Synesthesia: A Union of the Senses (Springer Series in Neuropsychology)

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Now, as irrefutable evidence mounts that some healthy brains really do this, we are forced to ask how this squares with some cherished conceptions of neuroscience. These include binding, modularity, functionalism, blinds For decades, scientists who heard about synesthesia hearing colors, tasting words, seeing colored pain just shrugged their shoulders or rolled their eyes. These include binding, modularity, functionalism, blindsight, and consciousness.

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The good news is that when old theoretical structures fall, new light may flood in. Far from a mere curiosity, synesthesia illuminates a wide swath of mental life. In this classic text, Richard Cytowic quickly disposes of earlier criticisms that the phenomenon cannot be "real," demonstrating that it is indeed brain-based. Following a historical introduction, he lays out the phenomenology of synesthesia in detail and gives criteria for clinical diagnosis and an objective "test of genuineness. In a discussion of brain development and neural plasticity, he addresses the possible ubiquity of neonatal synesthesia, the construction of metaphor, and whether everyone is unconsciously synesthetic.

The second edition has been extensively revised, reflecting the recent flood of interest in synesthesia and new knowledge of human brain function and development.

More than two-thirds of the material is new. Paperback , pages. Published September 17th by Springer first published March 13th To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up.

To ask other readers questions about Synesthesia , please sign up. See 1 question about Synesthesia…. Gray admits, however, that whether or not synesthesia has such a utility is an open empirical question. Visual perception seems to, at the very least, provide us with information about colored shapes existing in various spatial locations.

CYTOWIC, Richard E(dmund) 1952-

An account of the visual perception of objects should therefore include some account of the nature of color. Some theorists working on issues pertaining to the nature of color and color experience draw on evidence from synesthesia. Theories about the nature of color fall broadly into two categories. On the one hand, color objectivism is the view that colors are mind-independent properties residing out in the world, for example, in objects, surfaces or the ambient light.

Typically, objectivists identify color with a physical property. The view that color is a mind-independent physical property of the perceived world is motivated both by commonsense considerations and the phenomenology of color experience. It is part of our commonsense or folk understanding of color, as reflected in ordinary language, that color is a property of objects.

Color objectivism vindicates both the commonsense view of color and the phenomenology of color experience.

Synesthesia: A Union of the Senses

But some take it to be an unfortunate implication of the theory that colors are physical properties of objects, since it seems to entail that each color will be identical to a very long disjunctive chain of physical properties. Multiple external physical conditions can all cause the same color experience both within and across individuals. This means that popular versions of objectivism cannot identify a single unifying property behind all instances of a single color.

Subjectivist views, on the other hand, take colors to be mind-dependent properties of the subject or of his or her experience, rather than properties of the distal causal stimulus. Subjectivist theories of color include the sense-data theory, adverbialism and certain varieties of representationalism. The primary motivation for color subjectivism is to accommodate various types of non-veridical color experience where perceivers have the subjective experience of color in the absence of an external distal stimulus to which the color could properly be attributed.

One commonly cited example is the after-image. Some claim that the photisms of synesthetes provide another example of non-veridical non-referring color experiences Fish, ; Lycan, ; Revonsuo, But others argue that the door is open to regarding at least some cases of synesthesia as veridical perceptual experiences rather than hallucinations since photisms are often: Still, synesthesia may pose additional difficulties for objectivism.

Consider the implications for objectivism if color synesthesias were to become the rule rather than the exception. How then would objectivism account for color photisms in cases where they are caused by externally produced sounds? Revonsuo suggests that the view that colors can be identified with the objective disjunctive collections of physical properties that cause color experiences would have to add the changes of air pressure that produce sounds to that disjunctive collection of color properties.

Revonsuo takes this to be an undesirable consequence for a theory of color.

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Enactivism is a theory of perception that takes active engagement with perceptual objects along with other contextual relations to be highly relevant to perception. Typically, enactivists take perception to consist in a direct relation between perceivers and objective properties. Ward uses synesthesia in an argument for enactivism about color, proposing that the enactivist theory of color actually combines elements of both objectivism and subjectivism, and is therefore the only theory of color that can account for various facts about anomalous color experiences like synesthesia.

For instance, Kohler fitted normal perceivers with goggles, each of whose lenses were vertically bisected with yellow tinting on one side and blue on the other Kohler, When perceivers first donned the goggles, they reported anomalous color experiences consistent with the lens colors; the world appeared to be tinted yellow and blue. But after a few weeks of wear, subjects reported that the abnormal tint adapted away. In both cases, the subject is aware of the fact that their anomalous color experiences are not a reliable guide to the actual colors of things around them.

The two cases are not alike, however, in one important respect. This asymmetry calls for explanation and Ward demonstrates that the enactive theory of color provides an elegant explanation for this asymmetry.

As perceivers acclimate to the fact that their color appearances no longer refer to the colors they had previously indicated, their ability to normally perceive color returns. Another philosophical problem having to do with the nature of color concerns whether or not phenomenal color experiences are intentional. If they are, we might wonder what sorts of properties they are capable of representing. A popular view is that color experiences can only represent objects to have specific color or spectral reflectance properties.

This argument for high-level representational contents from synesthesia, it is argued, withstands several objections that can be lodged against other popular arguments such as arguments from phenomenal contrast. The basic idea is that a special category of grapheme-color synesthesia depends on high-level properties. In higher-grapheme-color synesthesia, perceivers mark with a particular color, graphemes that share conceptual significance such as the property of representing a number.

Matey argues that these high-level properties penetrate color experiences, and infect their contents so that the color-experiences of these synesthetes represent the objects they are projected onto as being representative of certain numbers or letters. What the subject says about his or her own phenomenal experience usually carries great weight.

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However, in the case of color-grapheme synesthesia, Macpherson urges caution , p. A striking and odd aspect of color-grapheme synesthesia is that it may seem to involve the simultaneous experience of different colors in exactly the same place at exactly the same time. Consider synesthetes who claim to see both colors simultaneously: What could it be like for someone to see the grapheme 5 printed in black ink, but see it as red as well?

How are we to characterize their experience? A third possibility would be to find an interpretation compatible with ordinary color experience. For example, perhaps the synesthetic colors are analogous to a colored-transparency laid over ink as suggested by Kim et al. However, this analogy is unsatisfying and gives rise to further puzzlement. One might expect that the colors would interfere with each other, for example, they should see a darker red when the 5 is printed in black ink, and a lighter red when in white.

But against these suggestions are other reports that the synesthetic and regular colors match up perfectly Macpherson, , p. This, however, only recycles the problem. In seeing a white lamp reflected in a window facing a blue expanse of water, the colors mix for example, the reflected lamp looks to be a pale blue. Moreover, one does not undergo distinct impressions of the lamp and the region occupied by the waves overlapping with the reflected image though of course one can alter the presentation by either focusing on the lamp or on the waves.

A third explanation draws on the claim mentioned earlier that the extra qualia can depend on top-down processing, appearing only when the shape is recognized as a letter, or as a number as in seeing an ambiguous shape in FA5T versus Toggling might also explain reports that emphasize seeing the red, as opposed to merely? Along these lines, Kim et al. Cytowic and Eagleman , p. Instead of an apple, try visualizing a perfect duplicate of the actual coffee cup in precisely the same location for those who believe they can do this, continue visualizing additional coffee cups until the point becomes obvious.

If Cytowic and Eagleman are to be taken literally this ought to be easy. The visualization of a contrasting color also meets a conceptual obstacle. What does it even mean to visualize a red surface in exactly the same place as a real black surface in the absence of alternating presentations as in binocular rivalry or blending? Ramachandran and Hubbard b, pp.

Whether the more bizarre testimony can be explained away along one or more of the above suggestions, or has deep implications about synesthesia, self-report, and the nature of color experience, demands further investigation by philosophers and scientists.

An encyclopedia of philosophy articles written by professional philosophers.

Ter Hark offers a Wittgensteinian analysis of color-grapheme synesthesia, arguing that it fails to fit the contrast between perception and mental imagery, and so calls for a third category bearing only some of the logical marks of experience. He contends that it is somewhat like a percept in that it depends on looking, has a definite beginning and end, and is affected by shifts in attention.

On the other hand, it is also somewhat like mental imagery in that it is voluntary and non-informative about the external world. Although ter Hark cites Rich et al. The claim that synesthetic percepts seem non-experiential because they fail to represent the world is also contestable. Synesthesia might be important when it comes to questions about the nature of the senses, how they interact, and how many of them there are. The modified property condition is supposed to be necessary for individuating the senses, and states that each sense modality specializes in detecting certain properties , p.

As discussed in the section on representationalism, synesthesia might seem to indicate that properties usually deemed proprietary to one sense can be detected by others after all. Nevertheless, there are speculations about the connection between the two for example, Smith, , p. That not all sensory matches work aesthetically—it seems awkward to speak of a loud smell or a salty color—might be significant in suggesting ties to perceptual synesthesia. Perhaps they have more in common than is usually suspected Marks, ; Day Maurer and Mondloch suggest that the fact that the cross-modal parings in synesthesias tend to be the same as the sensory matches manifest in common metaphors may reveal that non-synesthete adults share cross-modal activations with synesthetes, and synesthesia is a normal feature of early development.

Ramachandran and Hubbard, among others, have been developing a number of hypotheses about the explanatory value of synesthesia towards creativity, the nature of metaphor, and even the origins of language b, a; see also Mulvenna, ; Hunt, Ramachandran and Hubbard b conjecture that greater connectivity or perhaps the absence of inhibitory processes between functionally discrete brain regions might facilitate creative mappings between concepts, experiences, and behaviors in both artists and synesthetes.

These ideas are controversial and although there is some evidence that synethetes are more likely to be artists for example, Ward et al. Synesthesia Most take synesthesia to be a relatively rare perceptual phenomenon.

Consciousness Some contend that synesthesia presents difficulties for certain theories of mind when it comes to conscious experience, such as representationalism Wager, , ; Rosenberg, and functionalism J. Modularity The modular theory of mind, most notably advanced by Jerry Fodor , holds that the mind is comprised of multiple sub-units or modules within which representations are processed in a manner akin to the processing of a classical computer.

This grapheme-color module would, according to Segal, possess at least most of the nine scientifically interesting characteristics of modules identified by Fodor: Theories of Color Visual perception seems to, at the very least, provide us with information about colored shapes existing in various spatial locations. An Extraordinary Feature of Color-Grapheme Synesthesia What the subject says about his or her own phenomenal experience usually carries great weight.

Individuating the Senses Synesthesia might be important when it comes to questions about the nature of the senses, how they interact, and how many of them there are. Synesthesia and Creativity Ramachandran and Hubbard, among others, have been developing a number of hypotheses about the explanatory value of synesthesia towards creativity, the nature of metaphor, and even the origins of language b, a; see also Mulvenna, ; Hunt, References and Further Reading Alter, T.

Does synesthesia undermine representationalism? Psyche , 12 5. A whole-genome scan and fine-mapping linkage study of auditory-visual synesthesia reveals evidence of linkage to chromosomes. American Journal of Human Genetics, 84, Is there a normal phase of synaesthesia in development? Psyche , 2 Hearing words and seeing colours: An experimental investigation of a case of synaesthesia.

Perception , 16 6 , Effect of orientation and of shape similarity on perceptual grouping. Perception and Psychophysics, 1, Is synaesthesia what happens when modularity breaks down? Synaesthesia in art and music since Synaesthesia and epistemology in abstract painting. British Journal of Aesthetics, 39 3 , The representational character of experience. Classical and contemporary readings pp. A union of the senses. A review of current knowledge.

Wednesday is indigo blue: Discovering the brain of synesthesia. Synaesthesia and synaesthetic metaphor. Some demographic and socio-cultural aspects of synesthesia. Perspectives from cognitive neuroscience pp. Five plus two equals yellow. Nature , , Not all synaesthetes are created equal: Projector versus associator synaesthetes.

The role of meaning in grapheme-colour synaesthesia. Cortex, 42 2 , Synaesthesia and aesthetic education. Journal of Aesthetic Education, 11, Do synaesthetic colours act as unique features in visual search? Special sciences, or the disunity of science as a working hypothesis. An essay on faculty psychology. Inquiries into human faculty and its development. Philosophical Writings , 37, How are qualia coupled to functions?

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7 5 , Creeping up on the hard problem. Possible implications of synaesthesia for the question of consciousness. Classic and contemporary readings pp. Creeping up on the hard question of consciousness. The second Tucson discussions and debates pp. Implications of synaesthesia for functionalism: Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9 12 , Evidence against functionalism from neuroimaging of the alien colour effect in synaesthesia.

A reply to Wager. Philosophical Psychology, 14 3 , Cognitive modules, synaesthesia and the constitution of psychological natural kinds. Philosophical Psychology, 14 1 , What synaesthesia really tells us about functionalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11 9 , On the nature of the senses. Classic and contemporary philosophical perspectives , pp. The appreciation of poetry: A proposal of certain empirical inquiries. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 15 3 , Cognitive and physiological constraints. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5 1 , When a pain is not.

The Journal of Philosophy, 94 8 , A review of psychological theories. Symbol systems and artistic styles. I would like to thank Tony Pitson for help in compiling this list and others who have suggested items. Any suggestions for additions to the bibliography would be gratefully received. University of California Press, Chapter 1.

Individuating modalities in humans and other animals", Journal of Philosophy , 99, pp. A longer version is online. Cambridge University Press, Chapter 7. A Sourcebook in the Anthropology of the Senses , Toronto: University of Toronto Press. A Realist Theory of Perception , Louisiana:

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