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It is a knowledge of God that is necessary, but insufficient. Contexts in which Contemporary Science Refers to God. The question of God has never been completely foreign to science. Beginning with the foundation of the scientific method, and throughout modern times, the natural sciences have examined many of the questions regarding God, offering issues for philosophical debate.
Even in contemporary times, which like any age has its own language and terms proper to its vision of the world, there are ways in which the sciences continue to appeal, at least indirectly, to the notion of God: There must, it seems to me, be a deeper level of explanation. In the transition from the second to the third millennium the question of God, or at least some reference to a notion of God, has continued to intersect with several branches of science.
Debates concerning bioethics hosted in biology and medicine involve specific visions of human life, one of which poses in a Creator God the very reason for the respect due to the nature of human creatures. Originally associated with the origin of life and of the human being in biology and paleoanthropology, the debate about evolution has now reached cosmology , which presents the evolution of the whole cosmos within a new, even more totalizing, vision cf.
In the first half of the 20th century, quantum mechanics initiated a debate with the metaphysical and religious vision of the world by discussing to what extent the principles of causality and indetermination should be applied. In the area of physics, especially in physical cosmology, comments on the possible role of a Creator God arise with the greatest insistence. A simple look at the amount of popular science books published in the last decades easily shows how reflections on nature and the question of God are tied together.
Numerous scientists have published popular works or undertaken studies on philosophy and science with titles explicitly addressing that connection: God and the New Physics P. Quantum Cosmologies and God W. Is God a Geometer? If the Universe is the Answer, What is the Question? It is very likely that the use of such titles is part of the reason they have sold so well; however, it also testifies to the existence of a new sensitivity, which is the implicit reason for such a specific market.
Cosmology and physics seem to imply questions regarding God in three main, intertwining themes. Furthermore, the role of God is debated in order to assign the correct values to the constants of nature and provide proper boundary conditions to the equations that describe the overall development of the cosmos. The second theme refers to what is called the Anthropic Principle and the interdisciplinary discussion deriving from it. A few interpretations of this Principle try to support a return to the famous Argument from Design, well known in philosophy, claiming experimental results at a cosmic level.
Presented in a coherent and fashionable form in the influential book The Anthropic Cosmological Principle by John Barrow and Frank Tipler which summarized and organized all the previous thought and evidence on this subject , the debate regarding the Anthropic Principle and its possible employment to back a Teleological Argument in favor of the existence of God has accompanied interdisciplinary literature up until now cf. Manson, ; Barrow et al. Though the Anthropic Principle contains interesting seeds for the revision of the presently reigning ideas regarding the evolution of the cosmos, it engages in leaps between different levels of abstraction when it is in dialogue with philosophy and theology.
The paradigm of an evolution that used to consider the progressive, blind game of chance, plus a sufficiently long period of time, as mainly responsible for the appearance of life, has revealed its limits. While in its strong formulation it is a philosophical and somewhat a priori principle that can be used as a deductive key for understanding and foreseeing properties of our human-inhabited universe, the weak Anthropic Principle simply indicates events and numerical results as read in terms of coordination and coherence. The observations and results on which the Anthropic Principle are based do not constitute a scientific experimental proof for the existence of a cosmic plan aimed at giving rise to life, or of the existence of a Creator: This is, firstly, because the delicate physical and biological conditions of life are actually necessary, but far from sufficient conditions for the appearance of life as such.
Secondly, because empirical analysis, equipped with the sole methods of science, cannot reveal the existence of a purposeful final causality, and even less of a Creator God. The third theme of scientific research where authors appeal to some notion of God regards the intelligibility of the universe.
In the debate regarding the ontological status of natural laws , one line of thought more inclined to realism has progressively underlined the objectiveness of such laws as something external to the knowing subject. According to some authors, intelligibility could be considered the banal result of a necessary tuning of cosmic laws and the laws regulating the human mind, since they were both forged by means of the same evolutionary process including the effectiveness of its selection mechanisms. However, we know that human cultural development started when its biological evolution terminated.
We could also ask why we interpret nature in terms of differential equations and nature is capable of being interpreted in this way, accordingly if differential equations are not so crucial for our survival. Reductive interpretations of the enigma of the intelligibility of nature seem to be less frequent today, and the issue is acknowledged to be meaningful cf. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order [Oxford: Barrow, Pi in the Sky [Oxford: Davies, The Mind of God [London: Explanations resorting to the postulation of meta-mathematical and meta-physical levels usually involve an occasional indirect reference to the notion of Logos , or universal rationality; empirical analysis, of course, does not possess the instruments necessary to discern if such a rationality is imminent within the cosmos or transcendent to it.
The reason why cosmology and physics give rise to references to the notion of God derives from the fact that today these disciplines are capable of placing us in front of the universe in its entirety. The discovery of the Hubble flow and cosmic background radiation, success in applying the nucleosynthesis of chemical elements to explain the evolution of the stars, the high degree of coherence between microphysical and astrophysical scenarios, and current theories of a great unification and its experimental successes of those energies now accessible to our particle accelerators, all provide sufficient ground to treat the universe as a strongly unified picture, as a unique, intelligible object, ordered by the same logic on a large scale.
We know it has one history, capable of connecting the past with the future, of associating what happens at a local level with that which happens, or has already happened, at a cosmic level. The fact that the natural sciences are not methodologically equipped to conceptualize passages from efficient to formal and final causal ascents to transcendence, that is, to transcend the empirical level, does not prevent scientists from facing these higher level questions from within their research domains, and then speaking about them.
Benvenuti, in Corriere della Sera , 10 April , p. In a manner different from those mentioned previously, there is a way in which some sectors of contemporary science demonstrate their openness to interpretations of reality in which a kind of spiritual or divine dimension seems to find a place: Ruyer, La gnose de Princeton. The new mystic vision of science arose from the desire to understand a number of paradoxes in particle physics and quantum mechanics by resorting to Eastern religious philosophies, chiefly Hinduism and Buddhism, whose visions of the world provide useful logical forms, which seem not to be found in Western thought.
The core of these religious visions of the cosmos is then assumed as the ultimate key to understanding the relationship between humankind and nature. This path from science to the realm of the spirit , however, shows signs of ambiguity. True contemplation—which the study of nature certainly gives rise to—is reduced to a mere sensation.
Without endorsing any specific religion, the movement acts as a spokesperson for the attempt to overcome scientism and reductionism , and it aims to open up science and scientists to the dimensions of the Spirit, however generically this may be interpreted. Among the new interpretative paradigms proposed by the mysticism of physics, there are some that have enjoyed growing success due to their explicative capability regarding certain problems left open by science. Some of these newly proposed paradigms, such as the complementarity, or the coincidence, of opposed poles, were already present in Christian thought think, for instance, of the mystery of the Incarnate Word , but they have not been recognized, probably because they require theological insight, whereas the philosophical views imported from the far East seemed to be easier to adopt.
The passage from the geocentric to the heliocentric system gave rise to an inevitable conflict between the image of the cosmology offered by the theological and cultural establishment and the new image of the cosmos. Due to the success of new scientific discoveries, the Enlightenment sought out the empirical sciences as a privileged interlocutor and gradually put forth an idea of nature where reference to God might be still present as occurred in deism but which was different from the idea of nature found in the revealed religions.
The natural sciences soon became the field where the forms of non-belief typical of modernity arose, such as rationalism, positivism , and later materialism ; however, at the same time, the natural sciences were also the field in which attempts to affirm the existence of God starting from the order of the cosmos found new strength. The physiology of human beings, the biology of living beings, and the order of the universe as a whole, were all used as a starting point to establish the existence of a divine Intelligence, an Architect of the world.
This philosophical and scientific trend influenced the work of great scientists, including Newton. The books published at the time bear titles that elucidate the intentions of their authors. From an historical point of view, in depth study is in order to discern what relationship the notion of God supplied by these authors may have had with that later notion referred to as the God of the gaps.
The use of this latter expression refers in particular to some remarks present in the works of Newton. Criticized by Leibniz, Newton does indeed mention God as a cause intervening in the mechanics of the planets in certain places where there was no way to interpret some aspects of their motion by means of natural causes only. Nevertheless, the approach followed by the exponents of the Physico-Theology movement was not necessarily the same as that of Newton. They believed that if the world was the work of an Intelligent Cause, this Cause must have visible effects on creatures.
The natural sciences, therefore, ought to be a source of knowledge of God. In this regard, despite their ingenuousness, they represented an interesting attempt to use the results of science in philosophy and theology. Today it is not the case, but at the time, their way of arguing was quite common and easily accepted: Some of their arguments, such as the marvelous complexity of the human eye, were destined to survive for a long time within 19th-century apologetics.
As the empirical and metaphysical levels of their arguments were not properly distinguished or satisfactorily explained, the physico-theological approach certainly did support the eventual idea of a God of the gaps. Philosophical insight about the transcendence of a final causality that remains non-accessible at the empirical level athough some of its effects certainly intersect the world of nature was not provided.
As a result, once a natural justification, and a complete experimental description, of many of those physical or biological well-organized structures was made available, the progress of science was considered to have superseded and removed the Architect or Clock-maker God. Again from an historical point of view, among the consequences of Physico-Theology, two repercussions are of great importance in relation to the question of God within a scientific context.
First, the debate between theism and atheism gradually became restricted within the kind of rationality associated only with empirical analysis, dramatically denying the capacity of other important areas of human reason to access God cf. Second, a Darwinian evolutionary interpretation of the forms of living beings ended by assuming a precise anti-religious character; it soon clashed with the religious, intellectual, and even linguistic, context that was guided by the argument from design , by wiping out any design and the Designer with the rules of natural selection and adaptability to the environment.
In a different philosophical and theological context, had the question of God been associated with other arguments, or had the distinct degree of philosophical abstraction involved in different levels of finalism been better explained, the theory of evolution would not have caused such a huge fracture. In such a scenario, theology would have found a better philosophical climate in which to comprehend the theory of evolution in the light of those seeds already contained in its biblical, patristic, and medieval sources. One example of how the natural sciences played a major role in the historical debate affirming or negating God is represented by 19th-century mechanism.
In a philosophical climate in which deterministic and rational laws of nature were considered the effect of an intelligence, and the source of all determination for the entire cosmos, theology was unwittingly led to think of, and present, mechanism as an image of harmony and order existing in the will of God. The permanence of laws and permanence of the Creator were to stand or fall together.
Once it was clear that the world could work quite well thanks to its own autonomy , the hypothesis of God became superfluous, a statement that has been inscribed in history by the well-known answer given by Laplace to Napoleon. In an atmosphere that lacked an adequate theology of creation and a correct image of God, the discovery of the intrinsic dynamisms of nature , which explained the origin of properties and forms both in chemistry and in biology, did favor the vision of a world with no God. The attempt to eradicate the question of God through the Marxist endeavor described in Dialectics of Nature F.
Psychoanalysis, as well, attempted to interpret religion from a scientific, namely pathological, point of view though it partially belongs to the field of human sciences, psychoanalysis chose to categorize itself as empirically grounded knowledge. In mathematics and logic, by restricting the value of knowledge to what is empirically verifiable and expressible within the formal language of science, Neo-Positivism tried to deny the notion of God had any meaning. These philosophical visions, whose implications for metaphysics and theology were clear at the outset, were later overcome by criticisms that originated within the world of science, rather than from philosophy.
The issue that, without a doubt, dominated the debate in the second half of the 20th century was the relationship between chance and finality, a paradigm capable of incorporating aspects of many different areas and disciplines. The issue reached the public primarily in the biological theses expounded by Jacques Monod Chance and Necessity , and Richard Dawkins The Blind Watchmaker , , although there have also been a few well-known thinkers in the areas of physics and cosmology e.
Atkins, The Creation , Behe, ; Dembski, ; Shanks, ; Brockman, ; Ayala, In fact, many exponents of this Movement maintain that their rejection of Darwinism makes no allusion to God their adversaries affirm exactly the opposite ; moreover, the debate contains probably on both sides some ideological aspects, which make it difficult to evaluate correctly its philosophical import. Another example of a reductive interpretation of the question of God within a chance-finality paradigm is the alternative between two different kinds of universes.
One is a universe born by chance from nothing, where dependence from time can be eliminated S. Hawking, A Brief History of Time , ; the other is a universe born from a space-time singularity, whose definite boundary conditions would reveal a plan, and eventually a Creator. In the context of the Anthropic Principle, this general paradigm operates again, discriminating between a single universe oriented towards the appearance of life, versus an infinite ensemble of universes, each with parameters set by chance, among which only one had, again by chance, the right parameters to allow the birth of intelligent beings, and in this way evidencing an apparently finalistic orientation.
Just like the previous examples regarding the affirmation and negation of God, the debate about chance and finality also transposed philosophical categories to an empirical level. Words like chance, purpose, necessity, or freedom belong, de facto , to a philosophical dictionary, just as other notions such as probability, consistency, or coincidence, belong only to that of the physical and mathematical sciences. A debate often presented as coming from a scientific framework to decide whether a Creator exists or not is actually a debate between two different philosophies. One philosophy is open to a notion of knowledge capable of transcending the empirical order, while the other is a philosophy which confines human knowledge to the world of phenomena and appearance; one is open to a transcendent foundation of reality responsible for the meaning of all reality, while the other embraces a self-referential, immanent foundation.
Behind the alternative between chance and finality, we can discern the everlasting philosophical struggle between realism and idealism. The idea that the world of science should be the chief field for proving or denying the existence of God, or that it is the best terrain for belief and unbelief to undergo reflection, is nothing but a very narrow and limited vision.
At the same time, theology cannot neglect the quest for understanding that comes from relating the discourse on the world and the discourse on God, even when this quest originates within the context of scientific knowledge. Theology is called to put such a search for unity on its correct epistemological track and acknowledge the philosophical soundness of many reflections arising from science. Theology is also definitely better situated to recognize the true cosmological contexts of its formulations and teachings.
Some of them are certainly a heritage from the past, but the history of the relationship between the discourse on nature and the discourse on God could assist theology in reexamining these contexts, and even altering them in the light of a new physical image of the world. Doing so acknowledges the role the natural sciences have in the work of theologians ; theology favors the contemporary intelligibility of its formulations, and better serves the dignity of their object.
The Epistemological Meaning of a Discourse on God. In any encounter between theology and science, it is not enough to emphasize that the question of God is of everlasting relevance. We should also analyze what kind of discourse on God a culture mainly shaped by science and technology can deem significant cf. Gaudium et spes , 5. Indeed, any discourse on God today is critically evaluated through categories belonging to science and rationality.
The success of technology has a crucial role in this respect. In fact, the notion of a Creator God, Almighty and Provident, implies His dominion over the world and its visible, material effects, that is, over those same effects which technology demands be held under its increasingly sophisticated control.
At a philosophical level the notion of God, in order to be relevant to the world of science, should include a meaningful semantic area of intelligibility that has been tested in the context of the scientific interpretation of the world and its language. Only pure reason , with its theoretical rationality nourished by the experience of the empirical sciences, brings about true knowledge.
Within the realm of pure reason, to affirm or deny something transcendent to the empirical level is impossible: The idea of God is an antinomy, since it is not a possible object of experience. According to Kantian epistemology, the notion of God would make sense only in terms of practical reason , since it would become the object of a practical postulate Ger. God is something thinkable, presumable, or can even be an object of invocation, but God is not knowable. Nevertheless, the profound separation he posits between pure reason and practical reason prevents Kant from seeing science as a source of philosophical human questioning, connecting the world of experience to the problem of existence.
Since these discourses on God refer to non-communicable assertions, which lack any objective validity and are impossible to falsify, they are deemed neither true nor false. According to the more rigorous heritage of logical Neo-Positivism, such assertions would not make sense in any context at all , since there is no knowledge at all, except that which can be empirically verified. It seems, however, that contemporary scientific thought provides new insights in overcoming both Kantian and Neo-Positivistic visions.
Contemporary science does not deny that an area of meaning and intelligibility exists, one that is also important to scientific reason, a semantic area that the scientist grasps from within his or her own research activity. This is the semantic area that calls for a Foundation of the world, for the source of its rationality and intelligibility, for the ultimate reasons for why all things are the way they are and not otherwise.
Here a logos of God becomes meaningful, one which entails sufficient guarantees of universality and meaning. I will try to illustrate this point in progressive arguments. Ludwig Wittgenstein took an important step in this direction. We cannot define it in terms of a formal language; the problem of the meaning of it all is something mystical. The philosophical path blazed by Wittgenstein overcomes the conclusions of Kantian pure reason, because the question of meaning and openness to the inexpressible both arise from an analysis coming from within scientific knowledge, rather than from outside it.
In other words, the problem is meaningful within a wider meta-logic, but it cannot be expressed. The resort to a meta-language is then a necessity arising from the very limits of language as they are acknowledged by language itself. Just like them, Wittgenstein drew a line between what we can speak of and what we must remain silent about. The important difference is that the neo-positivists had nothing to keep silent about. Indeed, for the positivists only that which we can speak about is important in life.
Wittgenstein, on the contrary, passionately believed that what is important in human life is that which, according to his vision, must be held in silence. It concludes the parable of logical empiricism and it lays the foundation for a philosophy capable of recovering a sense of the problem of God. It is a God we still cannot speak about, something or someone we can only show. This would lead to a mounting conflict with two intrinsic problems: Secondly, today it is easier to acknowledge that at the base of the world of facts, and beyond the language of science, there are some metaphysical requirements implicit in scientific knowledge, which are necessary for the work of science itself.
They make science possible, but their justification lies outside the methods of science. A notion of God, here understood as the cause of being and the source of the formal specificities of all natural reality that is, as the cause for why the world is as it is, and not otherwise is prior to any scientific description of the world, through making the world intelligible. It is a metaphysical cause that gives reason to the world, without interfering with it. Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, 6. Wes Morriston - - Philo 4 1: Moser - - Cambridge University Press. The Evidence for God: God and the Processes of Reality: Foundations of a Credible Theism.
Pailin - - Routledge. Carolyn Nystrom - - Moody Press. Towns - - Regal Books. A Grammar of God-Language. Jennings - - Oxford University Press. Charles Billingsley - - Regal Books. Added to PP index Total downloads 32 , of 2,, Recent downloads 6 months 1 , of 2,, How can I increase my downloads? Sign in to use this feature. Faced with the various philosophies, the Fathers were not afraid to acknowledge those elements in them that were consonant with Revelation and those that were not.
Recognition of the points of convergence did not blind them to the points of divergence. In Scholastic theology, the role of philosophically trained reason becomes even more conspicuous under the impulse of Saint Anselm's interpretation of the intellectus fidei. For the saintly Archbishop of Canterbury the priority of faith is not in competition with the search which is proper to reason.
Reason in fact is not asked to pass judgement on the contents of faith, something of which it would be incapable, since this is not its function. Its function is rather to find meaning, to discover explanations which might allow everyone to come to a certain understanding of the contents of faith. Saint Anselm underscores the fact that the intellect must seek that which it loves: Whoever lives for the truth is reaching for a form of knowledge which is fired more and more with love for what it knows, while having to admit that it has not yet attained what it desires: It is at this point, though, that reason can learn where its path will lead in the end: But is there anything so incomprehensible and ineffable as that which is above all things?
Therefore, if that which until now has been a matter of debate concerning the highest essence has been established on the basis of due reasoning, then the foundation of one's certainty is not shaken in the least if the intellect cannot penetrate it in a way that allows clear formulation. If prior thought has concluded rationally that one cannot comprehend rationabiliter comprehendit incomprehensibile esse how supernal wisdom knows its own accomplishments The fundamental harmony between the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of philosophy is once again confirmed.
Faith asks that its object be understood with the help of reason; and at the summit of its searching reason acknowledges that it cannot do without what faith presents. A quite special place in this long development belongs to Saint Thomas, not only because of what he taught but also because of the dialogue which he undertook with the Arab and Jewish thought of his time. In an age when Christian thinkers were rediscovering the treasures of ancient philosophy, and more particularly of Aristotle, Thomas had the great merit of giving pride of place to the harmony which exists between faith and reason.
Both the light of reason and the light of faith come from God, he argued; hence there can be no contradiction between them. More radically, Thomas recognized that nature, philosophy's proper concern, could contribute to the understanding of divine Revelation. Faith therefore has no fear of reason, but seeks it out and has trust in it. Just as grace builds on nature and brings it to fulfilment, 45 so faith builds upon and perfects reason.
Illumined by faith, reason is set free from the fragility and limitations deriving from the disobedience of sin and finds the strength required to rise to the knowledge of the Triune God.
Although he made much of the supernatural character of faith, the Angelic Doctor did not overlook the importance of its reasonableness; indeed he was able to plumb the depths and explain the meaning of this reasonableness. This is why the Church has been justified in consistently proposing Saint Thomas as a master of thought and a model of the right way to do theology. He passed therefore into the history of Christian thought as a pioneer of the new path of philosophy and universal culture. Another of the great insights of Saint Thomas was his perception of the role of the Holy Spirit in the process by which knowledge matures into wisdom.
From the first pages of his Summa Theologiae , 48 Aquinas was keen to show the primacy of the wisdom which is the gift of the Holy Spirit and which opens the way to a knowledge of divine realities. His theology allows us to understand what is distinctive of wisdom in its close link with faith and knowledge of the divine. This wisdom comes to know by way of connaturality; it presupposes faith and eventually formulates its right judgement on the basis of the truth of faith itself: This second wisdom is acquired through study, but the first 'comes from on high', as Saint James puts it.
This also distinguishes it from faith, since faith accepts divine truth as it is. Yet the priority accorded this wisdom does not lead the Angelic Doctor to overlook the presence of two other complementary forms of wisdom— philosophical wisdom, which is based upon the capacity of the intellect, for all its natural limitations, to explore reality, and theological wisdom, which is based upon Revelation and which explores the contents of faith, entering the very mystery of God.
He sought truth wherever it might be found and gave consummate demonstration of its universality. With the rise of the first universities, theology came more directly into contact with other forms of learning and scientific research. Although they insisted upon the organic link between theology and philosophy, Saint Albert the Great and Saint Thomas were the first to recognize the autonomy which philosophy and the sciences needed if they were to perform well in their respective fields of research. From the late Medieval period onwards, however, the legitimate distinction between the two forms of learning became more and more a fateful separation.
As a result of the exaggerated rationalism of certain thinkers, positions grew more radical and there emerged eventually a philosophy which was separate from and absolutely independent of the contents of faith. Another of the many consequences of this separation was an ever deeper mistrust with regard to reason itself. In a spirit both sceptical and agnostic, some began to voice a general mistrust, which led some to focus more on faith and others to deny its rationality altogether.
In short, what for Patristic and Medieval thought was in both theory and practice a profound unity, producing knowledge capable of reaching the highest forms of speculation, was destroyed by systems which espoused the cause of rational knowledge sundered from faith and meant to take the place of faith. The more influential of these radical positions are well known and high in profile, especially in the history of the West. It is not too much to claim that the development of a good part of modern philosophy has seen it move further and further away from Christian Revelation, to the point of setting itself quite explicitly in opposition.
This process reached its apogee in the last century. Some representatives of idealism sought in various ways to transform faith and its contents, even the mystery of the Death and Resurrection of Jesus, into dialectical structures which could be grasped by reason. Opposed to this kind of thinking were various forms of atheistic humanism, expressed in philosophical terms, which regarded faith as alienating and damaging to the development of a full rationality. They did not hesitate to present themselves as new religions serving as a basis for projects which, on the political and social plane, gave rise to totalitarian systems which have been disastrous for humanity.
In the field of scientific research, a positivistic mentality took hold which not only abandoned the Christian vision of the world, but more especially rejected every appeal to a metaphysical or moral vision. It follows that certain scientists, lacking any ethical point of reference, are in danger of putting at the centre of their concerns something other than the human person and the entirety of the person's life. Further still, some of these, sensing the opportunities of technological progress, seem to succumb not only to a market-based logic, but also to the temptation of a quasi-divine power over nature and even over the human being.
As a result of the crisis of rationalism, what has appeared finally is nihilism. As a philosophy of nothingness, it has a certain attraction for people of our time. Its adherents claim that the search is an end in itself, without any hope or possibility of ever attaining the goal of truth. In the nihilist interpretation, life is no more than an occasion for sensations and experiences in which the ephemeral has pride of place. Nihilism is at the root of the widespread mentality which claims that a definitive commitment should no longer be made, because everything is fleeting and provisional.
It should also be borne in mind that the role of philosophy itself has changed in modern culture. From universal wisdom and learning, it has been gradually reduced to one of the many fields of human knowing; indeed in some ways it has been consigned to a wholly marginal role. Other forms of rationality have acquired an ever higher profile, making philosophical learning appear all the more peripheral. In my first Encyclical Letter I stressed the danger of absolutizing such an approach when I wrote: All too soon, and often in an unforeseeable way, what this manifold activity of man yields is not only subject to 'alienation', in the sense that it is simply taken away from the person who produces it, but rather it turns against man himself, at least in part, through the indirect consequences of its effects returning on himself.
It is or can be directed against him. This seems to make up the main chapter of the drama of present-day human existence in its broadest and universal dimension. Man therefore lives increasingly in fear. In the wake of these cultural shifts, some philosophers have abandoned the search for truth in itself and made their sole aim the attainment of a subjective certainty or a pragmatic sense of utility.
This in turn has obscured the true dignity of reason, which is no longer equipped to know the truth and to seek the absolute. This rapid survey of the history of philosophy, then, reveals a growing separation between faith and philosophical reason. Yet closer scrutiny shows that even in the philosophical thinking of those who helped drive faith and reason further apart there are found at times precious and seminal insights which, if pursued and developed with mind and heart rightly tuned, can lead to the discovery of truth's way.
Such insights are found, for instance, in penetrating analyses of perception and experience, of the imaginary and the unconscious, of personhood and intersubjectivity, of freedom and values, of time and history. The theme of death as well can become for all thinkers an incisive appeal to seek within themselves the true meaning of their own life. But this does not mean that the link between faith and reason as it now stands does not need to be carefully examined, because each without the other is impoverished and enfeebled.
Deprived of what Revelation offers, reason has taken side-tracks which expose it to the danger of losing sight of its final goal. Deprived of reason, faith has stressed feeling and experience, and so run the risk of no longer being a universal proposition. It is an illusion to think that faith, tied to weak reasoning, might be more penetrating; on the contrary, faith then runs the grave risk of withering into myth or superstition. By the same token, reason which is unrelated to an adult faith is not prompted to turn its gaze to the newness and radicality of being.
This is why I make this strong and insistent appeal—not, I trust, untimely—that faith and philosophy recover the profound unity which allows them to stand in harmony with their nature without compromising their mutual autonomy. The parrhesia of faith must be matched by the boldness of reason. The Church has no philosophy of her own nor does she canonize any one particular philosophy in preference to others. Otherwise there would be no guarantee that it would remain oriented to truth and that it was moving towards truth by way of a process governed by reason.
A philosophy which did not proceed in the light of reason according to its own principles and methods would serve little purpose. At the deepest level, the autonomy which philosophy enjoys is rooted in the fact that reason is by its nature oriented to truth and is equipped moreover with the means necessary to arrive at truth. Yet history shows that philosophy—especially modern philosophy—has taken wrong turns and fallen into error. It is neither the task nor the competence of the Magisterium to intervene in order to make good the lacunas of deficient philosophical discourse. Rather, it is the Magisterium's duty to respond clearly and strongly when controversial philosophical opinions threaten right understanding of what has been revealed, and when false and partial theories which sow the seed of serious error, confusing the pure and simple faith of the People of God, begin to spread more widely.
In the light of faith, therefore, the Church's Magisterium can and must authoritatively exercise a critical discernment of opinions and philosophies which contradict Christian doctrine. Moreover, as philosophical learning has developed, different schools of thought have emerged.
This pluralism also imposes upon the Magisterium the responsibility of expressing a judgement as to whether or not the basic tenets of these different schools are compatible with the demands of the word of God and theological enquiry. It is the Church's duty to indicate the elements in a philosophical system which are incompatible with her own faith. In fact, many philosophical opinions—concerning God, the human being, human freedom and ethical behaviour— engage the Church directly, because they touch on the revealed truth of which she is the guardian.
This discernment, however, should not be seen as primarily negative, as if the Magisterium intended to abolish or limit any possible mediation. On the contrary, the Magisterium's interventions are intended above all to prompt, promote and encourage philosophical enquiry. Besides, philosophers are the first to understand the need for self-criticism, the correction of errors and the extension of the too restricted terms in which their thinking has been framed. In particular, it is necessary to keep in mind the unity of truth, even if its formulations are shaped by history and produced by human reason wounded and weakened by sin.
This is why no historical form of philosophy can legitimately claim to embrace the totality of truth, nor to be the complete explanation of the human being, of the world and of the human being's relationship with God. Today, then, with the proliferation of systems, methods, concepts and philosophical theses which are often extremely complex, the need for a critical discernment in the light of faith becomes more urgent, even if it remains a daunting task.
Given all of reason's inherent and historical limitations, it is difficult enough to recognize the inalienable powers proper to it; but it is still more difficult at times to discern in specific philosophical claims what is valid and fruitful from faith's point of view and what is mistaken or dangerous. It is not only in recent times that the Magisterium of the Church has intervened to make its mind known with regard to particular philosophical teachings. It is enough to recall, by way of example, the pronouncements made through the centuries concerning theories which argued in favour of the pre-existence of the soul, 56 or concerning the different forms of idolatry and esoteric superstition found in astrological speculations, 57 without forgetting the more systematic pronouncements against certain claims of Latin Averroism which were incompatible with the Christian faith.
If the Magisterium has spoken out more frequently since the middle of the last century, it is because in that period not a few Catholics felt it their duty to counter various streams of modern thought with a philosophy of their own. At this point, the Magisterium of the Church was obliged to be vigilant lest these philosophies developed in ways which were themselves erroneous and negative.
The censures were delivered even-handedly: The positive elements of this debate were assembled in the Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius , in which for the first time an Ecumenical Council—in this case, the First Vatican Council—pronounced solemnly on the relationship between reason and faith. The teaching contained in this document strongly and positively marked the philosophical research of many believers and remains today a standard reference-point for correct and coherent Christian thinking in this regard.
The Magisterium's pronouncements have been concerned less with individual philosophical theses than with the need for rational and hence ultimately philosophical knowledge for the understanding of faith. In synthesizing and solemnly reaffirming the teachings constantly proposed to the faithful by the ordinary Papal Magisterium, the First Vatican Council showed how inseparable and at the same time how distinct were faith and reason, Revelation and natural knowledge of God.
The Council began with the basic criterion, presupposed by Revelation itself, of the natural knowability of the existence of God, the beginning and end of all things, 63 and concluded with the solemn assertion quoted earlier: Against the temptations of fideism, however, it was necessary to stress the unity of truth and thus the positive contribution which rational knowledge can and must make to faith's knowledge: In our own century too the Magisterium has revisited the theme on a number of occasions, warning against the lure of rationalism.
Here the pronouncements of Pope Saint Pius X are pertinent, stressing as they did that at the basis of Modernism were philosophical claims which were phenomenist, agnostic and immanentist. In accomplishing its specific task in service of the Roman Pontiff's universal Magisterium, 70 the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith has more recently had to intervene to re-emphasize the danger of an uncritical adoption by some liberation theologians of opinions and methods drawn from Marxism. In the past, then, the Magisterium has on different occasions and in different ways offered its discernment in philosophical matters.
Although the notion of God is associated with the search for an answer to ultimate questions, it does not belong to speculative knowledge, or theoretical philosophy, only. To everything they do, they bring something which sets them apart from the rest of creation: All this is just too much for yet another interlocutor in the dialogue, Callicles. As a search for truth within the natural order, the enterprise of philosophy is always open—at least implicitly—to the supernatural. Another example of a reductive interpretation of the question of God within a chance-finality paradigm is the alternative between two different kinds of universes.
My revered Predecessors have thus made an invaluable contribution which must not be forgotten. Surveying the situation today, we see that the problems of other times have returned, but in a new key. It is no longer a matter of questions of interest only to certain individuals and groups, but convictions so widespread that they have become to some extent the common mind. Philosophy is expected to rest content with more modest tasks such as the simple interpretation of facts or an enquiry into restricted fields of human knowing or its structures. In theology too the temptations of other times have reappeared.
In some contemporary theologies, for instance, a certain rationalism is gaining ground, especially when opinions thought to be philosophically well founded are taken as normative for theological research. This happens particularly when theologians, through lack of philosophical competence, allow themselves to be swayed uncritically by assertions which have become part of current parlance and culture but which are poorly grounded in reason. There are also signs of a resurgence of fideism , which fails to recognize the importance of rational knowledge and philosophical discourse for the understanding of faith, indeed for the very possibility of belief in God.
In consequence, the word of God is identified with Sacred Scripture alone, thus eliminating the doctrine of the Church which the Second Vatican Council stressed quite specifically. Having recalled that the word of God is present in both Scripture and Tradition, 73 the Constitution Dei Verbum continues emphatically: Moreover, one should not underestimate the danger inherent in seeking to derive the truth of Sacred Scripture from the use of one method alone, ignoring the need for a more comprehensive exegesis which enables the exegete, together with the whole Church, to arrive at the full sense of the texts.
Those who devote themselves to the study of Sacred Scripture should always remember that the various hermeneutical approaches have their own philosophical underpinnings, which need to be carefully evaluated before they are applied to the sacred texts. Other modes of latent fideism appear in the scant consideration accorded to speculative theology, and in disdain for the classical philosophy from which the terms of both the understanding of faith and the actual formulation of dogma have been drawn. My revered Predecessor Pope Pius XII warned against such neglect of the philosophical tradition and against abandonment of the traditional terminology.
In brief, there are signs of a widespread distrust of universal and absolute statements, especially among those who think that truth is born of consensus and not of a consonance between intellect and objective reality. In a world subdivided into so many specialized fields, it is not hard to see how difficult it can be to acknowledge the full and ultimate meaning of life which has traditionally been the goal of philosophy. Nonetheless, in the light of faith which finds in Jesus Christ this ultimate meaning, I cannot but encourage philosophers—be they Christian or not—to trust in the power of human reason and not to set themselves goals that are too modest in their philosophizing.
The lesson of history in this millennium now drawing to a close shows that this is the path to follow: It is faith which stirs reason to move beyond all isolation and willingly to run risks so that it may attain whatever is beautiful, good and true.
Faith thus becomes the convinced and convincing advocate of reason. Yet the Magisterium does more than point out the misperceptions and the mistakes of philosophical theories. With no less concern it has sought to stress the basic principles of a genuine renewal of philosophical enquiry, indicating as well particular paths to be taken.
The great Pope revisited and developed the First Vatican Council's teaching on the relationship between faith and reason, showing how philosophical thinking contributes in fundamental ways to faith and theological learning. A renewed insistence upon the thought of the Angelic Doctor seemed to Pope Leo XIII the best way to recover the practice of a philosophy consonant with the demands of faith.
The positive results of the papal summons are well known. Studies of the thought of Saint Thomas and other Scholastic writers received new impetus. Historical studies flourished, resulting in a rediscovery of the riches of Medieval thought, which until then had been largely unknown; and there emerged new Thomistic schools.
With the use of historical method, knowledge of the works of Saint Thomas increased greatly, and many scholars had courage enough to introduce the Thomistic tradition into the philosophical and theological discussions of the day. The most influential Catholic theologians of the present century, to whose thinking and research the Second Vatican Council was much indebted, were products of this revival of Thomistic philosophy.
Throughout the twentieth century, the Church has been served by a powerful array of thinkers formed in the school of the Angelic Doctor.
Yet the Thomistic and neo-Thomistic revival was not the only sign of a resurgence of philosophical thought in culture of Christian inspiration. Earlier still, and parallel to Pope Leo's call, there had emerged a number of Catholic philosophers who, adopting more recent currents of thought and according to a specific method, produced philosophical works of great influence and lasting value. Some devised syntheses so remarkable that they stood comparison with the great systems of idealism.
Others established the epistemological foundations for a new consideration of faith in the light of a renewed understanding of moral consciousness; others again produced a philosophy which, starting with an analysis of immanence, opened the way to the transcendent; and there were finally those who sought to combine the demands of faith with the perspective of phenomenological method.
From different quarters, then, modes of philosophical speculation have continued to emerge and have sought to keep alive the great tradition of Christian thought which unites faith and reason. The Second Vatican Council, for its part, offers a rich and fruitful teaching concerning philosophy. I cannot fail to note, especially in the context of this Encyclical Letter, that one chapter of the Constitution Gaudium et Spes amounts to a virtual compendium of the biblical anthropology from which philosophy too can draw inspiration.
The chapter deals with the value of the human person created in the image of God, explains the dignity and superiority of the human being over the rest of creation, and declares the transcendent capacity of human reason. For Adam, the first man, was a type of him who was to come, Christ the Lord. The Council also dealt with the study of philosophy required of candidates for the priesthood; and its recommendations have implications for Christian education as a whole.
These are the Council's words: These directives have been reiterated and developed in a number of other magisterial documents in order to guarantee a solid philosophical formation, especially for those preparing for theological studies. I have myself emphasized several times the importance of this philosophical formation for those who one day, in their pastoral life, will have to address the aspirations of the contemporary world and understand the causes of certain behaviour in order to respond in appropriate ways.
If it has been necessary from time to time to intervene on this question, to reiterate the value of the Angelic Doctor's insights and insist on the study of his thought, this has been because the Magisterium's directives have not always been followed with the readiness one would wish. In the years after the Second Vatican Council, many Catholic faculties were in some ways impoverished by a diminished sense of the importance of the study not just of Scholastic philosophy but more generally of the study of philosophy itself.
I cannot fail to note with surprise and displeasure that this lack of interest in the study of philosophy is shared by not a few theologians. There are various reasons for this disenchantment. First, there is the distrust of reason found in much contemporary philosophy, which has largely abandoned metaphysical study of the ultimate human questions in order to concentrate upon problems which are more detailed and restricted, at times even purely formal.
On a number of occasions, the Second Vatican Council stressed the positive value of scientific research for a deeper knowledge of the mystery of the human being. A further factor is the renewed interest in the inculturation of faith. The life of the young Churches in particular has brought to light, together with sophisticated modes of thinking, an array of expressions of popular wisdom; and this constitutes a genuine cultural wealth of traditions.
Yet the study of traditional ways must go hand in hand with philosophical enquiry, an enquiry which will allow the positive traits of popular wisdom to emerge and forge the necessary link with the proclamation of the Gospel. I wish to repeat clearly that the study of philosophy is fundamental and indispensable to the structure of theological studies and to the formation of candidates for the priesthood. It is not by chance that the curriculum of theological studies is preceded by a time of special study of philosophy. This decision, confirmed by the Fifth Lateran Council, 87 is rooted in the experience which matured through the Middle Ages, when the importance of a constructive harmony of philosophical and theological learning emerged.
This ordering of studies influenced, promoted and enabled much of the development of modern philosophy, albeit indirectly. Conversely, the dismantling of this arrangement has created serious gaps in both priestly formation and theological research. Consider, for instance, the disregard of modern thought and culture which has led either to a refusal of any kind of dialogue or to an indiscriminate acceptance of any kind of philosophy. I trust most sincerely that these difficulties will be overcome by an intelligent philosophical and theological formation, which must never be lacking in the Church.
For the reasons suggested here, it has seemed to me urgent to re-emphasize with this Encyclical Letter the Church's intense interest in philosophy—indeed the intimate bond which ties theological work to the philosophical search for truth. From this comes the Magisterium's duty to discern and promote philosophical thinking which is not at odds with faith.
It is my task to state principles and criteria which in my judgement are necessary in order to restore a harmonious and creative relationship between theology and philosophy. In the light of these principles and criteria, it will be possible to discern with greater clarity what link, if any, theology should forge with the different philosophical opinions or systems which the world of today presents. The word of God is addressed to all people, in every age and in every part of the world; and the human being is by nature a philosopher.
As a reflective and scientific elaboration of the understanding of God's word in the light of faith, theology for its part must relate, in some of its procedures and in the performance of its specific tasks, to the philosophies which have been developed through the ages. I have no wish to direct theologians to particular methods, since that is not the competence of the Magisterium.
I wish instead to recall some specific tasks of theology which, by the very nature of the revealed word, demand recourse to philosophical enquiry. Theology is structured as an understanding of faith in the light of a twofold methodological principle: With the first, theology makes its own the content of Revelation as this has been gradually expounded in Sacred Tradition, Sacred Scripture and the Church's living Magisterium. Philosophy contributes specifically to theology in preparing for a correct auditus fidei with its study of the structure of knowledge and personal communication, especially the various forms and functions of language.
No less important is philosophy's contribution to a more coherent understanding of Church Tradition, the pronouncements of the Magisterium and the teaching of the great masters of theology, who often adopt concepts and thought-forms drawn from a particular philosophical tradition. In this case, the theologian is summoned not only to explain the concepts and terms used by the Church in her thinking and the development of her teaching, but also to know in depth the philosophical systems which may have influenced those concepts and terms, in order to formulate correct and consistent interpretations of them.
The intellectus fidei expounds this truth, not only in grasping the logical and conceptual structure of the propositions in which the Church's teaching is framed, but also, indeed primarily, in bringing to light the salvific meaning of these propositions for the individual and for humanity. From the sum of these propositions, the believer comes to know the history of salvation, which culminates in the person of Jesus Christ and in his Paschal Mystery.
Believers then share in this mystery by their assent of faith. For its part, dogmatic theology must be able to articulate the universal meaning of the mystery of the One and Triune God and of the economy of salvation, both as a narrative and, above all, in the form of argument. It must do so, in other words, through concepts formulated in a critical and universally communicable way.
Without philosophy's contribution, it would in fact be impossible to discuss theological issues such as, for example, the use of language to speak about God, the personal relations within the Trinity, God's creative activity in the world, the relationship between God and man, or Christ's identity as true God and true man. This is no less true of the different themes of moral theology, which employ concepts such as the moral law, conscience, freedom, personal responsibility and guilt, which are in part defined by philosophical ethics.
It is necessary therefore that the mind of the believer acquire a natural, consistent and true knowledge of created realities—the world and man himself—which are also the object of divine Revelation. Still more, reason must be able to articulate this knowledge in concept and argument. Speculative dogmatic theology thus presupposes and implies a philosophy of the human being, the world and, more radically, of being, which has objective truth as its foundation. With its specific character as a discipline charged with giving an account of faith cf. Recalling the teaching of Saint Paul cf.
In studying Revelation and its credibility, as well as the corresponding act of faith, fundamental theology should show how, in the light of the knowledge conferred by faith, there emerge certain truths which reason, from its own independent enquiry, already perceives. Revelation endows these truths with their fullest meaning, directing them towards the richness of the revealed mystery in which they find their ultimate purpose.
Consider, for example, the natural knowledge of God, the possibility of distinguishing divine Revelation from other phenomena or the recognition of its credibility, the capacity of human language to speak in a true and meaningful way even of things which transcend all human experience. From all these truths, the mind is led to acknowledge the existence of a truly propaedeutic path to faith, one which can lead to the acceptance of Revelation without in any way compromising the principles and autonomy of the mind itself.
Similarly, fundamental theology should demonstrate the profound compatibility that exists between faith and its need to find expression by way of human reason fully free to give its assent. Although faith, a gift of God, is not based on reason, it can certainly not dispense with it. Moral theology has perhaps an even greater need of philosophy's contribution.
In the New Testament, human life is much less governed by prescriptions than in the Old Testament. Life in the Spirit leads believers to a freedom and responsibility which surpass the Law. Yet the Gospel and the Apostolic writings still set forth both general principles of Christian conduct and specific teachings and precepts. In order to apply these to the particular circumstances of individual and communal life, Christians must be able fully to engage their conscience and the power of their reason.
In other words, moral theology requires a sound philosophical vision of human nature and society, as well as of the general principles of ethical decision-making. It might be objected that the theologian should nowadays rely less on philosophy than on the help of other kinds of human knowledge, such as history and above all the sciences, the extraordinary advances of which in recent times stir such admiration. Others, more alert to the link between faith and culture, claim that theology should look more to the wisdom contained in peoples' traditions than to a philosophy of Greek and Eurocentric provenance.
Others still, prompted by a mistaken notion of cultural pluralism, simply deny the universal value of the Church's philosophical heritage. There is some truth in these claims which are acknowledged in the teaching of the Council. Indeed, this kind of thinking is required for a fruitful exchange between cultures.
What I wish to emphasize is the duty to go beyond the particular and concrete, lest the prime task of demonstrating the universality of faith's content be abandoned. Because of its implications for both philosophy and theology, the question of the relationship with cultures calls for particular attention, which cannot however claim to be exhaustive. From the time the Gospel was first preached, the Church has known the process of encounter and engagement with cultures. A passage of Saint Paul's letter to the Christians of Ephesus helps us to understand how the early community responded to the problem.
In the light of this text, we reflect further to see how the Gentiles were transformed once they had embraced the faith. With the richness of the salvation wrought by Christ, the walls separating the different cultures collapsed. God's promise in Christ now became a universal offer: From their different locations and traditions all are called in Christ to share in the unity of the family of God's children. Jesus destroys the walls of division and creates unity in a new and unsurpassed way through our sharing in his mystery. This unity is so deep that the Church can say with Saint Paul: This simple statement contains a great truth: When they are deeply rooted in experience, cultures show forth the human being's characteristic openness to the universal and the transcendent.
Therefore they offer different paths to the truth, which assuredly serve men and women well in revealing values which can make their life ever more human. Inseparable as they are from people and their history, cultures share the dynamics which the human experience of life reveals. They change and advance because people meet in new ways and share with each other their ways of life.
Cultures are fed by the communication of values, and they survive and flourish insofar as they remain open to assimilating new experiences. How are we to explain these dynamics? All people are part of a culture, depend upon it and shape it. Human beings are both child and parent of the culture in which they are immersed.