Aristoteles Ausführungen zur Glückseligkeit (German Edition)

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Diogenes of Babylon would appear to assume an analogous position: See also and again SVF 3. See also SVF 3. Stoics as ratio perfecta, recta and consummata37—with the task of determining the orientation of human life, in each field. We should not forget another favourite polemical target of Sextus, namely educational processes of all kinds. He points to noteworthy difficulties in the formulation of dogmatic arguments on the matter and demolishes the very idea that solid theoretical knowledge may be transmitted regardless of elements such as its object, the teacher, the learner or the method used.

In a passage Adv. The answer seems to come down to a stark alternative: First of all, Sextus is convinced that it is impossible to remain completely inactive,46 and therefore no fall into quietism or resignation is contemplated. The Sceptical solution will appear to be leading in that direction only in the eyes of those who, pushing their interpretation far beyond the limits. On this mechanism of Stoic action, see especially Inwood 95— To put it more clearly, the dogmatists do not wish to renounce the militant intervention of rationality which they still regard as always being the best instrument we have for bringing our purposes into effect.

Taken together, such dogmatic presuppositions—whether ancient or modern—really seem to leave little space for the poor Sceptic. From the point of view of dogmatic philosophers, the Sceptical position itself seems condemned either to obvious and repeated theoretical-rational deficits, or to inexplicable irrational failures. Despite these radical and tenacious objections, however, Sextus insists that he knows the way out of this apparent impasse. He lays claim to an autonomous and legitimate space for Sceptic moral action. Almost as in an act of provocation—or at any rate in full awareness of the originality of his position—Sextus begins by refuting precisely those moral rules that dogmatists like to fix once and for all, for all times and places.

A gesture of this kind does not condemn the Sceptic to moral paralysis or inactivity: The Sceptic philosopher holds that it is possible to coherently engage in the countless decisions of moral life without running the risk of turning into a senseless plant. Should the tyrant order the Sceptic to kill his own father, the Sceptic will not be short of resources on the basis of which to make a decision, because his moral life is not a tabula rasa, a blank slate containing no indications. These form a network of elements that may be used in decision-making, and may be integrated into a wider, global outlook a sort of new and special.

See too Decleva Caizzi and now Lee 27— These stimuli to action will, in any case, seem the most functional with regard to achieving the double ethical goal clearly indicated elsewhere by Sextus: All this is then converted into a kind of ethical-empirical habitus, perhaps not so attractive on the level of absolute cognitive knowledge, but pragmatically functional hic et nunc. VI In light of the moral perspective thus constructed, the Sceptic too, therefore, acts and reacts in accordance with his own moral disposition.

This will be empirical—linked, that is, to concrete situations and historically conditioned. The Pyrrhonist will live free of the dogmatic claim to grant or deny absolute value to norms of behaviour, which are simply an integral part of daily life, arising from a continual process of confrontation with the reality of praxis. His actions, however, will not be left to chance; rather, they will follow four fundamental categories laid down by Sextus in a famous passage of his Outlines of Pyrrhonism Pyrrh. The list he proposes includes: See Hossenfelder A careful analysis, however, will allow us to identify at least a few passages that are important in this respect.

I do not wish to return here to the concluding paragraphs of Against the Astrologers cfr. He therefore sets out the weakly epistemological basis supporting so-called recollective signs. This clearly emerges from another passage immediately before the one just cited Adv. X , and also Frede For some interesting additional observations, see Chisholm —; Porro —, Chiesa ; Pellegrin —; and more generally now Tor This implies the need to investigate and show only those connections that are backed up by constant observation, most probably implicitly supported by a certain trust in the regularity of the course of nature.

Not only does he regard it as epistemologically valid according to the conceptual schemata of ancient medical empiricism, but he also maintains that it can be adopted in the sphere of ethics, since it is capable of providing guidelines for human conduct. What Sextus is offering is an alternative model of rationality, one that is empirically grounded.

Through it we can serenely accept the necessary uniqueness of our mortal horizon and turn the contingency of our existence not into misery or worse still defeat, but into an opportunity and perhaps even an accomplishment. Riaud — notamment et Nikiprowetzky Car il en va ainsi: Voir Siegert qui propose la traduction du De deo de Philon chapitre 2: Quand il leva les yeux, il vit avec ses yeux Gn. Philon la formule dans le De fuga et inventione44 en suivant Platon: On trouve une formule plus philonienne dans le De Abrahamo: Undoubtedly, a key factor was the decline of Athens as a philosophical centre of learning: In itself, this fact is not important from a historical perspective alone.

Decentralization from Athens implied also decadence for those institutions such as the Academy or the Lyceum that in Hellenistic times had been guardians of orthodoxy and presided over its enforcement in the schools. Almost all schools were in this predicament but Platonism fared particularly badly, as it was seeking to reconcile a host of interpretations of Plato.

On the other hand, though, the debate over this delicate issue could neither be sundered from the struggle for control pursued by rivalling schools: A stance had to be taken on this point, as well. The outcome was ongoing strife between them all and a huge output of sadly now lost treaties and essays focusing on mapping out the essence of Platonism—assuming there was one after all. Research in recent years has repeatedly stressed the importance of these debates, giving Plutarch his credit due for advocating, along with the anonymous Theaetetus commentator, the most challenging ideas.

The originality of Plutarch lies not only in his vindication of the unitary thesis, but also in his passionate defence of his own idea of Platonism outside the boundaries of academic debate between schools, addressing a wider audience. Indeed, one could note that the identity crisis sweeping through so many schools in early Imperial times also comes across as a legitimacy crisis undergone by these same schools, and by philosophy as a whole.

For sure, this problem is far from new, as even Plato, in the Gorgias and elsewhere, felt he had to justify his decision to spend his life in the pursuit of philosophy. Indeed, Plutarch stands out from the rest for the sensitivity he displays in this respect: The analysis of the Plutarchean arguments will also serve the purpose of clarifying his stance on the bios theoretikos.

On this issue Plutarch seems to stand out from other Platonists of his time, who had insisted on the ideal of theoria, drawing inspiration from some famous passages by Plato. With Plutarch things are somewhat different, and reservations are recorded in his writings on the notion of theoria as an end in itself. However, this is not to say that, on the opposite front, there is an outright tendency to vindicate active life. Rather, Plutarch is a supporter of the necessary union of theoria and praxis: Against the bios scholastikos: A fine polemicist or great lover of controversy , Plutarch has readily and oftentimes deployed this strategy, and not least when it came to mapping out the ideal of philosophy and the model of Platonism to identify with.

An eloquent testimony in this respect is certainly the opening part of the De Stoicorum repugnantiis. In opposition to the Stoics, Plutarch lays out two different scenarios, both giving rise to contradictory results: Plutarch mentions Zeno and Cleanthes, Chrysippus thrice, then Diogenes and Antipater ; on the other hand there are those who have endeavored to carry out these teachings E— F: To represent the Stoic view as dismissive of political commitment is at best a narrow portrayal thereof, if not downright wrong.

Likewise, the same applies to the delicate issue of bios scholastikos: Plutarch clearly exploits a number of controversial statements by famous Stoics without worrying too much to grasp the underlying reasons. See Boys-Stones for an overall account. Plutarch does not mention any name. Yet among the advocates of political commitment one could at least include Sphaerus of Borysthenes and Blossius of Cumae, whose merits regarding the Spartan king Cleomenes III and Tiberius Gracchus are credited by Plutarch elsewhere though not unambiguously; cf. Babut — n.

By way of this controversy Plutarch manages to highlight what he sees as the fundamental hallmarks of philosophy: If this first point is downright trite, much less predictable is the yardstick used to assess the earnestness of philosophy: The crux of the matter is that philosophy should yield practical and concrete results; it should set standards of behaviour that at the same time bear witness to its usefulness and superiority.

The consequences of adopting this criterion are even more interesting, as they seemingly imply that Plutarch has drifted away from an overriding feature in the Platonic tradition, namely the importance in its own right of a life devoted to contemplation and learning. Nonetheless, Plutarch in some passages seems to associate bios scholastikos to bios theoretikos, cf.

By the way, this quotation further contributes to satirize Stoicism, which saw a model in Odysseus, cf. The originality of the Plutarchean view stems from the comparison with his sources. As oftentimes before Plutarch also here deploys the dialectic strategy of Carneades, who shoots back at Stoics that same criticism leveled by them against their opponents: But since the Stoics themselves praise elsewhere the rational life devoted to learning, it follows that they are the true hedonists.

In the De Stoic. It has to be said, however, that Plutarch was not biased against schole cf. De genio A and below, n. Plutarch draws the necessary conclusions of this assimilation: Once again, the benchmark is nomos and therefore the set of values and rules upon which a city is established , which in Greek tradition has always defined what separates man from beast.

Epicureans deny nomos any value, and as a result of this men slip back into a bestial world. It follows that the philosophy of the Epicureans and Stoics too, given their identification is not only a manifestation of selfishness and worthlessness, but is actually subversive and dangerous to the very existence of men: As for Platonists the situation is completely reversed: On top of that, here it is deemed capable of salvaging the city even in the absence of laws, as it ensures justice is grounded in its divine and nonconventionalist value: This is a crucial point, which we shall come back to.

Besides, theoretical objection falls short of what is required: Alexander applied to Xenocrates for rules of royal government; and the emissary sent to Alexander by the Greeks of Asia, who more than any other kindled his ardour and spurred him to take up the war against the barbarians was Delius of Ephesus, a follower of Plato. But the situation does not change even in the following centuries.

An interesting case for gauging the originality of the Plutarchean position is that of Antiochus, whose vindication of theoria I mentioned earlier on: Plutarch notes that one of his most noteworthy merits is to have knowingly steered Cicero towards taking public office Vit. Notably, it is hard to assess whether Plutarch accepted Antiochus as being fully compliant with Platonic tradition, cf.

Donini n. But if he were, then it is thanks to his practical-political contribution rather than to his reflection on theoria. Demophanes, two pupils of Arcesilaus. The words uttered by Plutarch in their praise capture and convey the very same points of the discussion in the Adv.

These are the products of the Academy and this is the legacy a Platonist can go proud of: Beyond the bios praktikos: A quick analysis of these passages could lead to the view that Plutarch was a resolute supporter of the bios praktikos, understood in terms of active political commitment. This, however, would be a mistaken inference that could be easily offset by many other passages from the corpus, where Plutarch seems to favorably view contemplative life as the one most befitting the philosopher. The one exercises his intellect without the aid of instruments and independent of external matters for noble ends; whereas the other must bring his superior excellence into.

Should one acknowledge that Plutarch lacks a firm stance on such a key point, but wavers to and fro? To do this, however, we must place him in the right context, adopting a Platonic rather than Aristotelian perspective. Yet his solution strays off the path of Peripatetic debate. Plutarch stresses the need for unity between theoria and praxis, in other words between bios theoretikos and bios politikos that turn out to be the same thing. Now, while the differences may seem minimal, this thesis is not perfectly compatible with the Aristotelian perspective, for the Aristotelian doctrine fundamentally presupposes that things and activities are divided along the lines of the theoretical life and the practical-political life with different areas of investigations,22 whereas Plutarch rather harbors the notion of a strong identification between the two, both in the content and in the activities: The Plutarchean fatherhood of this treatise has been disputed, cf.

But ever since Wyttenbach numerous elements have been acknowledged as strongly recalling Plutarch. This passage is surely among them, especially the joint reference to Epaminondas and Dion. The underlying assumption is rather the view that theoria, being an appropriate evaluation of things, is therefore the only possible premise for true praxis.

Theology is the true foundation for the human world: All the noble and virtuous deeds performed by the aforementioned Academy members ultimately do not rest on their own practical experience, but rather on this theologicallyoriented knowledge. In other words, if we were to use a catchphrase, one might claim that Plutarch regards the true philosophy of Platonism as political theology. By basing his arguments on this belief, Plutarch is able to claim the superiority of Platonism over other schools: Platonism is a cut above the rest 1 for capably addressing the issue of God, being the question which everything else hinges on, and 2 because by successfully evaluating the divine it has been able to rouse and yield righteous and virtuous.

This partly rests on the common Socratic backdrop, even though it yields different outcomes. Instead, one might seek out interesting parallels with Plutarch in either Cicero and Alcinous or Philo of Alexandria. For the latter, cf. Calabi b —, for Cicero, cf. It is essential, then, to clarify this fundamental point. Together with other Imperial Platonists, Plutarch too believes that assimilation to God represents the end purpose of both human life and philosophical activity, as well as the true fulfillment of human beings.

Patently, the necessary condition to achieve this outcome is a striving for knowledge, as stated in a famous passage of De Iside: When setting forth the essence of God, Plutarch insists on three hallmarks: And given that the highest and noblest virtue is justice, it is by being righteous that men edge closer to the god: Just as God fulfills perfect virtue by engendering order, harmony and justice in the universe,31 so.

In Plutarch, homoiosis is never limited to the exercise of mere contemplation, but actually comes to a head through practical activity. The worthiness of this position, upholding the priority of reflection upon the divine and the practical value of homoiosis, warrants further commentary. But the Platonic texts that are usually relied on portray a far more complex situation, for even therein assimilation brings about imitation, in that it implies the need for crafting or transforming oneself and others.

Assimilation, Plato writes in a decisive passage of the Republic Resp. Also in Plato, then, assimilation is not resolved in contemplation, but is a prerequisite for action. Indeed, Plutarch proves to be well aware of these Platonic reverberations. For sure, even granting that other Platonists i. Antiochus or Alcinous too have appreciated the weight of the practical consequences of theoria, Plutarch undeniably stood out among them as the one who stressed the importance of this aspect as the feature that best defines the nature of Platonism.

In the light of what has been observed thus far, one might expect to find in Plutarch a strict application of the supremacy of the political dimension, tracing in. Instead, Sedley a tends to view more favourably a settlement with Aristotle and a reading of homoiosis in terms of contemplation.

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To clarify this point two reasons may be put forward. Firstly, the theological motivations: At most, this option could be likened to an ideal model rather than an actively feasible prospect. The second and more important set of reasons concerns the way in which politics is understood. Socrates at any rate was a philosopher, although he did not set out benches or seat himself in an armchair or observe a fixed hour for conversing or promenading with his pupils, but jested with them, when it so happened, and drank with them, served in the army or lounged in the market-place with some of them,.

Centrone —; see also Laurand, this volume, Crucial on this point is the contribution by Trapp — So this is what we must understand concerning statesmanship also: As Michael Trapp has rightly pointed out, this passage expressly draws a parallel between politics and philosophy. True statesmanship is not an intermittent string of services and needs, but a way of life, a bios An seni C; Praec. The aim of Plutarch is not to turn statesmanship into something else, but rather to show that there is a kind of political activity— the only rightful one—that meets the criteria set by philosophy for attaining goodness and a good life.

Consequently, a political life makes sense, and is the only one worth living, inasmuch as it coincides with philosophy. Still, a number of small but not irrelevant differences with Plato linger on: Starting from this need, we can truly appreciate his understanding of Platonism. Consequently, the portrayal of philosophy that is yielded does not always match that of the dialogues. Moving from here, though, Plutarch carves out a role for the philosopher that, rather than being shaped upon the dialogues, seems to address more the society of his time.

Whereas Plato appears to conceive only one true form of politics i. How should we evaluate this shift? No matter how significant they may be, these differences do not constitute disloyalty, however. More accurately, one should speak of a realistic adaptation of these ideas, which are capable of maintaining at least some of the most genuine instances of Platonic thought, albeit in a different context.

And given that Plato was actually the one who insisted on concrete results, this adaptation is not misplaced. Plato, the philosopher par excellence, is the guide who helps men become virtuous especially righteous , i. Still, this applies in a Platonic not Aristotelian perspective, in which theoria is no less practical, and praxis nonetheless flows from that theoria. In short, this is the lesson drawn from Platonism, which not only amounts to a set of doctrines but realizes itself as a way of life: Plato for the Empire?

A constant trait in modern critical literature is to portray again and again the Plutarchean image of the philosopher-adviser to the ruler as a mere repetition of the dominant theme in the political output of the time. Plutarch rather seems bent on overturning the hierarchy, by upholding the unique role of the philosopher. The real difference is metaphysical: On account of his constant striving towards the divine, the philosopher is a daemonic man who oversees the lives of men, and in this sense his role is even more important than that of the ruler.

Plutarch believes man to be made up of mind nous , soul psyche and body soma , whereof reason is the most divine part and overriding in the philosopher: I simply wish to point out here how the daemonic nature that Plutarch lays upon the true philosopher and therefore upon the true statesman serves the purpose of clarifying one of the issues that has engaged scholars most in recent years. I am speaking of the character and role of Epaminondas in the De genio Socratis, one of the most successful writings by Plutarch, yet one of his most unfathomable too.

Critics have long found Epaminondas to be the central figure of the book, and the one who best embodies the philosophical ideal set out by Plutarch, namely, full reconciliation between contemplative. The nous is linked to the theoretical virtue mentioned in the De virt.

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The non-commitment and silence of Epaminondas have greatly bewildered scholars. Plutarch repeatedly underlines his caring for his fellow citizens. Epaminondas is not a politician engaged in power struggles, nor is he concerned with backing either party in the process. His mission is to foster divine values such as justice, concord and harmony.

This explains his refusal to engage in an all-out military campaign: Epaminondas has been unsuccessful in his endeavor to persuade us to drop them, as he believes would be for us the best. It is hardly surprising, then, that he refuses our invitation to proceedings that run counter to his nature and his judgment […] [he] will gladly join with all who endeavor without resorting to civil bloodshed and slaughter to set our city free. But since the majority are against him, and we already engaged in this course, he would have us allow him to await the favorable moment for intervention, remaining innocent and guiltless of bloodshed.

Thus, interest as well as justice will be served. De genio D, E, D; Vit. Taking a cue from these hurdles, Babut 70—75 showed support for the ideal of contemplative life in Epaminondas in contrast with that of active life in statesmen. But he would never put a countryman to death without trial unless driven to it by extreme. The importance of this passage can be gleaned by contrasting it with some other passages, drawn from the Praecepta and from the same De genio: Even more eloquent is the passage in De genio that deals with the riddle-like messages of the gods, and recalls a recommendation by Plato—references to Plato should never be underestimated.

Plato construed the response as an exhortation to study geometry in earnest and explained the importance of the median point between two extremes a prefiguration of the daimones and the philosopher , going on to say that they were not, however, to suppose that it was this the god desired, but rather that he was ordering the entire Greek nation to give up war and its miseries and cultivate the Muses, and by calming their passions through the practice of discussion and study of mathematics, so to live with one another that their intercourse should be not injurious, but profitable.

Apart from this it was to the interest of the people of Thebes that there should be some men not chargeable with the guilt of what was done: De LacyEinarson slightly modified. Schole, therefore, does not have a negative connotation in itself, but only when it fails to yield results cf. Plutarch regards Epaminondas as the full-fledged, archetypal philosopher—as a true daemonic leader of men, above and beyond the juxtaposition between contemplative thinkers and political men.

On the strength of his privileged relationship with the divinity, the philosopher must seek to promote the values of the divine world among men, not stooping to their lowly political wrangling, but facilitating their heaven-bound ascent; his duty is to help them rise to the blissful state he has already attained alongside the god. This is his task: And this lays the foundation for a world and a social order structured upon and in harmony with divine justice—which means bringing mankind and the universe together.

If the debate on bios philosophos is also a vindication of philosophy, one cannot help but notice that the one put forward by Plutarch amounts to a grand celebration of philosophy, proudly reasserting its practical and political significance at a historical time in which room for action was shrinking fast. Moving from a Platonic perspective, Plutarch essentially rejects the contraposition between active and contemplative life as if they were two separate kinds of life addressing distinct objects and competences: Platonism is the philosophy that is capable of overcoming this false conflict, not by committing itself first to theoria and then to praxis the model for mixed life , but by displaying the necessary union that should bind theoria and praxis.

For sure, Plutarch was not alone in defending the key role of the philosopher. Rather, one might ask yet another question. After all even Plato had felt the full weight of this problem, as is apparent from his dialogues and from his own life. As has been rightly pointed out, the dialogues are an even grander vindication of philosophy than the one we find in Plutarch. Yet the dialogues constantly evoke the possibility that philosophy might fail, carrying the risk of dwindling to mere hollow verbal exercise. This too belongs to the legacy of Socrates.

He was thought not to be aware of these issues.

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Traditionally, Plutarch projects an edifying image, being praised for his grace and composure, and revered as the moralist capable of fair and impartial assessments across the board. But that is not so: Evidence of this awareness is indeed found in the least predictable of settings, namely, when dealing with those characters deemed by Plutarch to come closest to the model of the daemonic philosopher-adviser: Plato, Dion, and Epaminondas.

But the most important work of all, Life of Dion, does not contain praise alone.

When Dion came to power, he acted like a true philosopher, behaving in a morally irreproachable way: So when the ill-famed Heraclides a disease for the city, Remarkably Dion and Epaminondas are bound together against Epicureans in Lat. But the outcome was politically doomed, and the situation was settled only when, long after, Dion commanded that Heraclides be killed How should we evaluate this?

Or is the opposite not true, namely, that philosophical ideals do not always fit in with the harshness of reality? As suggested by De Genio the correct answer may be that the teachings of philosophy are not instrumental to the real political debate, because they strive towards a different and as Plutarch would say nobler goal. And so the philosopher has little choice but to abide by his median position: The daemonic time of philosophy is not always capable of effectively fitting in with the time of history,57 and a few cracks start to appear in the grand framework that is Platonism.

But this is not to say that the framework would necessarily collapse. It is rather a question of acknowledging that, while the philosopher may be daemonic, projected towards the deity, and even strengthened by his privileged contact with it, he still remains a man, and as such cannot expect to achieve everything. Only the gods ensure true salvation: Brenk and ; cf. David Sedley The Didaskalikos of Alcinous is the most systematic, coherent and comprehensive account of Platonism to survive from the half-millennium between Plato himself and Plotinus. There is no better source for learning the complex ways in which Middle Platonist discussion of the theoretikos bios drew on the authority of Plato and Aristotle.

No one doubts that this handbook, whoever its author may be, is a prime specimen of Middle Platonist exegesis. In the last two decades that identification has been more or less abandoned, and for good reasons. Hence its dating to the second century has remained virtually unchallenged. There is a whiff of circular reasoning about this, compounded by the difficulty that we have very few pre-Plutarchan first-century ad Platonist texts to compare with it. I have no particular axe to grind in the matter, and see nothing implausible about the conventional dating, but I nevertheless prefer to leave the question open, saying no more than that a the Didaskalikos seems to predate the arrival of Neoplatonism; and b , in view of its advanced synthesis of material from the texts of Plato and Aristotle, it could not credibly be dated earlier than the late first century bc.

Many would be confident in dating it at any rate later than the Augustan. I shall have occasion now and then to dissent on details, so it is appropriate to record my great appreciation at the outset. I also take the opportunity to thank the many people whose comments during the May Gargnano conference helped me to develop and improve the paper, and Georgia Mouroutsou for further helfpul written comments. Antiochus was already pursuing broadly the same agenda as Alcinous, recommending a life which would somehow combine both contemplative and practical components, and tracing its origins back to Plato and Aristotle.

That analysis of philosophy into its parts and sub-parts is one whose doctrinal details will in effect occupy the entire remainder of the work. He will not, even at the end, return to the. What is theoria, according to Alcinous, and how is it related to the theoretikos bios? Are the theoretikos bios and the praktikos bios related as alternatives, as complementary to each other, or in some other way? I start with the question what theoria is. Prima facie the two leading candidates should be: There are two kinds of life, the contemplative and the practical.

The core of the contemplative life lies in knowledge of the truth, while that of the practical life lies in performing the actions dictated on the basis of reason. The contemplative life is of high value, while the practical life is secondary, and necessary. That this is so may become clear from the following.

Contemplation is the activity of the intellect when it is intelligizing the intelligibles, while action is the activity of a rational soul brought about through the body. The soul, when contemplating the divine and the intellections of the divine, is said to be in good condition, and this condition of it is called wisdom. And that, one could say, is nothing other than assimilation to the divine. What then is happening when nous is doing this? The answer is presented in some detail in chapter 4, the chapter devoted to the criterion of truth see This activity of intellection, Alcinous goes on to specify, belongs par excellence to the soul pre-natally, that is when it resides outside the body.

But as he proceeds it becomes clear that the activity of intelligizing Forms can be regained even during an incarnate life You are contemplating only when your intellect is directly and non-discursively engaging with the Forms. Theoria during an incarnate life will be, not discursive reasoning, but the direct communion with intelligibles that follows upon discursive reasoning. See further, Sedley ; Boys-Stones It might by now be wondered whether such theoria, defined as narrowly as it is in chapter 4, can be the theoria which gives the theoretikos bios its name.

However, the immediate sequel in chapter 4 makes it clear that it is In theoria, it examines what is true and what is not, whereas in practical matters it examines what is fitting, what is unfitting, and what it is that is being done. Theoria, that is, even when it is understood as the direct and non-discursive intellection of Forms, as it is in chapter 4, constitutes one half of the antithesis between theoria and praxis which also underlies the distinction between the two lives. How, that is, can that supremely fulfilling contemplative act be enough to characterize an entire life?

Certainly there is for Alcinous, as for Aristotle, some sense in which the entire life of the philosopher is characterized by theoria: Here we face an interpretative choice. The pairing of the two verbs is found in the Stoic account of virtue at Stob. Yet we learn in due course that this latter branch of philosophy covers not just theology So far as nurturing and developing it are concerned, all investigative activity, including the study of physics, and even teaching, could be deemed to satisfy the description.

This second option differs in on the one hand insisting on a narrowly defined concept of theoria, direct non-discursive contemplation of first principles, but on the other hand allowing that the theoretikos bios is characterized by its devotion to promoting this narrowly defined activity in oneself and others, and not necessarily by the incessant practice of it. This last term is certainly not theoria in the strictest sense, the non-discursive contemplation of Forms.

Help in this regard was available to Alcinous from Symp. It is, we might say, what gives the theoretikos bios its meaning and value, but is not necessarily its only component. Since this second option maintains the definition of theoria given by Alcinous in the very act of explaining what a theoretikos bios is, we should stick with it if we can.

What then is Platonic theoria in the strict sense? In chapter 2 we read: We need first to see the complex synthetic process by which this equivalence between theoria and assimilation to the divine is extracted from the texts, and then to ask what it tells us about the character of a theoretikos bios. The chain starts from Phaedrus d: Theoria, in the technical sense applicable to the theoretikos bios, is an Aristotelian term, and Alcinous does not hide this fact.

The corresponding disadvantage of his choosing this passage from the Phaedrus palinode may seem to be the following. Its description of theoria.

Alcinous must be aware of this inconcinnity, since he deals with it in the way to which I have already alluded: An answer is found with the help of Phaedo 79d. This final remark is transcribed almost verbatim by Alcinous The final link in the chain is as follows: If that is so, the textual basis is this time a little more tenuous. In the Republic passage the Forms are themselves treated as if they were divinities rather than inanimate objects: This may already have been enough to encourage a degree of conflation between two kinds of divine entities, namely gods and Forms.

It could, additionally, be a specific application of the common Platonist thesis,. However, this variant has I think a quite specific function. De sera D, Vit. One possibility is that he finds the doctrine in the image of Zeus leading a procession of souls around the outer perimeter of the heaven: But this is speculative at best. The most important point for my purposes is as follows. This manoeuvre serves to confer upon the Republic an enriched conception of theoria, despite the fact that the term and its cognates do not occur there in any appropriate sense.

Then what about Theaetetus a—b, which thanks above all to Plotinus, Enn. We have seen that Alcinous does not after all allude to that locus classicus when expounding Platonic theoria, but diverts us rather to the Republic. In chapter 28,17 when. Thus Dillon It seems likely that this ethical reading of the Theaetetus passage was the norm for Middle Platonists. With the Theaetetus thus sidelined, Alcinous is free to make the Republic his key text for the theoretikos bios. Their wellknown preference for remaining outside the cave, in direct communion with the Forms, is interpreted in Aristotelian terms as a casting of their vote in favour of the theoretikos bios over the praktikos bios.

Here is how the two lives are contrasted: For the good person will broach public affairs whenever he is aware that there are people running them badly.

It is appropriate for the philosopher in no way to leave off from theoria, but always to be nurturing and developing it, yet also, as something secondary, to enter the practical life. The former of these occurs in a long list of laudatory epithets applied to the theoretikos bios None of the terms seems to me distinctively Stoic. In my view, if one were to defend the generally accepted post-Plutarchan dating of Alcinous, his relatively low level of concern about Stoicism might well be cited as evidence. But now is not the occasion to comment on other passages of the Didaskalikos in which Stoic allusions, positive or negative, have been detected.

One might also wonder if Alcinous has in mind Magna Moralia 2. De usu partium Hence, contrary to Whittaker 77, its equally frequent occurrence in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius is unlikely to be a sign that it is Stoic property. By implication, some human activities cannot be prevented. True, the list of epithets for the praktikos bios at This Platonist doctrine seems to be at work in our passage. When the contemplative life is said to be in our power, is this not, precisely, an application of the Platonic principle that singles out our choice of life as what is par excellence in our own power?

Two pairs of contrasts are at work: It is explicitly because practical activities are performed through the body that they can be prevented. Point i , then, must be that bodily infirmity or obstruction, physical circumstances and the like can on occasion prevent the successful performance of a bodily action, whereas there is no bodily obstacle to the successful performance of an act by the intellect, which, as Aristotle in particular would insist, has no bodily component.

I am not at all sure that any such implication is intended. If, for example, circumstances require a philosopher to suspend contemplation in order to help plan a military campaign, the fact that this action involves his use of bodily parts such as larynx and hands seems barely relevant to its not being fully in his own power. At all events, the main emphasis this time is not on the body but on the constraints imposed by external circumstances. Individual contemplative acts, then, are i free from prevention by circumstances, and ii free for us to perform whenever we wish. In which case the theoretikos bios itself would be in our power too, as Alcinous indeed asserts that it is However, the free choice of a contemplative life does not seem to be like that.

At no point in such a life can anything compel you to contemplate, or for that matter prevent you from doing so. Ancillary components of the theoretikos bios may be enforced or prevented by circumstances, for example giving a lecture or conducting a dialectical debate on a particular day. In the light of the above, how are we to reconcile the following two apparently conflicting sets of statements?

A theoretikos bios is unpreventable This may be the passage that Alcinous has in mind, but if so he is understanding the ranking differently.

There is no choice between the two lives. He is not actually interested in what a practical life would be like, but rather in practical activities, just in so far as these impinge on the contemplative life. For his description of the praktikos bios makes inescapable the conclusion that it is a life—or, better, a mode of living—that is available to nobody but the philosopher. And these circumstances turn out to be exactly the kind that according to Plato impose themselves upon philoso-. The allusion to the Republic seems to rule out the interpretation suggested by Eliasson , according to which The reference is not to instilling truly virtuous actions in oneself, but to drumming demotic virtue into the citizen body.

To treat the praktikos bios as itself a component of the theoretikos bios would be to impose a surprising asymmetry on the meaning of bios, with the theoretikos bios representing a whole life of which one component would be the praktikos bios. Symmetry can be restored by assuming instead that neither the one nor the other is a whole life, but that each is a component or aspect of a whole life, namely that lived by a philosopher.

This may indeed be what Alcinous intended to convey at the start of chapter 2. According to Alcinous But even that debt to Stoicism was limited to the lower grades of virtue, and never, I believe, impinged on Platonist understanding of the contemplative virtues and their exercise. Whittaker , See further, Sedley b. In addition to the requirements occasioned by specific circumstances, according to Alcinous, philosophers have to be prepared to play a major civic role in the drawing up of laws and constitutions, and in education The resolution to this comes in two parts.

If practical activity meant taking a break from the contemplative life, one might expect a more suitably tensed description: So much for how the theoretikos bios can remain uninterrupted. It could be that the solution to the previous problem, if it is as I have suggested, is deemed already to solve this one too: However, we may suspect that in addition the notion of necessity has been reinterpreted. This progressive weakening suggests the interpretation, which has plenty of modern advocates too, that the Republic in expecting philosophers to take part in government is not really proposing any compulsion beyond the intrinsic force of moral obligation.

In so meticulously worded a treatise, it is unlikely that the absence of this key term is merely accidental. This we may take to mean that, although both contemplation and action are components of it, it is the contemplative component alone that gives the philosophical life its distinctive character and surpassing value. A similar anomaly arises in Antiochus, who is reported by Augustine to have favoured the mixed life De civ.

Alessandro Linguiti The Neoplatonists were fervent proponents of the contemplative life. Much evidence exists regarding their considerable intellectual output, as well as their commitment to the philosophical speculation and the teaching of philosophy. Even Proclus, who—according to his biographer Marinus—spent most of his day praying or evoking daemons and gods,2 always gave proof of astonishing intellectual industriousness.

Nor did this labor hinder him from visiting other philosophers, from giving purely oral evening lectures etc. Further evidence might easily be adduced, but what really matters here is to stress not the actual lifestyle of the Neoplatonists, but rather their philosophical understanding of the contemplative life. Extant sources—it must be said—appear somewhat reticent on this matter. In examining the contemplative life, Plotinus almost invariably displays an inclination towards metaphysics. This is most clear in Enneads 3. Harder regarded enneadic treatises 3. In the opinion of R.

Dufour, by contrast, only treatises 5. On Eternity and Time Plot. That what comes into being is what I see in my silence, an object of contemplation which comes to be naturally, and that I, originating from this sort of contemplation have a contemplative nature. And my act of contemplation makes what it contemplates, as the geometers draw their figures while they contemplate. But I do not draw, but as I contemplate, the lines which bounds body come to be as if they fell from my contemplation. Once again, it is important to stress that the energy which in each case flows down from a higher principle to produce a lower level of reality is always described by Plotinus as an intellectual activity and noetic vision, which is to say an act of contemplation.

On these assumptions, everything that exists within reality is either thought or an outcome of thought. According to Plotinus, the human soul does not entirely descend into the world of Becoming,11 as part of it permanently dwells in the Being-Intellect, benefitting from an allembracing vision of the Forms. In other words, how was it possible for him to harmonize the noetic life of the undescended soul with the intellectual activity of the dialectician described in Enneads 1.

Plotinus himself, as might be expected, was often absorbed in philosophical speculations. It is not easy to answer this question, given the scantiness of explicit statements on the subject in the Enneads. Nevertheless, the existence of some positive link may be posited, some sort of connection between the two kinds of contemplation the one enjoyed by the undescended soul and. A well-known passage in the Enneads would actually appear to rule out this possibility: It will be not the whole of him that is unaware of this activity, but only a part of him […].

Perhaps we do not notice it because it is not concerned with any object of sense; for our minds, by means of sense-perception—which is a kind of intermediary when dealing with sensible things— do appear to work on the level of sense and think about sense objects. But why should not intellect itself be active [without perception], and also its attendant soul, which comes before sense-perception and any sort of awareness?

The reader is not necessarily aware that he is reading, least of all when he is really concentrating: This passage is examined in the valuable study by Schibli Plotinus, the theoretical activity of the undescended soul, like the blissful happiness deriving from it, is totally immune from any accidents that may affect the embodied soul. In this way, Plotinus both provides a new formulation of characteristically Stoic approaches19 and considerably limits—at least in the opinion of accredited scholars—his philosophical discussion of ethics. The former in no way affects the latter: But is the opposite also the case?

There is no ground to surmise that the way of life of the sage is completely transformed by this event. On the contrary, we may expect the sage to keep paying attention to the practical demands of everyday life and exercising his usual intellectual activities, albeit—presumably—not in the same manner as before. When absorbed in thought, Plotinus seemed to be living in two different worlds simultaneously:.

On this subject, see also Bussanich Remes and So his house was full of young lads and maidens, including Potamon, to whose education he gave serious thought, and would even listen to him revising the same lesson again and again. He patiently attended to the accounts of their property when their trustees submitted them, and took care that they should be accurate; he used to say that as long as they did not take to philosophy their properties and incomes must be kept safe and untouched for them.

Yet, though he shielded so many from worries and cares of ordinary life, he never, while awake, relaxed his intent concentration upon the intellect. He was gentle, too, and at the disposal of all who had any sort of acquaintance with him.

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Armstrong Even if he was talking to someone, engaged in continuous conversation, he kept to his train of thought. He could take his necessary part in the conversation to the full, and at the same time keep his mind fixed without a break on what he was considering. When the person he had been talking to was gone he did not go over what he had written, because his sight, as I have said, did not suffice for revision.

He went straight on with what came next, keeping the connection, just as if there had been no interval of conversation between. In this way he was present at once to himself and to others, and he never relaxed his self-turned attention except in sleep: Armstrong In the meetings of the school he showed an adequate command of language and the greatest power of discovering and considering what was relevant to the subject in hand […]. When he was speaking his intellect visibly lit up his face: Turning now to the Enneads, a passage from the treatise On virtues 1.

Perhaps the possessor of the superior virtues will know the inferior ones, and how much he can get from them, and will act according to some of them as circumstances require. But when he reaches higher principles and different measures he will act according to these. The latter, as Plotinus explains in the first section of Enneads 1.

In the passage from chapter 7 quoted above, Plotinus tentatively concedes the use of the civic virtues on the part of the sage who has already attained a superior way of life. Still, the sage must come back to the ordinary world and interact with other human beings, thus fulfilling a crucial pedagogical role. On the contrary, the moral actions of the sage are particularly valuable, although this does not imply that morality is the ultimate end of contemplation: For Plotinus, the fact that the latter enhances the moral character of the sage is probably a welcome but nonetheless accidental consequence of the process of ascension.

The practical action of the sage would follow effortlessly—at least in certain cases—from his contemplation, much as the World-Soul produces the sensible world without any deliberation, through the simple practice of contemplation. A compelling consequence of this is the fact that outwardly identical moral acts may derive from very different inner attitudes, which only involve deliberation and effort when performed by people who have not yet become sages.

These must also include the lower contemplation of the embodied philosopher: Porphyry and Some Uncertain Points Among the extant writings of Porphyry, De abstinentia and Sentence 32 are the most useful for the present enquiry. Authentic contemplation cannot be disjoined from moral purification and must be addressed to the intelligible world only; through it, we can revert to what properly belongs to us:.

This is somewhat reminiscent of the Stoic distinction between proper functions and right actions, and of the different quality of the acts performed before and after the formation of the Aristotelian moral habitus. See too Sleeman-Pollet coll. The same holds true for Porphyry: Van Riel, this volume, Clark In the same way we too, if we are going to reascend from here to what is really ours, must put aside everything we have acquired from our mortal nature, and the attraction to those things which brought about our descent, and must recollect the blessed and eternal being and eagerly return to that which is without colour or quality […].

For we were, and we still are, intellectual beings, pure from all perception and unreason. On the other hand, Porphyry casts serious doubts as to the capacity of the embodied soul to preserve its connection with intelligible reality: But we became involved with sensible because of our incapacity for eternal union with the intelligible and our capacity, so to call it, for what is here. For when the soul does not remain in the intelligible, all the capacities which are active through perception and the body germinate; they are like the effects of impoverishment in the earth, which often, though sown with wheat-seed, produces tares.

The cause is a depravity of the soul, which does not destroy its own essence by producing unreason, but still, through unreason, is linked to mortality and dragged from its own to what is alien. Clark The intellect is with itself, even when we are not with it. Amazon Giveaway allows you to run promotional giveaways in order to create buzz, reward your audience, and attract new followers and customers.

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