Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Volume 3

Hegel: Lectures on the History of Philosophy

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The Idea of Christianity 1b.

The Church Fathers 1c. Renaissance and Reformation 2.

Lectures on the history of philosophy

Beginnings of Modern Philosophy: Bacon and Boehme 2b. First Period of Metaphysics: Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche 2c. Critique and Second Period of Metaphysics: Locke, Leibniz, and Others 2d. Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide.

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Lectures on the History of Philosophy - Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel - Google Книги

Lectures on the History of Philosophy Robert F. The second form is Scepticism and Criticism with regard to the thinking understanding, to metaphysics as such, and to the universal of empiricism; here we shall go on to speak of representatives of the Scottish, German, and French philosophies; the French materialists again turn back to metaphysics. In metaphysics itself we have, however, the opposition between substantiality and individuality.

What comes first is the spontaneous, but likewise uncritical, metaphysics, and it is represented by Descartes and Spinoza, who assert the unity of Being and thought. The second stage is found in Locke, who treats of the opposition itself inasmuch as he considers the metaphysical Idea of experience, that is the origin of thoughts and their justification, not yet entering on the question of whether they are absolutely true.

In the third place we have Leibnitz's monad - the world viewed as a totality. We here encounter the innate ideas of Descartes. The philosophy of Spinoza, in the second place, is related to the philosophy of Descartes as its necessary development only; the method is an important part of it. A method which stands alongside of Spinozism and which is also a perfected development of Cartesianism, is, in the third place, that by which Malebranche has represented this philosophy.

It was Locke who became the instrument of setting forth this entire manner of thinking in a systematic way, for he worked out Bacon's position more fully. And if Bacon made sensuous Being to be the truth, Locke demonstrated the universal, Thought, to be present in sensuous Being, or showed that we obtained the universal, the true, from experience.

From Locke a wide culture proceeds, influencing English philosophers more especially; the forms adopted by this school were various, but the principle was the same; it became a general method of regarding things in a popular way, and calls itself Philosophy, although the object of Philosophy is not to be met with here.

Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston 5. The third development of the philosophy of the understanding is that represented by Leibnitz and Wolff. If Wolff's metaphysics is divested of its rigid form, we have as a result the later popular philosophy. THE decadence which we find in thought until the philosophy of Kant is reached, is manifested in what was at this time advocated in opposition to the metaphysic of the understanding, and which may be called a general popular philosophy, a reflecting empiricism, which to a greater or less extent becomes itself a metaphysic; just as, on the other hand, that metaphysic, in as far as it extended to particular sciences, becomes empiricism.

And in distinction to the assertion that we only find the solution in the principles of a fixed and permanent content form a reconciliation here and now, they adopt a position of independence, and assume an intellectual standing-ground which they find in what has generally been termed the healthy human understanding.

Such determinations may indeed be found to be perfectly good and valid if the feelings, intuitions, heart and understanding of man be morally and intellectually fashioned; for in that case better and more noble feelings and desires may rule in men and a more universal content, may be expressed in these principles. But when men make what we call sound reason - that which is by nature implanted in man's breast - into the content and the principle, the healthy human understanding discovers itself to be identical with a feeling and knowledge belonging to nature.

But the healthy human understanding and the natural feeling of rude and barbarous Turks, when taken as a standard, result in shocking principles. When we speak of healthy human understanding, however, of natural feelings, we always have before our eyes a cultured mind; and those who make the healthy human reason, the natural knowledge, the immediate feelings and inspirations found in themselves, into a rule and standard, do not know that when religion, morality, and rectitude are discovered to be present in the human breast, this is due to culture and education, which are the first to make such principles into natural feelings.

Here natural feelings and the healthy human understanding are thus made the principle; and much may be recognized as coming under these heads. This then is the form taken by Philosophy in the eighteenth century. Taken as a whole, three points of view have to be considered; in the first place, Hume must be regarded on his own account, then the Scottish, and, thirdly, the French philosophy.

Hume is a sceptic; the Scottish philosophy opposes the scepticism of Hume, the French philosophy has in the "enlightenment" of Germany by which expression is indicated that form of German philosophy which is not Wolffian metaphysics an appendage of a feebler form.

Since from the metaphysical God we can make no further progress in the concrete, Locke grounds his content on experience. But that empiricism leads thought to no fixed standpoint, Hume demonstrates by denying every universal; the Scottish philosophers, on the contrary, undoubtedly maintain universal propositions and truths, but not through thought. They do not, however, find its content in and from thought, but as living substance, as nature and matter. All this is a further working out of reflecting empiricism, and some more details respecting it must still be given.

Thought generally is simple, universal self-identity, but in the form of negative movement, whereby the determinate abrogates itself. This movement of Being-for-self is now an essential moment of thought, while hitherto it was outside it; and thus grasping itself as movement in itself, thought is self-consciousness - at first indeed formal, as individual self-consciousness.

Such a form it has in scepticism, but this distinction marks it off from the older scepticism, that now the certainty of reality is made the starting point. With the ancients, on the contrary, scepticism is the return into individual consciousness in such a way that to it this consciousness is not the truth, in other words that scepticism does not give expression to the results arrived at, and attains no positive significance.

But since in the modern world this absolute substantiality, this unity of implicitude and self-consciousness is fundamental - that is, this faith in reality generally - scepticism has here the form of idealism, i.

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The crudest form of this idealism is when self-consciousness, as individual or formal, does not proceed further than to say: All objects are our conceptions. We find this subjective idealism in Berkeley, 1 and another form of the same in Hume. In Scotland quite another school of thought developed, and the Scotch are the foremost of Hume's opponents; in German philosophy, on the other hand, we have to recognize in Kant another opposing force to that of Hume.

To the Scottish school many philosophers belong; English philosophy is now restricted to Edinburgh and Glasgow, in which places a number of professors belonging to this school succeeded one another. To the scepticism of Hume they oppose an inward independent source of truth for all that pertains to religion and morality. This coincides with Kant, who also maintains an inward source or spring as against external perception; but in the case of Kant this has quite another form than that which it possesses with the Scottish philosophers.

To them this inward independent source is not thought or reason as such, for the content which comes to pass from this inwardness is concrete in its nature, and likewise demands for itself the external matter of experience. It consists of popular principles, which on the one hand are opposed to the externality of the sources of knowledge, and, on the other, to metaphysics as such, to abstract thought or reasoning on its own account.

This sort of reasoning understanding applied itself to ethics and to politics - sciences which have been much developed by German, French, and above all by Scottish philosophers supra , p. Many of their works are translated into German; several of these on ethics or morality are translated by Garve, for instance, who also translated Cicero De Officiis , and they are written in a manner similar to that of Cicero when he uses the expression Insitum est a natura Vol.

This moral sentiment and the ordinary human understanding hereafter formed the common principle to a whole succession of Scots, such as Thomas Reid, Beattie, Oswald, and others; in this way they frequently made sagacious observations, but with them speculative philosophy quite disappears.

Lectures on the History of Philosophy

One special characteristic of these Scottish philosophers is that they have sought accurately to define the principle of knowledge; but on the whole they start from the same point as that which was in Germany likewise accepted as the principle. That is to say they represented the so-called healthy reason, or common-sense sensus communis , as the ground of truth.

The following are the principal members of this school, each of whom has some special feature distinguishing him from the rest. The Negative Aspect 2. Idea of a Concrete Universal Unity. Opposition between Sensation and Thought b. IN the philosophy of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, the revolution to which in Germany mind has in these latter days advanced, was formally thought out and expressed; the sequence of these philosophies shows the course which thought has taken.

In this great epoch of the world's history, whose inmost essence is laid hold of in the philosophy of history, two nations only have played a part, the German and the French, and this in spite of their absolute opposition, or rather because they are so opposite. The other nations have taken no real inward part in the same, although politically they have indeed so done, both through their governments and their people. In Germany this principle has burst forth as thought, spirit, Notion; in France, in the form of actuality.

Section Three

In Germany, what there is of actuality comes to us as a force of external circumstances, and as a reaction against the same. The task of modern German philosophy is, however, summed up in taking as its object the unity of thought and Being, which is the fundamental idea of philosophy generally, and comprehending it, that is, in laying hold of the inmost significance of necessity, the Notion supra , p. The philosophy of Kant sets forth, in the first place, the formal aspect of the task, but it has the abstract absoluteness of reason in self-consciousness as its sole result, and, in one respect, it carried with it a certain character of shallowness and want of vigour, in which an attitude of criticism and negativity is retained, and which, as far as any positive element is concerned, adheres to the facts of consciousness and to mere conjecture, while it renounces thought and returns to feeling.

On the other hand, however, there sprang from this the philosophy of Fichte, which speculatively grasps the essence of self-consciousness as concrete egoism, but which does not reach beyond this subjective form pertaining to the absolute. From it again comes the philosophy of Schelling, which subsequently rejects Fichte's teaching and sets forth the Idea of the Absolute, the truth in and for itself.

The First Principles of Fichte's Philosophy 2. Fichte's System in a Re-constituted Form 3. The More Important of the Followers of Fichte. Friedrich von Schlegel b. In the lectures of and Berkeley was passed over by Hegel; in both courses Hume follows directly after the Scottish and French philosophers, and thus comes immediately before Kant; in the course of the French philosophy precedes the Scottish also. The lectures presented herein were first published between in volumes in the first edition of Hegel's Werke. They were edited by Hegel's former student, Karl Ludwig Michelet.

According to Frederick C. Press, , the source material consisted of Hegel's notebook from his Jena lectures , a fragment written by Hegel on the history of philosophy, Hegel's introduction to his Berlin lectures , and several sets of student lecture notes. According to Haldane, the Jena volume is "made the basis, as representing the main elements of the subject afterwards to be more fully amplified The present translation - the first part of which was published in - is taken from this shortened edition. The translator's footnotes have been added by Carl Mickelson.

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