21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Marine Corps Operations (MCDP 1-0)

War Machines

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It is entirely reasonable to assume that this part of Corps history served as a facilitator for the thought process behind the devising of the Combined Action Program in Vietnam, as well as a basis for viewing the Corps as a special operations branch separately from its activities COIN activities in Vietnam. Mullen, had an idea for a solution that would involve melding U. Marines and South Vietnamese militia members: Navy corpsman, with the remaining members made up of PFs.

Marine Corps Combined Action Program, Ek immediately established a school, of sorts, that would try to effectively help the Marine volunteers better navigate the Vietnamese culture in which they would find themselves so thoroughly immersed. Additionally, it should be noted that one of the chronic and most substantial problems with CAP was the dearth of competent Vietnamese language speakers among the Marines, and the school could not adequately address these challenges, either, in just two weeks.

This is actually a significant piece of information with respect to the question at the center of this research - the fact that the young Marines of the Program were the recipients of so little specialized COIN training, of any kind, speaks volumes about the natural aptitude and skills they had to do the work, simply because they were Marines. At the same time, if the big units want to sortie out the mountains 18 Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons, These responsibilities are normally associated with dedicated special operations units, and a closer look at the CAPs performance of these operational duties validates a viewpoint of the Marines as special operators.

In terms of the applications 21 Ibid. Planning — The planning of military operations by the CAPs, in theory, involved coordination by the Marine squad leader and his PF counterpart; that was not, however, how things typically went. Allnut, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: Human Sciences Research, Inc.

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However, the roving ambush was not without distinct disadvantages, such as the greater chance of encountering the enemy more on 27 Ibid. Training the Popular Forces.

The PF soldier was a part-time warrior, someone who had a full-time job during the day to support his family. Although it was part of the charge to the CAPs that more formal intelligence networks be established within the villages and hamlets, that was not, in reality, the 36 Ibid.

As the presence of the Marines in the villages and hamlets, along with their intimate and constant interactions and work with the PFs, began to yield effective results in safeguarding those same villages and hamlets, the abilities and confidence of the PFs themselves would increase substantially, and those two effects…the actual increased safety of the local homefront, along with the resulting and associated higher regard of the native PFs by the villagers…combined to open more and wider lines of communication through which actionable intelligence would flow from the villagers.

In truth, much of the information relayed to the CAPs was useless, or otherwise so general as to be of little, actionable value, but in and amongst all of that proved to be many nuggets that were very valuable.

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In one case, a village couple being questioned by a VC patrol about the whereabouts of a CAP refused to tell the information they knew, even after one of the VC shot their baby in the foot. Regarding civic action, the CAPs were, at least theoretically, responsible for the enaction of three kinds: Unfortunately, the giveaways proved largely unproductive, as the villagers would often take the items dispensed and sell them. Other problems associated with the giveaways included local 43 Ibid.

The idea was for the CAPs to help to build such things as schools, bridges, wells, latrines, etc. Ek, the requests for what was to be built were to come from Vietnamese officials, and, barring that, from the villagers themselves. The result was that CAPs would frequently take it upon themselves to decide on the project, in the interest of doing something. From there, though, more problems would frequently arise; for example, supplies were not always easy to come by, and the incorporation of villagers in the building process…something that was to be a standard component of these sorts of efforts…often did not go well.

The reason for this, in the assessment of observers, is basically as simple as the fact that the sizes of the projects were small enough so that they could be easily accomplished, while the nature of them provided the opportunity for great personal satisfaction and value on both sides of the 48 Ibid.

Unfortunately, there was little opportunity in Vietnam to transfer those duties to local Vietnamese, for a variety of reasons, so the ability of the Marines and Navy corpsmen, who worked with the CAPs in this capacity to engage in the process of transferring legitimacy on behalf of these duties to PFs and other locals was basically nonexistent. For example, with so many of the problems, at the most elemental levels, sourced in the simple but significant inability to communicate effectively with the Vietnamese, the availability of even one language specialist per CAP would likely have resolved so many of the problems that were ultimately rooted in the language barrier.

That obstacle was not, however, enough to diminish the demonstrated ability of the Marines to broadly operate as SOF in this environment. That said, a further discussion of CAP problems follows. The Most Significant Problems with the Program As to an assessment of the problems with CAP, a review of the information suggests less the correctness of pointing a finger at the Marine or PF, for that matter or the Program, and more at the persistent challenges of prosecuting COIN when the counterinsurgent, more generally, is substantially removed, in culture and perspective, from the indigenous people with whom, and on behalf of whom, he is working.

First and foremost, of course, was the matter of the language barrier.

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In the case of the Marines in the program, because they did not arrive at CAPs by way of a careful selection process for special operators, were not recruited from the Defense Language Institute, or were not otherwise funneled into the program by way of some other unique program or plan that had, as a feature, a special emphasis on linguistic versatility, the challenges associated with the Marines ability to effectively communicate with the Vietnamese, in general, and the PFs, in particular, persisted.

Although the CAP school set up by Lt. Ek did provide rudimentary language instruction, the total two-week duration of the school could in no way impart anything linguistically useful. Project Gemini Technology and Operations: Fire Effects of Bombing Attacks: Air Force Cyberspace Reports: The History of Traffic Analysis: Orientation Guide and Nepal Cultural Orientation: Marines in the Global War on Terrorism: Marines in Iraq, Nuclear Fusion Energy Encyclopedia: One Hundred Years of Flight: National Defense Intelligence College Paper: How to write a great review.

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