Contents:
Dealing with the challenges of macro financial linkages in emerging markets , with Swati Ghosh, Economic Premise No. A Developing Country Perspective , Washington: World Bank, p.
Will We Ever Trust the State? Challenges in the coming phase of globalisation: Picking up the Pieces Delivering Aid Differently My published works — with links Otaviano Canuto Impressive selection of works.
Until Debt Do Us Part: Subnational Debt, Insolvency, and Markets Subnational debt crises have reoccurred in both developed and. Until debt do us part: subnational debt, insolvency, and markets (English). Abstract. State and local debt and debt of quasi-public agencies.
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By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use. To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: Subnational debt crises have reoccurred in both developed and developing countries. Restructuring debt and ensuring its sustainability confront moral hazard and fiscal incentives in a multilevel government system; individual subnational governments might free-ride common resources, and public officials at all levels might shift the cost of excessive borrowing to future generations. This book brings together the reform experiences of emerging economies and developed countries.
Written by leading practitioners and experts in public finance in the context of multilevel government systems, the book examines the interaction of markets, regulators, subnational borrowers, creditors, national governments, taxpayers, ex-ante rules, and ex-post insolvency systems in the quest for subnational fiscal discipline. Such a quest is intertwined with a country s historical, political, and economic context.
Such a quest is intertwined with a country s historical, political, and economic context. Otaviano Canuto , Lili Liu. Often, the resolution of a subnational debt crisis unfolds in the context of macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms. Subnational insolvency is not new. Furthermore, rapid urbanization in developing countries is requiring large-scale infrastructure financing to help absorb influxes of rural populations.
The formal legal framework interacts with political reality to influence the dynamics of and incentives for reform. Often, the resolution of a subnational debt crisis unfolds in the context of macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms. Four broad lessons emerge from the study.
First, debt and deficits arise from joint decisions of borrowers and creditors. Without lenders, there is no borrowing or debt, so their constraints and incentives deserve attention equivalent to the one laid on subnational governments.
Second, relying only on ex-ante constraints to over-indebtedness, without ex-post consequences to reckless behavior, gives irresponsible borrowers and lenders an incentive to get around the ex-ante rules and execute transactions that may later get bailed out. Third, it is worth closely tying borrowing decisions to revenue decisions as a feature of good institutional design.
Debt issuance that is tied to tax increases or dedicated revenue sources is much more likely to be repaid. Finally, rule-based systems in which higher-level government treats all lower-level governments according to the same rules are crucial.
Ad hoc or discretionary action is likely to be plagued with reckless behavior, both on creditor and debtor sides. The rising weight of subnational finance has become a clear structural trend. Like any marriage thought to be indissoluble, multilevel governments should define rules of the game so as to avoid debt-originated sources of dangerous strain. Follow the latest from Otaviano Canuto at twitter.