The Battle of Long Tan: As told by the Commanders

Assessment of the Battle of Long Tan

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Unable to see either platoon, the D Company forward observer was unsure of 11 Platoon's exact position, further delaying the process. To retrieve the situation, Smith planned to pull his company into an all-round defensive position enabling his platoons to support each other fighting a co-ordinated battle, and to care for the wounded until a relief force could arrive to assist.

In the meantime, Buick repaired the 11 Platoon radio and re-established communications with Company Headquarters, and with Stanley, who was again able to adjust the artillery by radio. Although the fire was probably impacting the VC rear area and causing considerable casualties there, these assault troops had deliberately closed with the Australians to negate its effect.

Buick estimated 11 Platoon was being assaulted by at least two companies; down to the last of their ammunition and with just 10 of its 28 men still able to fight, he feared they would soon be overrun and destroyed, and were unlikely to survive beyond the next 10 to 15 minutes. Stanley refused, but after confirming 11 Platoon's precarious situation, he was able to walk the artillery in closer. With just three magazines carried by each rifleman, they were only lightly equipped prior to the battle.

This was a standard load calculated on 1 RAR usage rates which had been enough during previous actions, but it proved insufficient for sustained fighting. This position would afford greater protection, while the helicopters would be less likely to attract ground fire. Yet with their casualties now unable to be moved, D Company would have to remain where it was. Relations between the Army and RAAF over the use of the helicopters had become increasingly bitter in the months prior, and were still tenuous despite recent improvements.

Jackson requested American assistance, and when the US Army liaison officer responded more favourably, Raw felt no alternative than to accede to the original request, offering to effect the resupply instead. Smith requested close air support , calling for the waiting aircraft to drop napalm across 11 Platoon's eastern frontage. The Phantoms soon arrived, but the rain and low cloud obscured the coloured smoke the Australians had thrown to mark their position through the trees.

Stanley was forced to halt the artillery while the aircraft flew overhead, but as Smith was unable to establish communications with the forward air observer he wanted the aircraft to move out of the area so it could resume firing. Townsend directed the aircraft to attack the forward slopes of Nui Dat 2 instead, believing the VC command element to be located there. Major Harry Honnor—officer commanding st Battery, RNZA attached to 6 RAR in direct support—served as Townsend's artillery advisor at Nui Dat and during the battle controlled the fires of the three field batteries, as well as directing the American medium artillery against depth targets.

On the ground, Stanley called down the fire himself or relayed the direction of the assault, from which Honnor selected targets and ordered the fire, which was then adjusted by Stanley using sound ranging to bring it closer. Despite the rain and the soft ground reducing the impact of the artillery, its effectiveness was aided by otherwise favourable technical conditions.

Having been repulsed on the left, Smith tried the right flank. Pushing his headquarters forward, he ordered Sabben to move 12 Platoon—until then held in reserve—up on the right to support 11 Platoon. With the VC enjoying a considerable numerical advantage, Smith feared his platoons would be defeated in detail and that it was only a matter of time before his entire company would be overrun, despite the devastating effect of the artillery on the VC assault formations.

Instead, Townsend informed him an infantry company mounted in APCs would be dispatched as a relief force. Consequently, although Smith repeatedly pressed Townsend, there had been a delay of more than an hour from when the relief force was ordered to ready themselves until Roberts was allowed to move. A Company, 6 RAR and 3 Troop had been on standby in the company lines and departed fifteen minutes later. But with the route largely dictated by the terrain, the possibility of the relief force being ambushed concerned Townsend and Jackson.

Regardless, given the dire situation, they saw no alternative; and considered it unlikely, given the ground had been covered by frequent patrols, the proximity of D Company's position to Nui Dat, the open country between the base and rubber plantation, plus it was not yet dark. The boxes landed in the centre of the position and the RAAF pilots were later praised for their skill and daring. However, while the machine-gun rounds were pre-loaded in belts, the rifle rounds were still in bandoliers , complicating Kirby's job and forcing the soldiers to reload their own magazines as they struggled to keep the ammunition clean in the mud and rain.

Despite being exposed to heavy fire from three sides, 11 Platoon had maintained its position for over two hours, narrowly holding off the VC with small arms fire and massive artillery support. However, many of the platoon had been killed or wounded, while most of the survivors were now out of ammunition. Finally, with the close artillery fire causing heavy casualties among the assaulting VC, Buick decided to take advantage of a temporary lull in the fighting to achieve a clean break.

One of the Australians was immediately shot and killed as he did so, while two more were wounded before they reached a position of temporary safety. Smith attempted to place his depleted platoons into a defendable position, yet D Company's location had been dictated by the actions of the VC and the need to care for the wounded, and as a result they had little choice of where to make their stand.

Against this position the VC found it difficult to use their heavy calibre weapons effectively and could only engage at close range. In contrast, the remainder of the position faced the relatively open rubber plantation. As a consequence, he placed 10 and 12 Platoons in positions on the southern and eastern flanks, while the badly mauled 11 Platoon was allocated a position to the north-west. Company Headquarters was located in the south-west.

During the lull, Smith walked around the position to gain an understanding of the situation and check the wounded. With one platoon almost destroyed, and the other two at approximately 75 percent strength, D Company had been battered but morale remained high. While Smith tied in the platoons, Kirby completed the distribution of ammunition and Stanley plotted new defensive fire tasks for the artillery. The respite proved only brief as the VC soon located the Australian position. A company-sized VC force subsequently formed up to their south on a broad frontage which threatened to engulf them.

The assault commenced at Yet as they did so an accurate barrage from the Australian artillery fell among them, effectively destroying the rear echelon. Lacking any reserve, the assault was rapidly halted, although many of the unwounded attackers then attempted to crawl around the D Company perimeter, from where they engaged the defenders individually, while snipers fired from the trees.

A second assault soon began advancing over the same ground, only to again be hit by artillery, with those unscathed going to ground among the increasing dead and wounded. As they moved forward, they were joined by some of the survivors of the first assault and together attempted to roll over the Australians.

The main attacks came from the east, south-east and south, falling on 10 and 12 Platoons, while smaller attacks were carried out around the rest of the perimeter. The slope likewise screened the advancing VC, preventing either side from effectively firing on the other until the VC closed within 50 metres. Few survived the heavy artillery fire to get that close. Meanwhile, the VC had set up a light and a heavy machine-gun on the forward slopes of Nui Dat 2 and these continued to engage the Australians throughout the battle.

Battle of Long Tan

Yet, while they were able to achieve plunging fire from this vantage point, they were unable to observe D Company's position through the rubber and so were reduced to sweeping a broad area. Australian casualties included four killed and several wounded during this period, the majority from head and chest wounds.

But the close fire devastated the VC ranks. A simultaneous assault from multiple directions would divide the artillery and might allow a strong thrust to overrun the Australian position. A fresh force was observed moving to the west, likely an attempt to encircle and cut off D Company. Meanwhile, the progress of the relief force had been slowed by several factors, including flooding from the heavy rain, VC action, poor equipment, limited communications, and an ambiguous command relationship between the armour and infantry.

As a consequence, they were augmented by three vehicles from 2 Troop, although these lacked gun shields , leaving the crew commander exposed. On arrival, he found the exit had moved due to road works being carried out by the engineers, and this resulted in further delay until an alternative was located. Detaching two APCs, Roberts ignored the second part of the order and the remainder of the troop proceeded, leaving Nui Dat at The terracing of the paddy fields resulted in a steep drop to the creek and a difficult climb out; however, using a bullock track alongside a dam which he had previously utilised during Operation Hardihood , Roberts began to swim the carriers across the water despite a fast moving current threatening to wash them downstream.

Continuing to monitor D Company's situation over the radio, he again chose to disregard the order. Mollison concurred, and they proceeded to cross the creek. Advancing another 1 kilometre 0. With sunset due at The relief force moved into the plantation in open formation, unaware of the location of D Company or the VC. With visibility limited by the low vegetation of the young rubber trees and the heavy rain, they suddenly encountered a company moving west in arrowhead dressed in greens, cloth hats and webbing.

Realising they were VC attempting to outflank D Company to attack it from the rear, Lieutenant Peter Dinham—commander 2 Platoon travelling in the right-hand APC—ordered the crew commander to engage, and was soon joined by the rest of the troop.

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The rain had masked their approach and the VC—later identified as the D Battalion weapons company—were caught by surprise as the cavalry crashed into their flank. Recovering rapidly though, they returned a heavy volume of machine-gun fire, covering their casualties as they were dragged to the rear. Platoon Sergeant Frank Alcorta had been travelling on top of the overcrowded carrier and was forced to jump clear to avoid being hit. Moving into extended line, they advanced, engaging the VC and causing heavy casualties. However, as the fighting continued it further delayed the advance of the relief force, and with Roberts concerned the presence of the infantry forward of the carriers would prevent them employing their heavy weapons, he called to Mollison to order their return.

After re-embarking the infantry, 3 Troop resumed the advance, breaking into the VC force as it streamed west, firing their. D Battalion was routed and forced to withdraw east, having lost an estimated 40 killed, while one Australian was wounded. Shortly after, they were accidentally engaged by the cavalry themselves and lost one man wounded. The APCs opened fire, engaging their flank with heavy machine-guns.

A number were hit while others turned to engage the cavalry as it closed with them. The second RCL round subsequently detonated against the fallen tree, saving both the vehicle and its occupants.

Despite being dazed, Carter killed three more VC soldiers as he scrambled back into the carrier, which was now without communications following the destruction of its aerial. By drawing further fire he allowed the remainder of the troop to advance, and for his actions was later awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal DCM. The potential presence of a second RCL team sited in mutual support forced the cavalry to halt, once again. Concerned about the danger of bypassing an anti-armour weapon only to be engaged from the rear, Roberts ordered the troop to scan the area.

Frustrated by the delay, Mollison demanded Roberts continue the advance, and an argument broke out between the two. As commander of the APCs, Roberts ignored the senior ranking Mollison, refusing to continue until he either located the weapon or was confident the threat did not exist. After a five-minute delay, with no weapon located, the Australians moved off again. One of the crew commanders was fatally wounded and the vehicle forced to a halt, but not before the VC machine-gunner was crushed to death by the driver.

Under heavy fire, the troop sergeant ran between the carriers to take command of the APC, after Roberts ordered him to return to Nui Dat due to the mistaken belief some of the infantry on board had also been wounded. Despite Mollison's objections, the vehicle departed, taking the headquarters of one of the infantry platoons with it. At the same time, the infantry continued to engage from the rear of the vehicles.

A further 45 VC were estimated to have been killed during this action. Unaware of the hold up on the left flank, the right hand section of APCs continued to advance. Pressing on, the section crossed a small track and moved through the artillery fire called in by Smith on D Battalion as it had attempted to outflank D Company. Townsend arrived with elements of his headquarters aboard three more Ms at Bolstered to nine Ms, 3 Troop again moved forward through the artillery fire with Roberts spreading the additional APCs across the rear of his formation for depth.

Utilising a track as a guide he reformed the troop into a wide assault formation.

Beginning the advance at A brief but heavy engagement occurred, with the VC responding with automatic fire, including tracer and explosive rounds, which enveloped 3 Troop from their front and left, but was mostly high. After a long approach under mortar fire and the threat of ambush by a superior force, Smith placed Ford on the western side of the D Company defensive position to act as a screen to allow them to treat their wounded and prepare to resist a counter-attack. Turning north-west, Roberts moved back to the company location at Yet even as they did so the VC continued to attack from the north-east, although this too was soon broken off.

A Company disembarked and took up firing positions between the vehicles, joining 2 Platoon. The artillery had been almost constant throughout the battle and had prevented D Company from being destroyed. Townsend assumed command as the defenders regrouped, while Kirby co-ordinated the collection of the dead and wounded. VC losses were believed to have been heavy; however, with no confirmed casualty figures it was beginning to look to the Australians like they had suffered a major defeat.

Handling the dead and wounded proved a slow process but with the casualties finally loaded onto the carriers D Company left at The artillery ceased as the evacuation commenced with the first casualties taken out by a US Army Dustoff helicopter, while the remainder were extracted by six UH-1B Iroquois from No.

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Despite being slowed by the requirement for the helicopters to land without lights, the operation went smoothly and was finally completed after midnight. The last of the casualties were taken out by During the night the artillery continued to fire on likely VC forming-up points, although 11 Platoon's final position was avoided for fear of hitting any survivors. Yet with the VC spent no further attack was mounted. Jackson stipulated the force was to remain within artillery range, but would otherwise have freedom of action to complete the exploitation over the next two to three days.

By morning the weather had cleared. Stepping off at The assault companies planned to sweep the area then dismount and commence a detailed search, while the others would clear the surrounding features and begin the follow-up. Moving cautiously in case the VC launched a counter-attack, they advanced on an axis following the route used by D Company, 6 RAR the previous day.

The battlefield was a scene of devastation, with many of the rubber trees stripped of leaves and branches and bleeding sap, while the area around D Company's final position was heavily cratered. As the scale of the VC's losses were revealed, it became clear D Company had won a significant victory. By late morning, a total of bodies and two wounded had been found, while numerous drag marks and blood trails indicated many more casualties had been moved the previous night.

A third wounded VC was later captured; and all three wounded were given first aid then being evacuated. An official investigation determined the allegations were exaggerated and based on hearsay, with the soldier claimed as the source found not to have been present during the fighting and those killed confirmed to have been armed.

The majority were from 6 Section, which had been the first to be hit. Both were evacuated, and later recuperated in hospital. Thirteen Australian dead were also recovered, accounting for all the missing. A further position of pits was also found to the east. Due to the likely presence of a significant force nearby, the Australians remained cautious as they searched for the VC. Over the next two days, they continued to clear the battlefield, uncovering more dead as they did so.

The search area was subsequently expanded to include that contested during Operation Hobart. Several tracks were found with telephone cables running along them, as well as further drag marks, blood stains, discarded equipment, fresh graves and evidence of use by heavy cart and foot traffic. The main VC withdrawal route was discovered after midday on 19 August, moving east away from the scene of the fighting.

Up to four weeks after the battle, decomposed bodies were found in the area, while numerous graves were also located, none of which were included in the estimates of VC losses. The rest of 6 RAR continued the search, with A Company discovering a series of freshly built and recently abandoned hides along the VC withdrawal route, which were believed to have been prepared as delay positions.

An older defensive position of approximately 40 pits was also found; while C Company located a makeshift hospital close by containing 14 graves. Both had recently been occupied. Later, an Australian OH reported the presence of scattered groups of civilians, with the largest numbering 30 to 40 people—mostly women with baskets and bags, while others had ox carts—believed to be carrying medical supplies. These reports were followed up by the 1st APC Squadron and a number of military age males were detained for questioning.

The Battle of Long Tan: As Told by the Commanders

Smithfield concluded at VC and PAVN casualties were claimed by the Australian Army to have numbered dead left on the battlefield and three captured, while many more were thought to have been removed as they withdrew. Others were so badly mutilated their remains were unidentifiable. The Australians estimated the VC had evacuated up to a further casualties, including an unknown number of dead buried along the withdrawal route.

This is directly contradicted by th Regiment commanders, whom had carried out attacks against ARVN 18th Divisions positions a week later [6] Meanwhile, D Battalion—thought to have played a supporting role and have suffered less heavily—was assessed as still capable of engaging forces up to company size, with a remaining strength of men. More than 10, rounds of small arms ammunition was also recovered, as well as hand grenades, 40 mortar bombs, 28 RPG-2 rockets, and 22 RCL rounds. In the aftermath, both sides claimed success. Yet despite their losses, the VC also claimed to have inflicted a heavy defeat on the Australians.

In contrast, the Vietnamese history of Dong Nai Province published in gave the battle little attention, claiming to have "eliminated Australians and destroyed 21 tanks" while their own losses were not recorded.

In , a review recommended awards made to three officers be upgraded to the equivalent medals in the modern Australian honours system. In , the commander of 6 RAR Harry Smith published Long Tan, The Start of a Lifelong Battle [] in which he accuses several senior officers of fabricating claims about the battle from Brigadier Oliver Jackson and Colonel Townsend, including fabrication of the presence of Colonel Townsend and other officers about being present at the battle. Heavily outnumbered, but supported by strong artillery fire, D Company held off a regimental assault, before a relief force of cavalry and infantry fought their way through and finally forced the VC to withdraw.

Although there were other large-scale encounters in later years, 1 ATF was not fundamentally challenged again. Despite being halted at the time of the clash, prior to the encounter the th Regiment had been advancing with two battalions forward and one in depth, while at least two companies from D Battalion were on its southern flank. The six to eight-man squad contacted by 11 Platoon was probably a standing patrol moving into position ahead of the main force, and may have been the first indication they received of the Australian patrol.

As a result, it could not be supported and was cut off.

The combination of indirect fire and the reverse slope on which they found themselves afforded a degree of cover, and mist from the heavy rain provided some concealment. The reasons for D Company's success included superior radio communications which had allowed Stanley to co-ordinate the fire of the guns at Nui Dat, the weight of the artillery which repeatedly broke up the assaulting formations, its timely aerial resupply which prevented them running out of ammunition, and the mobility and firepower of the APCs in the relief force which broke the VC's will to fight.

The battle highlighted the power of modern weapons and the importance of sound small-unit tactics, and has since been cited as an example of the effect of combined arms, demonstrating the effective coordination of infantry, armour, artillery and aviation. Indirect fire provided close protection to the infantry, allowing D Company to hold their line and repulse any VC that succeeded in getting through the barrage. Likely forming-up positions and withdrawal routes had also been heavily engaged throughout the battle.

In the wake of the battle the Australians were left to speculate on the reason it occurred. One hypothesis was that the VC had intended to attack and overwhelm Nui Dat, with the initial plan to mortar the base to draw a response force into an ambush after which the base would be attacked and captured, but that they had been prevented from doing so after clashing with D Company. A second possibility was that they may have had the more limited aim of drawing D Company into an ambush to destroy it and secure a small victory over an isolated force.

Finally, it was possible no ambush was planned at all, and that the VC had been moving on Nui Dat in regimental strength when they unexpectedly ran into D Company, resulting in an encounter battle. The outcome prevented them achieving a politically important victory so soon after the Australian deployment, and "placed Viet Cong plans in the province on the back foot for some time".

Most had carried modern Soviet assault rifles, as well as a large quantity of ammunition, which allowed them to sustain a high rate of fire. This also changed, while rounds would also be supplied loaded in magazines for quick use. Such weapons would afford integral fire support in situations where their opponents had closed within the safety distance of the artillery, and consideration was given to their re-issue.

Yet the added weight would limit the ability of sub-units to patrol and M grenade launchers were issued instead, while a number of APCs were modified as mortar carriers. Despite detecting a transmitter from the th Regiment moving west towards Nui Dat, such intercepts were unable to predict VC intentions with certainty, while patrols through the area also failed to find it.

However, Townsend had not been given access to this intelligence and some officers were later critical of the restrictions placed on it. Although it would not have altered the requirement for a company-sized patrol it might have changed the way the battle was fought, and afterwards both battalion commanders were regularly briefed on such intercepts. Lastly, the command relationship between the infantry and APCs had been problematic during the battle and changes to standard operating procedures were implemented to provide clearer direction in such circumstances.

It lasted until 8 September and despite the intensity of the previous fighting little contact occurred, with no evidence of a large force having been in the area uncovered. Several search operations were also conducted in areas suspected of containing VC base camps, and these often resulted in the discovery of recently used and quickly evacuated camps, hospitals and logistic bases which were then destroyed. Regarding a 50th year anniversary the Vietnamese government permitted Australians to hold a 'low-key ceremony', but the unexpected booking of 3, individuals to attend as well as a concert by Little Pattie led to the Vietnamese government to cancel the commemoration event.

The events in Canberra included a four-gun salute and flyover by Vietnam-era aircraft, including Iroquois helicopters, Hercules and Caribou transports, and two B bombers. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. This article's lead section may be too long for the length of the article. Please help by moving some material from it into the body of the article. Please read the layout guide and lead section guidelines to ensure the section will still be inclusive of all essential details.

Please discuss this issue on the article's talk page. Military engagements during the Vietnam War. Military history of Australia during the Vietnam War. Order of battle for the Battle of Long Tan. Assessment of the Battle of Long Tan. Attacks on RF outposts and village incursions also continued. These people weren't a blocking force; they were marching down to meet the wire cutters.

They thought they had won the fight. Archived from the original on 23 March Australian War Memorial Conference: International Perspectives on a Long War". We fly with the RAAF helicopter pilots whose ammunition resupply was the turning point of the battle, and experience the carnage of the battlefield through the eyes of those in the relieving APCs.

Delta Company's trauma on returning to the battlefield to claim their fallen was lightened only by the miraculous survival of two of their wounded. The trauma of the battle did not end with the action, however, as politics began to play their part in the drama. The valour of those directly involved in the battle has never been duly recognised - in some cases it has been belittled, in others denied.

The ongoing efforts of the Long Tan commanders to right the many wrongs perpetrated in the wake of the battle, and their own journeys from the events of August draw the reader into a compelling dialogue on the aftermath of Vietnam.

Delta Company prepares for Vietnam. The first two months in Phuoc Tuy Province. The days preceding the Battle of Long Tan. The Battle of Long Tan. Where are they now?

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