Contents:
The first was the aeroplane. One of the major problems faced by the Allies in the early years of the war was the existence of a 'mid-Atlantic gap', an area that could not be reached by friendly aircraft. It was crucial to find a way of reaching this area, as simply by flying over the sea, aeroplanes could force submarines to submerge and cease activity, and they could, of course, counter the Kondor. Early in the war, fighter aircraft such as the 'Hurricane' could be carried to the mid-Atlantic, and catapulted from the decks of specially adapted ships known as Catapult Aircraft Merchant ships, or CAMs , although these were 'one-shot weapons', the planes having to ditch in the sea afterwards.
Light escort carriers, also capable of carrying aircraft, entered service in September , and these were a major step forward. The role of long-range aircraft such as the American 'Catalina' flying boat was also crucial for the battle in the mid-Atlantic area, although there is a big question mark over whether the Allies made the best use of their available aircraft. At first it was used only for the strategic bombing of Germany, the dominant strategy within the RAF at that time, and was only released to Coastal Command towards the end of The argument of 'Bomber' Harris had been that the RAF's most useful contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic was to bomb the U-boat pens and production facilities on land - a view that was, and remains, deeply controversial.
By the second half of , however, as these longer-range aircraft were released for the sea battle, the mid-Atlantic gap was at last being satisfactorily covered. Both sides at various times were able to read the signal traffic of the other.
Britain's ability to break the Enigma codes, and the resulting 'Ultra' intelligence was a priceless advantage, particularly after the Royal Navy not, as a recent Hollywood movie would have one believe, the Americans seized an Enigma machine from a captured U-boat in May Armed with information about where U-boats were patrolling, the British were able to move convoys in safe areas, away from the wolfpacks. However, the code-breakers at Bletchley Park had a constant battle to keep their information current.
German changes to the naval Enigma code at the beginning of led to a rise in Allied sinkings, as the flow of Ultra intelligence temporarily ceased. This problem was compounded by the fact that although the USA had entered the war, it did not immediately put into place some protective measures - such as introducing convoys, and 'blacking out' coastal towns.
U-boats were relatively safe from aircraft at night for two reasons: The Battle of the Atlantic: Moreover, reduced frequency also reduced the chances of detection, as fewer large convoys could carry the same amount of cargo, while large convoys take longer to assemble. Three weeks later, its attacker, U, surrendered to Canadian forces. To counter Allied air power, UbW increased the anti-aircraft armament of U-boats, and introduced specially-equipped " flak boats" , which were to stay surfaced and engage in combat with attacking planes, rather than diving and evading.
A handful of U-boats operating on the North American and Caribbean seaboards area in the first half of accounted for nearly Allied ships. The period of this campaign, called Operation Drumbeat, was the second 'happy time' for the German submariners. The crisis of the Battle of the Atlantic came in early British supplies, especially of oil, were running out, and it became a question of whether Allied shipyards could build merchant ships fast enough to replace the tonnage that was being sunk.
Mass production of Liberty Ships in US shipyards, however, helped to ensure that the Allies would win this race. At sea, the situation was saved by aggressive anti-submarine tactics, by new technology - better weapons and radio, the long-range aircraft Liberator being equipped with centimetric radar - and, eventually, by a revived Ultra intelligence.
By April the U-boats were clearly struggling to make an impact. Even worse, from Hitler's point of view, was the fact that Allied sinkings of German submarines began to escalate, with 45 being destroyed in the months of April and May. This was not the end of the threat in the Atlantic, but thereafter it was greatly diminished. After his withdrawal, Hitler insisted on keeping troops on the Baltic coastline, even after they had been cut off by advancing Soviet troops, in order to maintain possession of a testing ground for new types of U-boats.
Destroyer escorts also carried out several important feats during the Battle of the Atlantic. Perhaps the most important of these feats was the capture of the German submarine U The destroyer escorts attacked the submerged U-boat and forced her to surface. Boarding parties from the destroyer escorts then rushed over to the submarine while its crew abandoned ship.
The American sailors stopped the submarine from sinking and then towed it back to Bermuda. It gave the Allies a working Enigma code machine; a device which generated codes that the Allies had been only marginally successful at cracking. It also produced a complete set of the code books to go along with the machine. Most importantly, the U gave the Allies the current settings for the Enigma machine in use by the U-boat fleet, which allowed the Allies to begin cracking German codes with great success. These finds allowed Allied cryptographers to intercept, decode and read German radio transmissions almost as quickly as the Germans themselves.
The U was an intelligence bonanza in other ways as well. It gave the Allies an opportunity to test the capabilities of their German foes, which in turn led to improved tactics to counter the U-boats. Among the many discoveries on the submarine was a new type of acoustic torpedo. These deadly weapons locked onto the propeller noise of Allied ships and caused massive damage when they struck.
This improved countermeasure saved many lives in the war's remaining months. Germany's surrender in May ended the longest continuous battle of the war. Between and , more than 2, Allied merchant ships were lost to enemy activity, with over 1, being lost to German U-boats alone. Over , Allied sailors lost their lives in the battle. Although these losses were severe, they would have been much worse without destroyer escorts. Once these ships entered the battle in , U-boat successes dropped dramatically. As severe as the Allied losses were, they were much worse for the U-boat force.
Of 1, German submarines produced during the war, nearly were lost to Allied action.
Allied losses in the Atlantic reached their peak in As 1, ships were sunk, supplies of petrol and food to Britain reached critically low levels. In , advantage shifted to the Allies once again.
By now, the Allies had sufficient escort aircraft carriers and long-range aircraft to cover the Atlantic Gap. The battle reached its peak between February and May The 'hedgehog' depth-charge mortar was just one innovation that was making life more and more dangerous for U-boat crews. By 'Black May' of , U-boat losses were unsustainable — one quarter of their strength in one month, and almost at the same rate as Allied shipping. U-boats were withdrawn from the Atlantic, and the battle was won.
Although new German submarines arrived in , they came far too late to affect the course of the battle. Historians estimate that more than convoy battles took place during the war. They cost the Merchant Navy more than 30, men, and around 3, ships.