Contents:
Saint Martin de Crau. Arrestation 50 militants, T-shirt: Cergy 3 conseils de discipline militants Eragny. Poste, 2 licenciements Arrestation de 2 militants CGT du Havre pour manif du Toulouse euros pour un feu de palettes. Deux enseignants poursuivis pour diffamation. Poursuivi pour la manif contre la loi travail du Manifestation Saverglass au Havre contre la discrimination syndicale Petetin Chute du sursis Il meurt sur le trottoir.
Jugement d'agriculteurs pour manif paysannes. Plainte de la Poste Paris Valentin et Gildo. Paris Max, 4 mois avec sursis requis pour "rebellion". Manif de personnes Fete de soutien aux 5 d'Amiens Montauban Rassemblement pour les Air France et pour Marina Costumes, Reenactment, Theater Other Consumer Electronics 4. Format see all Format. All Listings filter applied. Condition see all Condition. Item Location see all Item Location.
All items listed on eBay. Show only see all Show only. Canellopoulos; Ireland - Mr D. Quirke; Italy - Mr C. Cesareni and Mr C. Pesenti; Luxembourg - Mr J. Tesch; Netherlands - Mr M. Platschorre; Portugal - Mr J. Toscano Junior; Spain - Mr J. The Coordinating Group unanimously acknowledged the importance of the problem and recommended that it be considered urgently by the Executive Committee. It acknowledged the vital importance of these issues and decided to set up a meeting of Head Delegates and even devoted a special meeting on 22 December to organizing it in the best possible circumstances.
This explains why I considered it desirable to invite Executive Committee members who are not Head Delegates to this meeting. We shall now turn to the three chapters of the agenda which the Directors of Cembureau and I shall introduce and discuss. Needless to say there will be no minutes of this meeting. We plan on ending the meeting at No minutes or record of the meeting were included among the documents submitted by Cembureau; these documents included preparatory documents for the meeting, tables, transparencies, handwritten notes doc.
Tables showing imports from eastern European countries, data on output, domestic deliveries, imports, exports and consumption by Cembureau member country and a diagram with a note explaining the prices situation were attached to the letter calling the meeting doc. Belgium - Mr J. Van Hove; Denmark - Mr O. Stevens Larsen; France - Mr B. Collomb; Germany - Mr A. Quirke; Italy - Mr A. Teixeira Lopo; Spain - Mr J. Bailly and by Mr H. Collis and Mr P. Dutron, Director and Deputy Director. Imports from Eastern Europe.
Situation on the European market. Although the data collected were not fully comparable in view of the differences in price quotations, it was agreed that a visual presentation of price ranges was an effective means of highlighting potential causes of conflict. It would not, however, be advisable to distribute the document more widely as it might be interpreted incorrectly.
In addition, the effects of major changes in exchange rates were not apparent. More detailed data which included the prices charged by cement firms rather than the official prices communicated by Members might be considered contrary to the rules of the common market. The discussion then turned to the table containing all the statistics for , in particular trade flows between Members. The following comments were made:. As previous discussions between Head Delegates had not altered this state of affairs, it was pointless to continue the discussion within Cembureau.
The Chairman reminded participants that the decision to hold the present meeting had not been opposed at the recent Executive Committee meeting and asked the other members for their views. Further discussion of this matter was essential, otherwise Spain would be prepared to leave Cembureau. If the problem could not be dealt with at this level, Cembureau's future would be at stake.
It must be possible to discuss these problems here and it was pointed out in this connection that the dispute between Switzerland and Italy was about to be resolved. As the country which had started these discussions, Ireland had a duty to request that they be continued as they had been extremely useful in calming the situation in Ireland. Pressure from inter-member trade had slackened considerably through improved bilateral contacts. Collomb; Germany - Mr P. Cesareni; Luxembourg - Mr J-C. Tesch; Portugal - Mr V. Bailly, Chairman, and by Mr H. This is unanimously considered as the basic criterion if better export prices are to be achieved, and the risk of a destabilisation in Europe avoided.
Negotiations have been proceeding for several months between four Spanish and three Greek companies, though the mechanism of the discussions were not described. Some results have been achieved, but there has been no effect so far on prices. Discussions have already been held also with Japan and Korea. The general sentiment, however, is that the main problem is to achieve a firm understanding between the major European exporters. The situation was serious and export prices damagingly low.
There was surplus capacity both in West Europe and the Far East, which had to be used in a responsible manner. The Greek and Spanish cement industries were to be congratulated on their efforts to reach understanding, and other Member countries were prepared, if requested, to support fully their endeavours.
The record, drawn up by Lafarge, reads as follows: Set up supply company, for supplies either from La Malle, or from Robilante, or through imports e. I said there was no urgency as we had 15 or 20 years of reserves. The problem was chiefly the operating licence. The covering note states that: Price increase timetable has not been decided as yet. At Buzzi's request doc. On 23 April , Buzzi sent the following telex to Vicat doc. We replied in the negative to all such requests and intend to continue so doing. We have learnt that your prices rose recently. Our prices from March are: The percentage increase was around 4.
Vicat sent Buzzi its price-list applicable from 1 July doc. The Commission also considers that the fact that Buzzi informed Vicat both of its refusal to fill cement orders from the south of France and that it intended to continue doing so constitutes sharing the south of France market. It points out that if there had been any agreements with French producers, it would not have tackled such obstacles in order to develop a market for itself in France.
The fact that it had embarked on the difficult task of exporting shows that it acted completely independently, in accordance with the actions of an entrepreneur seeking new markets. Buzzi also states that the prices it charged were lower than the prices communicated to it by the French producers. The data provided by Buzzi in its reply p. According to Buzzi, its sales in France fell because two important customers were taken over by French cement producers.
The Commission is not contesting the possibility that Buzzi may have lost two important customers, but notes that Buzzi refused to supply cement to new customers, that it informed Vicat by telex on 23 April of its refusal to fill cement orders and its intention of continuing to do so, and that it informed Lafarge at a meeting on 26 November that it would not upset the south of France market and wished only to retain its present customers. The fall in Buzzi's cement sales in France from can thus be attributed to concerted action between Buzzi and the French producers Vicat and Lafarge.
As regards Buzzi's claim that its prices in France were lower than those in the French producers' price-lists, it need only be said that the lower prices are justified by the fact that the Portland cements sold by Buzzi in France grades and have lower resistance grades than the corresponding cements manufactured and sold by the French producers grades and Oficemen was represented at the meetings by its Chairman and Board members.
The parties present, who may be regarded as the representatives of Spanish and Portuguese cement producers, expressed their clear support for the principle that there should be no cement movements from Spain to Portugal or from Portugal to Spain that are not instigated or controlled by the cement industry of either country.
However, they acknowledge that this unambiguous position of agreement does not prevent third parties distributors, retailers, consumers, carriers, etc. The Commission has no evidence of a meeting in October; however, according to a Hispacement document doc. He said that Cimpor had recently received several requests to export to Extremadura in Spain. During the meeting, the Portuguese producers informed Oficemen that the Portuguese prices had increased by ESC a tonne, and both parties agreed to inform each other about any exports known to them. Two records of this meeting were made: These show that the Spanish producers had expressed anxiety about the increase in exports of sacked Portuguese cement to Extremadura and the start of bulk exports of Portuguese cement to Galicia; that the Portuguese producers attributed the trade to the price differences which did not take account of the difference in quality between Portuguese and Spanish cement; that they suggested a medium-term solution consisting of an increase in the price of Portuguese cement, and a short-term solution, consisting in a policy of discouraging Portuguese operators engaged in cross-frontier exports.
Portuguese cement prices in conjunction with exports to Spain, and the Portuguese cement P which did not conform to Spanish standards and should be prohibited by the Spanish authorities. At the meeting, the Portuguese producers provided their Spanish colleagues with a list of the Spanish operators who had asked them for cement quotations doc.
The evidence for such meetings lies in the following documents:. A Spanish trader, Tracoisa, in response to a refusal to supply cement intended not only for Spain doc. According to Oficemen, the aim of the Spanish cement producers was, as is evident in the record of the meeting on 6 March , to prevent the use in Spain of cement not conforming to Spanish legislation and to ensure that Spanish producers were not liable should Portuguese cement be mixed with Spanish cement.
In any event, however the application of the Decrees is interpreted, it is for the public authorities to apply them and not enterprises or private associations that have not been empowered to do so. The record of the meeting on 22 July doc. If what the parties claim is true, namely that their main concern was to avoid selling cement not corresponding to national standards, it is not clear how the fact that movements are controlled or instigated by the cement industries of either country could ensure that cement exports conformed to the standards of the country of destination.
Furthermore, this is not enough to justify the control of any exports from Spain to Portugal since Spanish cement is at least grade 35 and thus higher than the Portuguese grade The Hispacement document doc. The reason why Portuguese enterprises firmly state their intention of resisting the temptation to export is because export is possible, otherwise the problem of temptation would not even arise. The increase in exports is not sufficient to refute the documentary evidence.
Historically, the starting point to this business was when Saarland became a economic part of Germany in After the Second World War, administratively autonomous Saarland was returned to France before being attached once again to Germany on 1 January Economic reintegration finally took place in In the period , cement was supplied by French Thionville and Hagondange and German steelmakers under a specific quota system.
Thus, until recently, deliveries were broken down as follows:. Saarland, with a consumption rate of 0. The German producers protested vehemently, then, tired of fruitless discussions, took the initiative by entering Eastern France with the aim of making good their losses on the French market, in particular by targeting Cedest customers. Very tense relations thus arose between Cedest and SCF, further heightened by the battle taking place between these two competitors in the Lower Rhine and Moselle regions.
Despite the devaluation of the French franc and the price freeze In addition to the four Lower Rhine traders, a very large trader Angernmuller, a Sarreguemines cement-maker tied to Cedest is now being supplied by Heidelberger. Should this situation, which is limited to the Lower Rhine and Moselle, spread to the Meurthe et Moselle or Vosges regions, it would have particularly serious consequences in a market experiencing full recession. Furthermore, Cedest is spoiling the climate which can only result in conflict, a conflict that is liable to spread at a time when we are endeavouring to increase our tonnage.
In view of the fact that the German associates were no longer able to use the joint venture and because of its operating losses, the transport company was sold on 16 April doc. The memo continues on p. Unfavourable impression of L[afarge] because of W[oessingen]. Aim should be to join two businesses. Not deal with things separately t years ago.
Where do we stand with regard to Cedest? CGIP not just a cement group, similar size to Lafarge 10 billion. Cedest tried to demolish the French system. Relations today with Cedest. Our power stops where Cedest's or the parent company's interests start. The industry Syndicat and Lafarge in particular applied their full weight when: What are Cedest's rights since this has been going on for ten years?
Renard [Cedest] says that he is dependent on W[oessingen] and L[afarge]. To whom should we speak above him. Cedest must understand that the tonnage must be brought back to the basic figure or to balanced reciprocal exports but not one-way. Since we have constantly told our French colleagues not to accept Cedest We counted on our French colleagues for solutions.
The other alternative was RMC impossible so in the end, against our fundamental principles, we are going into France. Also delivery prices to RMC are below French prices. Same principle as in North America. Unpleasant feeling [illegible] presence. The greatest overcapacity is in Westphalia. But overcapacity virtually everywhere and this creates moves towards the regions and neighbouring countries. Thus we believe we have sufficiently good relations with L[afarge] to say: We are fully prepared to see you take part once we are certain that you will accept the rules of the game but we are not yet there.
We have t clinker capacity: BC [Bertrand Collomb - Lafarge] considers that the level of trust required initially by L[afarge] is not less than the trust you should have in. This letter confirms the agreement between Dyckerhoff and Lafarge see memo of 23 June in preceding paragraph to seek a solution to the problem of non-quota sales by Cedest in Germany. Dyckerhoff returned to an idea expressed on 29 July during a telephone conversation concerning a general meeting between Dyckerhoff, Heidelberger, Cedest and Lafarge to resolve the problem of Cedest's aggression in Germany. Lafarge answered that first of all the possibilities of direct negotiation with Cedest should be explored; Lafarge could take part if invited by Cedest.
Lafarge also said it seemed too soon to organize a meeting with the German producers, including Woessingen, affected by Cedest's aggression, before the talks with Cedest had taken place. Lafarge ended by suggesting to Dyckerhoff: No general meeting, but an essential talk between Dyckerhoff with or without Heidelberger and the Chairman of Cedest before any other meeting.
Thus Lafarge, through its Woessingen subsidiary, is prepared to sacrifice some of its market share with the other German producers concerned if agreement is reached with Cedest. The note sets out the content of the discussions on the basis of information communicated by Woessingen, which probably obtained it from Cedest:.
Mainly HDZ cement; ten months He apparently went back several years with data on cement and clinker ten years but details? He also said he had sold 9 t of clinker this year to Woessingen which does not please K. Cedest confirmed that it would sell only to RMC. It also agreed in future to adjust its supplies to Germany excluding Saarland to delivery trends in that country whether the trend is upward or downward. To which Gruner apparently replied that PZW [Woessingen] should cede to D[yckerhoff] an equivalent tonnage to the one given up by Cedest in the Karlsruhe and Mannheim-Ludwigshafen area It appears from this note that Cedest was prepared to limit its sales in Germany and adapt them to market trends.
The note comments on several items on the agenda: As regards items 6 and 7, the record states:. These tonnes will not a priori go to Saarland unless there is a definite economic advantage compared with the Goellheim plant which currently delivers to Saarland. The tonnes will never go to France. The letter refers first to the regular meetings between Lose Dyckerhoff and Brenke Heidelberger , the progress made during the meetings compared with the situation in , and the fact that, if the arbitrators appointed on the French side and the German side failed to reach a solution acceptable to all parties, the latter would have to take the matter in hand, continues as follows: Ted Brenke expressed during our last meeting the opinion that, if we were to renew our agreement, there would be a demand from the German side that the gap existing since between French and German deliveries be reduced.
I told him that, if this demand were to be maintained, I saw very little hope in our reaching a further agreement. As you remember, there was no logical and, even less, ethical justification for this gap, which was not, in fact, the result of bilateral discussions between French and German interests, but resulted from a far more complicated pattern of discussion which included conflicts between the French parties, and would probably have included conflicts on the German side had we not agreed then to leave Woessingen aside for the time being.
I do not believe that we can have so many people agree on something new unless they are under pressure, and the very purpose of a renewal is not to let such a pressure develop. I should like to have your reaction on these two questions. The following essential points emerge from the letter: According to an internal Heidelberger memo of 12 August doc.
You will meet him with the Cembureau delegation that is leaving for Russia. I should like to discuss with you, before you meet him, the content of your talks with him. As stated in the contract between the partners doc. After acquiring control, Lafarge contacted the German producers on several occasions, in particular Heidelberger, with a view to bringing PZW into the quota allocation system for southern Germany, a system which PZW left in The contacts were intensified in with a view to obtaining results, and involved meetings and exchanges of letters doc.
The final decision to take part in the quota system for southern Germany was taken at the PZW supervisory board meeting on 27 September doc. As the Bundeskartellamt inquiry and decision of 12 September doc. Under the agreement, PZW obtained a delivery quota of The stated aim of the exchange is to be able to compare the data in the possession of the two associations with those published by the national statistical institutes.
Although the data exchanged are aggregate and do not contain any indication of destination by region and although the data published by the various statistical institutes and those published by the Statistisches Bundesamt do not indicate destination by region, BDZ is able, each quarter, to establish that imports from various countries are intended for specific Laender and to publish those results.
In particular, BDZ is able to state that French cement imports have always been intended for Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland and Baden-Wuerttemberg, with tonnages for each Land, as can be seen from the figures available at the time of verification for the last five years:. This system of data exchange is a means of monitoring the implementation of the agreement on regulating sales between French and German enterprises see paragraph 10 above. The location, however, of the Lafarge plants in France allegedly shows that there is no serious threat which could have persuaded Lafarge to conclude agreements with German competitors; as regards Woessingen, it would not, it is claimed, be in its economic interests to export to France.
Even if it were true that the location of the Lafarge plants in France might to some extent constitute an obstacle, compared with other better-situated French producers, to serious competition in Germany or to the risk of experiencing German competition, Lafarge would not be protected from all the consequences of competition between producers in the two countries since, as Vicat states in its note of 22 July referred to above in paragraph 1, such competition could spread and affect other regions. It is fully in Lafarge's interests to take part in the market-sharing system, if only to protect its subsidiary Woessinger.
This is evident from the letter which Italcementi sent the Commission on 21 March doc. They have not even been in contact with each other the last month! The British were in favour of winding it up, but the Swiss finally convinced their colleagues that this would be a mistake: Its aims are fairly wide-ranging and include the bringing together of all the members of the trade in order to coordinate their activities, carry out studies, develop the training of skilled labour, pass on any useful documentation to members and represent the trade in dealings with the public authorities and the trade and intertrade groups. Furthermore, this is not enough to justify the control of any exports from Spain to Portugal since Spanish cement is at least grade 35 and thus higher than the Portuguese grade
Woessinger is affected on its market by certain French exports. Lafarge has worked since at least to incorporate Woessinger in a quota-balancing scheme in Germany see documents referred to above in paragraph 11 ; Lafarge thus has an interest in seeing that agreements between French and German producers do not upset Woessinger's market and the German system in which Woessinger took part. The notes undoubtedly point to some aggressiveness on the part of Cedest in Germany, but it is also true that the letter of 22 Septemer talks of an improved situation since and of a Franco-German agreement which might be renewed.
The gap between the two tables is the most interesting period; furthermore, it can be said that exports gradually fell off in the period compared with the preceding decade, and rose in and Lastly, the fact that an agreement has been infringed is not proof of the non-existence of an agreement. Nor was it concerned with Cedest's exports to Germany or the role of Woessinger. As regards the grinding of Dyckerhoff's clinker quota on Ciments Luxembourgeois plant, the Commission is not objecting to the distribution of the joint subsidiary's clinker production.
Finally, the letter of 22 September see paragraph 10 above has no particular meaning as it simply refers to hypotheses. The arguments put forward by Dyckerhoff and Heidelberger are contradicted by the facts already referred to, namely: Lastly, according to the Heidelberger memo of 12 August see paragraph 10 above , the subjects dealt with in the Laplace letter were discussed in BDZ also states that these allocations are compared later with data on imports drawn up by each Land.
According to information provided at the hearing, the comparison is not followed by corrections to the estimated allocations.
After announcing it at the hearing, BDZ sent the Commission on 4 May , through its lawyers, a model of the new statistics drawn up for domestic deliveries since , and an example from North Rhine-Westphalia of cement import statistics drawn up by the Laender. Despite the arguments produced in writing and orally by BDZ, the Commission has been unable to find any valid explanation for the allocation of imports to the various Laender.
BDZ states that the allocation is based on official statistics. In order to carry out such an operation, BDZ must know the real provenance of these imports and their real destination. The estimated transport cost does not appear to be a reliable basis for allocating imported tonnes to different Laender. Although such an estimate can give an overall measure of the extent of French penetration of the German market, it is not possible to quantify the tonnage intended for the various regions covered by the estimated market penetration. In addition, the table produced by BDZ on 4 May , which contains statistics on imports into North Rhine-Westphalia from to , shows that France exported and sold there, through trade channels, amounts ranging from 4 tonnes in to 8 tonnes in The table of imports through traders in North Rhine-Westphalia clearly shows that the allocations effected by BDZ are indeed estimates and hence do not correspond to the facts.
Apart from the fact that it is difficult to understand without further explanation why French exports to North Rhine-Westphalia, known of for several years, have never been taken into account in BDZ statistics, this observation could be valid if the allocations were made globally for the three Laender concerned by French exports: Again in , following the acquisition of Cemij and Robur by Hoogovens and ENCI respectively, and the winding-up of the Verkoop Associatie, Hoogovens and ENCI concluded agreements on mutual supplies, the sharing of the Dutch cement market and cooperation in sales and distribution.
Under the agreement, total forecast Dutch demand, after deduction of tonnes which was subject to free competition, was to be shared among the parties in the following proportions: The CRN agreement was declared incompatible with Article 85 The minutes of the CBR management board meeting held on 30 August doc. Rhineland is chiefly due to fall in cement consumption. The allocation of market shares.
The statistics on deliveries to the Netherlands drawn up by CBS, all of which are in the possession of the parties concerned see e. NCH held a market share of roughly [. This symmetry may be set against the links referred to in the beginning of paragraph 1 above between the two major producers and ENCI and between Dutch producers until However, the sum of the percentages held by the Dutch and the Belgian producers, an addition that is justified by the relations between them, is very close to the percentage provided for in the CRN agreement for the two groups of producers.
The agreement specifies [. The total delivery percentage for the two groups of producers gives the following results for each year from to The only significant variation on the CRN percentage occurs in The constancy of delivery quotas was maintained despite variations in consumption in the Netherlands and in deliveries by third parties, which rose in as may be seen in the following table:.
According to the notes on this meeting, the Belgian Head Delegate complained about the non-structural exports from Germany: As earlier discussions between Head Delegates had not modified this state of affairs, it was considered pointless to continue discussion within Cembureau. The figure appears to be provisional and might be exaggerated since the BDZ statistics give the figure of 1 as the definitive figure for German exports to the Netherlands. The difference between the two figures is considerable, but the firms did not provide any explanation in the course of the proceeding.
In any event, it must be concluded, using the same sources to provide a consistent comparison, that the exchanges of views and the bilateral or multilateral dialogue advocated by the Chairman of Cembureau at the Head Delegates meeting on 14 January had some effect since German exports to the Netherlands, especially by non-NCH members, first gradually fell and then started to level off in , in relation to consumption, as the following figures show:. By mid, however, the fall in oil prices which led to the collapse of the Middle-East markets, combined with the expansion of local cement firms, created huge overcapacity in the Greek cement industry and prompted a search for new markets for domestic output which considerably outstripped domestic consumption.
I was approached on two occasions to try to make sure that the Cembureau Task Force continues in operation as a means of keeping up our pressure on the Greeks. In addition, as Blue Circle noted in its reply to the statement of objections point 3. Mr Marshall thus held a position giving him good knowledge of the structures of Cembureau and its activities.
In Annex 2, p. Apart from the question whether the note constitutes a record of the EPC meeting on 13 May , irrespective of Mr Marshall's capacity at the moment he wrote the note and of its addressees, it is a fact that Mr Marshall does not dispute the factual content of the note. The statement by ECMEC also shows that it contests only its possible liability in regard to the facts set out in the note.
Its explanation does not therefore invalidate the Commission's conclusion that the note effectively establishes a link between Cembureau and the Task Force, a link resulting from the actual terms chosen by Mr Marshall. The typewritten record of this meeting was drafted by Mr Phillipe Dutron, Director of Cembureau, who was present at the meeting doc. The representatives of these companies decided to meet again in Stockholm, at the Grand Hotel, on Monday, 9 June at With a view to the Stockholm meeting, a working party made up of four members United Kingdom, Spain, France and Italy was instructed to prepare, with the assistance of Mr Henry Collis, a Director of Cembureau, at the Zurich meeting the following week, documents on possible defensive measures and on the following subjects: The representatives of the companies also planned that, if a strategy was defined at Stockholm, three representatives of the European cement industry would meet with representatives of the Greek industry on 10 June, after the Cembureau General Assembly.
In addition to the countries referred to in the note of 28 May , Holderbank, in whose offices the meetings took place, also attended. Attendance was as follows doc. According to Holderbank, Mr Collis, a Director of Cembureau, was present only at the start of the meeting and withdrew rapidly;. The introduction to the document, prepared for the Stockholm meeting on 9 June see doc.
Furthermore the presence of idle floating silos constitutes an additional destabilizing effect. The strategies developed below reflect a response based on solidarity and the obstacles to be overcome. The document goes on to examine possible short-term measures:. The joint venture would essentially aim at obtaining orders on the main export markets supplied by the countries threatening the stability of the markets in member countries; purchasing cement and clinker from the countries threatening the stability of member country markets; exporting cement and clinker to the countries threatening the stability of member country markets.
None of the firms indicated whether and which Commission officials were informed of the collective actions proposed. The Commission does not have a record of this meeting and it must therefore endeavour to reconstruct the list of persons present and the topics discussed from other documents.
Italy - Italcementi admits its involvement in a letter of 21 March replying to a request for information doc. Belgium - In its reply to the statement of objections, p. Thus CBR was present at the meeting as indeed it acknowledged at the hearing on 11 March France - The presence of Lafarge may be deduced from the fact that it admits generally having taken part in the meetings as part of the Task Force p.
Germany - Dyckerhoff acknowledges that it took part in the Stockholm meeting, but states that its representative was not a Head Delegate reply to statement of objections, pp. Heidelberger states that it did not take part in the meeting p. Spain - Asland's participation in the Stockholm meeting was planned at the Rome meeting doc. The presence of a Spanish Head Delegate may, however, be deduced from the distribution of shares in Interciment referred to in Annex 2 to the agenda of the meeting on 19 August doc. According to reply 7 b of 7 May from Holderbank doc.
Blue Circle sent Holderbank, before the meeting and at the latter's request doc. Holderbank had also asked Lafarge before the meeting to indicate at the meeting on 17 June the Greek tonnage which Lafarge could sell on non-European markets doc. A memo from Mr Cheney of Blue Circle dated 19 June lists the items dealt with at the meeting doc. A draft document attached to the memo provided for the notification of the contract to the Commission, but it was apparently not put into practical effect and no notification took place ;.
The draft agenda lists the following items doc. No agenda or record of the meeting is available. An agenda was prepared for the meeting doc. No minutes of the meeting were found during the investigation. The record by Mr Ulestig contains exactly the same items as those on the agenda and describes the discussions and decisions that took place.