Crónicas de un Conquistador II: México-Tenochtitlan (Spanish Edition)

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Mesoamerican Studies in Memory of Thelma D. Fernando Horcasitas and Doris Heyden. Eric, Mexico Before Cortez London: Charles Scribners Sons, Flannery, and Joyce Marcus, eds. Gillespie, The Aztec Kings: University of Arizona Press, Iconography and Function , ed. Essays in Mesoamerican Ideas , ed. Gary H Gossen Albany: Cambridge University Press, Kathryn Hosserand and Karen Dakin Ocford: BAR International Series , Postconquest Central Mexican History and Philology , ed.

Concepts of the Ancient Nahuas , trans. University of Utah Press, See Gibson, Tlaxcala, , for a full list and more details about their privi- leges. Harris, Aztecs, Moors, and Christians. Restall, Maya Conquistador, This perspective tends to begin by posing the question, How were such amazing feats possible? The question has been repeated by chroniclers and historians from the early sixteenth century to the present. For example, in the recent Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest, Matthew Restall argues that Spanish conquests in the Americas can mostly be explained by a combination of three factors working together—epidemic disease, native disunity or micropatriotism, and metal weapons but not necessarily guns and horses.

Reproduced courtesy of the Jay I. The traditional conquistador-based view of the conquest is not as entrenched as it once was. On the other hand, that book was also made possible by increasing numbers of revisionist voices and presentations of myth-debunking evidence—a development notably reflected in the pres- ent volume. Indeed, the aspect of the revisionist view of the conquest that has arguably become most widely known and accepted is the existence of native allies.

In this chapter, we will discuss native roles in four categories, moving from the better known toward a more novel suggestion regarding conquest patterns and possibilities. These four categories are, first, the numbers of native auxiliaries; second, the ubiquity of native allies beyond the best- known examples from the Spanish-Mexica war of —21; third, the cru- cial role of noncombatant auxiliaries, such as guides, spies, interpreters, porters, cooks, and so on; and fourth, the possibility that the Spanish con- quest imitated preconquest patterns of imperial expansion in Mesoamerica, so that it became modeled to some extent on the conquests that created the Mexica empire.

Our sources are a combination of secondary sources and primary archival ones, mostly petitions sent to Spain by sixteenth-cen- tury Mesoamerican conquistadors. Such language cannot be avoided altogether. Nor should the role of the Spaniards as initiators and ultimate beneficiar- ies of the war be forgotten. Yet a highlighting of the demographic balance within allied forces—the sheer numbers of native warriors fighting against the Mexica in —21 and against other polities in subsequent years— helps to illuminate the important ways in which the nominal subordina- tion of native forces to Spanish leadership was tempered by the utter dependence of Spaniards on the native warriors who consistently out- numbered them.

The cal- culation of numbers is admittedly an imprecise science, as total numbers are seldom given, and Spanish accounts often omit mention of native allies. Thus Cempoala gave forty cap- tains, while Xalacingo gave twenty. Later, during the siege of Tenochtitlan, the number of Spaniards had grown to some five hundred men, while at least twenty-four thousand indigenous allies took part.

These numbers could have been higher still; there are ref- erences to as many as forty thousand indigenous soldiers taking part in a campaign to Iztapalapa. But it was still com- mon for Spaniards embarking on campaigns throughout Mesoamerica to be accompanied by thousands of Nahua from central Mexico and other native warriors.

As the next section briefly discusses and subsequent chap- ters in this volume demonstrate in detail , this was true for decades— through the founding of a Spanish colony in Yucatan in the early s. All Spaniards participating in the process of exploration, discovery, conquest, and colonization in the Americas were required to submit reports to royal officials—addressed directly to the king—detailing what they had found and done.

The rewarding of titles of office and other benefits of conquest was contingent upon the submission of these reports, but they were also the principal means whereby any participant in any Spanish conquest might acquire or have restored official reward, privilege, or benefit. Thus while most probanzas were submitted by Spaniards and requested the granting of pensions, encomiendas, and offices of colonial rule, black conquistadors also petitioned for such rewards as royal pensions, tribute exemption, and the right to a house-plot in the traza, or central zone, of a colonial city.

In addition to styling themselves as conquistadors, these native petitioners often cited the num- bers of people that were involved in conquest campaigns. A document from Xochimilco, for example, claims that twelve thousand Xochimilca took part in the siege of Tenochtitlan and that another twenty- five hundred accompanied Pedro de Alvarado to Guatemala and Honduras.

Finally, Jorge de Alvarado brought some five to six thou- sand native auxiliaries to Guatemala in On one expedition to San Salvador, for example, a campaign lasting about one hundred days, indigenous soldiers left, but only came back. Other testimonies of the campaigns to southern Mesoamerica are vague as to the number of people that died, but all agree that many did.

On some expeditions, survivors settled as colonists; for example, in a let- ter to the king the authorities of Xochimilco claim that more than 1, war- riors left on campaigns to Panuco, Guatemala, Honduras, and Jalisco, but not a single one of these men came back. In Don Joachin de San Francisco, cacique of Tepexi de la Seda in present-day Puebla, demanded to be exempted from paying tribute due to the merits and services of his grand- father, Don Gonzalo Matzatzin Moctezuma. This would hardly be the only colonial Mesoamerican source to exaggerate or invent native roles in the conquest.

The pictorial Lienzo de Tlaxcala shows the same sequence of events as described by Don Joachin and his witnesses: Of course, many gifts were reported and much was remitted to Spain, but enough was held back in order to make the enterprise more profitable. Furthermore, testimonies by the witnesses, many of whom were from the conquered towns, lend considerable credibility to the Tepexi document.

In addition, on July 8, , Don Joachin received the merced grant that exempted him from paying tribute. This may explain the manner in which these conquests took place. Such soldiers did not participate in the initial Pizarro- Almagro invasion of Peru, as that was launched from Panama with native men and women brought from no further north than Nicaragua. Addressed to the king in , the petition complained that the city had received many griev- ances from the officers gente de guerra that were sent to the Philippines and Havana or that were used for the defense of New Spain.

A century after the Spanish- Mexica war, it had long become an accepted fact of life that Mesoamerican soldiers fought near and far in the service of His Majesty. It has recently become increasingly clear to historians that black and free colored sol- diers were a ubiquitous presence on Spanish campaigns of conquest and networks of colonial defense; what should not be forgotten is the fact that native Mesoamericans also played significant roles that were almost as wide-ranging, both geographically and chronologically.

For this reason, the Castilian men went on with trepidation in their hearts, but as they killed five or six of the [Cehach] soldiers upon arriving in Cehach, it was Cehach men who cleared the way through to Tayasal [Ta Ytza]. However, these changes, which were part of what historians have dubbed the Military Revolution, were of little relevance to sixteenth-century Spanish conquests in the Americas although they contributed to subsequent mythology about the conquest.

Spanish invaders in Mesoamerica were not soldiers in a for- mally structured army but armed members of companies of exploration, conquest, and—if successful—settlement. Meanwhile, would-be Spanish settlers were dependent on native networks of supply and support.

Warriors were thus not the only natives who contributed to allied forces in Mesoamerica; there were also porters, cooks, guides, spies, and interpreters, who often played roles as crucial to Spanish survival as those played by armed native allies. Large numbers of porters or tameme, as Nahuatl speakers called them were of the utmost importance for the success of any military undertak- ing in Mesoamerica. The sources on campaigns throughout Mesoamerica give many references to the tameme given to conquistadors; even a low-ranking Spanish con- queror who could not afford a horse had two indigenous porters.

Indeed, one of the main complaints of the conquistadores amigos in the second half of the sixteenth century was precisely that their communities had provided large numbers of tameme carrying supplies, arms, and food for the Spaniards, without adequate recognition or reward. This same complaint is depicted in the painted lienzos from Analco and Quauhquechollan. On various occasions indigenous conquistadors would have had to carry wounded Spaniards from the battlefield to safe havens, and, at times, when tameme were relatively few in number, warriors would have carried the sick and wounded during the march.

From the very onset of the Spanish invasion of Mesoamerica, every time Spaniards stepped foot on shore they needed to gather or acquire food. The problem during this early stage of the inva- sion was that many of the villages they encountered along the coast were either abandoned or openly hostile. References to this fundamental service are also common in other documents that concern Spanish-indigenous relations.

This situation was worsened by the tactics of the opposing side, who would hide food and other resources before hiding them- selves in the mountains, leaving behind empty villages and barren lands. En route to Tenochtitlan native guides warned the invaders on various occasions that there were large armies awaiting them on the road ahead.

Guiding and clearing roads was certainly not a job without its risks, for any Mesoamerican on the allied side who was taken prisoner was likely to be ritually executed or sacrificed, as indigenous conquistadors make clear in their testimonies. In order to get from Acalan-Tixchel to the next large Maya kingdom, that of the Itza, the expedition had to cross rivers and forests, as well as the smaller Cehach Maya kingdom.

But once some Cehach Maya had been killed, the allied expedition was able to coerce the Cehach to then clear the way to the Itza capital see the quote at the opening of this section ; the Cehach motive for speeding the expedition through their ter- ritory is obvious. As soon as the Spaniards set foot on shore, reports were sent to the Mexica ruler. This well-established system was soon appropriated by the Spaniards as a means of communicating both with enemy groups and among the conquistadors and allies themselves.

This flow of information was crucial during the conquest period. Conquistadors often mention messages being continuously sent, although they seldom give much indication of exactly how this system worked. From one Spaniard, Gonzalo de Caravajal, we know that the system of native messengers covered much of Mesoamerica; he mentions, for example, that every month messengers came from Mexico City to the province of Yucatan. Malinche has become legendary in a way that reveals more about postconquest especially postcolonial Mexican history than it does about the role of interpreters in the conquest.

They also waged campaigns of intimida- tion against cities they did not attack directly. Emmissaries went to such cities to ask that they become subjects of the Aztec king—usu- ally on reasonably favorable terms. Both the proximity of a large, trained, and obviously successful army and the object lessons burn- ing around them led many cities to capitulate peacefully. More recently, historians have emphasized patterns of conquest rooted in the Castilian experience in Spain, the Canaries, and the Caribbean in the decades, even centuries, before the invasion of Mexico.

None of these procedures was, according to this argument, rooted specifically in pre- conquest indigenous procedures or patterns of conquest. Specific strate- gies included the forging of multicity alliances, the pursuit of sequential conquests, the heavy use of trade routes, and the granting of lordships and lands as a way of coercing or motivating native communities into joining alliances. This interpretation is not without problems. One could argue that these strategies were used equally in western European traditions of warfare and alliance building.

Yet the question is less, What was customary in Europe at the time? Based on their experience and traditions the Spaniards hoped to imple- ment many things as soon as they reached Mesoamerican soil, but they were not likely to succeed if the local populations were not willing to coop- erate—at least in the initial conquest years when the Spaniards did not have the same means of colonial coercion developed later. Alliances Colonial coercion was rooted in a system of administration and rule that depended upon the collaboration of local elites.

A popular theme since the sixteenth century has been the supposed reputation of the Spaniards as invincible warriors, even gods—but conquest-era evidence suggests that this was a postconquest myth, that tales of apotheosized invaders were apocryphal. The Triple Alliance had succeeded another confederation between Azcapotzalco, Culhuacan, and Coatlinchan, which in turn was preceded by the alliance of Culhuacan, Tula, and Otumba. This kind of appeal across polit- ical boundaries could also be used against Spanish interests, of course, and thus helps to explain hindrances to Spanish expansion in regions such as Yucatan as much as it helps explain success in other regions.

One important dimension to alliance building in Mesoamerica both before and during the Spanish invasion was the exchange of women for marriage. The longer a relationship or alliance between two houses lasted, the more intermar- riages would take place and, therefore, the stronger and closer the relation- ship would become. This pattern of intermarriage continued through the early colonial period. As illustrated by the Mixteca codices, this political system of alliance building was not just typical for central Mexico.

Throughout the postclassic period A. Between the mid-fourteenth century and many city-states from the Valley of Oaxaca and the Mixteca Alta constituted a confederacy, which was used to invade the Isthmus of Tehuantepec to control the trade route to Xoconosco and Coatzacualco. During the preceding months, the Spaniards had frequently encountered deserted towns and villages or had suffered attacks from indigenous war- riors that had injured many Spaniards and their horses. But Tlaxcala was potentially an ally against the powerful Triple Alliance.

In the passage quoted earlier, Hassig describes the sequential strategy of Mexica expansion; like the Spaniards after that, the Mexica used each newly con- quered location—including its resources and personnel—as a springboard for the next. One of the most obvious examples is, of course, that of Tlaxcala. Whereas the Tlaxcalteca are often depicted as voluntarily aligning themselves with the Spaniards, this was initially not the case. Furthermore, whereas the Fat Cacique may have seen opportunities in an alliance with the Spaniards after they had been victo- rious in a couple of battles on the Gulf coast, the Tlaxcalteca were not espe- cially impressed by the surrender of these relatively small polities.

After all, along with Tenochtitlan and Texcoco, Tlaxcala was one of the largest and most powerful political entities in central Mexico. However, things had changed considerably after the three battles. Unable to beat the Spaniards, Tlaxcala was forced to consider an alliance with them. This failure to defeat the Spaniards was turned into a potential positive; it meant that the Spaniards might be able to help Tlaxcala beat the Mexica, thereby opening the door to Tlaxcalteca imperial expansion an expansion, it turned out, that would take place with Tlaxcalteca warriors but with somewhat different imperial ramifications.

And if the alliance proved to be unsuc- cessful or unworkable, Tlaxcala might still continue to oppose the Triple Alliance as before. Although some Tlaxcalteca factions were ready to continue fighting against the Spaniards and arguably, eventually they would have defeated them and forced the survivors back to the coast , an alliance was forged, and it became the turning point in the —21 war. The Tlaxcalteca who had initially fought against the Spanish invaders now became part of a large army of Spanish-indigenous allies. As with the Cempoala before them, the Tlaxcalteca warriors were incorporated into this army but would continue to be semiautonomous sections.

Each section had its own cap- tain, its own banner, and its own internal organization and as such rep- resented its own community or barrio. As discussed earlier and in subsequent chapters in this volume , this pattern was repeated across Mesoamerica in the ensuing decades: The tlatoani of Tepexi, Don Gonzalo Matzatzin Moctezuma, decided not to fight the Spaniards and their allies but rather strike the deal discussed earlier. The noblemen of the subject towns, who had been gathered in Tepexi when this decision was made, took part in the subsequent campaign to southern Puebla and the Mixteca.

The twist in the tale, however, is that they took part in the allegedly violent conquests of their own towns. In fact, the majority of the towns Matzatzin conquered were already paying tribute and personal service to him. Why, then, did he conquer them again?

Spanish and Nahuatl Views on Smallpox and Demographic Catastrophe in the Conquest of Mexico:

Was he tricking the Mexica? Or was he tricking the Spaniards? Although the Tepexi source cannot answer these questions definitively, we suggest that Matzatzin or his father, Xochiztin or Tozancoztli took part in the conquest of the Mixteca under Ahuizotl or Moctezuma Xocoyotl. The bulk of the tribute, of course, would have gone to the Triple Alliance.

Then, in , with the arrival of the Spaniards, Matzatzin saw the opportunity to improve this settlement by reconquering, or perhaps conquering, the towns that were subject to the Triple Alliance, allowing him to receive all their tribute, rather than just a part of it. The trick, therefore, was played against both the Mexica specifically his grandfather, Moctezuma and the Spaniards—an impres- sive manipulation of the complex power politics of early-sixteenth- century Mesoamerica. Furthermore, we should not forget the ambivalent nature of alliances and the possibilities for historiographical manipulation.

After a peaceful agreement is reached, both sides can claim victory because nobody is clearly conquered. We see this in the Tlaxcalteca-Spanish alliance, but it clearly occurred in preconquest times too. According to a number of Mexica sources, Tehuantepec was conquered by Ahuitzotl, but sources are divided on whether Tehuantepec paid tribute or not.

A subsequent marriage between Cocijoeza, the Zapoteca ruler of Tehuantepec, and a daughter of Moctezuma Xocoyotl sealed the peace between these two kingdoms. Oaxacan sources, however, emphasize that Cocijoeza and Moctezuma fought a long exhaus- tive battle, which the latter ended with a peace proposal that was sealed by this marriage.

Obviously, these Oaxacan sources deny that the Zapoteca were obliged to pay tribute to Tenochtitlan. In short, an agreement between two lords was interpreted in two different ways by their respective historians, each giving the benefit of the doubt to their own group. These other patterns or mechanisms of conquest were related to that of sequential conquests and likewise persisted during the sixteenth century.

Trade Routes When the Spaniards arrived in Mesoamerica, this culture area consisted of a multitude of city-states interconnected through a complex web of social, political, and economic relationships. In the late postclassic period — this expressed itself in what is known as the Mixteca-Puebla style or the postclassic international style.

According to Michael E. Smith and Frances Berdan, these city-states can be divided into different, partly overlapping, zones: Considering that during their military campaigns the Spaniards were to a large extent led by local lords and guides, we can presume that they followed existing routes. Logically, the routes of conquest would conse- quently follow the prehispanic trade routes.

A simple comparison of the zones proposed by Smith and Berdan with the routes of the early con- quest expeditions reveals that this was indeed what happened, as illus- trated by map 2. In the Yucatan peninsula, there were three Montejo campaigns—those led by Francisco de Montejo the elder in — 29 and —35 and that led by his son in — Nor does it include every trade route or related zone or the route of every expedition.

The same is true for Zacatula, which was a known tributary city-state of the Triple Alliance, but no information exists about how this tribute got to central Mexico. Of course, there were alternative paths at several points along the way. For example, after Cholula one could go to Tecamachalco, Tehuacan, Teotitlan, and Cuicatlan to hook up again in Huajolotitlan. Or if one wanted to avoid Cholula the route would pass through Amecameca and Cuautla before arriving in Izucar.

Furthermore, at several points one could take routes to other places.

Teotitlan was an important crossroads toward Tuxtepec via Huauhtla in the Mazatec mountains. In Tlacolula there was a path north through the Sierra Zapoteca connecting again with Tuxtepec, or one could go a bit further to Mitla and turn north to Coatzacualco. Alternatively, one could go to Coatzacualco via Tehuantepec. Or one could continue along the coast via Champoton to the city-states of northern Yucatan like Mayapan or Chikinchel. Furthermore, in the Valley of Oaxaca itself there is hardly any alternative between Huajolotitlan and Mitla.

The towns of the first part are some- what confusing, as there does not seem to be a clear pattern in their dis- tribution: However, Tlachinola was the headtown of a gold-produc- ing province, while Igualtepec, Acatlan, and Chinantla were salt-producing centers. At no time did the army of Matzatzin reach that far south, and it is therefore at this time not clear how to explain these claims. The identification of the town as Huajolotitlan in the state of Puebla is strengthened if we consider the subsequent conquests of Chila, Teotitlan, Te[qui]cistepec, Tecomauacan, Acatepec, Quiotepec, Zapotitlan, Cuicatlan, Tehuacan, Coixtlahuaca, Chiapulco, Texupan, Coxcatlan, Tamazulapa, and Teposcolula.

It is immediately clear from the layout of these towns see map 3 that Matzatzin was taking over the two main trade routes between the Valley of Mexico and southern Mesoamerica. Furthermore, he secured the cross- roads to Tuxtepec and the Mixteca coast when he took Teotitlan and Teposcolula. Whereas at first his conquests appear to be an opportunistic attempt to gain more power, this analysis of the geography of his expedi- tion shows that Matzatzin was orchestrating a calculated military campaign to control one of the economic lifelines of Mesoamerica and an important resource-extraction zone.

The conquests show the existence and importance of trade routes connecting central Mexico to the Gulf coast, from where Yucatan could be reached, or to the Oaxaca region, which leads to Xoconosco and Guatemala. In taking over southern Puebla and the Mixteca, Matzatzin not only enriched and empowered himself but also paved the way for later Spanish intrusions into the Valley of Oaxaca, the Tututepec province, and southern Mesoamerica. Some of these paths, such as the route through the Chontal Maya capital of Itzamkanac and into the Itza Maya kingdom may have been many centuries old, possibly those also used by expeditions from classic period Teotihuacan to Tikal located within sixteenth-century Itza borders, just north of the capital, Tah Itza or Tayasal.

What motivated indigenous troops to participate in the Spanish undertaking? The most common explanation has been the wish to free themselves from the Mexica military and tributary control, but this can explain only part of the story. As detailed earlier, indigenous participation did not stop after the destruction of Tenochtitlan but continued for many decades; as the conquest continuously developed and changed, the motives for native participation must have developed and changed with it.

Of course, right from the start the Fat Cacique complained about the tribute and service he had to give to Moctezuma and the people he had to hand over for sacrifice to the Mexica gods. The motives for participation by native groups often seem to have been opportunistic and short-term. What, therefore, did local rulers imagine would happen in the long run? This is a difficult question to answer since we lack indigenous sources from the s that could illuminate such expectations.

Of course, these letters might be viewed as inflated reports by indigenous groups who knew how to manipulate the Spanish legal system. But if we can show a continuity of conquest practices from preconquest to early colonial decades and show that the claims these indigenous conquistadors made were actually based on this practice, then we must accept that such letters were more than mere manipulations and exaggerations. A typical aspect of conquest practice prior to the Spanish invasion was the division of land by a warlord, a religious leader, or a supreme ruler among his captains.

These captains were probably leaders of cohesive groups based on some kind of relationship consanguinity, ethnicity, geog- raphy, etc. A clear example of this pattern is described by the central Mexican chronicler Ixtlilxochitl in relation to the early Nahua conquests by Xolotl. Having sent his four captains in the four cardinal directions to seize the territory, Xolotl then divided it among his lords and assigned peo- ple to serve them.

We know that around A. New towns were established, and the warlords received the Title of Pichana, or Xoana—comparable to the central Mexican Title of Teuctli. From that moment on, these Xoanas periodically had to pledge loyalty to their lord, who in return gave them recognition. The lienzos of Guevea, Santo Domingo Petapa, and Huilotepec contain representations of cere- monies in which the authorities of these villages received the Titles of Xoana, based on the simple fact that their ancestors had been captains in the conquest of the region, following which events the supreme lord and leader of the campaign had divided the land among these captains.

In other words, the ritual is a reenactment of conquest. Once the Tolteca-Chichimeca won the war, they gave these mercenaries the title of teuhctli, as well as land and people to work it. In various indigenous groups living in Guatemala but originally from central Mexico, Puebla, and Oaxaca claimed from the Spanish Crown the right to land and tribute based on the partic- ipation of their ancestors in the conquest of the region. Of course, the Spaniards also claimed similar rights and privileges from the Crown as a reward for their part in the conquest, and as such they also followed an old tradition which goes back into the Middle Ages.

However, the existence of this Spanish tradition does not explain indigenous Mesoamerican participation in the conquest. It is evident that indigenous troops took part in the Spanish-allied conquest because they took for granted that they would receive what until then was usually granted after such campaigns. But, when the Spaniards did not respond in the same way as the preconquest lords used to do, indigenous nobles began submitting judicial claims.

These petitions reveal a growing desperation as the early colonial period wore on. Eventually, these kinds of claims by indigenous nobles and their descendants faded away as they became aware that the system no longer worked in the same way. Preconquest society had changed into colonial society. Whereas our view of this period was and still is based on sources produced within the European historio- graphical tradition, these recently emerged sources make it clear that an indigenous historiographical tradition existed too albeit one recorded and preserved within the formats of the colonial system.

Moreover, the conquest is described as a continuation of precolonial processes of conquest and domination. In order to reach a balanced view on the conquest period it will be nec- essary to reconstruct and study the indigenous historiographical tradition thoroughly and as a whole. That is, we need to consider this corpus of documents as independent from those of the European tradition before we can begin an analysis and comparison of the two traditions. We have offered a preliminary discussion of some of the sources through the creation of four categories of analysis.

Although Spanish captains were often in primary leadership positions, this was not always the case, as demonstrated by the conquests of Don Gonzalo Matzatzin Moctezuma of Tepexi de la Seda. The third cat- egory detailed nonmilitary participation in the conquest by natives in ways that are less obvious but often just as decisive. In other words, noncom- batant indigenous participation—from spies to interpreters and from porters to cooks—was as important as combatant participation.

More sur- prising, however, was the importance of the continuation of precolonial patterns and mechanisms during the conquest period. This fourth analyt- ical category argued that there was a correspondence between prehispanic trade routes and conquest routes and that motivations for conquest par- ticipation and the maintenance of multicity alliances were both continua- tions of precolonial practices and patterns. All this suggests that there is another story to be told, one that we will eventually be able to tell in considerable detail.

We know the half that was written by the Spanish conquistadors and their compatriots, but there is still another half that needs to be unlocked—the other side of the con- quest of Mesoamerica. The unsigned paintings, formerly known as the Strickland series, were acquired by the Jay I. They are now housed at the Library of Congress in Washington, D. The series is oil on canvas, and the seventh painting is 48 x 78 inches. For examples, see Restall, Seven Myths, 3.

Restall, Seven Myths, — Alvarado, Account of the Conquest, See Hassig, Aztec Warfare, Also see Restall, Seven Myths, 54— On the campaign of Jorge de Alvarado, see Asselbergs, chapter 2, and Herrera, chapter 4, this volume; also see Asselbergs, Conquered Conquistadors. AGI Justicia, , 1, f. Some of these conquistadors not coming back to their original communities may also be due to settlement in the conquered regions rather than death in battle.

We thank the referent for this suggestion. Los popolocas de Tepexi. See Berdan et al. See Asselbergs, chapter 2, and Yannakakis, chapter 7, this volume. AGI Justicia , 1, ff. AGI Guatemala 52, ff. Vasquez , book 2, chap. Restall, Seven Myths, AGI Justicia , 1, f. Restall, Seven Myths, 18— Presented variously by Lockhart; see, e. With respect to central Mexico, this miscon- ception or myth was based largely on the use of the Nahuatl term teotl as a refer- ence to the Spanish invaders. Nahua were probably referring to the latter of these semanti- cally related concepts when they called the Spaniards teules.

The apparently con- tradictory nature of these concepts is rooted in the Mesoamerican belief system and the characteristic of sacred entities as being loaded with mana power. That these tactics worked is clear from some descriptions in indigenous sources expressing an awe and fearful respect for certain Spaniards; see, e. On the contrary, Spaniards may have been seen as the ixiptlatli of the teteuh; i. Hassig, Aztec Warfare, Chimalpain Quauhtlehuanitzin, Memorial Breve, chaps.

See Herrera, chapter 4, this volume, for further discussion of this mecha- nism during the conquest. This meant the Spaniards ran out of food and water. At a village on the Rio Grijalva they received some food under threat of war. The next day a bat- tle took place and they deserted their village, only to be followed by more days of battle. See also Hassig, Aztec Warfare, n48; Berdan et al. The whole document shows this pattern but see particu- larly ff.

See Oudijk, Historiography, chap. But even conquests are ambivalent as different kinds occur: Chinantla is a bit confusing, as it is normally associated with the Chinantec region in northern Oaxaca. However, within this context it seems to be referring to the name of the town right next to the important town of Piaztla. A similar thing can be said of Tlachinola, which is or became a barrio of Tlapa and is sometimes even used an alternative name for Tlapa. Ibid, ; Carrasco, Tenochca Empire, — We have not been able to identify the town of Ecatepec.

See Gruzinski, Conquest of Mexico, for an analysis of the adaptations and changes of the indigenous cosmovision and psyche as a consequence of the arrival of the Spaniards and the establishment of colonial society. AGI Justicia , f. AGI Mexico 94, exp. This is a similar methodological challenge to that faced by historical archae- ology; in the words of Michael E. When the two records are compared, one should not confuse any resulting composite models with the independent primary data sets. The creation of colonial pictorials continued a prehispanic historical tradition in which information and claims were recorded and communicated through narrative pictography.

The Nahua script, as part of this tradition, made use of a repertoire of images pictographs, logograms, and ideograms to log historical events, genealogies of ruling lineages, tribute lists, geographical descriptions, and religious information. Probably the most famous is the Lienzo de Tlaxcala from Tlaxcala, Mexico, which describes the Spanish-Tlaxcalteca alliance and presents impressive lists of Spanish conquests in which Tlaxcalteca conquistadors participated.

Although the original Lienzo de Tlaxcala is lost, this document is known through surviving descriptions and various copies. This document relates to the role of Tlaxcalteca conquis- tadors in the area of Villa Alta, where they founded a satellite colony: This final document describes the alliance of the Spaniards with the Quauhquecholteca and the role of Quauh- quecholteca conquistadors in the period of the Spanish conquest.

There is little doubt that there were once other lienzos made by indige- nous conquistadors who fought under the Spanish banner. This manuscript refers to a group of central Mexican conquistadors who had arrived with the Spanish and who had settled in San Miguel Totonicapan. The Lienzo de Tlaxcala, the Lienzo de Quauhquechollan, and the Lienzo de Analco were all painted in the decades following the conquest. Also, all three documents are composed in Nahua pictorial writing style, the writing tradition of the homelands of the conquistadors who painted them: Tlaxcala and Quauhquechollan, both Nahua communities located in cen- tral Mexico.

In this chapter I will provide brief descriptions of each of these three early conquest accounts. I will discuss them in relation to one another with special attention to their formats, rhetoric, and the way in which the indigenous conquistadors presented their accounts. According to Mazihcatzin, the document was a mapa historiographo painted on the request of viceroy Don Luis de Velasco and under the supervision of the Tlaxcalteca cabildo.

Mazihcatzin reported three originals: Only the last was seen and described by Mazihcatzin.

Clean Aztecs, Dirty Spaniards

When Tlaxcala requested its return in , it could not be found. This was probably the same Lienzo de Tlaxcala. Fortunately, the lost Lienzo de Tlaxcala was copied repeatedly.

In their census, John B. Although the surviving copies vary in form and con- tent, most have similar outlines: English translations are available in three editions. The first, published in by Dibble and Anderson, is often cited in extenso. Brooks uses the second translation, published in I favor a third by Lockhart , the first to offer English translations of both the original Nahuatl probably completed in and the accompanying Spanish gloss written before Twenty-ninth chapter, where it is said how, at the time the Spaniards left Mexico, there came an illness of pustules of which many local people died; it was called 'the great rash' smallpox.

Evidence Review

Before the Spaniards appeared to us [again], first an epidemic broke out, a sickness of pustules. It began in Tepeilhuitl ['which is at the end of September,' according to the accompanying Spanish gloss]. Large bumps spread on people, some were entirely covered. They spread everywhere, on the face, the head, the chest, etc. The disease brought great desolation; a great many died of it. They could no longer walk about, but lay in their dwellings and sleeping places, no longer able to move or stir.

They were unable to change position, to stretch out on their sides or face down, or raise their heads. And when they made a motion, they called out loudly. The pustules that covered people caused great desolation; very many people died of them, and many just starved to death; starvation reigned, and no one took care of others any longer. On some people, the pustules appeared only far apart, and they did not suffer greatly, nor did many of them die of it. But many people's faces were spoiled by it, their faces and noses were made rough.

Some lost an eye or were blinded.

The disease of the pustules lasted a full sixty days; after sixty days it abated and ended. When people were convalescing and reviving, the pustules disease began to move in the direction of Chalco. And many were disabled or paralyzed by it, but they were not disabled forever.

It broke out in Teotl eco, and it abated in Panquetzaliztli. The Mexica warriors were greatly weakened by it. Brooks interprets the translation of this passage as evidence that "it is reasonable to credit their collective memory with knowledge that not many died" even though the text itself states unequivocally that the pustules brought "great desolation," that "very many died" and "many just starved to death.

When this manuscript was written which is now over thirty years ago [i. Those who helped me write it were prominent elders, well versed in all matters, relating not only to idolatry but also to government and its offices, who were present in the war when this city was conquered. Indeed, Chapter 29, unlike the Spanish chronicles, reads like a pictorial history of the Nahuas' suffering, rendered in their own words. Lockhart characterizes the entire book as "authentic oral tradition with an emphasis on visuality" and "an authentic expression of indigenous people.

Note the shift from visual description to interpretive synthesis:. During this epidemic, the Spaniards, rested and recovered, were already in Tlaxcala. Having taken courage and energy because of reinforcements who had come to them and because of the ravages of the [Mexican] people that the pestilence was causing, firmly believing that God was on their side, being again allied with the Tlaxcalans, and attending to all the necessary preparations to return against the Mexicans, they began to construct the brigantines Historians and chroniclers began to compare the severity of the various epidemics toward the middle of the sixteenth-century.

Several years after his manuscript was shipped to Spain and while its author was in Guatemala , the great devastation of broke out so we cannot know how his numerology would have taken this into account. He addressed the question directly and forcefully, leaving no doubt that the smallpox attack of was exceedingly lethal " murio casi infinita gente " --more deadly even than the war--but the deadliest was the matlazahuatl epidemic of , "a very great and universal pestilence where, in all of New Spain, the greater part of the people who lived therein died.

While he wrote in November , the number of deaths mounted daily. He feared that if the contagion continued for another three or four months there would be no natives left, that the land would revert to wild beasts and wilderness. He reasoned that Spaniards were too few to settle the land, and the Indians were becoming extinct. Pomar, the historian of the city of Texcoco, also singled out three great epidemics of the century, , , and , but characterized that of as the worst. Many smaller subject villages had disappeared entirely. I say that the first [] ought to be the greatest because there were more people, and the second [] was also very great because the land was very full [of people], and this last one [] was not as great as the first two because although many people died many escaped with the remedies that the Spaniards and the religious people provided Evidence from a wide variety of sixteenth-century Spanish and Nahuatl sources point to a single conclusion: Nonetheless, if we accept the intelligence offered by one of the most celebrated native chroniclers of the colonial era, the smallpox epidemic of was the greatest demographic catastrophe of the century for the Nahuatl-speaking people of Central Mexico.

Raging disagreement over the size of the pre-contact native population obscures the widespread consensus that the sixteenth-century was a demographic catastrophe for the native peoples of Central Mexico and that disease, exploitation and ecological disruption were the principal agents. All population figures for the early modern era are riddled with errors of every conceivable kind.

Yet, for some historians, narrative is easily misread, generalization difficult to elicit, or, perhaps number simply has its own fascination. Table 3 offers a summary of population figures at two points in the sixteenth-century, and , for all the most widely-cited, authoritative efforts. The last column of the table reports the percentage of population decline over the century implied by each set of figures.

Where authors report ranges rather than a single number, these are included in the table. Figure 1 depicts the percentage of population decline over the century implied by the figures of these authorities. Figures for the total population of "Mexico" at contact range from 4. This enormous span reflects the paucity of data as well as fundamental disagreement over how the few data that are available should be interpreted.

If a number for the native population in is desired, a lengthy chain of supposition and extrapolation is required. Even so, some figures are more nearly guesses than others. Rosenblat, the Argentine linguist he always disclaimed the sobriquet "historical demographer," which others seek to bestow , characterizes his work as nothing more than a "vague approximation" "without fanaticism" based on "likelihood" or a "reasonable probability," but "the only feasible" nonetheless.

Over three decades of publishing on this subject , Rosenblat scarcely revised a figure--nor was his widely cited work subjected to the slightest scholarly scrutiny. For , Rosenblat refers the reader to an appendix of sources, but none are listed for Mexico before In its place, he criticizes the figures of Mexicanists such as Mendizabal and Kubler.

Rosenblat reasons that his pattern of change is basically in agreement with that of Kubler who writes of "appalling mortality in the sixteenth-century" , but this is not the case. His position would be unproblematic if he stood on solid ground. His sympathy for Kubler's figures, which point to a fifty percent drop over the century, does not extend to an acceptance of the pattern of decline sketched by Kubler's work. Rosenblat criticizes the catastrophe school of contact demography for failing to take into account the recovery potential of the native population.

His objection went unmet until recently, when Thomas Whitmore published a series of wide-ranging, sophisticated epidemiological simulations. Some will dismiss this work as historical fiction of a quantitative sort, but Whitmore's simulations offer a partial answer to Rosenblat's question about the role of demographic recovery between epidemics.

From Whitmore's simulations, based on morbidity and mortality rates obtained from scrutinizing the world-wide historical record, we learn that the likely levels of epidemic mortality probably overwhelmed the homeostatic potential of the indigenous population--even without taking into account deaths due to war or social and environmental disruption. The simulations also reveal what Rosenblat fails to appreciate--the devastation of epidemic disease. If in fact I did derive moderate and even low figures for the population, it was not because I had intended to do so. The data I had about the Conquest allowed no other choice, unless one were to assume vast and horrible killing, which requires a macabre imagination and which I found unacceptable given the known extermination techniques of the sixteenth-century.

My study of Rosenblat's sources for Mexico and the considerable body of other texts reviewed in this paper leads me to reject his vague approximations on precontact populations, and, more importantly, reject the pattern of demographic decline which his figures imply. Attentive readers of the Spanish and Nahuatl narratives witness a demographic catastrophe, indeed a succession of catastrophes, of unsustainable magnitudes. If numbers are required to comprehend this, they must agree with the narratives. At the opposite pole stand Cook and Borah's figures, but they are not entirely alone.

Clavijero, writing at the end of the eighteenth-century, also suggested 30 million as a possible figure, but noted at the same time that any number is subject to a wide margin of error. Cook and Borah's numbers are an order of magnitude greater than most that preceded them and have provoked the greatest controversy and disbelief. The Berkeley empiricists sought to move the debate from the arena of belief to evidence, by using the documentation on tribute paid by subject towns.

The long chain of assumptions and conversion factors necessary to transform tax payments into tax payers convince many students of the subject that the exercise is untrustworthy. Yet, their writings are less dogmatic than critics would have us think. Borah noted many years ago: For those [estimates of population] of the first century, it seems likely that the most we can hope for is estimates of the order of magnitude.

Their critics--Rosenblat, Sanders, Zambardino and others--might reply that even this range is a wild exaggeration.

Did Emperor Moctezuma II’s head injury and subsequent death hasten the fall of the Aztec nation?

What I find remarkable in Figure 1 is the correspondence among scenarios of demographic disaster, theirs and their critics--with the exception of Rosenblat. For smaller areas, population estimates require less extrapolation, and the range of uncertainty contracts accordingly. All the researchers on this subject who rely on primary sources--Mendizabal, Kubler, Rosenblat, Gerhard, Gibson, Cook and Borah and Sanders--encourage research at the local level.

Thus, Sanders' estimate for the "Central Mexican symbiotic region" is based on a sampling of archaeological excavations and tribute lists sprinkled over an area of "only" a thousand square miles. Similarly, Gibson and Kubler compile figures for a select group of settlements with data at two or three points over the sixteenth-century. Consensus is emerging on the scale, causes, and consequences of the demographic disaster which struck sixteenth-century Mexico.

There is agreement that a demographic catastrophe occurred and that epidemic disease was a dominant factor in initiating a die-off, beginning, in Mexico, with smallpox in But the role of disease cannot be understood without taking into account massive harsh treatment forced migration, enslavement, abusive labor demands and exhorbitant tribute payments and ecological devastation accompanying Spanish colonization. A fair-minded cross-examination of the broad range of primary sources for the epidemic of leaves little doubt that smallpox swept throughout the Central Mexican Basin, causing enormous mortality.

The epidemic ranked with the deadliest disasters that native annals customarily recorded.

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