Joint Security Operations in Theater: Joint Publication 3-10

Joint Special Operations Command

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It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other JFCs and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance.

Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational alliance or coalition military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

Liked conceptual slide that reminded me of BeInformed Story: The goal of MAMA is to enhance cyber-situational awareness by the automated assessment of mission execution through the analysis of network traffic flows. The goal of the Living Plan is to transform Air Force planning and operations assessment from a disjointed static approach based on paper documents into a unified dynamic and computational approach. The Dictionary is available for browsing, searching, or can be downloaded in the formats below.

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, is the capstone publication for all joint doctrine, presenting fundamental principles and overarching guidance for the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States. It specifies the authorized command relationships and authority that military commanders can use, provides guidance for the exercise of that military authority, provides fundamental principles and guidance for command and control, prescribes guidance for organizing and developing joint forces, and describes policy for selected joint activities.

It also provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multiagency and multinational operations. Also includes publications used in development of Joint Doctrine. This instruction establishes joint doctrine development policy to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in implementing his responsibility to develop doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces.

This instruction establishes policy for the standardization of Department of Defense and multinational terminology. This manual sets forth procedures for joint doctrine development in support of the CJCS responsibility for developing doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces. This publication sets forth standard US military and associated terminology to encompass the joint activity of the Armed Forces of the United States. These military and associated terms, together with their definitions, constitute approved Department of Defense DOD terminology for general use by all DOD components.

Doctrine for planning, coordinating, and providing personnel support to joint operations. It also provides information relating to the functions, authorities, and responsibilities of a combatant commander, joint force commander and staffs, and the Service components as they relate to personnel management and selected activities that support the personnel needs of the joint force. This publication provides doctrine for planning, coordinating, and providing personnel support to joint operations.

This publication provides joint doctrine and information for the planning, preparation, and execution of legal support to joint military operations. This publication provides doctrine for religious affairs in joint operations. This publication provides doctrine for financial management in support of joint operations, to include multinational and interagency financial coordination considerations. Doctrine for conducting joint and multinational intelligence activities across the range of military operations. This publication is the keystone document of the joint intelligence series.

It provides fundamental principles and guidance for intelligence support to joint operations. This publication provides doctrine for joint and national intelligence products, services, and support to joint military operations. Provides the doctrinal foundation and fundamental principles that guide the Armed Forces of the United States in the conduct of joint operations across the range of military operations. This publication provides doctrine for joint counterair operations and protection against air and missile threats across the range of military operations.

This publication provides overarching joint doctrine to plan, conduct, and assess amphibious operations. This publication provides doctrine for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing joint interdiction operations. This publication provides doctrine for planning, coordinating, and conducting joint shipboard helicopter and tiltrotor aircraft operations from United States air-capable ships.

This publication provides overarching doctrine for special operations and the employment and support for special operations forces across the range of military operations. This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of joint operations in an urban environment. This publication provides doctrine for the conduct of stability operations during joint operations within the broader context of US Government efforts. This publication provides joint doctrine for the coordination of military operations with US Government agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for planning, coordinating, executing, and assessing joint fire support during military operations. This publication provides doctrine for the planning and execution of joint security operations. This publication provides doctrine for planning, conducting, and assessing military operations in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear environments.

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of joint cyberspace operations across the range of military operations. This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of information operations across the range of military operations. This publication provides joint doctrine for planning joint space operations. This publication provides doctrinal guidance for planning and executing barrier, obstacle, and mine warfare for joint operations as they relate to strategic, operational, and tactical mobility and countermobility across the range of military operations.

This publication provides doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States when they operate as part of a multinational force.

It addresses operational considerations that the commander and staff should consider during the planning and execution of multinational operations. This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, employing, and assessing air mobility operations across the range of military operations. This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing joint forcible entry operations.

This publication establishes joint doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States involved in or supporting foreign internal defense FID. It discusses how joint operations, involving the application of all instruments of national power, support host nation efforts to build capability and capacity to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of counterinsurgency operations.

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing counterterrorism operations across the range of military operations. This publication provides joint doctrine for homeland defense across the range of military operations. It provides information on planning, command and control, interorganizational coordination, and operations required to defeat external threats to, and aggression against, the homeland, or against other threats as directed by the President.

This publication provides overarching guidelines and principles to assist commanders and their staffs in planning, conducting, and assessing defense support of civil authorities DSCA. This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing foreign humanitarian assistance operations. This publication provides joint doctrine for the command and control of joint air operations across the range of military operations. This publication provides doctrine for the command and control of joint land operations by a joint force land component commander JFLCC.

It addresses considerations for forming and establishing a functional land force component with a designated JFLCC and for planning, executing, and assessing joint force land operations across the range of military operations. This publication provides doctrine for the command and control of joint maritime operations across the range of military operations.

It also describes the maritime domain; addresses considerations for establishing a joint force maritime component commander and attendant command relationships; provides principles and guidance for the planning, execution, and assessment of joint maritime operations; and presents considerations for specific maritime operations. This publication provides joint doctrine for the formation and employment of a joint task force JTF headquarters to command and control joint operations.

This publication provides doctrine for the planning, command and control, execution, and assessment of joint engineer operations. This publication provides joint doctrine and principles for planning and executing deployment and redeployment operations. It describes the deployment and redeployment processes and the planning and execution considerations that may impact deployment and redeployment operations to include command relationships and the interactions of combatant commands and Services with the Department of Defense and other US Government departments and agencies, host nations, multinational partners, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations.

This publication provides guidance and the basis for the planning and execution of military activities to counter weapons of mass destruction. This publication provides joint doctrine for the military response to mitigate the effects of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear event or incident. This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, execute, and assess airspace control during joint operations across the range of military operations. This publication provides joint doctrine for planning and conducting civil-military operations CMO by joint forces, employing civil affairs forces, conducting civil affairs operations, and coordinating with departments, agencies, or other organizations during the execution of CMO.

This publication sets forth the joint doctrine for the planning and execution of meteorological and oceanographic operations in support of joint operations throughout the range of military operations. This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for public affairs support to joint operations.

It also addresses public affairs operations and the role of public affairs in strategic communication. This publication provides guidelines for planning and conducting detainee operations. It outlines responsibilities, discusses organizational options, and provides command and control considerations across the range of military operations. This publication provides doctrine for planning and conducting joint noncombatant evacuation operations throughout the range of military operations.

Specific information on repatriation operations is also provided. Doctrine for joint logistic operations and a framework within which joint logistics can be planned, executed, and controlled effectively. The overarching ideas and principles contained in these publications provide a common perspective from which to plan, execute and control joint logistics operations. This publication is the keystone document of the joint logistics series. It provides overarching joint doctrine on logistic support to joint operations. It provides commanders and staff guidance and considerations for planning, execution, and assessment of joint operations.

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, command and control, and employment of resources within the Defense Transportation System.

This publication provides doctrine for the planning, preparation, and execution of health service support across the range of military operations. This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for providing bulk petroleum and water in support of US military operations.

Joint Publication Jp 3-10 Joint Security Operations in Theater 03 February 2010

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for the planning and conduct of joint military mobilization and demobilization, force expansion, use of volunteers, and Presidential Reserve Call-up. This publication provides joint doctrine for mortuary affairs support in joint operations.

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning and execution of US logistics in support of the Armed Forces of the United States during multinational operations. This publication provides doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of joint distribution operations.

This publication provides doctrine for planning, executing, and managing operational contract support in all phases of joint operations. Doctrine for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational planning activities across the full range of military operations. This publication reflects current guidance for planning military operations and, as a keystone publication, forms the core of joint doctrine for joint operation planning throughout the range of military operations.

Doctrine for communications system support to joint operations and guidelines to our commanders regarding information systems and networks as a part of the Global Information Grid. This publication is the keystone document for the communications system series of publications. It provides the doctrinal foundation for communications system support to joint operations and provides a comprehensive approach to the support of joint force command and control through the integration of joint communications and information systems across the range of military operations.

This chapter covers duties of personnel of the firing battery except those duties prescribed for the service of the piece and prescribes fire commands with explanation of their execution. It governs primarily the division artillery, but with obvious modifications applies to all types and calibers.

Firing battery, as used in this manual, includes only that portion of a gun or howitzer battery at the firing position, carriages unlimbered or uncoupled and prepared for action. Battery commander, as used in this manual, refers to the officer commanding the battery or conducting the fire of the battery. Fire discipline is that condition, resulting from training and practice, which insures the orderly and efficient functioning of personnel in the delivery of fire. The basis of fire discipline is the thorough training of the individual soldier.

The object of training is the perfection of fire discipline throughout the firing battery as a whole. Training of the firing battery should be started shortly after instruction of gun squads is begun. Firing battery instruction is started in the gun park. As proficiency is gained, the training advances to varied terrain and simulated service conditions. Fire on targets is first simulated, followed by subcaliber and service practice. Each battery should maintain a minimum of four trained gun squads. During maneuver or campaign Eas well as during the training year, frequent drill of the firing battery is necessary to maintain a high standard of fire discipline.

Accuracy in the performance of individual duties must be stressed; it is obtained by insistence upon exactness from the beginning. To eliminate the effects of lost motion, settings must be made in a uniform manner as prescribed for the particular piece or instrument concerned. Frequent checks of setting and laying are necessary to insure accuracy, both at drill and during firing. It must be made with an absolute minimum of delay in firing.

When a piece is discovered to have fired with an error in laying, the error is corrected and reported immediately to the battery commander. Uniformity is necessary both in giving and in executing commands. Special measures peculiar to a particular weapon will be found in the pertinent manual of the FM 6-series for the Service of the Piece. As soon as practicable after artillery materiel has been used, it is cleaned and put in order under the supervision of an officer. Lost or unserviceable parts are replaced or repaired. Before the piece begins firing, the chief of section verifies that the recoil mechanism contains the proper amount of liquid; thereafter he carefully observes the functioning of the recoil system.

In the case of separate-loading ammunition, the powder chamber is swabbed out after each round to extinguish sparks. Usually it is sufficient to wash the bore forward a distance of 2 feet from the breech for light and medium and 6 feet for heavy artillery. When time permits during suspension of fire, the breechblock is dismounted, cleaned, and oiled, and the bore cleaned as prescribed in Technical Regulations for the materiel.

Permissible rates of fire for short bursts up to 10 minutes and for prolonged fire are given in FM ; these rates are exceeded only if the situation demands it. Ammunition is sorted and stored by lots. When received boxed or crated, it is kept packed as long as practicable; after it is unpacked, it is protected from dirt and ground moisture by being placed on paulins or raised off the ground. The paulin or other covering should be raised to allow free circulation of air.

When piled, the height will not exceed five layers for mm ammunition and three layers for mm projectiles. Planks or brush are placed between layers. Care is taken to prevent injury to the rotating bands; they are always examined before firing and any burrs removed with a file. They are kept in moisture-proof containers until just before use. They are not carried on the person.

Fuzes are seated securely screwed home with the fuze wrench issued for that purpose before firing. If difficulty is encountered in screwing home a fuze or if a fuze is otherwise defective, it is laid aside temporarily and at a convenient time it is buried 3 feet deep or turned over at the position to ordnance personnel if available.

Unloading fixed ammunition or projectiles is to be avoided whenever possible. When unloading fixed ammunition, the breech is opened very slowly to reduce the likelihood of separating the cartridge case from the projectile and of scattering loose powder from the propelling charge inside the breech. Projectiles being removed should be prevented from falling to the ground when forced to the rear. Smoking in the vicinity of explosives is prohibited; care is taken to avoid sparks or open flames nearby. A round of ammunition held in preparation for reloading the piece is kept free from the path of recoil.

With pieces using separate loading ammunition, primers are not inserted until after the breechblock is closed and locked in its recess. When the long lanyard is used, it will not be attached until the piece is otherwise ready to fire. Pieces are examined before firing is begun to insure that their safety features are in order and that the bores are clear. Individuals at the firing battery are dismounted; they are not restricted to posts designated herein when their duties require their presence elsewhere.

The post of the executive is a position near the pieces from which he can best supervise the firing battery and be in communication with the battery commander. His principal duties are to:. The post of the assistant executive when at the firing battery is in the vicinity of the pieces where he can best perform his duties. His principal duties when at the firing battery are to: Assist the executive and to act as executive in the latter's absence.

The chief of a piece section goes where he can control the service of his piece, hear commands, and perform his duties effectively. To place the piece in position, to announce to his gun squad its number in battery, to measure and announce the minimum elevation or range , and to enforce camouflage and gas defense discipline. To follow fire commands, but to repeat only such part as may be called for by a member of his squad.

For direct laying in which his section is used, to assign a part of the target to his gunner. See the pertinent manual of the FM 6-series for the Service of the Piece. For indirect laying, to indicate the general direction to be given the piece and to operate the gunner's quadrant when used. To show that his piece is ready to fire by extending his right arm vertically as soon as his gunner calls "Ready. Except when otherwise prescribed, to give the command FIRE, dropping his arm sharply to his side.

To supervise and check the work of the gun squad and to report to the executive errors discovered in the laying; for example, "No. To report when the piece is out of action and the reason therefor; for example, "No. During firing, to watch the recoil system and measure the length of recoil.

To ascertain by inspection that the recoil cylinder contains the proper amount of liquid and that the pressure in the counterrecoil system is correct. To have the section ammunition properly handled, cared for, and stored by lot, and the mat6riel and equipment cleaned as prescribed. To apply calibration corrections to his piece when and as prescribed by the battery commander.

The battery coinmander will designate an ammunition sergeant or corporal. His post is at the battery ammunition dump, if there is one; otherwise, in the vicinity of the post of the executive. Keep accurate records, by lot, of all ammunition issued to the battery, tabulating receipts, issues, and expenditures; prepare ammunition reports.

The telephone operator is usually seated in rear of the battery and toward the windward flank. His duties are to:. Have ample slack wire left at the battery and to see that the wire is not damaged during the occupation of position. Establish communication promptly and report to the executive, "Communication established.

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Linemen at the position of the firing battery are with, and under the command of, the telephone operator. The battery commander designates a recorder. The recorder is seated beside the telephone operator. Inspect mat6riel, observe the functioning of the pieces, and make such repairs as can be made properly at the position.

To distinguish pyrotechnic signals; to operate rocket boards; to call, "Barrage" immediately upon seeing the barrage signal; and to report other signals in accordance with his orders.

During action, casualties are replaced as follows: Permanent assignments and reassignments are made by the battery commander as appropriate. Casualties are reported to higher authority daily or at such times as called for. Under the direction of the battery commartder, the executive, assisted by the ammunition sergeant, supervises the ammunition supply. The battery commander makes a daily ammunition report to the battalion. Organization of the position is the systematic performance at the firing battery position of all functions which contribute to the prompt opening and delivery of accurate fire and to the concealment and protection of personnel, mat6riel, and ammunition.

Organization begins when the position is selected and is continuous through occupancy.

All carriages are unlimbered or uncoupled and prepared for action. The pieces may be placed in line at regular intervals or they may be placed irregularly, in which case they are said to be "staggered. When the pieces are in line and the interval between muzzles is 20 yards, they are said to be at "normal" intervals. When a position is occupied after dark or positions have been selected for each individual piece, the executive designates to each chief of section the position for his piece and the direction of fire.

Each chief of section conducts his section individually to the position designated. Where practicable, in order to avoid a multiplicity of tracks, the position is occupied from the march formation. The position is approached from a flank in section column. The executive checks communication at the battery and posts the telephone operator at the position from which he will normally give commands.

The executive lays the battery as commanded by the battery commander, or, if no commands have been received, lays it parallel in the direction indicated by the gun marker. To refer a piece which has been laid for direction, an aiming point is announced and the deflection is measured and recorded.

The command for referring is, for example: A common aiming point used for referring should be fixed, continuously visible, and as distant from the battery as possible. It should contain a clearly defined vertical line or a definite point on which the gunners can lay. When a common aiming point is used, aiming stakes should be set up for emergency use at such a time as does not interfere with the firing. When a common aiming point is not used, the executive orders the aiming stakes set up as soon as the position is occupied. Two aiming stakes are used for each piece.

One stake is set up at a convenient location at least yards from the piece; the other stake is set up at the midpoint between the first stake and the piece. Both stakes are set up so that they and the sight of the piece are on the same straight line. Whenever aiming stakes are used, the pieces are also referred to an auxiliary aiming point which is used in case the aiming stakes are knocked down during firing.

During darkness, a light is attached to each aiming stake, the near light lower than the far light. Each light is completely screened except for a narrow vertical slit visible through the sight. The correction is made by the gunner who:. Lateral displacement is most likely to occur when the axle of the piece is not level. This is particularly true of materiel equipped with pneumatic tires. Lateral displacement may be prevented by placing sandbags against the outside of each wheel.

If the pieces are staggered, the executive determines the interval from No. These intervals are recorded and used for forming the sheaf as explained in paragraph As soon as each piece is established in position and laid in the direction indicated by the gun marker, the executive causes the minimum range or elevation to be measured. The foregoing is a rapid method providing a satisfactory safety factor for clearing an unoccupied crest.

The battery commander normally will advise the executive as to the probable sector of fire and require a report as to the minimum elevation throughout the sector. A few probable critical points can be selected readily by Inspection and the minimum elevations determined for them. In this way, accidents will be avoided in instances where the mask is very irregular.

The executive may be required to determine minimum elevation for a particular projectile, charge, and fuze; further, he may be required to determine it for each piece. Pieces are not fired at a quadrant elevation less than the minimum elevation or that corresponding to the minimum range setting and site as determined by the executive. If a fire command includes an elevation or range less than the minimum elevation or range , the executive reports to the battery commander, "Minimum elevation so much " or "Minimum range so much.

When the above operations have been completed, the executive reports to the battery commander, "Battery ready. If complete fire commands are received before these operations have been completed and if it is obviously safe to fire, the opening of fire takes precedence. Further steps in the organization of position are completed as rapidly as possible provided they do not interfere with the fire. AS time permits, such of the following improvements are carried out as are appropriate for the type of mat6riel: Positions should be concealed from enemy ground and air observation.

Measures for concealment must not delay preparations for promptly opening fire. Passive means, such as camouflage, cover, and concealment, are used. Construction work must harmonize with the camouflage scheme and ordinarily be executed at night. All personnel must be instructed in defensive measures and selected individuals taught gas protection. Sentinels are posted at the pieces when the latter are not actually firing, the remainder of each gun crew being allowed to rest in sheltered positions near by.

In the notebook he keeps data of semipermanent value to his piece, such as calibration corrections, base deflection, and data for defensive fires. The ammunition report is prepared from this record. Extract copies of fire missions or fire schedules may be furnished by the battery commander to each chief of piece section and complete copies to the recorder. All schedules are carefully preserved. Firing is not interrupted because of casualties.

Available first aid is administered immediately. Fire commands are commands which convey all the information necessary for the commencement, conduct, suspension, and cessation of fire, and activities incident thereto. Firing data are the elements of a fire command which prescribe the settings of instruments and fuzes in the firing battery. The base piece is the piece usually No. Fire commands originate with the battery commander. They are sent to the firing battery by telephone, radio, signal flags, signal lamp, voice relay, or messenger.

The executive repeats the commands of the battery commander to the gun squads, except as noted herein. Fire commands are not repeated by any member of the firing battery except on request of a subordinate or when a fire command has manifestly been unheard or misunderstood. Repetitions are prefaced by "The command was so and so. The fire commands for the first firing from a position must contain all the elements necessary to cause instruments and fuzes to be set and the pieces to be laid, loaded, and fired.

When firing more than one piece, a change for an individual piece or pieces will be preceded by the command NO. For the executive, the indication to fire is the battery commander's command for the range or elevation, except when otherwise specified herein. By the gunner during fire at moving targets with direct laying. See the pertinent manual in the FM 6-series for the Service of the Piece. The pieces are left loaded and the laying conforms to the schedule. When fire may be delayed more than a minute, the battery commander should command: In the following months there was a series of investigations and a total of 29 complaints were investigated in relation to Camp Nama, 5 were upheld resulting in disciplinary action against 34 soldiers.

By the early months of , JSOC had exploited the best information available to them to round up fugitive Ba'athist , including Saddam Hussein , by early many of the leading 'deck of cards' figures had been accounted for. By the Spring of , McChrystal was making Iraq his top priority and began dealing with the level of abuse of detainees at Camp Nama.

McChrystal—believing that 'you need to build a network to defeat one'—shut down Camp Nama—the special ops facility at Baghdad Airport and established a new base at Balad , there he created a state-of-the-art JOC Joint Operations Centre where JSOCs war in Iraq would be run day to day by the commander of Delta Force, the base was up and running by July Teams from each of the different intelligence agencies were also established at Balad; once information was gathered, McChrystal put it all into JSOCs intranet similar to one he'd created in Afghanistan, which allowed those at the cutting edge of the US counter-terrorism effort to share information worldwide, McChrystal also established a network of liaison offices run by his own people across the Middle East.

It took much of for the counter-terrorist network to take shape. The British government—in response to the Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse scandal and the 2 Pakistani terrorists from the LeT who were captured by the SAS in Operation Aston and were flown out of Iraq for interrogation at the US facility at Bagram Air base unknown to the British, there were no interrogators in Iraq that had the linguistic skills to screen the detainees —decided that they could no longer hand over detainees to JSOC if they were going to be flown elsewhere.

The SOF shaping included sophisticated feints to mislead the insurgents as to the direction of the final assault, close target reconnaissance and direct-action missions where a logistics node or IED factory was targeted. Shortly before the battle, MI6 visited JSOCs TSF Temporary Screening Facility at Balad to question a suspected Iraqi insurgent, following the visit, concerns were raised about the detention conditions of the cells and the condition of some of the detainees. During the course of to early , the technology, people and ideas at the heart of JSOC's war had coalesced.

Its centrepiece was a basketball-court-sized control room known as the JOC, three large screens relayed live pictures from different operations as well as other information that was needed for desk officers from operations, intelligence, aviation, medical etc. People who worked at the JOC often referred to it as the ' Death Star ' because 'you could reach out with a finger and eliminate somebody'; the liaison team from the NSA had its own private room for the US eavesdropping operation; TF changed its codename to Task Force In January , JSOC contributed to the arrest of a master bomber responsible for bombing the Canal Hotel and other vehicle bombings in —aimed at police stations, recruiting offices and markets.

There are different versions of what followed: By early , JSOC had a clear focus deriving from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld , McChrystal's command had built a regional laydown, which was designed to allow rapid response to intelligence anywhere that Zarqawi or key associates might be found. The Laydown consisted of: JSOC leaders devoted the best intelligence-gathering individuals and the UKs share of resources to this aim, however the UK opted out owing to its concerns about American actions, the resumption of full cooperation between US and UK was dependent on work to improve the condition of the prison cells at Balad.

In April , the Battle of Abu Ghraib took place; on 13 April up to insurgents including 3 vehicle suicide attacks mounted a sustained assault on a Marine base near the Syrian border at al-Husaybah , the attack was beaten off by airstrikes and helicopters, the attack was attributed to al-Qaeda; and on April 29, al-Qaeda staged 14 car bomb attacks in a single day most of them in Baghdad. These events disturbed General George Casey due to the capabilities shown in these attacks that he formally upgraded AQI to be the Coalition's principal enemy in Iraq.

The JSOC task force operating from Balad, successfully obtained a large proportion of the ISR Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms in the hunt for Zarqawi, this meant not only control of Predator UAVs, but other technical means such as satellites and aircraft used to intercept and locate mobile telephones, this huge taking of resources caused tension with Casey and with commanders of regular battalions and brigades that were still taking a large amount of casualties.

Casey and other commanders increased pressure on JSOC for results, McChrystal began to shift emphasis of his operations in Iraq, now that AQI was the target of the whole coalition force, he needed to do more to take on the local militant networks that were killing and wounding many US troops. McChrystal exploited the growing information flow from drones and cell phones to target the entire al-Qaeda network from top to bottom with particular focus on middle.

By the first half of , JSOCs commander put forward three tactical concepts that were central to Operation Snake Eyes, they advocated: The US characterised these places as stopovers on the infiltration routed of foreign fighters from Jordan or Syria to the capital; in many of these communities, regular troops came up against well-organised paramilitary groups armed with everything from small arms to mortars or surface-to-air missiles. As these operations went ahead during the summer of , JSOC mounted dozens of takedowns against suspected local militants and middle managers in the guerrilla organisation—exposing McChrystals men to determined heavily armed opposition that stood and fought rather than retreating in classic guerrilla fashion.

After Delta Force took casualties in the summer of , McChrystal asked the then UK Director Special Forces for assistance, however he refused, citing the treatment of detainees and the conditions of JSOC detention facility at Balad and other operational issues such as rules of engagement, so a second Delta Force squadron flown in and Delta pressed on with its operations. Due to the extremely high tempo and hazardous nature of their operations, JSOC's Task Force generally served three-month rotations.

During the Basra prison incident , the Colonel who was the-then Delta Force commander that ran JSOCs operation in Iraq, offered the services of a Delta squadron and scrambled a Predator from Baghdad to assist, the incident was eventually resolved by British forces. During late and early , the change of allegiance of tribes and small towns on the outskirts of Baghdad added militants to the Jihadists groups faster than JSOC could take it down. By coincidence, 6 Sunni insurgent groups formed the Mujahedeen Shura Council , they were cells that embraced the Salafist ideology of AQI—wanting to declare an oppressive Sunni caliphate in the western Iraq believing it would require increased violence against the Shia, the Coalition and even Sunnis.

JSOC would broaden its takedowns against the AQI leadership, carrying out more missions against mid-level terrorists pinpointed by ground-hold units, giving US Army and Marine units greater access to precious assets such as drones. In nigh-time raids on April 8 and on April 13, , in a town near Yusufiyah , operators from B squadron SAS and B squadron Delta Force killed 7 insurgents 5 on April 8 and 2 on April 13, who the intelligence agencies claimed were foreign jihadists, the intelligence gathered in these raids gave JSOC a clear intelligence picture of a group of Al-Qaeda cells around Baghdad, suggesting that their tactics had evolved.

Operation Larchwood 4 was part of an intense series of operations in the Triangle of Death , most of which were carried out by Delta Force and other US forces, with each mission the intelligence picture on the AQI networks was becoming clearer. The mission took place in broad daylight because the Delta Force squadron commander "allowed aggression to get the best of him", a fierce firefight ensued, 5 Americans were wounded and 2 were killed when their AH-6 little bird was shot down, whilst more than 25 terrorists were killed and 4 captured, a number of civilians were also wounded; B squadron's commander was relieved of his command.

JOC called in two FCs that dropped lbs bombs on the farmhouse, US troops from a regular unit nearby recovered Zarqawi, who was severely wounded from the ruins, he soon succumbed to his wounds; President George Bush told reported that he called McChrystal and congratulated him—marking the first official acknowledgement that JSOC was engaged in Iraq. That night 14 high-priority targets were added to the already-scheduled raids—each target that had been uncovered as part of Zarqawi's and al Raham's network Operations continued throughout summer , with the aim of dismantling al-Qaeda faster than it could regenerate, which meant sacrificing some target development in the interest of getting raids themselves to produce intelligence and were also willing to launch raids on a single 'trigger' or piece of intelligence.

The Coalition mounted raids in little more than a week—operations on a scale that was beyond the resources of JSOC and its Task Forces. In November , a new secret directive sanctioned by President Bush had allowed US forces in Iraq to kill or capture Iranian nationals if they were engaged in targeting Coalition forces due to Hezbollah success in the Lebanon War and Iran's defiance on its nuclear issue ; the new mission was known by its acronym CII Counter Iranian Influence. Since , there had been growing human intelligence about the training of Iraqi insurgents in Iran as well as financial backing for attacks on Coalition forces; finds of mortars rounds or rockets with recent Iranian markings had multiplied.

It was essential to maintain the pressure of nightly raids on al-Qaeda, The Pentagon 's solution was to keep Delta Force's commander working through the JOC against Sunni extremists changing its name from TF to Task Force 16 ; whilst a new command based around the headquarters of an Army Special Forces group was formed, codenamed: Task Force 17, they were given the CII missions.

TF 17 early operations netted an intelligence treasure trove, analysts used the same networking mapping and phone record techniques that they were employing against the jihadists; in December a Quds Force officer had been found in the compound of the leader of SCIRI whom it was long believed that they and its armed militia, the Badr Brigade were agents of Iranian influence.

As they cleared the building they found its staff trying to destroy records and change their appearance, the 6 men that were captured had fake ID cards and one would test positive for handling explosives, they didn't find the two men they were looking for. Analysis of papers and phones from the raid and the arrest of the Quds Force officer by TF 17 revealed that the Iranians were assisting a much wider variety of insurgent groups including evidence of connections with Ansar al-Sunna as well as elements within the Mahdi Army. Biden said, "I believe the present authorization granted the president to use force in Iraq does not cover that, and he does need congressional authority to do that.

I just want to set that marker. They also found critical documents: There were Memos to about attacks on British forces in Basra and large financial payments based on performance against the Coalition, Daqduq revealed that he had been brought into Iraq by Quds Force leadership to be a sort-of insurgent management consultant.

The mission made a strategic impact, Task Force 17 stepped up its raids against Iranian targets. By early JSOC estimated that it had killed 2, members of the Sunni jihadist groups as well as detaining many more; TF 16 was mounting 6 raids per night. Over 2 years JSOCs intelligence database had grown with each terrorist network it eliminated, agent networks within the al-Qaeda cells were providing good information, millions of Iraqi's had mobile phones that JSOC could monitor and a steady increase in number of drones available for surveillance increased the operational.

Joint Doctrine Pubs Interface

In summer and fall of JSOC continued to eliminate insurgent groups against the ' anvil ' of conventional forces; the CII missions succeeded in forcing Muqtada al-Sadr , the leader of the Mahdi Army, to flee to Iran, where in August he declared a ceasefire with the coalition. These operations included seizing members of Al-Quds, the commando arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard , and taking them to Iraq for interrogation, as well as the pursuit, capture or killing of high-value targets in the war on terror.

The Bush administration allegedly combined the CIA's intelligence operations and covert action with JSOC clandestine military operations so that Congress would only partially see how the money was spent. By March , the climate for mounting aggressive special force operations was changing due to the Sunni insurgency waning rapidly, a hundred thousand defectors from Sunni militants were enrolled in the Sons of Iraq. By May , of around 11, to 12, insurgents that JSOC removed, around 3, had been killed, JSOC had captured or killed al-Qaeda members faster than they could recruit new ones—breaking al-Qaeda and its associates in Iraq.

The covert offensive against both al-Qaeda and Iranian influence had played an important role in bringing the country back from the brink of anarchy. Although the wider JSOC and CII campaign against Shia militants demonstrated that Iran could be deterred from further escalation of its covert activities and the militias checked. But since Iran was Iraq's neighbouring country and the Shia would form a majority of Iraq's population, these efforts could only achieve containment rather than the 'knockdown punch' JSOC inflicted on al-Qaeda.

In an October leak published on the WikiLeaks website, U. Ambassador to Pakistan, Anne W.

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