Julikrise 1914 (German Edition)
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Then she will crush us on land by weight of numbers, and she will have her Baltic Fleet and her strategic railroads ready.
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Our group meanwhile is getting weaker". Jagow's belief that the summer of was the best time for Germany to go to war was widely shared in the German government. On 13 July, Austrian investigators into the assassination of Franz Ferdinand reported to Berchtold that there was little evidence that the Serbian government had abetted the murders. On 14 July, the Austrians assured the Germans that the ultimatum to be delivered to Serbia "is being composed so that the possibility of its acceptance is practically excluded ".
Petersburg meant that it was considered undesirable to present the ultimatum until the visit was over. Petersburg that Russia should inform Austria-Hungary of its negative view of Austrian demands. The Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg falsely told the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Sazonov , that Austria was not planning on any measure that might cause a war in the Balkans, so no Russian complaints were made.
On 17 July, Berchtold complained to Prince Stolberg of the German Embassy that though he thought his ultimatum would probably be rejected, he was still worried that it was possible for the Serbs to accept it, and wanted more time to re-phrase the document.
Zimmermann told Schoen that a powerful and successful move against Serbia would save Austria-Hungary from internal disintegration, and that was why Germany had given Austria "a blank power of full authority, even at the risk of a war with Russia". On 19 July, the Crown Council in Vienna decided upon the wording of the ultimatum to be presented to Serbia on 23 July.
Due to Austria's delay in writing the ultimatum, the element of surprise that Germany had counted upon in the war against Serbia was lost. Though Jagow's pretence was not widely believed, it was still believed at the time that Germany was aiming for peace, and could restrain Austria. On 20 July, the German government informed the directors of the Norddeutscher Lloyd and Hamburg America Line shipping companies that Austria would soon present an ultimatum that might cause a general European war, and they should start withdrawing their ships from foreign waters back to the Reich at once.
On 23 July, the whole German military and political leadership ostentatiously went on vacation. On 22 July, before the ultimatum was delivered, the Austrian government asked that the German government deliver the Austrian declaration of war when the ultimatum expired on 25 July.
The French and the Russians agreed their alliance extended to supporting Serbia against Austria, confirming the already established policy behind the Balkan inception scenario. As Christopher Clark notes "Poincare had come to preach the gospel of firmness and his words had fallen on ready ears. Firmness in this context meant an intransigent opposition to any Austrian measure against Serbia.
At no point do the sources suggest that Poincare or his Russian interlocutors gave any thought whatsoever to what measures Austria-Hungary might legitimately be entitled to take in the aftermath of the assassinations". The meetings were centrally concerned with the crisis unfolding in central Europe. On 21 July, the Russian Foreign Minister warned the German ambassador to Russia that "Russia would not be able to tolerate Austria-Hungary's using threatening language to Serbia or taking military measures".
The leaders in Berlin discounted this threat of war. German foreign minister Gottlieb von Jagow noted "there is certain to be some blustering in St.
German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg told his assistant that Britain and France did not realize that Germany would go to war if Russia mobilized. He thought London saw a German "bluff" and was responding with a "counterbluff". Meanwhile, Berlin was downplaying its actual strong support for Vienna so as to not appear the aggressor, for that would alienate German socialists.
The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum demanded that Serbia formally and publicly condemn the "dangerous propaganda" against Austria-Hungary, the ultimate aim of which, it claimed, is to "detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it".
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Moreover, Belgrade should "suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda". The Austro-Hungarian Government, concluding the document, was expecting the reply of the Serbian Government at the latest by 5 o'clock on Saturday evening, 25 July An appendix listed various details from "the crime investigation undertaken at court in Sarajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his comrades on account of the assassination", which allegedly demonstrated the culpability and assistance provided to the conspirators by various Serbian officials. Instructions were given to the Austrian Minister in Belgrade, Baron von Gieslingen, whereby if "no unconditionally positive answer" was received from the Serbian government within "the hour deadline" of the ultimatum "as measured from the day and hour of your announcing it" , the Minister should proceed to leave the Austro-Hungarian Embassy of Belgrade together with all its personnel.
On the night of 23 July, Serbian Regent Crown Prince Alexander visited the Russian legation to "express his despair over the Austrian ultimatum, compliance with which he regards as an absolute impossibility for a state which had the slightest regard for its dignity".
Confronted with the ultimatum and the lack of support from other European powers, the Serbian Cabinet worked out a compromise. Some historians argue Serbia accepted all of the terms of the ultimatum except for the demand in point 6 that Austrian police be allowed to operate in Serbia.
We are urgently advised to proceed without delay. Asquith outlined the sequence of events that might lead to a general war, but noted that there was no reason for Britain to become involved. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia being the most insolent document of its kind ever devised", but believed that Britain would stay neutral in the coming war.
It [Serbia] is not a nation in the European sense, but a band of robbers! The Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov sent a message to all of the great powers asking them to pressure Austria to extend the deadline of the ultimatum. On 23 July, British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey made a mediation offer with a promise that his government would attempt to influence Russia to influence Serbia, and Germany to influence Austria-Hungary as the best way of stopping a general war. Lichnowsky reported to Berlin "If we do not join the mediation, all faith here in us and in our love of peace will be shattered.
At the same time, Grey met with opposition from the Russian Ambassador who warned that a conference with Germany, Italy, France, and Britain serving as the mediators between Austria and Russia would break apart the informal Triple Entente. Starting 23 July, all of Germany's leaders returned secretly to Berlin to deal with the crisis. Moltke repeatedly stated that would be the best time for starting a "preventive war", or the Russian Great Military Programme would finish by , making Germany unable to ever again risk a war.
On 24 July, Zimmermann sent out a dispatch to all German ambassadors except for Austria-Hungary telling them to inform their host governments that Germany had no advance knowledge whatsoever of the ultimatum. Grey suggested mediation between Italy, France, Germany, and Britain as the best way of stopping an Austro-Serbian war. Jagow sabotaged Grey's offer by waiting until after the ultimatum had expired to pass on the British offer.
One would not have believed it of the Viennese! How hollow the whole Serbian power is proving itself to be; thus, it is seen to be with all the Slav nations! Just tread hard on the heels of that rabble! On 24 July, the Serbian government, expecting an Austrian declaration of war the next day, mobilized while Austria broke off diplomatic relations.
Wildest enthusiasm prevails in Vienna. On 24—25 July the Russian Council of Ministers met. The Russian Agriculture Minister Alexander Krivoshein , who was especially trusted by Nicholas, argued that Russia was not militarily ready for a conflict with Germany and Austria-Hungary, and that it could achieve its objectives with a cautious approach.
On 25 July , the council of ministers was held in Krasnoye Selo at which Tsar Nicholas II decided to intervene in the Austro-Serbian conflict, a step toward general war. He put the Russian army on alert on 25 July. Although this was not mobilization, it threatened the German and Austrian borders and looked like a military declaration of war. Despite the fact that she had no alliance with Serbia, the Council agreed to a secret partial mobilisation of over one million men of the Russian Army and the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets.
It is worth stressing, since this is a cause of some confusion in general narratives of the war, that this was done prior to the Serbian rejection of the ultimatum, the Austrian declaration of war on 28 July or any military measures taken by Germany. As a diplomatic move this had limited value since the Russians did not make this mobilisation public until 28 July.
In addition Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov believed that war was inevitable and refused to acknowledge that Austria-Hungary had a right to counter measures in the face of Serbian irredentism.
On the contrary, Sazonov had aligned himself with the irredentism, and expected the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Crucially, the French had provided their clear support for their Russian allies for a robust response in their recent state visit just days before. Christopher Clark states, "It would be difficult to overstate the historical importance of the meetings of 24 and 25 July", [] as it emboldened Serbia and raised the stakes for Germany, which was still hoping for a conflict localized to the Balkans.
Russian policy was to pressure the Serbs to accept the ultimatum as much as possible without being humiliated too much.
July Crisis
Petersburg, the acting head of the French government, Jean-Baptiste Bienvenu-Martin took no line on the ultimatum. On 25 July, Grey suggested again that Germany inform Austria that the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum was "satisfactory". Petersburg wants a war". Jagow accepted the Franco-Russian offer as it offered the best chance to sever Britain from France and Russia.
On 26 July, Berchtold rejected Grey's mediation offer, and wrote that if a localization should not prove possible, then the Dual Monarchy was counting, "with gratitude", on Germany's support "if a struggle against another adversary is forced on us". Petersburg stated that the principal aim of German foreign policy now was to make it appear that Russia had forced Germany into a war, in order to keep Britain neutral and ensure that German public opinion would back the war effort. On 26 July, in St. Austrian demands" and willing to do almost anything to save the peace.
Grey stated that a compromise solution could be worked out if Germany and Britain were to work together. Conrad wanted to wait until a military offensive was ready, while Berchtold thought that the diplomatic window for a retaliatory strike would have passed by then. On 27 July, Grey sent another peace proposal through Prince Lichnowsky asking for Germany to use its influence on Austria-Hungary to save the peace.
Petersburg if Germany should "counsel moderation in Vienna, since Serbia had fulfilled nearly every point". On 28 July, after reading Serbia's reply, Wilhelm commented, " But that eliminates any reason for war" [] or " every cause for war falls to the ground". Wilhelm's sudden change of mind about war enraged Bethmann Hollweg, the military, and the diplomatic service, who proceeded to sabotage Wilhelm's offer. The Kaiser wants peace He even wants to influence Austria and to stop continuing further.
General Falkenhayn told Wilhelm he "no longer had control of the affair in his own hands". Bethmann Hollweg mentioned two favourable conditions for war in his telegram to Vienna: Later, on 27 July, Austria-Hungary started to complete the preparations for war. We must therefore avoid any action [that] might cut the line, which has so far worked so well, between Germany and Britain". In London, Grey told a meeting of the British Cabinet that they now had to decide whether to choose neutrality if war did come or to enter the conflict.
Our attitude gives rise to the opinion that we want war at any price. On 28 July at Moltke ended his assessment with: I appeal to you to help me. An ignoble war has been declared on a weak country Soon I shall be overwhelmed by pressure brought upon me To try and avoid such as a calamity as a European war, I beg you in the name of our old friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from going too far. Shortly after declaring war on Serbia, Conrad informed the Germans that Austria-Hungary could not start operations until 12 August, to much fury in Berlin.
But a successful war on three fronts viz, in Serbia, Russia and France can not be initiated and carried on such a basis. It is imperative that the responsibility for any extension of the conflict to the Powers not directly concerned should under all circumstances fall on Russia alone. The prospect of talks was rejected out of hand by Bethmann Hollweg. Through as late as 27 July, Jagow expressed the view that Russian partial mobilization against the frontiers of Austria-Hungary was not a casus belli , Moltke instead argued that Germany should mobilize at once and attack France.
Moltke was overruled by Bethmann Hollweg in two meetings on 29 July, who argued that Germany should wait for Russia to begin a general mobilization.
As Bethmann Hollweg told Moltke, this was the best way to ensure that blame for the "whole shemozzle" could be placed on Russia's door, and thus ensure British neutrality. In a meeting with the British Ambassador Goschen, Bethmann Hollweg made the flagrantly false statement that Germany was trying to pressure Austria to abandon the war against Serbia.
On 29 July, Wilhelm sent a telegram to Nicholas stating "I think a direct understanding between your government and Vienna possible and desirable". At a meeting in Potsdam, according to Admiral Tirpitz 's notes, Wilhelm "expressed himself without reserve regarding Bethmann's incompetence" in foreign affairs. To ensure acceptance of his peace plan, Grey proposed a "Stop in Belgrade" offer, in which Austria would occupy Belgrade and go no further.
Since this was the same proposal as Wilhelm had made, Bethmann Hollweg regarded this as a particular threat as it would have made it difficult for Germany to reject it.
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At a meeting with Bethmann Hollweg late on 29 July, Falkenhayn and Moltke both again demanded that Germany use Russian partial mobilization as an excuse to go to war. Count Szogyeny reported to Vienna that the German government "regarded the possibility of a European conflict with the most complete calm", [] and that the Germans were only concerned about the possibility of Italy not honouring the Triple Alliance. In a meeting in London, Grey warned Prince Lichnowsky in veiled terms that if Germany attacked France, then Britain would consider going to war with Germany.
At another meeting with Goschen late on the night of 29 July, Bethmann Hollweg stated that Germany would soon be going to war against France and Russia, and sought to ensure British neutrality by promising him that Germany would not annex parts of metropolitan France Bethmann Hollweg refused to make any promises about French colonies. The Goschen-Bethmann Hollweg meeting did much to galvanize the British government into deciding to ally with France and Russia. After Goschen left the meeting, Bethmann Hollweg received a message from Prince Lichnowsky saying that Grey was most anxious for a four power conference, but that if Germany attacked France, then Britain would have no other choice but to intervene in the war.
At the start of the July Crisis, Germany had given her full support to Austria. This stratagem had earlier served to keep Russia on the sidelines during the Annexationist Crisis of , and may therefore have been thought to offer the best possible prospect of keeping the Austro-Serb dispute localized. On 28 July, Russia ordered partial mobilization in response to Austria's declaration of war on Serbia, Bethmann-Hollweg became alarmed and changed his attitude degrees.
Already on 28 July, two hours before becoming aware of the Austrian declaration of war, the Kaiser had suggested the "Halt in Belgrade" plan and instructed von Jagow that a cause for war no longer existed with the Serbian reply and he was ready to mediate with Serbia. After learning of the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, Bethmann Hollweg sent off the Kaiser's 'pledge plan' to Vienna on the evening of 28 July, with instructions to Tschirschky the German ambassador in Vienna to express himself "emphatically" to Berchtold and to "wire reply".
After receiving information from Rome that Serbia was now ready "on condition of certain interpretations, to swallow even Articles 5 and 6, that is, the whole Austrian ultimatum", Bethmann Hollweg forwarded this information to Vienna at He telegraphed Vienna at 2: These early-morning telegrams from Bethmann Hollweg were given by Tschirschky to Berchtold while the two men lunched on Thursday, 30 July.
Tschirschky reported to Berlin that Berchtold was "pale and silent" as the Bethmann telegrams were read twice, before stating that he would take the matter to the Emperor. Bethmann spent the remainder of the day, 30 July, continuing to impress Vienna with the need for negotiations and to inform the Powers of his mediation efforts. On 30 July, Nicholas sent a message to Wilhelm informing him that he had ordered partial mobilization against Austria, and asking him to do his utmost for a peaceful solution.
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Petersburg informed Nicholas that Germany would mobilize if Russia did not cease all military preparations at once, including those it had previously assured Russia it did not see as a threat against Germany or cause for German mobilization. The cancellation of general mobilization led to furious protests from Sukhomlinov, Sazonov, and Russia's top generals, all urging Nicholas to reinstate it. Under strong pressure, Nicholas gave in and ordered a general mobilization on 30 July. This was the first of the general mobilisations.
It came at the moment when the German government had not yet even declared the State of Impending War" []. Nicholas wanted neither to abandon Serbia to the ultimatum of Austria-Hungary , nor to provoke a general war. In a series of letters exchanged with Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany the so-called " Willy and Nicky correspondence" the two proclaimed their desire for peace, and each attempted to get the other to back down. Nicholas desired that Russia's mobilization be only against the Austrian border, in the hopes of preventing war with the German Empire. However, his army had no contingency plans for a partial mobilization, and on 31 July Nicholas took the fateful step of confirming the order for general mobilization, despite being strongly counseled against it.
In the evening of Thursday, July 30, with Berlin's strenuous efforts to persuade Vienna to some form of negotiation, and with Bethmann Hollweg still awaiting a response from Berchtold, Russia gave the order for full mobilization. When the German Emperor learned that, were Germany to attack France and Russia, Britain would in all likelihood not remain neutral, he launched a vehement rant, denouncing Britain as "that filthy nation of grocers.
Later that day, Bethmann Hollweg sent a message to the German ambassador to Vienna increasing pressure to accept the halt-in-Belgrade proposal. But shortly afterwards, "as soon as news of Russia's general mobilization began to arrive in Berlin" the Chancellor instructed the ambassador in Vienna "that all mediation attempts be stopped", and the directive be suspended. Petersburg asking that Russia not take any action that would offer Germany an excuse to mobilize. On 31 July, the Austrian Crown Council decided to continue the war against Serbia, and to ignore the dangers of Russian mobilization in the expectation of German support.
The German Ambassador in Paris delivered an ultimatum to Premier Viviani telling him that if Russia did not stop its mobilization, then Germany would attack France. When the word reached Berlin of Russian general mobilization, Wilhelm agreed to sign the orders for German mobilization, and German troops began preparations to enter Luxembourg and Belgium as a preliminary towards invading France.
Asquith wrote to Stanley in London that "the general opinion at present—particularly strong in the City—is to keep out at all costs". The Conservatives promised the government if the anti-war Liberal ministers were to resign, they would enter the government to support going to war. Smith told Churchill that the Conservatives would support a war against Germany were France attacked. On 31 July, Kaiser Wilhelm II wrote that the Triple Entente had conspired to entrap Germany in its treaty obligations with Austria "as a pretext for waging a war of annihilation against us".
On 1 August , a British offer to guarantee French neutrality was sent out and promptly accepted by Wilhelm. Wilhelm then ordered German forces to strike against Russia alone, leading to fierce protests from Moltke that it was not technically possible for Germany to do so as the bulk of the German forces were already advancing into Luxembourg and Belgium. Moltke , German Chief of General Staff, told him that this was impossible, to which the Kaiser replied "Your uncle would have given me a different answer!
Once mobilization was complete, the army would redeploy to the east.
In response to Wilhelm's order, a dejected Moltke complained that "Now, it only remains for Russia to back out, too. In Berlin, Bethmann Hollweg announced that Germany had mobilized and delivered an ultimatum to France telling that country to renounce its alliance with Russia or face a German attack.
At the same time as the invasion of Luxembourg, on August 1, [] Germany declared war on Russia. In the morning of 2 August, while French troops were still at a distance from the German frontier, [] German troops took control of Luxembourg [] as a preliminary to the invasion of Belgium and France. In truth a great country does not wage war by halves. Once it decided to fight the war at sea it would necessarily be led into fighting it on land as well. A German ultimatum was delivered, this time to Belgium on 2 August, requesting free passage for the German army on the way to France.
King Albert of Belgium refused the German request to violate his country's neutrality. This act violated Belgian neutrality, the status to which Germany, France, and Britain were all committed by treaty ; German violation of Belgian neutrality provided the casus belli. Later on 4 August, Bethmann Hollweg told the Reichstag that the German invasions of Belgium and Luxembourg were in violation of international law, but argued that Germany was "in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law".
Jagow rejected the British ultimatum and Goschen demanded his passports and requested a private and personal meeting with Bethmann Hollweg, who invited Goschen to dine with him. During their highly emotional conversation Bethmann Hollweg, who had spent his career trying to improve relations, accused Britain of going to war for its own national agenda, which was unrelated to that of Belgium, who would have been compensated for the wrong done to it.
He quoted Grey's speech as evidence that Britain was not going to war for Belgium's sake. Goschen's telegrams on 4 August to Grey never reached London, so it was unclear whether a state of war existed between Britain and Germany until the expiry of the ultimatum at midnight, Berlin time. The British government expected a limited conflict of rapid movement on the battlefield like the Franco-Prussian War , in which Britain would primarily use its great naval strength. At the outbreak of the war, Wilhelm is reported to have said: If my grandmother had been alive, she would never have allowed it.
Britain's reasons for declaring war were complex. After the war began the propaganda reason given was that Britain was required to safeguard Belgium's neutrality under the Treaty of London The German invasion of Belgium was, therefore, the casus belli and, importantly, legitimized and galvanized popular support for the war among the antiwar Liberal Party constituency. However, the Treaty of London of had not committed Britain on her own to safeguard Belgium's neutrality.
Rather Britain's support for France was decisive. Edward Grey argued that the naval agreements with France although they had not been approved by the Cabinet created a moral obligation vis a vis Britain and France. British Foreign office mandarin Eyre Crowe stated: What will be the position of a friendless England? What would be their attitude towards England? What about India and the Mediterranean? In the event that Britain abandoned its Entente friends, Britain feared that if Germany won the war, or the Entente won without British support, then, either way, it would be left without any friends.
This would have left both Britain and her Empire vulnerable to attack. Domestically, the Liberal Cabinet was split and in the event that war was not declared the Government would fall as Prime Minister Asquith , Edward Grey and Winston Churchill made it clear they would resign. In that event, the existing Liberal government would lose control of Parliament.