Er kam aus der Vergangenheit (Romantik- Thriller paranormal) (German Edition)

---

One of the likeable aspects, and a common trait in YA fantasies, is the growing confidence Holly has in herself as she identifies her enemies and develops her skills as a witch. The evil ones in this book have no redeeming qualities, which makes them rather two dimensional, but they do have major magical skills which adds to the suspense and horror. Kesan pertama yang aku baca dari buku ini, ceritanya sadis. Pembantaian, pembunuhan yang menurut saya keji, maksudnya pembunuhan yang berdarah darah dan penyiksaan, saya tidak akan ngeri jika pembunuhan dilakukan dengan menembak atau dengan sihir mungkin.

Ceritanya dari sudut pandang karakter yang terlalu banyak sehingga Holly yang merupakan karakter utama dari cerita ini kurang begitu ditonjolkan. Dan entah ini kesalahan dari penerbit atau memang dibuat sengaja seperti itu adanya, pada paragraf pertama hurufnya sedikit lebih besar. View all 7 comments. I gave this book so many chances to turn around but it just didn't. I started this one because I liked one of Holders other books but this one really bugged me. I listened to it which may have been a hindered in this case but then again they made it into an audiobook.

It has historical flashback moments reminiscent of Beautiful Creatures but unlike Beautiful Creatures which I also listened to it didn't work. I was lost a lot, I it was really hard to follow. The perspective jumped around so that I gave this book so many chances to turn around but it just didn't. The perspective jumped around so that added to the confusion. There were a lot of times I thought about giving up but pushed through.

I eventually gave up on chapter 13 not chapter 13 in the audio but she read the phrase "chapter 13" it was a couple full work days of listening to the book Besides being hard to follow there were a few parts that made me roll my eyes and I just thought were frustratingly cheesey. I really wish that I had clicked better with this book. View all 3 comments.

Die Geopolitik

Sebenarnya buku ini punya potensi buat jadi lebih menarik, dan ada saatnya chemistry di antara kedua tokoh, Holly dan Jed kerasa banget, tapi sayang, scenes dalam buku ini terasa campur aduk dan terlalu banyak kilas balik. Penjabaran tentang para karakternya juga kurang, jalan ceritanya juga jadi nggak jelas, seakan2 buku yang ditulis oleh dua orang ini sempat bingung ingin ditulis bagaimana.

Yang pasti saya nggak tertarik buat baca buku kelanjutannya. Dec 16, Pearl rated it really liked it. I find this continued novel to have the same plot, which for the Cahors witches to end the vendetta and the warlocks Michael and Eli to get revenge. This author uses the same flash forward and flash back to the past method in her narration of the story. Blood, Mead, Dark, or Red Moon. Jan 22, Steph rated it really liked it Recommends it for: Recommended to Steph by: Oct 25, Wren [t he y] rated it really liked it Shelves: Ich versuche mich also neutral zu halten.

Mir hat das Buch leider so gar nicht gefallen. Der Klappentext war ja recht ansprechend gestaltet, aber damit kann die Geschichte nicht mithalten. Ganz abgesehen davon, dass die Magie einfach viel zu kurz kommt und nur unklar skizziert wird. This book had a promising premise. Holly Cathers discovers the truth of her heritage when her parents and best friend die in a white water rafting accident and she moves to Seattle to live with a paternal aunt she never knew. It is there that she discovers that she is descendent from a very powerful line of witches. Her family's most fiercest enemy is the Devereaux family.

Unlike Holly's family who has lost their history, the Devereaux have continued to practice and are determ This book had a promising premise. Unlike Holly's family who has lost their history, the Devereaux have continued to practice and are determined to eliminate Holly's family for all time. Of course, it isn't that simple.

But once Holly is made aware of power, she comes into it very quickly, and then it is just a matter of the past repeating itself, which might have been fine but I didn't like the back and forth in time and I began to dislike all the characters. I also didn't like the reader, Cassandra Morton. She sounded like she was But I will be back for more since I have the first three books in the series.

Aug 31, Nicole rated it it was ok. This isn't a bad book, but I was pretty meh over it. I did like the bits of history scattered throughout. I also like the fact that the past life families are both monstrous. When something like this is written, there's a 'good' family the hero's ancestors and the 'bad' one, but nope. Both of those families were terrible and I wanted to see both of them burn. It' This isn't a bad book, but I was pretty meh over it. It's one way trope that the authors avoided so well. The biggest problem for me was the resolution of the plot. All of the sudden, every character just knows everything because the plot needs to move forward.

Arcadia Awakens

There was no reason that made sense, which was annoying. It also went all Charmed in the last rushed scenes, which was an awkward change of tone. Oct 29, Ashley rated it it was ok. I got this book off of bookoutlet. Unfortunately it was not that interesting. The overall concept is a good idea. I love how there is a witch feud going back centuries, but how it was developed was problematic for me.

There were very odd time jumps in Holly's story and I didn't like how spread out everything was. Also, some things weren't explained that great in my opinion or maybe I missed some things while reading. I got confused about some o I got this book off of bookoutlet. I got confused about some of the things going on. This book just wasn't entertaining for me. I found it really difficult to get through.

I got the bind up of the first two books, but I was only able to get through the first book. The characters in this book were boring and very flat. I found the side characters more entertaining than the main characters. This book really had the potential to be good. The problem is the jumping around. If it just jumped between time from Holly to Isabeau that would be fine. However, this jumps between several characters. Some in the present and some in the past. This makes it terribly hard to follow the story.

This book really fell short for me. I am really disappointed because it sounded so interesting. Jun 01, Sarah Blundell rated it really liked it. I thought it was pretty good and went really fast especially considering its a teen book. I'm 25 and I still really enjoyed it. Die Witch Reihe hat mich schon lange interessiert, doch der Preis hat mich immer ein wenig abgeschreckt. Jetzt nachdem ich das Buch gelesen habe, stelle ich fest das es so gar nicht das ist was vermutet hatte.

Ich habe mich noch nie so sehr geirrt wie hier. Eine Liebesgeschichte ist dies nicht. Obwohl ich diese Reisen in die Vergangenheit sehr interessant fand, nur das dadurch Jer und auch Holly irgendwie an Subtanz verloren haben. Das macht die Geschichte der beiden zwar tragisch, aber auch langweilig. Jerauds Vater versucht alles um die Cahor Hexen - Holly und ihre beiden Cousinen, sowie deren Mutter - zu vernichten um das Geheimniss des schwarzen Feuers wieder aufzudecken.

Heaven by Christoph Marzi

Die Autorinnen haben so viel ausgelassen. Wirklich mal etwas anderes. Hexenblut Hexentocher Hexenerbe Verfilmung: Bis dahin hat sich Holly imme Spannender Reihenauftakt Buchinfo: Eine Rafting Tour , ein Unwetter und 5 Personen. Was ich toll finde, jeder neue Kapitel beginnt mit einen Zaubervers. Das Buch war am Anfang verwirrend, es schenkt immer zwischen Vergangenheit und Gegenwart hin und her und man merkt dann selber warum. Ich habe Teil 2 hier schon liegen und bin gespannt wie es weiter geht vielleicht schafft es dann 4 Feen ; Bei einem Familienausflug sterben ihre Eltern und ihre beste Freundin.

Da der junge Teenager nicht alleine wohnen kann, zieht sie schon bald zu ihrer Tante und deren Zwillingen nach Seattle. Wirkliche Sympathie konnte ich nicht aufbringen. Sehr irritierend empfand ich allerdings die Bezeichnung Jugendbuch. Zwar hat man mit Holly eine Protagonistin im Teenageralter, das war es allerdings auch schon.

Ob ich die anderen beiden Teile lesen werde, bleibt jedoch ungewiss. Si bien la historia de Wicked es muy sencilla, con personajes poco profundos, situaciones de suspenso y una historia de amor-odio intrigante. Hay situaciones que no se comprenden bien a la primera y creo que eso hace que la historia se vuelva un poco confusa y desesperante.

Sie verlor dabei ihre Eltern und ihre beste Freundin. Aus ihrer gewohnten Umgebung gerissen versucht sie ihrer Trauer Herr zu werden, doch viel Zeit bleibt Holly nicht, denn immer seltsamere Dinge geschehen. Als sie dann Zwei uralte Clans. Hier sind Hexen am Werk und sie ist eine davon. Doch dies ist nicht der einzige Zirkel, der existiert. Oct 09, Cathleen Ash added it.

Oh, great, a storm. On top of everything else. These are Holly's thoughts as she white-water rafts down the Colorado River with her fighting parents, her best friend Tina another only child and the guide.

The raft is capsized, Holly can't unbuckle the belt that ties her into the raft and the water is freezing, drowning her, as the raft sinks. This is all Holly can think as the grey mist descends and she becomes numb, empty. She closes her eyes. That's Oh, great, a storm. That's when she sees it. An exquisite shade of blue. It shimmers like a movie on a moving screen. The blue glow becomes a figure, a person, a woman who is beautiful and speaks: Don't pack your belongings.

You must go, go now, if she is to live. A scene from the past plays in Holly's head, and she struggles to wake up. There's a circle of people, a wood, fire, a knife, blood. The rustling of fabric Holly is lying on the bank of the river, and hears a shout: This begins Holly's awareness of her magic, her past, her future without her best friend or parents. No one else survived the storm on the river. She buries her parents and gains an Aunt her father never told her about. She's seventeen, alone, orphaned, and having visions of people long dead who practiced witchraft and blood rites.

Jul 04, Doris rated it really liked it Shelves: This series starts with the main character, Holly, losing her parents and her best friend in a freak accident, then in a weird turn of fate having the best friend's mother hospitalized. Having nowhere to go, she moves to live with her aunt, a family she did not know existed. The story then jumps into introducing all the characters, which I found difficult to follow, especially as it intertwined with the historical characters and counterparts.

I found this distracting, although the story was great This series starts with the main character, Holly, losing her parents and her best friend in a freak accident, then in a weird turn of fate having the best friend's mother hospitalized. I found this distracting, although the story was great. I liked that the characters were not all single-mindedly focused on the same thing, and that the story was able to show actual conflict, emotion, and dissidence in a way that made sense in the story line.

Even the twins, Nicole and Amanda, were not mirror images of each other, and in fact agreed on very little. The book spent quite a bit of time explaining about witches and warlocks, which was good, but not really necessary. However, it did build up to the differences and to another cross-cultural reference. There were reflections of the tv series "Charmed" there were several instances that almost but not quite referred to the three.

I found this interesting and almost like a copy cat, but it was still an interesting, enjoyable read, and I will read the next in the series. Dec 13, Mimi rated it it was ok. I have no idea if I liked this book or hated it. It the weirdest most twisted book I have read, and not in an interesting way. The idea behind it is not bad, but the writing is all over the place, at one point you're reading something, and then the next thing something else happens that leaves you confused.

I did not connect to any of the characters and had a feeling of depression all the way through the book. I normally don't go for witches and warlocks type of books, and I was right. The main I have no idea if I liked this book or hated it. The main character does not grip me at all, weird things happen and she says it's only a dream, next thing you know she is totally cool with the idea of magic and now all three cousins share a magic mark, somehow I thought it would be a more different approach to the world of the witches where there would be some interesting events.

Things happen too fast and too complicated. It is just way too dark and way too soul oppressing, I will not bother reading the second book. And yes it is one of those first look instant love books. In this respect, there is a kind of consensus in the country that, like it or not, the Soviet external empire has irreversibly disintegrated; this is a fait accompli.

This is reflected by Russian foreign policy, which considers the Central European region to be insignificant to national interests Kobrinskaia, Regrets are of a much more geopolitical than a cultural order, though even the former are rather muted. Russian nationalists blame Gorbachev not so much for allowing the former clients to go their own ways, but for not insisting that they should pay an adequate price for their freedom.

One might call this a realistic attitude. Some sober people understand that the negative attitude towards the Soviet Union and Russia existing in Central European countries is inevitable. However, they were unable to liberate anybody else. The state that was not free itself could not deliver freedom. Many argue that since these allies turned their backs on Russia, Russia, in turn, should turn her back on them. In , I predicted that if the new leadership in Yugoslavia turned to the West, Russian nationalists would soon forget about their brotherhood with the Serbs. It seems that I was right.

At the moment, interest in Serbia is rapidly diminishing in the country. Does the sense of isolation and alienation from the West that may be observed in Russia indicate that the country really turns to Eurasia — whatever that vague term may imply? One should be cautious in this respect, since the speculative constructs of some ideologists of contemporary Russian nationalism often do not correspond with the attitudes and feelings of ordinary nationalists, and even less with the general public.

Likewise, a negative attitude towards Islam has become widespread in Russia. Before the Revolution, very few Russian thinkers proclaimed the Eurasian character of the Russian Empire; the majority conceived of it as a European state. It was an attempt at suggesting an ideology for the restoration of the Russian Empire in another garment.

In fact, this ideology was not very original and borrowed generously from different sources: This mish-mash was seasoned with a romanticized historical mythology. Thus, the early eurasianists insisted on almost eternal enmity and antagonism between the continental Eurasian and Western Atlantic civilizations. They argued that for ecological and cultural-historical reasons, all peoples from the Hinggans to the Carpathians shared the same destiny and should have a common statehood. They also claimed that autocratic rule in Russia, which, incidentally, they praised, was a Mongol contribution to Russian development for recent reprints of the most important publications by the eurasianists see Isaev, ; Novikova and Sizemskaia, ; Tolstoi, ; on ideology of eurasianism see Tsimbursky, Very soon, some eurasianists discovered that many of their attitudes and goals, namely the rejection of the capitalist West and especially the restoration of the empire, were not so different from the Soviet communist ones.

The result of this discovery was far from glorious. Some eurasianists became agents of the Soviet secret police later, when their usefulness expired, they were imprisoned in the Soviet Union, but this is already another story — see Ashnin and Alpatov, Others became disillusioned in the ideology or in its practical applications. Only since the s have some ideas of the eurasianists, especially the thesis about the cultural and political symbiosis of the Eastern Slavs and the Turko-Mongol nomads, been revived, though for a time in a somewhat less extreme form, by their epigonus , the Soviet historian Lev Gumilev ; cf.

It is true that Gumilev was a maverick in Soviet academia, whose unprofessional treatment of many historical problems was matched only by his unbridled fantasy. However, during the perestroika period, and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, eurasianism has been reborn and is once again in demand. Still, its influence on contemporary Russian nationalism should by no means be overestimated. Sometimes I get the impression that eurasianism attracts more attention in the West than in its own country. In Russia, it remains the domain of a narrow circle of ideologists and quite often is disjunctive from the practical demands of Russian nationalists.

Eurasianism is inseparably linked with nostalgia for the lost empire and the vain dream of reversing the course of history. As such, it is a nationalist ideology with a strong imperial accretion. In a way, it is an inconsistent attempt to somehow overcome a narrow ethnic Russian nationalism, or rather to make it more attractive to non-Russian peoples. However, in this capacity it does not make a sufficiently strong appeal to either Russians or to non-Russians. This brings me to other trends in contemporary Russian nationalism. One historical circumstance that has made a strong impact on all its varieties is that the Russian state, in all of its history, was never a nation-state; and even at present nation-state building in the country is more of a project than an accomplishment.

Just as in the past, at present Russia in historical, ethnic, and cultural respects is more, and at the same time less, than the Russian state. I have to begin not with history, but with philology and linguistics. This may be difficult for those who do not know Russian, however it is important for understanding the current situation in the country. The fact is that there are two different nouns in Russian, and consequently two different adjectives, for the country and for the people. Correspondingly, there are two different adjectives, russkii and rossiiskii. The first adjective is also used as a noun to designate ethnic Russians as a people.

In English, both adjectives are translated as Russian or Russians. At present, russkii is an ethnic definition, while rossiiskii is mainly a political and territorial, and only potentially a civic definition. The word rossiiskii was first introduced in by Feofan Prokopovich, an associate of Peter the Great. At that time, and much later as well, it was used mainly in the official lexicon, and aimed at designating all subjects of the Russian Empire, nothing more. Thus, it had a strictly political meaning, and, in fact, was rarely used at all. I may be wrong, but I could not find even one case when, in the pre-revolutionary period, the word rossiiskii was applied to the non-Russian populations of the Caucasus, not to mention Central Asia.

In the official lexicon, the former were usually identified as Armenian, or Georgian, or Muslim, or as other subjects of the Russian Empire, that was all. At the turn of the century, only a few liberals occasionally used the word rossiiskii. In the Soviet period, the word rossiiskii was either used interchangeably with the word russkii , or, in some cases, as pertaining to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, for example, to its territory, resources, administration, et cetera. Inasmuch as the Soviet concept of nation was based on the primordialist approach, there was no place in it for a civic nation.

It is true that the Soviets initiated a much more ambitious project: However, this supra-national community was called Soviet, not Russian, although it implied a linguistic and cultural Russification. Thus, the very idea of a civic Russian nation is basically a new phenomenon. It began to be propagated by liberal-minded people in Russia only in the late perestroika period, and for political reasons it was taken up by Yeltsin.

In turn, Yeltsin made a proposal to their leaderships that he would later prefer to forget: Just at that time, those who were more or less acquainted with the Western theory of nation began to talk about a multiethnic and civic Russian nation. In the New Speak of the Russian democrats, the archaic and rarely used noun rossiiane , a derivative of rossiiskii , had acquired a new and different meaning. First, it implied not only citizenship, but also common interests, values, cultural characteristics, history, and fate that the Russian and non-Russian citizens of the Federation supposedly shared, as well as the bright future that they would share together.

At that time, many democratic-minded intellectuals made mention of it in another context. They liked to quote a famous saying about patriotism as the last refuge of scoundrels I must recall that in the late s and early s, the Russian liberals considered the Russian nationalists, along with the communists, to be their enemies. Only during the election campaigns did the parties of democratic orientation begin to stress their patriotism and allegiance to the Russian nation. However, it is not enough to construct identities.

In order to be successful these identities have to be accepted. In this respect, the stories of failure are much more numerous than success stories. It soon became evident that there was no consensus in the country with regard to the civic Russian nation. Post-Soviet Russia remains not only a multi-ethnic, but to some extent a multi-national state, which retains the principle of ethno-territorial autonomies inherited from the Soviet Union.

Many members of non-Russian nationalities are suspicious of attempts at imposing upon them any common identity with ethnic Russians, with the exception of citizenship. Many opinion polls and surveys indicate that among members of territorialized non-Russian nationalities, loyalty to their own nationality, republic, or small homeland is stronger than loyalty to the Russian Federation in general Khazanov, On the political and cultural levels, the negation of the idea of a civic Russian nation is most clearly expressed by non-Russian political elites and nationalist-minded intellectuals.

If the concept of civic nation implies, at least in theory, ethnically neutral policies and the equality of all citizens everywhere in the territory of the nation-state, then this is precisely what they want to avoid. They insist that members of indigenous nationalities should have the right of preferential treatment in their titular republics. Apparently, a civic nation implies something more than citizenry. It should have some shared political, historical, and cultural symbols acceptable to the multi-ethnic majority. Russian history lacks a George Washington or Abraham Lincoln as symbols of civic nationhood acceptable to all, without regard to their ethnic background.

Lenin and Stalin are already discredited in this capacity to the majority of the population. Members of different nationalities in Russia have quite different attitudes to the past and different ethnocentric mythologies. In the Northern Caucasus, nobody cares about this war. There, children are told that General Yermolov was a bloody colonizer of the Caucasus.

Even a common citizenship is under dispute, and some republican leaders insisted that priority should be given to republican citizenship over federal. It is perceived there as another attempt at Russification or as a desire to deny non-Russians privileged status in their homelands. Interestingly, Russian nationalists also resent this decision, though for wholly different reasons. But this is only one side of the coin. The other is that the concept of a civic nation is not appealing to many ethnic Russians as well. It seems that nationalism as a post-imperial syndrome is quite different in stable and prosperous countries from those that experience political uncertainty and economic hardships.

The Russians have still not overcome the crisis of identity caused by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Now, they are afraid that even some parts of the Russian Federation may also be taken away from them. In the early s one could witness the almost paranoid mood in the country. Many people were convinced that Russia was in danger of immediate disintegration.

Even in , 12 to 15 percent of ethnic Russians considered the disintegration of their country to be quite likely. In addition, the growth of ethnic nationalism among the non-Russian peoples of the former Soviet Union and of the Russian Federation resulted in a Russian backlash. In the late s and early s only Russian nationalists used the bugaboo of Russophobia; nowadays almost all political movements use it. Thus, the ideological space in Russia became open to only one variety of nationalism: At present, the Russians are seeking out a new base for their identity as a nationality and a nation; hence the ongoing debate about the character of the Russian Federation and about the status of ethnic minorities there.

Curiously enough, however, even the problem of an ethnic Russian nation is far from being solved. Who is an ethnic Russian remains a matter of heated debate. Many still argue that ethnic affiliation is hereditary and is defined by blood or genes. Among other things, ambiguity is reflected in the new terminology in the Russian official and public lexicon, which stresses the difference between genuine Russians and Russophones — acculturated members of other nationalities who have Russian as their first or even only language.

This distinction is the direct consequence of the Soviet practice of ascriptive and hereditary ethnic identity. However, the Orthodox Church and clerico-nationalists are propagating an even more restrictive concept of Russian-ness. They argue that only an Orthodox Christian can be a true Russian. A more circumspect trend in Russian nationalism is advocating a more inclusive approach to the problem: However, it does not provide a clear answer to the question of how to achieve this goal.

Apparently, it pins its hopes on voluntary assimilation, but this seems dubious at the moment, at any rate with regard to territorialized nationalities in the Russian Federation. Perhaps the most remarkable moment in the ongoing debate between various kinds of Russian nationalists is the intellectual poverty of the latter.

Their debate does not contain anything new. The ideas and approaches under discussion go back to pre-revolutionary times. This is despite of the fact that one of the main concerns of pre-revolutionary Russian nationalists had been the preservation of the empire, while the post-Soviet nationalists had to experience its dissolution. One of the remarkable features of Russian nationalism is that since the 19th century it has always acquired, and still acquires, illiberal, anti-Western, and authoritarian characteristics I am writing now not about individuals, but about political movements, although there is little difference in this respect.

Nationalism has many facets and varieties. It may be a political movement, or an ideology, or just a sentiment, or all of these together. Whatever one may have thought, nationalism does not necessarily belong to either the left or the right of the political spectrum. It is compatible with different political systems, from totalitarianism to democracy; and with different ideologies, from fascism and communism to conservatism, liberalism, and even social democracy.

However, different varieties of nationalism are always connected with specific historical and political circumstances. We used to think that nationalism strives for the congruence of political, linguistic, and ethno-cultural borders Gellner, This was never the aim of Russian nationalism. In the pre-revolutionary Russian context, nationalism was always aimed at preserving and extending the Russian Empire and at maintaining the dominant position of ethnic Russians in the Empire.

If these aims were provided with any ideological justification at all, then references were usually made to Orthodoxy as the only true Christian faith, to the messianic mission of the Russian people, and to similar arguments that has once again become popular in the country. Thus, this kind of nationalism might be called imperial nationalism. However, it was also quite contradictory. With regard to the non-Russian subjects of the empire, only two options were discussed: However, even assimilation was a matter of debate: In any case, the Russian nationalists considered linguistic and even cultural assimilation insufficient.

To them, the sine qua non of assimilation was conversion to Orthodoxy. Even the last Romanovs and their ruling elite were increasingly trying to legitimize the existing order by identifying autocracy with the Orthodox Russian people at the expense of the imperial transnational identities and pretentions von Hagen, All this made Russian nationalism exclusive.

Thus, in the Russian political and ideological space the boundaries between nationalism and other movements were quite different from those in many other European countries. It was possible to be simultaneously a nationalist and a liberal in England because there was a clear distinction between England, or even Great Britain, and the British Empire.

In Russia this was much more difficult, because to the Russian nationalists, the territorially contiguous Russian Empire and Russia itself were at once single and indivisible. Ethnic Russia to them extended to the entire empire, but at the same time they denied its non-Russian subjects civic equality and strongly opposed the very idea of their administrative or even cultural autonomy.

Some of its influential members, such as P. Berdiaev, also began to claim that Russians were a Staatsvolk and that the Russian Empire was their national state. But they continued to insist on granting the non-Russians equal civil rights with the Russians, and this made them ideological and political opponents of the nationalists. Other liberals, like P. Miliukov, who wanted to transform the Russian Empire into a multiethnic nation-state in which ethnic Russians would not occupy a politically dominant position, were considered by the nationalists to be their archenemies Weeks, Incidentally, Miliukov was known to sometimes use the word rossiiskii as opposed to russkii.

The history of the Second International has proved that it was possible to be simultaneously a socialist and a nationalist. In Russia, this was possible only for members of ethnic minorities. There were Polish, Georgian, Jewish, and Latvian socialist parties with strong nationalist agendas; however there was no Russian russkaia socialist party. In tacit or overt forms, Russian nationalism continued to exist in Soviet times and remained empire-centric. One of its remarkable characteristics was the identification of Russia with the whole Soviet Union Khazanov, However, I will skip over the Soviet period and turn directly to the post-Soviet one.

In spite of some differences, there are remarkable similarities between pre-revolutionary and post-Soviet Russian nationalisms. Indeed, Russian nationalism remains anti-modernist, anti-Western, anti-democratic, illiberal, authoritarian, and offensive, although nowadays sometimes in a defensive disguise. Steady screams on the threat to the Russian people from numerous external and internal enemies have become commonplace.

During the last few years I have devoted a lot of time to reading the growing number of Russian nationalist publications. I must say that it is not very exciting reading. To a large extent, all nationalist ideologies are based on mythologies, and the Russian nationalist mythology, just like any other for that matter, pretends to be a self-evident truth that does not require proof.

Favorite phrases of the Russian nationalists are: They are extremely verbose, bombastic, monotonous, declarative, repetitive, and simply very bad, stylistically speaking. This should not be surprising if one takes into account that many of the ideologists and proponents of Russian nationalism can best be characterized as lumpen -intellectuals: To satisfy my curiosity, I inquired as to what some of these people were doing during the Soviet period.

The results were quite beguiling. In the recent past, many of them were Marxist philosophers, or were teachers of the so-called scientific communism. Now, the Sauls have become Pauls, or, perhaps more accurately, the Pauls have become Sauls. There are also quite a lot of poets, writers, and journalists among the ideologists of Russian nationalism. Two or three are good or were good. The rest are very bad. In the Soviet Union they were protected from competition, patronized and fed, and fed quite well, by the Soviet government for their loyalty to the regime.

Nowadays they cannot compete and want to protect themselves by any means possible. Some years ago, one of them, the poet Vladimir Sorokin, made a remarkable statement: But then he added: He does not have the right to write in Russian. Although at present the Russian nationalist movement is politically fragmented and consists of many parties and groups that are often competing with each other, it is not difficult to summarize the common characteristics of their mythology and political program.

Let me start with mythology. It is almost disappointing in its lack of almost any new and original traits. In many respects, the contemporary Russian mythology repeats the myths of Soviet historiography and propaganda, or goes back to pre-revolutionary nationalist myths. In accordance with this mythology, we are now witnessing a clash of civilizations, a global struggle between the materialistic, individualistic, consumerist, cosmopolitan, corrupt, and decadent West led by the United States and the collectivist, idealistic, spiritually and morally superior Eurasia led by Russia.

Russia is more than a country and a state, it is a civilization in which high spiritual qualities prevail over materialistic factors. Likewise, the Russian Empire was unique: All peoples enjoyed peaceful coexistence and equality within her borders. Non-Russians joined it voluntarily. Russia never conquered and subjugated them, but if it did conquer them it was only for their own good, in order to protect them from external and internal enemies this is a direct continuation of Soviet mythology.

So, what or who prevents Russia from fulfilling her messianic mission? Of course, the West, and at present the U. Russia has always been a besieged fortress, surrounded by enemies to the East and the West. For many centuries, the West has wanted to force Russia to her knees. The collapse of the Soviet Union is the result of this plot. Nowadays, America wants to break up Russia, to turn her into a source of raw materials. And so on and so on.

Get A Copy

Conspiracy theory and the clarion call of Russophobia have become an indispensable part of contemporary Russian nationalist mythology. There are two almost eternal Russian questions: What is to be done. The mythology of Russian nationalism provides an answer to the first question; its political program answers the second one. I will describe the political program of the Russian nationalist mainstream, not those of the extreme, overtly fascist organizations, such as Russian National Unity, which already claims to have about thousand members and wants to establish a system of apartheid in Russia Shenfield, So, then, what about the program of the Russian nationalist mainstream?

Russia should become the state of the Russian people, and the Orthodox faith should be proclaimed the state religion. Russia is single and indivisible and should become a unitary state, in which ethnic minorities will at best enjoy cultural autonomy, but no political or territorial autonomy whatsoever. It is very difficult to translate this word, because even in Russian it has many different and vague meanings. The Old Russian word sobor that until recently was only rarely used, meant an assembly, whether ecclesiastical or lay. The purport and reason for the very existence of the Russian nation is a strong and mighty state derzhava.

S. A. Graham

The state, and by no means civil society, is the bearer, protector, and guarantor of national interests. The most immediate and urgent goal of the Russian people is the restoration of the mighty Russian state in its historical borders in practical terms, the restoration of the Russian Empire.

Since the West in general, and the United States in particular, strive to prevent Russia from achieving this goal, Russian foreign policy should become anti-Western and anti-American. In all, the political program of Russian nationalism is not only anti-democratic and illiberal, it is also revanchist. Now, the final question: Some observers point out that it is hardly likely that radical nationalists, especially neo-fascists, will come to power in the country in the near future.

I tend to agree with them. However, there is a danger of a different order. First, some power structures and their officials are becoming increasingly receptive to the nationalist agenda. It is no secret in the country that extreme nationalist Russian organizations have many sympathizers in the Ministry of the Interior, in the judiciary, and in some regional administrations, not to mention in the secret services.

Second, and perhaps more important, is that other political movements are becoming increasingly receptive to nationalist programs and slogans. Nationalism in the country has become fashionable, and most of the political movements and parties are striving to advertise themselves as adequate defenders of national interests. The main Western, especially West European, patterns of ideological and political orientation, conservatism, liberalism, and social democracy, are still not applicable to Russia.

Instead I would single out four major forces of the Russian political spectrum: It may be revealing to trace the extent to which these forces are becoming receptive to nationalist ideology. One of the peculiar and intriguing elements of contemporary Russian political life is that it lacks a strong social-democratic movement. There are only a few tiny groups of social-democratic orientation, and this in a country with a very strong socialist tradition! There are several reasons for this state of affairs, but I can only dwell upon one of them now. While in many East Central European countries the communists are gravitating towards social democracy, their Russian counterparts are not.

Instead, they are gravitating towards nationalism. It is true that at the moment there are several ideological trends in the Russian Communist Party, including a traditional or internationalist one Urban and Solovei, But most conspicuous by far is the nationalist trend. Let me summarize the main points of some books by Gennady Ziuganov, the leader of the Russian communists see, for example, Ziuganov, ; Ziuganov, Ziuganov, who evidently has a team of ghostwriters, is a very prolific author indeed. Russia is a unique, continental, Slavic, Orthodox civilization.

At the same time, Russia is the legitimate successor to the empire of Jenghiz Khan. The main achievement of the Soviet period was that the Russian state became even stronger; the main deficiency was that the Russian-ness of the Soviet Union was played down. Stalin understood this and wanted to strengthen the Russian character of the Soviet Union; but unfortunately he died too early.

Many Marxist ideas and doctrines contradict the Russian mentality and need revision. Thus, at present the struggle of states is substituted for the class struggle. Russia was always and still is opposed by the predatory Western civilization, which is negatively affected by Judaism. The current goal of the West is to destroy Russia and Russians once and for all. There are too many non-Russians in science, culture, mass media, and the state structure. I think that this is enough to create a clear picture of the contemporary ideological trend of the Russian communists.

Whatever one calls them, they have ceased to be Marxists. We are now witnessing a merger of radical right wing extremism with renascent anti-capitalist populism on the conservative nationalist agenda. Let me now turn to the party of power. Many of these people remain in power today.

In the new situation, they are additionally attracted to nationalism, because it can provide them with a new legitimization of power. To other members of the Russian political elite, nationalism has become a matter of expedience. Since , derzhavnichestvo , statism, has almost become its official ideology, just like a little later its demonstrative anti-Americanism. For various reasons anti-Americanism is growing in the country, and in this respect the Russian leadership is following and at the same time instigating the public mood. Many Russians cannot forgive America for winning the Cold War and especially for the consequences of defeat, which they consider a national humiliation.

The Russian leadership considers the U. Actually, the Russian political elite is trying to sit on two chairs simultaneously, but not very successfully. In principle, the propagated state patriotism and allegiance to the strong and mighty state can be ethnically neutral.

In Russia it is not. In some respects, the propagated ideology of derzhavnichestvo is a more circumspect nationalism, but it is still ethnic Russian nationalism. When the incomplete break with the Soviet past is accompanied by a growing desire to associate with the Russian imperial past and its symbolism, which non-Russians in the country completely reject; policy cannot be ethnically blind. When the state provides one of the many denominations in the country with the de facto status of state religion, policy cannot be ethnically neutral.

When the new law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Affiliations promulgates that Orthodoxy is an inseparable part of the all-Russia historical, spiritual, and cultural legacy, this law cannot be neutral with regard to non-Russian and non-Orthodox citizens of the country. In Russia, all ideas of derzhavnichestvo imply two assumptions. First, that the interests of non-Russian nationalities should coincide with the interests of ethnic Russians.

To pursue this line of argumentation to its logical end, one may say that the one hundred thousand victims of the Chechen wars were slaughtered for their own sake. These attempts have not only revealed a deeply rooted authoritarian mentality, but also a specific vision of the post-Soviet Russian state. In a society which is already somewhat pluralistic, such an ideology can be promoted and disseminated only by the state and inevitably would be a statist ideology with strong nationalist and anti-liberal accretions.

However, everything indicates that the new leadership in Russia is not going to abandon this endeavor. The policy of authoritarian centralism that President Putin is imposing upon the country is to a large extent influenced by many concepts of Russian nationalism.

And what about the liberals? They also contributed to the growth of pro-empire sentiments, because in their struggle with the communists and their negative attitude towards the Soviet period they began to appeal to the idealized pre-revolutionary past. What is more important, however, is that at present even the liberals have different attitudes to ethnic nationalism in the country.

There are still staunch liberals and Westernizers who disdain all forms of nationalism, especially the Russian variety; but there are also growing numbers of other, so-called liberal statists or liberal imperialists, who are ready to make concessions to Russian nationalists. A few years ago, many of these supported the first Chechen war, and many more now support the second.

In private conversations, some of them explained to me that they had to bow to the public mood. According to a poll taken by the Moscow Humanitarian Academy, 61 percent of Russians favor the restoration of a unitary state of the kind that existed in pre Russia Russia Today , January 4, To sum up, at the moment Russia lacks a consensus with regard to the concept of nation, and common identifications are very weak in the country. This work may be used, with this header included, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of this work may be distributed electronically, in whole or in part, without written permission from Transit.

Tr nsit online , Nr. Vestnik Evrazii, N 2 3: Nationalism and the Soviet State, The University of Wisconsin Press. Ethnic Nationalism in the Russian Federation. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mir Rossii — Evraziia. Russkii vopros v sovremennoi Rossii. Armonk, NY and London: Acta Eurasica, N3 Acta Evrasica, N Multiethnic Societies and Nation-building.

Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia. Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, Northern Illinois University Press. Rossiia — rodina moia. Die anderen hingegen sind der Ansicht, dass es strategisch und patriotisch sei, sich mehr in Richtung Westen anzusiedeln.

Schatten über den Highlands (Kann die Liebe alle Zeit überwinden?) (German Edition)

Wir sind aber nicht die einzigen, die von solch migratorischen Obsessionen heimgesucht werden. Oder im vor-russischen Osten, wie Dorohoi dies unter Beweis zu stellen mag? Wir sind, Gott stehe uns bei, aller und niemandes Kind! Wir sind vom Schicksal gezeichnet, mon cher , wir sind Waisen, doch wunderbar heroisch. An den Grenzen der Christenheit, um das mal so zu formulieren… E. Sollen wir uns in Richtung Mitteleuropa bewegen? Das lassen die dort nicht zu. Das wollen wir nicht. Und trotzdem gibt es etwas, das uns eindeutig und, meiner Meinung nach, irreversibel mit dem Zielobjekt unserer nahezu irrationalen Faszination verbindet.

Der Bukarester ist kein Balkanese. Niemand trinkt, ohne den mehr oder minder unschuldigen Wunsch, den Rausch, das kleine Delirium zu erreichen. Der Trinker will nicht nur effizient trinken, er will viel trinken. Alles kann verschoben werden: Although it experienced the cultural and linguistic influences of other languages mainly Polish and German historical, social, geopolitical and linguistic factors made its relations with Russian the most problematic. One would have expected this situation to change after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of the Ukrainian state in But after 10 years of independence the problem of the real functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of society and of the uneven status of the Russian language has become even more urgent and fraught with dangerous political conflicts.

These ten years were in fact wasted on inconsistent and contradictory attempts to introduce market reforms and institutions of liberal democracy whilst the unlimited power of the new Ukrainian oligarchs and the growing state bureaucracy were left untouched. The Ukrainian language, proposed by the intellectual elite as a main ground for national identity formation, turned out to be exclusive for many regions and social and ethnic groups.

The potential of politicizing this symbolic division becomes even stronger if one takes into account the international dimension of this crisis. Despite all the declarations of the Russian leaders concerning the intention to develop non-imperialist and equal relations with the neighboring countries and the official recognition of Ukrainian independent states and borders, Ukraine, according to the statements of those same leaders belongs to the sphere of special Russian interests.

In the area of cultural policy it assumes the promotion of Ukrainian language at the expense of Russian and this attitude is widely reflected by international foundations and donor organizations in the Ukraine. The Ukrainian Diaspora, which is largely involved in these activities, enthusiastically lobbies the policy of ukrainization.

Another aspect of globalization is a certain relativization of the Russian-Ukrainian language dilemma: It mainly considers the status and relations between the Russian and Ukrainian languages and the relations and rights of related linguistic groups since the real status of the Russian language is completely different from the status of other minority languages and because the relations between Russian and Ukrainian are much more politicized.

Starting with a brief historical review of the relations between Ukrainian and Russian languages in the context of the nation building process, I will then present the current debate on the status of the Russian language in Ukraine, the so-called krainization campaign and the opposition to it. In the last part I consider the theoretical debates surrounding the concepts of multiculturalism, minority rights and cultural differences in contemporary political theory and their implications for the situation in the Ukraine. Compared to Russian, the Ukrainian language is very young.

Leaving apart the debates about its historical origins, the process of shaping the modern literary Ukrainian language started at the end of last century and was complicated by the lack of an independent state and of territorial unity and also by the economic backwardness of the country. At the turn of the 19th century the territories with Ukrainian population were divided between three countries: Russia, Austria and Hungary, and they were therefore ruled by three different laws regulating the rights of Ukrainian language.

However, Ukrainians were the minority mainly belonging to the low classes on the territories where they lived. Therefore in Galychyna for example they suffered from the restrictions imposed by the Polish administration. Nevertheless Ukrainian primary schools were widely spread, the Ukrainian press was well developed and Ukrainian-speaking intelligentsia willingly used language as a banner for national consolidation and liberation. Under Hungarian rule in Transcarpatia, the most backward of all Ukrainian territories, the Ukrainian language existed as a mixture of local rural dialects and had very little chance of developing under the conditions of total magyarization.

Publication of books, journals and newspapers was restricted; theatre performances were subject to complicated regulations, and schooling in Ukrainian was prohibited; the language of the juridical system and the local administration was Russian. Being concerned about the territorial integrity of the Russian empire, its top officials considered Ukrainian nationalism and separatism as most dangerous given the size of population and territory and its strategic political and economic importance: Under these conditions the Ukrainian language was virtually eliminated from all spheres of public life and was given the official status of a Russian dialect, not suitable for political and academic life.

Even among the Ukrainian intelligentsia there were many who considered it as a mainly rural, poetic and folkloric language and supported the idea of bilinguism. A limited vocabulary particularly concerning scientific and technical terminology based on rural origins, regional differences and strong influence of local dialects, underdeveloped and shaky grammar rules are traits that characterized Ukrainian in the beginning of 20 century.

To some extent the language reflected the state of the Ukrainian society as a mainly agricultural one: Ukrainian was the language of the peasants and of those very narrow strata of intelligentsia which came from the peasants and served their interests: Because of political obstacles for inter-regional communication and cultural differences the development of the Ukrainian language in eastern and western territories was divided into two isolated processes.

This situation continued until almost the end of the Second World War when western territories were attached to the Soviet Ukraine. The years of were a period of high political instability, the political regime changed several times, and most of the territory was beyond the control of the central authorities. The official status of the Russian-Ukrainian interstate relations remained uncertain till , when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was created.

Civil war and external military intervention did not allow Ukrainian leaders to pay much attention to the language issue, but in general this political and cultural shift was of course in favor of the Ukrainian language. But with the establishment of Soviet power over most of the Ukrainian territory only the western regions remained under Poland and the emergence of the Soviet Union it became clear that the idea of an independent Ukrainian state would not be realized and the official policy turned again to some version of Russian-Ukrainian bilinguism.

This rather unclear policy, mainly determined by pragmatism, mysteriously changed some years later. The reason for it can be found in the changing international environment and the new focus on supporting anti-imperialist struggle in the colonial world. Soviet republics were supposed to demonstrate the successful solution to the nationalities question. Forceful measures were implemented to ensure the official status of the Ukrainian language: It was the first attempt to conquer the urban cultural space — usually the fortress of Russian speakers.

In the early 30s with the total change of political climate and the beginning of Stalinist terror the ukrainization campaign was stopped by the order from Moscow. The social basis of a further Ukrainization was eventually eliminated by a deliberately organized famine among rural the population: This caused a new political shift and some concessions to the Ukrainian language, but soon the war with Nazi Germany cut this tendency. Western Ukrainians had a particularly bad record because of collaborating with the Nazis against the Soviet army. Some military groups continued to resist to Soviet authorities till the end of the 50s, and this struggle cost many lives on both sides.

Millions of Ukrainians were forcibly moved to Siberia. Many who did not accept the Soviet rule and tried to avoid political repressions emigrated to the West. Since these years the fear of Ukrainian nationalism has never left the Moscow leadership and later it was this that caused the particularly extensive repressions against Ukrainian dissidents. Poetry readings, public lectures and celebrations of cultural events attracted students and intelligentsia both in Eastern and Western Ukraine. Khrushchev and later P. Shelest tried to keep these activities under control in order not to scare Moscow, but at the same time provided some kind of protection for them.

On the other hand some political and administrative decisions were made at the same period, which in fact were in favor of further russification. In the Congress of CPSU announced a policy to eliminate ethnic differences and develop a new community — the Soviet people. According to the law of , Ukrainian language lost its compulsory status at schooling: Public opinion, awakened by the young intelligentsia, perceived these politics as anti-Ukrainian. However, the wave of national cultural renaissance had one particular feature: A new generation of intelligentsia, committed to Ukrainian language and culture grew up in Soviet society and believed in its values: What they wanted was to clear up these values from distortions and bureaucratization.

The first arrests among Ukrainian intelligentsia started in , and in the beginning they only fuelled public solidarity for the national cause. But after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in and the worsening political atmosphere any open manifestations of national feeling became almost impossible. Publications of books, journals and newspapers in Ukrainian were subsidized by the state and this fact partly explains the paradox of the decline of the Ukrainian media and publishing industry after the collapse of the USSR.

What the Soviet authorities were concerned about was the danger of turning the language into a banner of the national consolidation of Ukrainians against the existing political regime. And this threat to the Communist system was very real, particularly in Western Ukraine and was becoming more and more real in other regions. The official ideology of internationalism in the USSR encouraged inter-republic migration and cross-ethnic marriages. The Soviet leadership encouraged ethnic Russians to relocate on Ukrainian land and supported Ukrainians moving to the eastern and northern territories of Russia.

These factors plus the continuing reduction of teaching in Ukrainian led to the change of balance not in favor of Ukrainian-speakers but rather of a hidden russification. The growing dissident movement in Ukraine, being concerned about human rights and having a lot in common with Russian dissident groups, was mainly focused on the facts of ethnocide of Ukrainians, discrimination of the Ukrainian language and oppression of cultural life.

The cruel repressions against Ukrainian dissidents and the general political stagnation resulted in the radicalization of the nationalist movement and the revival of the idea of a secession from the USSR. According to the Ukrainian constitution, the people of the Ukraine are divided into three categories: The Russian language, which is still very influential in Ukraine, automatically gained secondary status, and a campaign to introduce the Ukrainian language into the educational system and state structures began.

This is not due to a conscious political strategy but mainly because of the administrative capacities of the new Ukrainian state which were not sufficient for radical reform; in addition to that, the unstable political leadership could not formulate a clear language policy. In Eastern and Southern Ukraine both historically Russian-speaking ukrainization faced hidden resistance, hence was not very successful and rather superficial.

The state tried to promote the Ukrainian language mainly through bureaucratic measures, which were efficient only to some extent. President Leonid Kuchma came to power in due to support from Eastern Ukraine. This policy or absence of a clear policy became a subject of criticism from Ukrainian nationalists on the one side and the Russian-speaking intelligentsia on the other. By the end of new appointments in the Ukrainian government were made: At the same time, the Constitutional Court made a decision regarding the usage of state language in Ukrainian society.

This decision, rather political than juridical, was in fact an attempt to expand the compulsory usage of state language to institutions like local self-administration bodies and municipal higher education. The danger of this decision was stressed in the special opinion of one of the constitutional judges, Mironenko, who argued that according to the constitution Ukrainian is the official and working language of the state but not necessarily of society or private persons. Another issue in the recent language debate became the ratification of the European Charter of Minority Languages by the Ukrainian Parliament in December Moreover, a new situation has emerged, since now Russian-speakers can use democratic and human rights rhetoric and consequently the authority of Western liberal ideology against Ukrainian nationalism.

But the Charter had no chance of being implemented because after 6 months the ratification was abandoned by the Constitutional Court on the ground that mistakes were made during the procedure of ratification, but the true reason was political. This rather banal crime was interpreted by extremist nationalists as a crime against the Ukrainian culture and nation and led to an escalation of anti-Russian hatred. As a result Igor Bilozir became a national hero — as his predecessor, another Ukrainian composer, Volodymyr Ivasuk, who was killed in supposedly on the order of the KGB. All these events of the last two years initiated a new wave of politization of the language issue.

Currently the population of Ukraine, which is about 50 million people, speaks mainly two languages: According to one recent sociological survey January Panina, Bilinguism in Ukraine: Real Situation and Perspectives. A Sociological survey , in: Russian-Ukrainian Bulletin , Nr. In fact Ukraine is a bilingual country. Despite all the historical transformations, the changes of the political system and of state borders, despite a significant progress made by Ukrainian language and despite the efforts of ten years of independence, the contemporary situation in a way reproduces the old pattern of the beginning of 20 century.

The language split has actually two dimensions: What makes Ukraine different from other former USSR republics, such as the Baltic states, is that the Russian language is widely spread and still dominant in culture, science, business and other spheres except, possibly, politics. The ruling political and administrative elite remains to a large extent Russian-speaking, and Ukrainian is used mainly for political rituals. In the case of the Ukraine, Russian can hardly be considered as a national minority language. There are some points, which are crucial for the situation with language politics in Ukraine.

First, these are mainly language differences not so much ethnic, religious, nor even cultural that constitute the grounds for political tensions in Ukrainian society. Up to now religious differences played only a marginal role, and some confessional tensions between members of the Ukrainian Orthodox and of the Greek-Catholic churches had only regional importance. Although cultural differences do exist between the Eastern and Western regions of Ukraine, they are traditionally articulated first of all as language differences.

In this context the issue of language has become crucial. As it was shown above, for the Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia language was the main focus of struggle against the Austrian authorities, the Russia Empire, and then against Soviet rule. It is no wonder that the very idea of the Ukrainian nation has been constructed by constant attempts to defend the Ukrainian language and to save it from vanishing — first of all in opposition to Russian. The second thesis may seem contrary to the first one: Language problems become politicized not so much because of the urgency of these problems, but because transitional processes in post-Soviet countries have their own logic.

One of the core elements of this logic is the growing gap between elites and masses, alienation of the masses from political life. In some sense, language can be considered as a signifier of other interests, first of all of the economic interests of the Ukrainian regional elites, their geo-economic and geopolitical orientations. Third, the issue of closeness or differences of Russian and Ukrainian, which is the subject of political discussions, can hardly be solved in a neutral and objective way.

But what political implications can this have? Does it favor the mutual understanding and communication, perspectives of bilinguism, and make the life of Russian speakers easier than, say, in Estonia?

Der G’spritzte

Surzhyk is a term, which initially came from the mill industry: This distorted language different in every region serves as an inter-linguistic mediator and also poses additional difficulties for a full-fledged functioning of Ukrainian.

• Memoirs At The Dinner Table
• Brouillon pour un dictionnaire des amantes (Les Cahiers Rouges) (French Edition)
• Global Rebalancing: A Roadmap for Economic Recovery
• The Art of the Sentence Diagram_1 John (777 Bible Sentenc Diagram)
• Claustrophobia
• String Quartet No. 8 in F Major, K168 - Cello