of it. We hope to examine the trajectory of the three revolutions, from mid-twentieth century up to the present, in a future volume. An informative collection of critical essays exploring the role played by Pragmatism in the various phases of twentieth-century philosophy is Hollinger and Depew This road has been partly explored by Bacon One should also mention Richard Rorty, who in his earlier and later works alike e.

Another philosopher who forcefully and effectively worked to build bridges between Analytic and Continental philosophy is Stanley Cavell ; however, his troubled relationship with Pragmatism complicates the story further. Charles Taylor is another philosopher working at the crossroads of the three traditions, with much more defined pragma- tist sympathies Taylor More recently, important figures such as Brandom and Kitcher reiterated the centrality of Pragmatism for understanding both Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy.

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Friedrich Albert Lange

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Their Lives and the Nature of Their Thought. Wittgenstein on Mind and Language. Last accessed 1 June Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. I-II, edited by Michael Nedo. He settled in Winterthur. He became co-editor of the Winterthurer Landboten and joined a friend's publishing house. He became very involved in Swiss politics, particularly in the movement to reform the constitution and make it more democratic—a movement that was particularly strong in his Zurich canton.

He was on the boards of many social organizations and on various state committees as an expert on education, banking, and the railways Weinkauff , During this time, he also taught occasionally at the Winterthur Gymnasium.

In he joined the Zurich faculty as a Privatdozent. He finished the heavily revised second edition of the Arbeiterfrage in In he also finally received a professorship at Zurich though unfortunately soon after being diagnosed with cancer. Despite the illness he continued working on the second edition of The History of Materialism Lange He gave lectures right till the end, but cancer eventually led to his death on 21 November in Marburg.

Lange's intellectual interests were quite varied. One of his earliest interests was in theoretical questions about both the purpose and method of education. Before he had even taken up his first job as a high school teacher in Cologne he was already thinking and writing about reforming the German Gymnasium system. Like others he was concerned in particular that the emphasis on the classics in the Gymnasiums failed to prepare students for a time in which the natural sciences were becoming more and more important.

Mathematics and the natural sciences needed to be emphasized Lange a, Lange returned again and again throughout his career to questions of pedagogy and the history of pedagogy. However, despite his many publications and lectures on pedagogy, despite his collaboration with K. He even began by attempting to give lectures on pedagogy when he started teaching at the University of Bonn but failed to generate any interest among the students for his lectures Knoll b, Lange claimed that the purpose of education should be to produce rational, cultured citizens. The question was how to produce such citizens.

Lange tried to show that turning to both the history of education and the history of pedagogy would throw light on this question of means. The history of education would help us understand the way in which social, cultural and political conditions interact to affect the kind of education that occurs in a particular historical context Lange Creating free citizens and leaders requires that the teachers themselves be actively engaged in their communities as citizens. Teachers thus should not be prevented from political engagement.

Only politically engaged teachers will, indeed, be able to communicate to their students the love of freedom and fatherland. As he was later to emphasize in his History of Materialism , simply instructing people, including students, to be ethical—to be concerned with the good of humanity in general—does not have much of an impact. In the case of education one can have an impact by presenting a role model and by being a personal inspiration for one's students. His example is that of Thomas Arnold of Rugby whom he believed was able to shape his students' ethical views precisely because of he was so impressive as a person and this personality was the result of, and in some sense constituted by, his active engagement with the political issues of his time Lange This is no surprise given his later discussions of religion see below.

Education, in the inclusive sense of Bildung , also required instruction in philosophy. Exposure to philosophy is an essential part of learning how to make reasoned decisions. There must also be education in politics. This gives one the requisite knowledge to participate in political affairs and helps prepare one for being a citizen Knoll b, The importance of education, and the crucial role of the freedom of thought in education, implied, for Lange, that any social entity should have the right to set up schools and decide what should be taught in them.

The state should set up schools only where existing structures of civil society have failed to generate enough schools. The state should restrict the opening of a school only when it poses a genuine threat to a legitimate state or explicitly promotes criminal activity.

There should be no requirement that there be any religious instruction let alone a requirement that any particular religion be taught. In state schools it is important in fact that there should be no religious instruction Lange b, Lange tries to take a middle position on the relative importance of natural talent and social environment for both the method and results of education. He grants that there probably are given differences in dispositions but that the environment has a significant influence on how these dispositions express themselves and thus on how students' talents develop.

He criticizes social Darwinist theories that think there is no need to pay attention to the barriers to development created by the lack of economic or social privileges Lange , ; Lange a, On the other hand he warns against an idealism that assumes some fundamental human equality of ability either as a given, underlying fact or as a plausible goal Knoll a, He emphasized the importance of statistical methods—an emphasis that was also quite prescient for the later development of pedagogy Knoll a, Lange developed an interest in, and sympathy for, labor movements in their socialist and communist manifestations from the very early days of his university career.

Politically he should probably be regarded as occupying a middle position between left liberalism and socialism. The first edition of the Arbeiterfrage was created in response to heated debates about political strategy in the developing labor movement. It was followed by a second and third edition that to an increasing degree took up more theoretical questions. The Arbeiterfrage was, like the works of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and others of the period, shaped by a direct experience of rapid industrialization.

A crucial consequence of this industrialization was the generation of an impoverished urban working class. This required politically organizing the workers and their organizations to form a front against the bourgeoisie Irmer , 2. Lange's position is one of socialist Darwinism as opposed to social Darwinism. Lange accepted a modified version of Thomas Malthus's concerns about the relation between increases in population and food production: This is an essential part of the explanation of the social conditions of the working class.

He quotes Darwin to emphasize that it is population pressure that lies behind the struggle for existence for all organisms. This, he emphasizes, includes humans Lange , 2. Within capitalism the struggle for existence for the working class becomes a struggle for wages. Malthus granted in principle that measures like contraception could prevent the increase in population that reduces standards of living to the subsistence level but he held out little hope.

Lange was more sanguine though the positive note in his book may have come too late to prevent its opening chapters from ensuring its unpopularity. The talk of the struggle for existence, and the rigid-sounding laws that govern it, could hardly have been inspiring to the workers' movement it was meant for Mehring , Nonetheless Lange did not draw the conclusions from Darwin that the social Darwinists did.

He did not take Darwinism as supporting capitalism in part because he took it to be a mistake to straightforwardly infer any normative conclusions from the Darwinian explanatory claims.

He also seemed to regard the principles appealed to in Darwin and Malthus as natural tendencies that could be mitigated by human reason. These explanatory laws do not determine how we should think nor do they determine how we must inevitably think:. Just as human reason can control and mitigate the struggle for existence among the plants we cultivate, it can control and mitigate the struggle for existence among humans.

What is needed is enough of an improvement in the living conditions of the working class that the workers will decrease their rate of reproduction. Once the quality of the living conditions becomes high enough, the working class will become reasonable enough to be susceptible to rational arguments in favor of having a reasonable number of children. Their lack of rationality in this matter is a result of their misery and ignorance.

The improvement of living conditions to a sufficient level requires organizing the working class so that they can demand better wages and a decrease in the concentration of capital. This may be possible while maintaining private property in the means of production, but, if not, we should try for communism, or whatever other path including various forms of mixed economies, promises success.

We will only learn slowly through experience what the best system is Lange a, ; Lange a, It is important to note, given the political context in which Lange was writing, that he did not seem to think that some revolutionary act would bring us suddenly closer to such improved conditions of existence. He saw the process of such development as a slow one. Simply changing the legal property relations or the official structure of the state will not be sufficient, he argues. What is required in addition to changes in the structure of the state and the legal system are fundamental changes in the way people think.

This kind of change though will always take time. The reform of the state and laws only provides the preconditions for this change in consciousness. Such reform does not immediately bring this change about. Lange is careful though not to deny that the kind of revolution some socialists and communists supported could bring us closer to the goal. It is just that any such revolution would be merely one step in a long process that will involve both progress and regress Lange a, Lange criticizes the kind of self-help approach that some of the liberal middle-class, in particular Franz-Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch, famously pushed.

Schulze-Delitzsch believed that the goals of the liberal bourgeoisie and the working class did not have to be thought of as in conflict. The problems facing the working class could be dealt with within the existing capitalist mode of production. The working class, to put it crudely, could, thanks to the help of a series of consumer, credit and production cooperatives, educate itself and save enough money to compete with capitalists on their own terms.

Lange thought this position was completely unrealistic and that those who pushed it failed to actually listen to the workers themselves. He criticized the paternalistic attitude of these liberal reformers and mocked their inability to even understand the dialects spoken by many of the workers. The problem of producing enough is a problem generated by the existing mode of production.

The technological means available then and in the future are and would be more than enough to deal with any increases in population as long as capitalism is overcome. Theories of eternal laws are part of an ideology that supports the existing mode of production because they present what are contingent laws as necessary thus creating the impression that the social order cannot be changed.

This inhibits the interest in changing society Lange b, ; Marx and Engels , They also disagreed about the usefulness of Hegel. Lange suspected that Hegelian dialectic, even in the more empiricist and materialist form that Marx deployed it, was not that useful for purposes of explanation. Indeed he expresses his surprise that at a time in which Hegel was no longer taken seriously in philosophy, Hegelian ideas could be so influential in the workers' movement in both the thought of Lassalle and Marx Lange a, , Lange had immense respect for Marx and thought of him as the leading economist of the time.

Lange also thought that the emphasis on revolution, and the thought that a revolution could somehow suddenly change the conditions of the working class and the mode of production, was also the result of the negative influence of Hegel. Marx and Engels, on the other hand, were committed to some kind of dialectic form of explanation. Lange had an indirect impact on what was later known as the revisionist debate within socialism. Eduard Bernstein, the father of revisionism, eventually broke with Marxian orthodoxy and argued that achieving socialism did not require a revolution or at least that much could be achieved by working within existing democratic political structures.

This was in part a result of Bernstein's developing neo-Kantianism. The domination of German philosophy by Hegelian Idealism for the first third of the nineteenth century was followed by a revival of materialism. This was in part brought on by the criticisms of Christian theology and supernaturalism in David Friedrich Strauss's The Life of Jesus and the criticisms of Christian theology and Hegelian idealism in the works of Ludwig Feuerbach, most famously in The Essence of Christianity. The revival was also given impetus by the recent successes and the increasing prestige of the natural sciences.

These materialists explicitly took the natural sciences as their ideal; indeed, many of them were practicing natural scientists. There was a more or less immediate reaction to this new materialism from those who thought that these materialists were philosophically naive and overly optimistic about the degree to which they could defend materialism, the degree to which materialism could solve, or avoid, traditional philosophical problems, and the degree to which it could avoid thoroughly undermining morality.

These opponents focussed on a range of philosohical problems for materialism centered on whether it could adequately account for our mental lives.

Could it, for example, account for sensations and consciousness? The epistemology of the new materialists also struck many as philosophically naive. The principles of inference, for example, that allow one to draw conclusions from sense perception do not themselves seem to be justified by sense perceptions. Lange was one of those who thought that materialism faced serious philosophical problems; however, he also thought that Hegelian Idealism was bankrupt.

What was needed was a philosophical approach that would be compatible with the recent successes of materialistic explanations as deployed by the natural sciences but not simply be a form of materialism. Lange was one of the first in this period to argue that the appropriate response to the philosophical situation in Germany at the middle of the nineteenth century was to return to Kant. Herbart, to whom I first attached myself, was for me only a bridge to Kant, to whom so many honest researchers return in order to, where possible, complete what Kant had only half done: It is not easy, however, to assess the degree of genuine continuity between the many different strands of neo-Kantianism that emerged and Kant's own interests.

Lange is sometimes taken as the founder of the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Lange was a mentor of the first famous member of the Marburg School, Hermann Cohen. The other famous members were Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer. These later figures were more genuinely Kantian than Lange himself. This is in part because Lange shared much with Hermann von Helmholtz. While keeping much of the language of Kant, Hermann von Helmholtz, and others, managed arguably to fundamentally change the questions being asked in Kant's name and the methods that were allowed in finding answers to these questions.

In many ways Hermann Cohen returned to a conception of these questions that was closer to Kant's. Lange, on the other hand, drew from Helmholtz a version of the thought that the scientific investigation of the physiology of the sense organs provided some kind of confirmation of Kant's fundamental claims. Helmholtz had argued that contemporary science was confirming on empirical grounds insights that Kant hat had but that Kant took as supported by a priori considerations.

The ground for this conclusion was supposed to be the fact, uncovered by physiology, that nerves are not faithful transmitters of external properties to consciousness:. Helmholtz thinks the confirmation of Kant goes further. Thus, as he puts it later, what science shows us is quite compatible with extreme forms of idealism:.

Scientific theories are thus perfectly acceptable, indeed extremely important, as long as we do not give them a metaphysical interpretation. One should wholeheartedly welcome the successes of natural science and empirical methodology, but the naive realism of the materialists was mistaken. The epistemological questions need to be taken seriously. The return to Kant was precisely to raise again the question of whether indeed the natural sciences give us a picture of reality in itself.

In other words, accepting the success of empirical methodology and materialistic explanations did not entail accepting a materialist ontology or epistemology. Lange's most famous book, The History of Materialism and the Critique of its Contemporary Significance , is in essence a defense of such a return to Kant. It is also a detailed history of materialism and was read well into the twentieth century for precisely this reason.

However, more fundamentally, it was meant to drive home the above mentioned concerns about materialism. Lange accepted materialism as a sensible maxim for the construction of theories within natural science. However, as a comprehensive philosophical system, as both fundamental ontology and epistemology, materialism is self-undermining, he argues, for essentially the kinds of reasons Helmholtz presents. Lange's History is divided into two parts.

The first part covers the history of materialism from the atomism of Democritus till the time of Kant. It includes discussions of what Lange considers to be reactions to materialism: He includes a discussion of the dominance of Aristotelianism in the writings of the Scholastics. Materialism finally returns with the regeneration of science. In this context, after discussions of Gassendi and Hobbes, he turns to Newton and Locke. Finally he treats Leibniz as a German reaction to materialism. The second part covers the history of materialism from the time of Kant. These arguments are directed against the contemporary forms of materialism mentioned above.

Such physiological investigation into the sense organs may initially look favourable for the materialists—in that it promises to give us a materialistic account of our knowledge of the world—in fact it is deadly. Physiology shows us that the sense organs do not show us how the world really is and indeed that our very concept of matter may have nothing to do with what is really there in the world Lange , 3: The arguments Lange deploys are essentially extended versions of the arguments Helmholtz was using.

For example, he claims that the physiology of our eyes shows that the visual sensation of a single three-dimensional object in front of me is in fact a composite generated from the two two-dimensional stimulations of each of my retinas Lange , 3: Supposedly we learn that even the simplest of sensations is not the result of a single natural process, which processes are in anycase completely different from sensations in themselves, but the combination of many different processes 3: Indeed, according to these physiological accounts, only a very specific set of vibrations is picked out and the rest are ignored 3:

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