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During a visit to Damascus , British statesman David Davis was shown by Syria's Bashar al-Assad a spreadsheet outlining the identities of whose targeted killing he had approved. Referring to human rights abuses during the Bosnian War , the U. State Department noted politically or ethnically motivated "targeted killings" in Bosnia in Section 1a. During the First Chechen War , Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudaev was killed on 21 April by two laser-guided missiles when he was using a satellite phone , after his location was detected by a Russian reconnaissance aircraft , which intercepted his phone call.
On 20 March , Ibn al-Khattab , who led his militia against Russian forces in Chechnya during the First and Second Chechen War , setting up many effective ambushes against Russian forces as well as managing the influx of foreign fighters and money, was killed when a Dagestani messenger hired by the Russian FSB gave Khattab a poisoned letter.
Chechen sources said that the letter was coated with "a fast-acting nerve agent, possibly sarin or a derivative ". On 13 February , Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev , who served as acting president of the breakaway Chechen Republic of Ichkeria between and , was killed when a bomb ripped through his SUV in the Qatari capital, Doha. Yandarbiyev was seriously wounded and died in hospital.
His year-old son Daud was seriously injured. One of them, the first secretary of the Russian Embassy in Qatar, Aleksandr Fetisov, was released in March due to his diplomatic status and the remaining two, the GRU agents Anatoly Yablochkov also known as Belashkov and Vasily Pugachyov sometimes misspelled as Bogachyov , were charged with the assassination of Yandarbiyev, an assassination attempt of his son Daud Yandarbiyev, and smuggling weapons into Qatar. The agents however received a heroes' welcome on returning to Moscow in January but disappeared from public view shortly afterwards.
The Russian prison authorities admitted in February that they were not in jail, but said that a sentence handed down in Qatar was "irrelevant" in Russia. On 10 July Shamil Basayev , a Chechen militant leader who was alleged to be responsible for numerous guerrilla attacks on security forces in and around Chechnya [] [] [] and the Moscow theater hostage crisis and described by ABC News as "one of the most-wanted terrorists in the world", [] was killed by an explosion near the border of North Ossetia in the village of Ali-Yurt, Ingushetia , a republic bordering Chechnya.
According to the official version of Basayev's death, the FSB , following him with a drone , spotted his car approach a truck laden with explosives that the FSB had prepared, and by remote control triggered a detonator in the explosives. Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned with polonium , which a public inquiry in the UK concluded was carried out by FSB agents.
US and UK intelligence agents reportedly say they believe Russian assassins and possibly the Russian government could have been behind at least fourteen targeted killings on British soil, which were dismissed as non-suspicious by UK police. Ukrainian authorities have blamed Russian security services for multiple killings in Ukraine.
The Russian government is alleged by the British government of being behind a failed assassination attempt on Sergei Skripal and his daughter using a Novichok agent. This article is construed as prohibiting assassination, proscription, or outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price upon an enemy's head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy "dead or alive". It does not, however, preclude attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or elsewhere.
Daniel Reisner, who headed the International Legal Division of the Israeli Military Advocate General's Office from to , [] has stated that although targeted killing is illegal under previous understanding of international law, "If you do something for long enough, the world will accept it. The whole of international law is now based on the notion that an act that is forbidden today becomes permissible if executed by enough countries. We invented the targeted assassination thesis and we had to push it. At first there were protrusions that made it hard to insert easily into the legal moulds.
Eight years later it is in the center of the bounds of legitimacy. Georgetown Law Professor and former U. Marine , Gary Solis , has argued that under certain conditions, " Assassinations and targeted killings are very different acts. Abraham Sofaer , a former legal advisor to the U. State Department and fellow at the conservative Hoover Institution think tank, has written that targeted killing is "sometimes necessary, because leaders are obliged to defend their citizens".
After the killing of Hamas founder and quadriplegic Ahmed Yassin by Israeli helicopter gunships, Sofaer argued that targeted killing is not prohibited by American Executive Order banning assassination: Sofaer had previously argued during the First Gulf War that targeted killing was ethical but impractical: Given the legal, political and moral constraints that limit such activities in democratic regimes, the United States has a substantial interest in discouraging acceptance of the killing of political leaders as a routine measure, even in self-defense.
Author and former U. Army Captain Matthew J. Morgan has argued, "there is a major difference between assassination and targeted killing Colonol and commander of the IDF school of military law, now Professor of law at the University of Utah, has written, "targeted killing is American defense department analyst and professor Thomas Hunter has defined targeted killing as the "premeditated, preemptive, and intentional killing of an individual or individuals known or believed to represent a present or future threat to the safety and security of a state through the affiliation with terrorist groups or individuals.
It only states that the President has the "authority to use all necessary and appropriate force" this could be interpreted to mean that the President can attack al-Qaeda anywhere in the world. During the bombing of Iraq , The Scotsman reported, "US law prohibits the targeted killing of foreign leaders Administration officials have been careful to say they will not expressly aim to kill Saddam. Frank Sauer and Niklas Schoernig have described targeted killing as a violation of international law and a contravention of domestic laws, [] and maintain that the term itself is merely a legitimized euphemism for assassination.
The American Civil Liberties Union states in its website, "A program of targeted killing far from any battlefield, without charge or trial, violates the constitutional guarantee of due process. It also violates international law, under which lethal force may be used outside armed conflict zones only as a last resort to prevent imminent threats, when non-lethal means are not available.
Targeting people who are suspected of terrorism for execution, far from any war zone, turns the whole world into a battlefield. Response to 'Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing'":. The argument that this policy affords the public a sense of revenge and retribution could serve to justify acts both illegal and immoral. Clearly, lawbreakers ought to be punished.
Yet, no matter how horrific their deeds, as the targeting of Israeli civilians indeed is, they should be punished according to the law. David's arguments could, in principle, justify the abolition of formal legal systems altogether.
In , Ibrahim Nafie criticized the U. For drone strikes to be effective, the United States must obtain consent from the host country they are operating in. Finally, he recommends the United States work with international partners to establish rules and norms governing the use of drones. First, the so-called Hydra effect , or the rise of more—and more resolute—leaders to replace those who were recently "decapitated.
Daniel Byman, security studies professor at Georgetown University , argues that Washington must clarify its policies behind extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings, lest a nefarious precedent in international law is set. That number includes over 50 senior leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban--top figures who are not easily replaced. To avoid attracting drones, al Qaeda operates have avoided gathering in large numbers and mitigated use of electronic devices. Drones have turned al Qaeda's command and training structures into a liability, forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders.
Audrey Kurth Cronin of George Mason University argues that while drones are tactically savvy, they have failed to advance the strategic goals of U. The problem for Washington today is that its drone program has taken on a life of its own, to the point where tactics are driving strategy rather than the other way around. In this endless contest, the United States risks multiplying its enemies and heightening their incentives to attack the country. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
This article may require cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards. The specific problem is: June Learn how and when to remove this template message. List of Iranian assassinations and Chain murders of Iran. Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on 10 February Retrieved 15 February Archived from the original on 18 February Retrieved 16 December The New York Times.
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Retrieved 19 May Sofaer 26 March Archived from the original on 29 August Retrieved 20 May Archived from the original on 3 December Archived from the original on 5 November Archived PDF from the original on 7 September Archived from the original on 25 August Journal of Strategic Strategy. Archived from the original on 24 June Retrieved 5 August Archived from the original on 7 May Archived from the original on 15 September Brennan 30 April Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Archived from the original on 31 October Retrieved 1 May Archived from the original on 30 April Archived from the original on 17 June Drones have enhanced surveillance capabilities that allow them to linger with a view of the target for long periods without risk to human operators.
Drone operators are thus in theory better equipped to distinguish valid military targets from civilians who are immune from attack. Some 40 other countries also possess basic drone technology, and the number is expected to expand significantly in coming years. Those drones are primarily used for surveillance. Aerial drone strikes by the US on suspected members of al Qaeda and the Taliban in northern Pakistan have been conducted at least since , although the US does not officially acknowledge them.
They escalated in , with some 60 strikes taking place through the end of September. These strikes were carried out primarily by the CIA. It is not known to what extent they are hitting military targets in battle zones, causing disproportionate civilian loss compared to the expected military gain, or using lethal force in what are more properly law enforcement situations. As in previous years, these strikes were often accompanied by claims from local sources of large numbers of civilian casualties, but a lack of secure access to the areas has prevented independent verification.
At the same time, the US government has made unverified claims that there have been no civilian casualties in the attacks. The US has not provided information — such as videotapes taken by drones of attacks — that would demonstrate the lawfulness of the attacks or refute claims of civilian casualties. The US reportedly has conducted at least 20 drone strikes and other aerial attacks against alleged al Qaeda militants and other Islamist forces in Yemen from through November The other known strikes were carried out under the Obama administration, mostly in These strikes, attributed to the CIA and US special operations forces, have reportedly killed scores of people.
Lack of access to the attack sites has prevented independent verification of the strikes, including whether those targeted were lawfully subject to attack, the numbers of civilians killed or wounded, and the circumstances of the civilian casualties. A Yemeni parliamentary inquiry found that a US cruise missile strike in December killed at least 41 local residents, including 14 women and 21 children.
It allegedly involved cluster munitions, a weapon that poses unacceptable risks in civilian areas because of its indiscriminate nature. The US government has conducted targeted airstrikes against alleged al Qaeda members in Somalia since At his confirmation hearing in June , Vice Adm.
William McRaven of the US Special Operations Command said that there was a need for greater use of drones in Somalia to enhance the chance of successful strikes. Beginning that month, the US initiated drone attacks on suspected members of the Islamist armed group al-Shabaab, which is fighting the US-backed Transitional Federal Government. On June 23, in the only publicly acknowledged attack, the US conducted a drone strike targeting two high-ranking members of al-Shabaab who allegedly had "direct ties" to American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen see below.
There have been reports of new drone attacks since June, yet corroborating these reports has been particularly difficult because all have been reported in al-Shabaab-controlled areas where access and communication is severely restricted. The US also reportedly operates drone missions over Somalia from a base in the Seychelles, an archipelago in the Indian Ocean. Through public statements by senior officials, the Obama administration has provided an outline of its legal authority for conducting targeted killings. The essence of its argument is that targeted killings of those associated with al Qaeda are lawful in general, because the US is justified in going to war in self-defense an argument about the legal justification for war.
However, the administration has yet to clearly explain how it would assess the legality of any specific attack against a particular individual under international humanitarian law the law governing the conduct of war. State Department legal adviser Harold Koh told the American Society of International Law in March that the United States is in an ongoing armed conflict with al Qaeda, and so has the authority under the laws of war to use lethal force against al Qaeda members and associated forces. Neither Koh nor Brennan provided details that would lend insight into the process for determining whether specific strikes met international legal standards, particularly with respect to CIA-led operations.
The applicability of international humanitarian law, which requires an armed conflict situation, must be determined on a case-by case basis. This may be clear on a traditional battlefield, but where that is not the case, the determination will be more complex. For a government to act on the assumption that international humanitarian law always applies — effectively making all the world a battlefield and summarily rejecting international human rights law — will undermine international legal protections.
In September , US drone-launched missiles killed Anwar al-Awlaki, a US citizen of Yemeni descent, and three other alleged al Qaeda members who were traveling by car in northern Yemen's al Jawf province. Awlaki had been sought by Yemeni authorities since November for plotting to kill foreigners and being a member of al Qaeda. The United States may be engaged in an armed conflict in Yemen during which it would be permitted to target combatants.
On the other hand, an individual actively involved in operational planning would be a valid military target — but not if he played an operational role only in the past. The US should make clear what information supported its rationale that Awlaki was playing an ongoing operational role in a battle zone and thus could be lawfully attacked. The administration should release the legal opinion, or otherwise disclose its analysis of the applicable international law in targeted killings and the manner by which individuals are determined to be lawful targets of attack.
To date, the administration has refused to confirm or deny the existence of the legal opinion. The report basically updates earlier reports on drone warfare, this time through a beautifully constructed website, which literally and metaphorically shows the sites where US, UK and Israeli drones have hit. Through a study of some thirty recent attacks with reported civilian casualties, the report retells a by now familiar story about drone warfare; a story of destabilization of societies living under drones, civilian casualties, lack of transparency, and shaky normative foundations.
In this way, the report makes another important contribution to the ongoing struggle over the lawfulness and legitimacy of policies of targeted killings. At the same time, the report reflects some of the underlying tensions that come with attempts to subject drone warfare to the laws of armed conflict. I will focus on two of these tensions below. Both tensions are illustrative of the politics of international law today; a politics that is made possible by the significant increase of legal rules and regimes the past few decades. However, the rise of legal rules, regimes and one may add: Princeton University Press, It is also the creation of new vocabularies for political struggle, as the debates on drone warfare attest.
The first tension or gap I would like to discuss is that between the promise and practice of drone warfare. As the report makes clear, there is nothing inherently immoral or illegal about the use of drones per se. They are subject to the same rules as other weapons, and they can be used for both legal and unlawful purposes. More than that, drones come with the promise of small scale, smart wars that produce less death and destruction than more expensive, traditional military operations.
Technically speaking, drones offer better opportunities to live up to the laws of armed conflict than, for example, F 16 air fighters. Pilots in traditional air fighters have to decide in very short time where to drop bombs, and normally cannot remain circling around their targets in order to minimize collateral damage. Drones, by contrast, allow for more time to identify targets, to deliberate about targeting decisions, to consult military lawyers and to check and re-check the sites under potential attack.
Moreover, the information available on screen is much better readable than in the cockpit of an air fighter. In other words, drones seem to offer much better chances of living up to the requirements of distinction and proportionality in warfare.