Zu Arthur W. Burks Eine Theorie der Eigennamen (German Edition)

Western philosophy

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Dictionary of Arguments

Wolf Hg Eigennamen Frankfurt Wenzel Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, , pp. The Philosophical Review, 78, pp. Foundations of Language, 4, , pp. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps. The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.

Analysis Vol 9, Nr. Man kann eine Aussage machen, ohne "wahr" zu gebrauchen. Bsp "Es ist wahr dass die Sonne scheint": Searle I John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 pp. Last edit December First Person Authority, in: Signs on playing cards identify them criterion , but their meaning for the game goes beyond that - I Difference. Self-attribution not because of observation - but predicates are no solution to the mind-body problem. He can speak incorrectly or with intent to deceive. Thus, mental names for forms can be created. Two concepts could correspond to one property and one concept if it has ambiguous Fregean sense can correspond to two properties.

Even if we know of a concept that a property corresponds to it, this is never a priori knowledge. At most there is natural necessity natural necessity. It is not a "logical competition". For example, "S cannot be at the same time P and not P" is either meaningless, because "S" and "P" have no meaning, or something like true because it is a statement about the nature of the world.

Their adequacy is not destroyed by the appearance of a contradiction. Concepts are abilities, but in an important respect unlike other abilities: This is sufficient to be as secure as we can that the concept is really from something real. Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. I HungerlandVs "inductive conception" of the context-implication: One must assert something in order to lie. I f Strawson: Deception just before right background. I 53 SchifferVs fails with the original counter e. Deception just before proper background. Lies are no correct use of the language.

We have to go on our own. We cannot rely on the tradition of Russell-Trawson-Donnellan. The real value is determined by the rest of the sentence, not by the indefinite description itself. Their normal eigenfunction is to be translated into an inner description, which still contains a general expression. Here I think of Rakesh. I leave the referent open on purpose. On the other hand: And the identification was finally caused by Rakesh, who gave me the book. The causal connection of an intentional icon with its real value makes it possible for the listener to use it as a natural sign.

This also applies to stories fiction. But this is not a public reference. Here, causality and mapping rules do not matter. Therefore an indefinite description can have a natural one without having a public one. Which of my friends was it? The one who gave me the book. I can use the description if I have one or more brothers. Vol XXIV, , in: Laurence Jonathan Cohen, "Mr. Theories of Truth, Aldershot Rather, there should only be one S to which I refer in context. First, there must be something physical.

Fact has causal relation - several statements possible for a fact. Fact has causal relation - several statements possible for a fact like Austin. Searle Expression and Meaning. I must be in the place to say "here", but change is possible "new meaning, old meaning ". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. Particulars have priority in our conceptual system - ability to attribute consciousness to predicates necessary.

Condition for them for physical predicates. These particulars take precedence of processes or events that we could not identify without them. Class of People - Tradition: Because one can replace predicates by other predicates, e. Do predicates have to correspond to universals when we treat them as substances?

In any case, we must not look at them as single objects, but rather as in tradition as thought objects or as possibilities. They too are supposed to reflect variables of nature, but they do not have to be things. Then they must be in the same way in nature as is their identity or their sameness. Bill cannot be both large and small at the same time. It does not change the meaning the mapping rules. It operates on the part of the logical predicate, which is the grammatical predicate of the sentence. A useful negative sentence will limit the domain of possibilities.

Subject and predicate in "Logic and Grammar" Millikan: I replaced "general concept" here by "properties": Then we know for each property that it is in competition with others. No individual competes with others for properties within a domain. No things are related to each other, so that for each property that exemplifies the one, it would follow that the other does not exemplify them even not at the same time.

It is traditionally recognized among concepts, but we cannot transfer it to properties and relations. Definition "S presupposes S'": The truth of S' is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of the assertion that S. I also imply that I believe to have children.

His definition does not refer to the beliefs or intentions of speakers or listeners, nor to any circumstances of communication. It is rather a formal logical than one of the normal language. Function of the specific article, relevant grammar. Strawson's model is a logical explanation model. Strawson also takes mistakes as exceptions from the rule HungerlandVs. S" - in other words,. Definition "S presupposes S': Bsp "Einstein ist der Kopernikus des So ist alles Subjektive getilgt - die eine oder die andere Seite kann dominieren, der Sinn kann an die Stelle des Referenten treten.

Reference is also possible if the description is not fulfilled, but not designation. Definition "S requires S": The truth of S is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of the claim that S. Frank I EvansVsStrawson: Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass.

Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 German Edition: Laughing stock - Ryle: The philosopher should not want to discover a pattern where there is none. It is the sentences and not the words which have a "use" in the general sense. Likewise "truth" and "falsehood" were constantly used unexplained.

Anyone who is not in the claws of theory would initially tend to distinguish what a sentence literally says from what one might try to communicate with it in special circumstances.

According to the "philosophy of everyday language" only the latter term is considered to be legitimate. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 pp. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London , pp. Mind and Language, Oxford , pp. Philosophical Review 73 pp.

Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 S. Thus it is not included, that we refer with the singular term to individual things. In various uses the term can therefore refer to different objects. A implies B iff it cannot be that A is true but B is false. A presupposes B iff B must be true so that A can take a truth value.

And also does not claim the existence and uniqueness. Strawson provides no philosophical-logical arguments for his thesis. In principle, both sentences are used for a predication. Thus, the first sentence is informative when it is read predicative and not purely referential. Strawson brings a series of basic distinctions between types and levels of use of linguistic expressions into play. Fundamental difference between the logical subject and logical predicate. Pleads for stronger focus on everyday language. Such sentences are simply wrong in the case of non-existence.

Then we also not need to make any dubious ontological conditions. We analyze according to Russell the sentence as follows: There is a king of France. There are no more than a king of France. There is nothing that is King of France and is not bald. Since at least one member in the conjunction is false, it is wrong in total. But one has to consider the use of linguistic expressions, which shows that there must be a much finer distinction. Russell confused what a sentence says with the terms of the meaningful use of this sentence.

The everyday language and not the formal logic determines the meaning. Rather, it is "implied". Therefore, the sentence does not need to be true or false. The term does not refer to anything. Definition truth value gap Strawson: There can also be more than one description in one sentence. The meaning is exactly the individual thing.

This leads him to the fact that he can no longer regard sentences with descriptions as logical propositions. But these are not "descriptions" in Russell's sense. The conjunction of three statements, one of which is wrong and the others are true, is false, but meaningful. Sentence begins with clear referring description. Sentences that can start with a description: A1 sentence A2 use of a sentence A3 uttering of a sentence accordingly: B1 expression B2 use of an expression B3 utterance of an expression. VII Various uses: Everyone understands this sentence, it is absurd to ask "what object" the sentence is about about many!

It is also absurd to ask whether it is true or false. Sense cannot be determined with respect to a specific individual use. It is about conventions, habits and rules. Russell says two true things about it: It is not like grasping after a raincoat suggests that one believes that it is raining. Saying that there is one or the other table, which is referred to, is not the same as to designate a certain table. Referencing is not the same as claiming. I could form my empty hand and say "This is a beautiful red! Therefore, "this" no "camouflaged description" in Russell's sense.

Also no logical proper name. You have to know what the sentence means to be able to respond to the statement. Russell's "Inquiry into meaning and truth" contains a logical catastrophic name theory. He takes away the status of logical subjects from the descriptions, but offers no substitute. The meaning of the name is not the object. Confusion of utterance and use. They are the expressions together with the context that one needs to clearly refer to something. When we refer we do not achieve completeness anyway.

This also allows the fiction. Names are choosen arbitrary or conventional.

- Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Otherwise names would be descriptive. That only believe those who believe that the meaning of an expression is the object. Everyday language has no exact logic. This is misjudged by Aristotle and Russell. Taking out of the situation, recognition, countability.

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All singular terms refer to the lowest level of identification. Only with localizing expressions we have singular terms whose reference can no longer fail. Therefore, they no longer imply existential statements! Thus they resemble Russell's logical proper names. In principle, the talk of existence always assumes that one speaks of all objects, and therefore one could not even say VsRussell of a single object that it exists.

Russell has already seen that correctly with regard to singular terms, but with his logical proper names he was wrong anyway, precisely because he denied them the reference to that background of a peculiar generality. But he does note make the distinction. Nevertheless, "presidential candidate" would absurdly refer to Goldwater. It could eb said that they refer to the thing itself, not to the thing under the condition that it has any special properties. But it does work with referential use. His fully developed theory of singular terms extended this to the of proper names. Philosophy of logical atomism: Waverley that what is described by the description, i.

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Scott, is not "part" of the expressed proposition. Only logical proper names could accomplish the feat of actually mentioning a certain particular. Putting great emphasis on concepts such as "about" would lead us into marshy terrain. We should require no definition of "about"!. It would be a delicate task to show that such a statement is either not a statement in any sense of "about" about the described thing or that there is a clear sense of "about" by it being not. For his theory he paid the price of giving up the natural use of singular terms. Does he refute Russell? No, in itself not!

Nevertheless, it will probably fail in the end. But he does not assert this! If we now asked "Is the statement is true?

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