He succeeds by drawing parallels to the Cold War, Katz's other area of expertise. Marxist-Leninists and Arab nationalists found it difficult to remain united while propagating their ideology. They also became corrupted by power and often resorted to the same sorts of repression that they had previously railed against. These practices engendered opposition that ultimately thwarted their most grandiose aims.
In a similar way, radical Islamists may unleash sectarian animosity within the countries they seek to govern, while also bumping up against regional rivals if they try to expand their influence. In short, the dreaded transnational Muslim caliphate from Morocco to Indonesia is a figment of fevered imagination, and not much else.
The Islamists, Katz concludes, are unlikely "to be more patient, resourceful, and foresighted" than the Marxist-Leninists of the Cold War era.
Katz's discussion of particular regional dynamics reveals why. He explains how the rise of terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda has been driven by sectarian divisions within societies that many Americans presume are monolithic. By revealing the tensions within Iraq, Yemen or Iran, or between transnational Islamist movements, Katz suggests how a wise strategy would exploit these divisions and hasten al-Qaeda's demise.
Policy makers should also be watchful for shifting loyalties and rank opportunism on the part of our erstwhile friends and present-day adversaries.
The Bush administration made common cause with former Saddam Hussein loyalists in Iraq, and the Obama administration has proved willing to talk to former Taliban sympathizers in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such outreach invites attack from political opponents at home, who will decry negotiations with anyone with American blood on their hands.
It might be harder still to shove aside uncooperative allies, even when it is clear, as in the case of Pakistan, that our interests generally do not align. But Katz makes a compelling case for why such flexibility is essential to long-term success.
The mere framing of the book, as expressed in its title, might be its singular achievement. For many Americans, "leaving" is synonymous with losing.
Victory, by contrast, is often associated with staying. By this logic, we can tell that we won in Germany, Japan and Korea by the fact that tens of thousands of Americans remain in those countries more than six decades after the shooting officially stopped. But there is an equally compelling case that long-term occupation is a sign of a nation's weakness, or at least self-doubt.
If the advocates of wars of liberation are as convinced by their own rhetoric as they would have us believe, then U. Having purchased their goodwill with U. The truly grateful should be more than willing to cooperate with the United States going forward. But their calculations are unlikely to be guided by gratitude or sentimentality, Katz explains. If former adversaries choose to ally with the United States in the future, it will be because they fear us less than they fear others.
During the Cold War, "revolutionary regimes came to see a fellow revolutionary regime as more of a threat than the previously reviled United States.
Before that, tensions between the Soviet Union and China created an opening for U. Might the Taliban come to fear the United States less than neighboring Iran? Katz argues that looking to its Cold War experience would help the U.
This sober, objective assessment of what went wrong in the U. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University. He has authored several books, including Russia and Arabia: A collection of short chapters, some not much longer than op-eds, reveals author Mark Katz's wisdom and prudence when it comes to the use of military power, and the need for patience and persistence when pursuing long-term objectives His straightforward prose engages the reader in what often feels like a quiet one-on-one conversation Drawing on the history of previous ideological movements, Katz suggests that radical Islamic groups— without the benefit of a unifying external enemy—will overreach, fight among themselves, alienate their followers and even reach out to the United States, as have former U.
This book should be required reading for all students of foreign policy and especially U. The many insights Mark Katz draws from the Cold War experience provide a sound basis for navigating successfully through the perplexing problems related to international terrorism. Mark Katz's new book Leaving without Losing provides exactly the balanced and realistic analysis necessary to understand the complex nature of modern terrorism and the unique challenges we face in confronting it. A first class study.
Leaving without Losing: The War on Terror after Iraq and Afghanistan [Mark N. Katz] on www.farmersmarketmusic.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. As the United States . Leaving without Losing. The War on Terror after Iraq and Afghanistan. Mark N. Katz. As the United States withdraws its combat troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, .
The book discusses the marginalization of al-Qa'ida and its radical paradigm in light of winding down the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the Arab Spring. Katz offers a sobering analysis of 'what went wrong' during the first decade of the war on terror.
Mark Katz piece on Syria in Foreign Policy: It's Time to Act in Syria. Lobe Log blog post: The Perils of a Limited Response. The State of Russian-American Relations". Lobe Log Blog post: Mark Katz blog post: Middle East Policy Council panel on U.