Einführung in die Philosophie Descartes: Erkenntnistheorie (German Edition)
Contents:
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Was ist und Was sein soll. Natur und Freiheit bei Immanuel Kant. Berlin Walter de Gruyter , — Gemeinsamkeiten in den Geschichtsphilosophien von Vico und Hegel".
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Recent literature to German Idealism". European Journal of Philosophy , 15, , — For Natorp, as for Kant, thinking is activity, doing: He argues that a critical account of knowledge is not justified in presupposing some object conceived as existing radically independent of mind, and which then somehow affects it via intuition: But how does it appear? This then raises the following pressing question: Natorp is distressingly elusive on this point, even in his explicit discussions of the status of time and space in science. Like Kant, Natorp understands thinking always to be thinking an object.
But since he re interprets these objects as non-sensible phenomena, he also interprets space and time non-psychologically, i. Natorp everywhere likens this problematic relation of first-order phenomenality and second-order objectivity to solving for X in an equation. Moreover, just as in solving an equation one can only determine the X in light of other known quantities assumed in the equation, one must in the same way establish the determinations of the problematic object in light of other objectivities laws that are assumed ge-setzt.
No such objectivities are ever granted absolutely, of course, but only relatively, namely with respect to the particular problem. They, too, are always susceptible to becoming problems in their turn. Therefore no complete solution—no total determination of the object—can be achieved for any X , except asymptotically. While the fully determinate object itself thus remains a forever unreachable focus imaginarius See Section 3 , it is, by the same token, always at least partially determined.
Paul Natorp
The question now is: Whereas the first-order phenomena constitute private, lived subjectivity, not open to prediction or even adequate description, Natorp's answer is that the second-order object is constructed in accordance with laws of thinking, which as laws are in their very nature objective, i. Any such lawful objectivation or object-formation just is knowledge or science, in the sense of being objectively think able. These laws of constitution are in turn hierarchically arranged: With the apparent exception of the basic logical laws e. In other words, philosophy always begins from the second-order phenomena.
We finally turn to the Marburg thesis that philosophy, as philosophy of science, must also be the philosophical history of science. For science, as a fieri a do ing evolves over time; hence the activity of its basic functions and the regulated mutation of its laws can only be observed through time. Yet this historical tracing of the progress of science must be philosophically informed, that is, grounded in the transcendentally isolated system of basic functions.
As mentioned above, Natorp holds that the entire value of the transcendental method is normative: The Marburgers, with this criterion in hand, enthusiastically apply it in praise and blame. A historiographical commonplace of neo-Kantianism has it that the labor of grounding the sciences was divided between the Marburg and Southwest Schools, the former attending to the natural sciences, the latter to the human sciences or Geisteswissenschaften.
Still, the common view, if one-sided, is not wrong, for the Marburg theory of history has a very different starting-point than does the Southwest School. When they speak of history, they mean, on the one hand, the history of science , and on the other, the history of philosophy , properly construed, namely as the critique of science. Only secondarily are they interested in political, economic, or social history, and only insofar as it advances their primary project.
This sounds odd since we have heard again and again that science is rooted in its method , but now are told it is rooted in its history. Perhaps the paradox is only seeming, for there is an intimate connection between the Marburg School's notion of hypothesis as the active posit of mind, on the one hand, and its notion of science as essentially historical, on the other.
Their conception of the logic of science as the dynamic Gang of categorial hypotheses implies that science can only be grasped developmentally, i. The Marburg view of that history differs importantly from Hegel's, with which it might seem to have much in common, in two respects: For Hegel, history is the linear evolution of Geist 's self-knowledge through time; the further to the right you go, the more advanced the stage of self- consciousness.
Cohen and Natorp, too, take genuine history to be the history of rational self-consciousness, but for them this simply means reason's transcendental, reflective consciousness of the basis of science, that is, method. Because its object—this rational insight into reason's own principle—is essentially detached from time, history for the Marburg School is not conceived with respect to time.
Of course science develops in time, and may be tracked diachronically along a time-line, yet its innermost core is the self-same atemporal idea, around which science circles , its progression represented by ever wider, but concentric orbits. He considers the fact that each of these moments of self-consciousness must occur in concrete circumstances and have a unique point on a real time-line to be as obvious as it is irrelevant. The transcendental nucleus is method, and method is the meaning of idealism; hence, idealism is born when reason becomes self-conscious of its thinking as methodical and scientific.
This involves a secondary task, viz. The history of science is a history of often contradictory or incommensurable theories, each of which is represented in Cohen's image as a ring. Nonetheless, as scientific, the variety of theories all express the central, unitary activity of reason: They are moments of reason's recollection, rebirth, and self-renewal. Hence the Marburgers consider it of the utmost significance that their heroes—especially Galileo, Leibniz, and Kant—explicitly link their conceptions of science back to Plato. As Cohen and Natorp select and interpret their idealistic predecessors, they see illustrated in them the crucial immanent role of historical reflection in science, by which it ascends to transcendental self-reflection upon its methodological foundation.
To stop reading Plato is to subtract science from its rational core, and deprive it—not of its method, which it will always have qua science—but of self-transparency of its own pure foundation and legitimacy. This statement confirms the hermeneutic inseparability of system and history: This reciprocity of history and theory informs the following passage, in which Cohen links Plato with the Marburg program.
That mistaken reading consists in taking the ideas to be substances, i. Kant himself of course understood Plato in just this way, chastising him for flying beyond the limits of reason on the wings of intellectual intuition. Thus, the problems of how the ideas could exist apart from the world of real particulars, and whether pure reason has a special intuitive faculty capable of bridging the gulf, evaporate, once we recognize the immanent operation of the ideai as the categorial hypotheses [ ] that are the conditions of possibility of thinking in general, and of science in particular.
These ideai are no more separately existent, according to Natorp, than are Kant's categories: This picture of Marburg Philosophiegeschichtsphilosophie [ ] will strike many as downright surreal; still, it only seems right to note the following.
Though we must understand the Marburg conception of history to grasp their motivation for reading and re-reading Plato, we need not accept that conception in order to appreciate either Natorp's genetic logic of science or his reading of Plato. As Lembeck puts it in the introduction to his Indeed, one can perhaps better appreciate the value of Natorp's reading of Plato if one does not think of it as support for Marburg idealism as such, but simply as an ingenious attempt to make sense of the relation of ideal form and empirical particular, an attempt that merely employs the logic of categorial functions—as a hypothetical springboard.
Paul Natorp First published Tue Aug 12, Natorp and Marburg neo-Kantianism 2. Transcendental method in the philosophy of science 3. Method and hypothesis 4. Natorp and Marburg neo-Kantianism Neo-Kantianism, it is often said, was the dominant current of late nineteenth-century German academic philosophy.
Transcendental method in the philosophy of science It is a commonplace of nineteenth-century German intellectual history that with the collapse of post-Kantian Idealism, philosophy ceded its claim of scientificity to the positive sciences. In this he follows Cohen's dictum: What is the foundation of the reality which is given in such facts? What are the conditions of that certainty from which visible actuality takes its reality?
The laws are the facts, and [hence] the objects [of our investigation]; not the star-things. The risk [ Wagnis ] [of hypothesizing] is inevitable if the process of experience should begin and continue moving: This taking a stand is necessary, but the stand must in turn always be left behind. It is true that thinking operates [ schafft ] in the sciences in accord with secure laws of synthesis, although to a large extent it is at the same time unconscious of these laws.
Thinking is in each case focused upon its particular object. An entirely new level of reflection is required to investigate, not the particular object, but the laws in accordance with which this and any scientific object in general first constitutes itself as an object. History of Philosophy We finally turn to the Marburg thesis that philosophy, as philosophy of science, must also be the philosophical history of science.
Plato is the founder of the system of philosophy … because he founded logic [in the Marburg sense], and thereby the system of philosophy. He is generally to be understood as the founder of idealism.
- A Wonder Book For Girls & Boys.
- Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Neo-Kantianism" by Jeremy Heis - PhilPapers.
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The concept of idealism must be determined logically. This determination is the profoundest task and the highest content of logic. Plato found this determination by establishing logic's connection to science, and thus grounding logic. The determination lies in the concept of the Idea [i. It is not a matter of proving that Plato's philosophy is not transcendental idealism; that is so obvious as to be taken for granted.
It is however something entirely else to show why Cohen and Natorp believe that Plato, at least in principle, laid the groundwork for this idealism. Politis, Vasilis, Connolly, John, trans. In Holzhey , vol. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 12 3: Wilamowitz-Moellendorff's Platon Berlin, Frankfurter Zeitung , 26 June Siegel's Platon und Sokrates. Frankfurter Zeitung , 13 March Neue Richtlinien sozialer Erziehung. Eine Neuuntersuchung der philosophischen Grundlagen seiner Erziehungslehre.
Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Herrn Prof. Wundt's Platons Leben und Werk Jena Pohlenz's Aus Platos Werdezeit. Philosophische Untersuchungen Berlin Ihr Problem und ihre Probleme. Deutsche Literaturzeitung , columns Untersuchungen auf ihrem Grenzgebiet.
New Release Ebook Einführung In Die Philosophie Descartes Erkenntnistheorie German Edition Epub
Sein Leben und seine Ideen. Sabbadini's Epoca del Georgia di Platone Trieste, Deutsche Literaturzeitung 3, column , f. Berliner philologische Wochenschrift 5, columns Mit Beziehung auf Edm. Finsler's Platon und die Aristotelische Poetik Leipzig, Berliner philologische Wochenschrift 30, columns Theorie der Willensbildung auf der Grundlage der Gemeinschaft.
Reprinted in Natorp Lasswitz's Geschichte der Atomistik vom Mittelalter bis Newton 2 vols. Siebeck's Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen Freiburg, Zeller's Grundriss der griechischen Philosophie Leipzig, Ein Programm der Akademie Marburg Siebeck's Geschichte der Psychologie 2 vols. Protagoras, Demokrit, Epikur und die Skepsis. Eine Studie zur Vorgeschichte des Kritizismus. Studia Leibnitiana 17 Mit Bezug auf W.
Secondary Sources Aars, A. Review of Natorp's Platos Ideenlehre. Zur Psychologie des Subjekts bei Natorp und Husserl. Natorps Monismus der Erfahrung und das Problem der Psychologie. Jahrhundert als Metaphysik nach Hegel.
Aktuelle Funktionen und Aufgabenbereiche
Natorp e la teoria delle idee. Presses Universitaires de France. A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger. Open Court Publishing Company. Speech in honor of Natorp's centenary, delivered 24 January at the University of Marburg. This speech, with slightly different notes, is identical to Gadamer Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie.
Das Problem der Psychologie in Natorps Philosophie. Schriften zur Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte.