Machiavellis Principe - Virtù und Fortuna (German Edition)

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Machiavelli was born on May 3, , to a somewhat distinguished family. He grew up in the Santo Spirito district of Florence. He had three siblings: Primavera, Margherita, and Totto. His mother was Bartolomea di Stefano Nelli. His father was Bernardo, a doctor of law who spent a considerable part of his meager income on books and who seems to have been especially enamored of Cicero. He was studying Latin already by age seven and translating vernacular works into Latin by age twelve. When he was twelve, Machiavelli began to study under the priest Paolo da Ronciglione, a famous teacher who instructed many prominent humanists.

Machiavelli may have studied later under Marcello di Virgilio Adriani, a professor at the University of Florence. In , he returns to the historical record by writing two letters in a dispute with the Pazzi family.

Niccolò Machiavelli

During this period, there were many important dates during this period. The Pazzi conspiracy against the Medici occurred in Savonarola began to preach in Florence in , the same year that Lorenzo the Magnificent died and that Rodrigo Borgia ascended to the papacy as Alexander VI. In , after preaching elsewhere for several years, Savonarola returned to Florence and was assigned to San Marco.

On May 23, , almost exactly a year later, he was hung and then burned at the stake with two other friars in the Piazza della Signoria. Not long after Savonarola was put to death, Machiavelli was appointed to serve under Adriani as head of the Second Chancery. Machiavelli was 29 and had no prior political experience. A month after he was appointed to the Chancery, he was also appointed to serve as Secretary to the Ten, the committee on war.

In November he undertook his first diplomatic assignment, which involved a brief trip to the city of Piombino. His first major mission was to the French court, from July to January In , he would take three trips to the city of Pistoia, which was being torn to pieces by factional disputes P Over the next decade, he would undertake many other missions, some of which kept him away from home for months e. In August he was married to Marietta di Ludovico Corsini. Machiavelli and Marietta would eventually have several children, including Bernardo, Primerana who died young , an unnamed daughter who also died young , Baccina, Ludovico, Piero, Guido, and Totto.

Machiavelli was also romantically linked to other women, such as the courtesan La Riccia and the singer Barbera Salutati. In , Machiavelli met Cesare Borgia for the first time e. In the same year, Florence underwent a major constitutional reform, which would place Piero Soderini as gonfaloniere for life previously the term limit had been two months. The militia was an idea that Machiavelli had promoted so that Florence would not have to rely upon foreign or mercenary troops see P 12 and In , Machiavelli would be appointed to serve as chancellor to the newly created Nine, a committee concerning the militia.

Between and , Machiavelli would collaborate with Leonardo da Vinci on various projects. The most notable was an attempt to connect the Arno River to the sea; to irrigate the Arno valley; and to cut off the water supply to Pisa. He was one of the few officials from the republic to be dismissed upon the return of the Medici. During this period, Cesare Borgia became the Duke of Valentinois in the late summer of Julius II would ascend to the papacy later in November In late , Machiavelli was accused of participating in an anti-Medici conspiracy.

In early , he was imprisoned for twenty-two days and tortured with the strappado , a method that painfully dislocated the shoulders. He seems to have commenced writing almost immediately. By 10 December , he wrote to his friend, Francesco Vettori, that he was hard at work on what we now know as his most famous philosophical book, The Prince. He also began to write the Discourses on Livy during this period. During the following years, Machiavelli attended literary and philosophical discussions in the gardens of the Rucellai family, the Orti Oricellari.

He wrote poetry and plays during this period, and in he likely wrote his most famous play, Mandragola. Something must have worked. In , Machiavelli was sent on a minor diplomatic mission to Lucca, where he would write the Life of Castruccio Castracani. Giuliano would also commission the Florentine Histories which Machiavelli would finish by In , Machiavelli published the Art of War , the only major prose work he would publish during his lifetime. It was well received in both Florence and Rome.

He directed the first production of Clizia in January He was the first Florentine ever to become pope. In , Luther was excommunicated by Leo X. In , Piero Soderini died in Rome. If to be a philosopher means to inquire without any fear of boundaries, Machiavelli is the epitome of a philosopher.

He claims that he will not reason about certain topics but then does so, anyway e. Machiavelli occasionally refers to other philosophical predecessors e. For the sake of presentation, this article presumes that The Prince and the Discourses comprise a unified Machiavellian philosophy. Readers should note that other interpreters would not make this presumption. Regardless, what follows is a series of representative themes or vignettes that could support any number of interpretations. Although difficult to characterize concisely, Machiavellian virtue concerns the capacity to shape things and is a combination of self-reliance, self-assertion, self-discipline, and self-knowledge.

Maximally, it may mean to disavow reliance in every sense—such as the reliance upon nature, fortune, tradition, and so on. To be virtuous might mean, then, not only to be self-reliant but also to be independent. In this way, Machiavelli is perhaps the forerunner of various modern accounts of substance e. With respect to self-assertion, those with virtue are dynamic and restless, even relentless. Machiavellian virtue thus seems more closely related to the Greek conception of active power dynamis than to the Greek conception of virtue arete.

The Romans, ostensibly one of the model republics, always look for danger from afar; fight wars immediately if it is necessary; and do not hesitate to employ fraud P 3; D 2. Cesare Borgia, ostensibly one of the model princes, labors ceaselessly to lay the proper foundations for his future P 7. He laments the idleness of modern times D 1. Machiavelli says that a wise prince should never be idle in peaceful times but should instead use his industry industria to resist adversity when fortune changes P The Prince , for instance, is occasionally seen as a manual for autocrats or tyrants.

But in fact it is replete with recommendations of moderation and self-discipline. For Machiavelli, virtue includes a recognition of the restraints or limitations within which one must work: It is not enough to be constantly moving; additionally, one must always be ready and willing to move in another direction. Success is never a permanent achievement. Time sweeps everything before it and brings the good as well as the bad P 3 ; fortune varies and can ruin those who are obstinate P Virtue involves flexibility—but this is both a disciplined and an optimistic flexibility. Furthermore, it is a flexibility that exists within prudently ascertained parameters and for which we are responsible.

What it means to be virtuous involves understanding ourselves and our place in the cosmos. It should be emphasized that Machiavellian virtue is not necessarily moral. At first glance and perhaps upon closer inspection, Machiavellian virtue is something like knowing when to choose virtue as traditionally understood and when to choose vice. As he puts it, we must learn how not to be good P 15 and 19 or even how to enter into evil P 18; compare D 1.

Machiavelli is sensitive to the role that moral judgment plays in political life; there would be no need to dissimulate if the opinions of others did not matter. But his point seems to be that we do not have to think of our own actions as being excellent or poor simply in terms of whether they are linked to conventional moral notions of right and wrong. Praise and blame are levied by observers, but not all observers see from the perspective of conventional morality.

Crucial for this issue are the central chapters of The Prince P Neither is it an accident that fortune, with which virtue is regularly paired and contrasted, is female e. Machiavelli often situates virtue and fortune in tension, if not opposition. At times, he suggests that virtue can resist or even control fortune e.

But he also suggests that fortune cannot be opposed e. Let and 7, as well as D 2. Fortune accompanies good with evil and evil with good FH 2. Thus, one of the most important questions to ask of Machiavelli concerns this relationship between virtue and fortune. This phrase at times refers literally to soldiers who are owned by someone else auxiliaries and soldiers who change masters for pay mercenaries.

Maximally, it may mean to rely completely upon outside influences and, in the end, to jettison completely the idea of personal responsibility. Few scholars would argue that Machiavelli upholds the maximal position, but it remains unclear how and to what extent Machiavelli believes that we should rely upon fortune in the minimal sense.

A second way of engaging this question is to examine the ways in which Machiavelli portrays fortune. This image uses language similar to the description of successful princes in the very same chapter as well as elsewhere, such as P 19 and This linguistic proximity might mean various things: In The Prince , fortune is identified as female P 20 and is later said to be a woman or perhaps a lady una donna ; P There he is more specific: Finally, in his tercets on fortune in I Capitoli , Machiavelli characterizes her as a two-faced goddess who is harsh, violent, cruel, and fickle.

Machiavelli makes at least two provocative claims. Firstly, he says that it is necessary to beat and strike fortune down if one wants to hold her down. This hypothetical claim is often read as if it is a misogynistic imperative or at least a recommendation. But it is worth noting that Machiavelli does not claim that it is possible to hold fortune down at all; he instead simply remarks upon what would be necessary if one had the desire to do so.

Secondly, Machiavelli says that fortune allows herself to be won more by the impetuous than by those who proceed in a cold or cautious manner. Here, too, it is worth noting that the emphasis concerns the agency of fortune. She is not conquered. Rather, she relents; she allows herself to be won. It is far from clear that the young men who come to her manage to subdue her in any meaningful way, with the implication being that it is not possible to do so without her consent. The most notable ancient example is Dido, the founder and first queen of Carthage P 20 and D 2.

Other possibilities include women who operate more indirectly, such Epicharis and Marcia—the respective mistresses of Nero and Commodus D 3. In other words, Machiavelli seems to allow for the possibility of women who act virtuously, that is, who adopt manly characteristics. It may be that a problem with certain male, would-be princes is that they do not know how to adopt feminine characteristics, such as the fickleness or impetuosity of Fortune e.

Even the most excellent and virtuous men appear to require the opportunity to display themselves. Figures as great as Moses, Romulus, Cyrus, and Theseus are no exception P 6 , nor is the quasi-mythical redeemer whom Machiavelli summons in order to save Italy P They all require the situation to be amenable: However, some scholars have sought to deflate the role of fortune here by pointing to the meager basis of many opportunities e.

It is worth noting that Machiavelli writes on ingratitude, fortune, ambition, and opportunity in I Capitoli ; notably, he omits a treatment of virtue. This pregnant silence may suggest that Machiavelli eventually came to see fortune, and not virtue, as the preeminent force in human affairs. In The Prince , he says: But surely here Machiavelli is encouraging, even imploring us to ask whether it might not be true. Elsewhere, it seems related to stability, as when he says that human nature is the same over time e. The following remarks about human nature will thus be serviceable signposts.

Human beings enjoy novelty; they especially desire new things D 3.

In other words, they love property more than honor. Human beings are generally susceptible to deception. They are generally ungrateful and fickle liars P 17 who judge by what they see P They tend to believe in appearances P 18 and also tend to be deceived by generalities D 1. It is easy to persuade them of something but difficult to keep them in that persuasion P 6.

This susceptibility extends to self-deception. Human beings deceive themselves in pleasure P They are taken more by present things than by past ones P 24 , since they do not correctly judge either the present or the past D 2. They have little prudence D 2. They always hope D 2. He says that human beings are envious D 1. Consequently, they hate things due to their envy and their fear D 2. They do not know how to be either altogether bad or altogether good D 1.

In something of a secularized echo of Augustinian original sin, Machiavelli even goes so far at times as to say that human beings are wicked P 17 and 18 and that they furthermore corrupt others by wicked means D 3. Unlike Augustine, however, he rarely if ever upbraids such behavior, and he furthermore does not seem to believe that any redemption of wickedness occurs in the next world.

For Machiavelli, human beings are generally imitative. In other words, they almost always walk on previously beaten paths P 6. Especially in The Prince , imitation plays an important role. Machiavelli regularly encourages or at least appears to encourage his readers to imitate figures such as Cesare Borgia P 7 and P 13 or Caesar P 14 , as well as certain models e. However, it should be noted that recent work has called into question whether these recommendations are sincere. On such a reading, Machiavelli might believe that substances are not determined by their natures or even that there are no natures and thus no substances.

Machiavelli is among the handful of great philosophers who is also a great historian. Although he was interested in the study of nature, his primary interest seemed to be the study of human affairs. He urges the study of history many times in his writings e. He implies that the Bible is a history D 2. And Machiavelli wrote several historical works himself, including the verse Florentine history, I Decannali ; the fictionalized biography of Castruccio Castracani; and the Medici-commissioned Florentine Histories.

But what exactly does the historian study? Both accounts are compatible with his suggestions that human nature does not change e. In some places in his writings, he gestures toward a progressive, even eschatological sense of time. His call for a legendary redeemer to unite Italy is a notable example P In other places, he gestures toward the cyclical account, such as his approximation of the Polybian cycle of regimes D 1. Scholars thus remain divided on this question.

History for Machiavelli might be a process that has its own purposes and to which we must submit. Alternatively, it might be a process that we can master and turn toward our own ends. In his major works, Machiavelli affords modern historians scant attention. Machiavelli was friends with the historian Francesco Guicciardini, who commented upon the Discourses.

Machiavelli speaks more amply with respect to ancient historians. Among the Latin historians that Machiavelli studied were Herodian D 3. In , when Machiavelli was eight years old, his father obtained a complete copy of Livy and prepared an index of towns and places for the printer Donnus Nicolaus Germanus. Machiavelli mentions and quotes Livy many times in his major works.

With only a few exceptions AW 2. Machiavelli frequently returns to the way that necessity binds, or at least frames, human action. He speaks of the necessity that constrains writers FH 7.

Machiavelli, Niccolò | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Let and D 1. Machiavelli speaks of the necessities to be alone D 1. And in one of the most famous passages concerning necessity, Machiavelli uses the word two different times and, according to some scholars, with two different meanings: Necessity might be a condition to which we must submit ourselves. Alternatively, it might be a condition that we can alter, implying that we can alter the meaning of necessity itself. If what is necessary today might not be necessary tomorrow, then necessity becomes a weaker notion. At the very least, necessity would not be directly opposed to contingency; instead, as some scholars maintain, necessity itself would be contingent in some way and therefore shapeable by human agency.

The beginning of Prince 25 merits close attention on this point. There Machiavelli reports a view that he says is widely held in his day: On this question, some scholars highlight Renaissance versions of the Stoic notion of fate, which contemporaries such as Pietro Pomponazzi seem to have held. Two years before he wrote his famous September letter to Giovan Battista Soderini—the so-called Ghiribizzi al Soderini Musings to Soderini —Machiavelli wrote a now lost letter to Batolomeo Vespucci, a Florentine teacher of astrology at the University of Padua.

In his response to Machiavelli, Vespucci suggests that a wise man can affect the influence of the stars not by altering the stars which is impossible but by altering himself. Still other scholars propose a connection with the so-called Master Argument kurieon logos of the ancient Megarian philosopher, Diodorus Cronus. Diodorus denies the possibility of future contingencies, that is, the possibility that future events do not already have a determined truth value.

Aristotle famously argues against this view in De Interpretatione ; Cicero and Boethius also discuss the issue in their respective treatments of divine providence. Although the effectual truth may pertain to military matters e. Surprisingly, there is still relatively little work on this fundamental Machiavellian concept. What exactly is the effectual truth? One way to address this question is to begin with Chapter 15 of The Prince , where Machiavelli introduces the term.

Two things seem to characterize the effectual truth in Chapter Whatever it is, the effectual truth does not seem to begin with images of things. The implication seems to be that other more utopian? Another way to address this question is to begin with the Dedicatory Letter to The Prince. These sketchers place themselves at high and low vantage points or perspectives in order to see as princes and peoples do, respectively. The truth begins in ordinary apprehension e. But precisely because perspective is partial, it is subject to error and indeed manipulation e.

Milan is not a wholly new principality as such but instead is new only to Francesco Sforza P 1. Unlike Machiavelli himself, those who damn the tumults of Rome do not see that these disorders actually lead to Roman liberty D 1. It is worth noting that perspectives do not always differ. Some scholars believe that differing causes cannot help but modify effects; in this case, admiration itself would be stained and colored by either love or fear and would be experienced differently as a result.

And Machiavelli says that what makes a prince contemptible is to be held variable, light, effeminate, pusillanimous, or irresolute P What matters in politics is how we appear to others—how we are held tenuto by others. But how we appear depends upon what we do and where we place ourselves in order to do it. A wise prince for Machiavelli is not someone who is content to investigate causes—including superior causes P 11 , first causes P 14 and D 1.

Rather, it is someone who produces effects. And there are no effects considered abstractly. Some commentators believe that effects are only effects if they are seen or displayed. They thus see the effectual truth as proto-phenomenological. Others take a stronger line of interpretation and believe that effects are only effects if they produce actual changes in the world of human affairs. Touching rather than seeing might then be the better metaphor for the effectual truth see P Machiavelli is most famous as a political philosopher.

Although he studied classical texts deeply, Machiavelli appears to depart somewhat from the tradition of political philosophy, a departure that in many ways captures the essence of his political position. At least at first glance, it appears that Machiavelli does not believe that the polity is caused by an imposition of form onto matter. Given that Machiavelli talks of both form and matter e. For Aristotle, politics is similar to metaphysics in that form makes the city what it is.

The difference between a monarchy and a republic is a difference in form. This is not simply a question of institutional arrangement; it is also a question of self-interpretation. Aristotelian political form is something like a lens through which the people understand themselves.

Firstly, it matters whether monarchs or republicans rule, as the citizens of such polities will almost certainly understand themselves differently in light of who rules them. Justice is thus the underlying basis of all claims to rule, meaning that, at least in principle, differing views can be brought into proximity to each other.

Concord, or at least the potential for it, is both the basis and the aim of the city. With respect to the first implication, Machiavelli occasionally refers to the six Aristotelian political forms e. He even raises the possibility of a mixed regime P 3; D 2. But usually he speaks only of two forms, the principality and the republic P 1. The lines between these two forms are heavily blurred; the Roman republic is a model for wise princes P 3 , and the people can be considered a prince D 1. Machiavelli even at times refers to a prince of a republic D 2.

Finally, he says that virtuous princes can introduce any form that they like, with the implication being that form does not constitute the fundamental reality of the polity P 6. On this account, political form for Machiavelli is not fundamentally causal; it is at best epiphenomenal and perhaps even nominal. Some scholars focus on possible origins of this idea e.

Still others focus on the fact that the humors arise only in cities and thus do not seem to exist simply by nature. Machiavelli says that the city or state is always minimally composed of the humors of the people and the great P 9 and 19; D 1. The polity is constituted, then, not by a top-down imposition of form but by a bottom-up clash of the humors.

And as the humors clash, they generate various political effects P 9 —these are sometimes good e. Furthermore, Machiavelli does attribute certain qualities to those who live in republics—greater hatred, greater desire for revenge, and restlessness born from the memory of their previous liberty—which might be absent in those who live in principalities P ; D 1.

Such passages appear to bring him in closer proximity to the Aristotelian account than first glance might indicate. The humors are also related to the second implication mentioned above. Machiavelli distinguishes the humors not by wealth or population size but rather by desire. These desires are inimical to each other in that they cannot be simultaneously satisfied: Discord, rather than concord, is thus the basis for the state.

Consequently, Machiavelli says that a prince must choose to found himself on one or the other of these humors. Firstly, it is unclear what desire characterizes the humor of the soldiers, a third humor that occurs, if not always, at least in certain circumstances. Finally, it should be noted that recent work has questioned whether the humors are as distinct as previously believed; whether an individual or group can move between them; and whether they exist on something like a spectrum or continuum.

For example, it may be the case that a materially secure people would cease to worry about being oppressed and might even begin to desire to oppress others in the manner of the great ; or that an armed people would effectively act as soldiers such that a prince would have to worry about their contempt rather than their hatred. Some scholars claim that Machiavelli is the last ancient political philosopher because he understands the merciless exposure of political life.

Either position is compatible with a republican reading of Machiavelli. As in The Prince , Machiavelli attributes qualities to republican peoples that might be absent in peoples accustomed to living under a prince P ; D 1. He also distinguishes between the humors of the great and the people D 1. However, in the Discourses he explores more carefully the possibility that the clash between them can be favorable e.

He associates both war and expansion with republics and with republican unity; conversely, he associates peace and idleness with republican disunity D 2. He notes the flexibility of republics D 3. He ponders the political utility of public executions and—as recent work has emphasized—courts or public trials D 3. He even considers the possibility of a perpetual republic compare D 3. Like many other authors in the republican tradition, he frequently ponders the problem of corruption e.

Although what follows are stylized and compressed glosses of complicated interpretations, they may serve as profitable beginning points for a reader interested in pursuing the issue further. It holds that Machiavelli is something of a neo-Roman republican. What matters the most, politically speaking, are robust institutions and deliberative participation in public life e. Freedom is the effect of good institutions. Corruption is a moral failing and more specifically a failing of reason. This interpretation focuses upon the stability of public life.

It holds that Machiavelli is something of a radical or revolutionary democrat whose ideas, if comparable to anything classical, are more akin to Greek thought than to Roman. What matters the most, politically speaking, is non-domination. Freedom is a cause of good institutions; freedom is not obedience to any rule but rather the continuous practice of resistance to oppression that undergirds all rules.

Corruption is associated with the desire to dominate others. This interpretation focuses upon the instability—and even the deliberate destabilization—of political life. A possible weakness is that it seems to understand law in a denuded sense, that is, as merely a device to prevent the great from harming the people; and that it seems to overlook the chaos that might result from factional strife e. It holds that Machiavelli advocates for something like a constitutional monarchy. What matters the most, politically speaking, is stability of public life and especially acquisitions, coupled with the recognition that such a life is always under assault from those who are dissatisfied.

Freedom is both a cause and effect of good institutions. Corruption is associated with a decline though not a moral decline in previously civilized human beings. This interpretation focuses both on the stability and instability of political life e. Some scholars go so far as to claim that it is the highest good for Machiavelli. Possessions, titles, family achievements, and land could all contribute to dignitas. Plebeians, who did not possess as much wealth or family heritage as patricians, could still attain prominence in the Roman Republic by acquiring glory in speeches e.

The destabilization of the Roman Republic was in part due to individuals who short-circuited this system, that is, who achieved glory outside the conventional political pathway. A notable example is Scipio Africanus. At the beginning of his ascendancy, Scipio had never held any political positions and was not even eligible for them. However, by his mid-twenties he had conducted major military reforms. This unprecedented achievement gained Scipio much glory—at least in the Senate, as Machiavelli notes though not with Fabius Maximus; P 17 and D 3.

Indeed, Scipio gained so much glory that he catapulted past his peers in terms of renown, regardless of his lack of political accomplishments. Consequently, his imitation was incentivized, which partly led to the rise of the warlords—such as Pompey and Julius Caesar—and the eventual end of the Republic. One useful example of the concatenation of all three characteristics is Agathocles the Sicilian. Indeed, there is little, if anything, that can be attributed to fortune in his ascent. It seems clear for all of these reasons that Agathocles is virtuous on the Machiavellian account.

Although such acts are compatible with Machiavellian virtue and might even comprise it , they cannot be called virtuous according to the standards of conventional morality. In general, force and strength easily acquire reputation rather than the other way around D 1.

But Machiavelli concludes that Agathocles paid so little heed to public opinion that his virtue was not enough. Glory for Machiavelli thus depends upon how you are seen and upon what people say about you. Many of the successful and presumably imitable figures in both The Prince and the Discourses share the quality of being cruel, for example.

This is at least partly why explorations of deceit and dissimulation take on increasing prominence as both works progress e. One must learn to imitate not only the force of the lion but also the fraud of the fox P 7, 18, and 19; D 2. Whether veneration venerazione and reverence riverenzia are ultimately higher concepts than glory remains an important question, and recent work has taken it up. Those interested in this question may find it helpful to begin with the following passages: P 6, 7, 11, 17, 19, 23, and 26; D 1. His brother Totto was a priest.

His father appeared to be a devout believer and belonged to a flagellant confraternity called the Company of Piety. When Machiavelli was eleven, he joined the youth branch of this company, and he moved into the adult branch in From to , Machiavelli and Totto paid money to the friars of Santa Croce in order to commemorate the death of their father and to fulfill a bequest from their great-uncle. He did write an Exhortation to Penitence though scholars disagree as to his sincerity; compare P And he did accept the last rites upon his deathbed in the company of his wife and some friends.

But evidence in his correspondence—for instance, in letters from close friends such as Francesco Vettori and Francesco Guicciardini—suggests that Machiavelli did not take pains to appear publicly religious. Still others claim that he was religious but not in the Christian sense. Species of sects tend to be distinguished by their adversarial character, such as Catholic versus heretical FH 1.

They also generally, if not exclusively, seem to concern matters of theological controversy. It is not clear whether and to what extent a religion differs from a sect for Machiavelli. Such interpretations implore human beings to think more of enduring their beatings than of avenging them D 2. He seems to allow for the possibility that not all interpretations are false; for example, he says that Francis and Dominic rescue Christianity from elimination, presumably because they return it to an interpretation that focuses upon poverty and the life of Christ D 3.

And one of the things that Machiavelli may have admired in Savonarola is how to interpret Christianity in a way that is muscular and manly rather than weak and effeminate compare P 6 and 12; D 1. Some scholars have emphasized the various places where Machiavelli associates Christianity with the use of dissimulation e.

Other scholars believe that Machiavelli adheres to an Averroeist which is to say Farabian understanding of the public utility of religion. On such an understanding, religion is necessary and salutary for public morality. The philosopher should therefore take care not to disclose his own lack of belief or at least should attack only impoverished interpretations of religion rather than religion as such. Is this a fair characterization? At least since Montaigne and more recently with philosophers such as Judith Skhlar and Richard Rorty , this vice has held a special philosophical status.

Indeed, contemporary moral issues such as animal ethics, bullying, shaming, and so forth are such contentious issues largely because liberal societies have come to condemn cruelty so severely. Such recommendations are common throughout his works. The fact that seeming vices can be used well and that seeming virtues can be used poorly suggests that there is an instrumentality to Machiavellian ethics that goes beyond the traditional account of the virtues.

One could find many places in his writings that support this point e. But what exactly is this instrumentality? Partly, it seems to come from human nature. Human life is thus restless motion D 1. It is thus useful as a regulative ideal, and is perhaps even true, that we should see others as bad D 1. In order to survive in such a world, goodness is not enough D 3.

Instead, we must learn how not to be good P 15 and 19 or even how to enter into evil P 18; compare D 1. Thus, virtues and vices serve something outside themselves; they are not purely good or bad. Recognizing this limitation of both virtue and vice is eminently useful. Another way to put this point is in terms of imitation. While we should often imitate those greater than us P 6 , we should also learn how to imitate those lesser than us. For example, we should imitate animals in order to fight as they do, since human modes of combat, such as law, are often not enough—especially when dealing with those who do not respect laws P More specifically, we should imitate the lion and the fox.

The lion symbolizes force, perhaps to the point of cruelty; the fox symbolizes fraud, perhaps to the point of lying about the deepest things, such as religion P The mention of the fox brings us to a second profitable point of entry into Machiavellian ethics, namely deception. Throughout his writings, Machiavelli regularly advocates lying e. He even at one point suggests that it is useful to simulate craziness D 3. Because cruelty and deception play such important roles in his ethics, it is not unusual for related issues—such as murder and betrayal—to rear their heads with regularity.

If Machiavelli possessed a sense of moral squeamishness, it is not something that one easily detects in his works. If this hypothesis is true, then his moral position would be much more complicated than it appears to be. Does Machiavelli ultimately ask us to rise above considerations of utility?

Does he, of all people, ask us to rise above what we have come to see as Machiavellianism? It was begun in and probably completed by Machiavelli also says that Filippo Casavecchia, a longtime friend, has already seen a rough draft of the text. These manuscripts, some of which we do possess, do not bear the title of The Prince. Which title did Machiavelli intend: That the book has two purported titles—and that they do not translate exactly into one another—remains an enduring and intriguing puzzle.

The structure of The Prince does not settle the issue, as the book begins with chapters that explicitly treat principalities, but eventually proceeds to chapters that explicitly treat princes. At some point, for reasons not entirely clear, Machiavelli changed his mind and dedicated to the volume to Lorenzo. We do not know whether Giuliano or Lorenzo ever read the work. There is an old story, perhaps apocryphal, that Lorenzo preferred a pack of hunting dogs to the gift of The Prince and that Machiavelli consequently swore revenge against the Medici. At any rate, the question of the precise audience of The Prince remains a key one.

Some interpreters have even suggested that Machiavelli writes to more than one audience simultaneously. The question of authorial voice is also important. Machiavelli himself appears as a character in The Prince twice P 3 and 7 and sometimes speaks in the first person e. However, it is not obvious how to interpret these instances, with some recent scholars going so far as to say that Machiavelli operates with the least sincerity precisely when speaking in his own voice.

This issue is exacerbated by the Dedicatory Letter, in which Machiavelli sets forth perhaps the foundational image of the book. The suggestion seems to be that Machiavelli throughout the text variously speaks to one or the other of these vantage points and perhaps even variously speaks from one or the other of these vantage points. At the very least, the image implies that we should be wary of taking his claims in a straightforward manner. In the first chapter, Machiavelli appears to give an outline of the subject matter of The Prince.

But this subject matter appears to be exhausted as early as Chapter 7. What, then, to make of the rest of the book? One possibility is that The Prince is not a polished work; some scholars have suggested that it was composed in haste and that consequently it might not be completely coherent. An alternative hypothesis is that Machiavelli has some literary or philosophical reason to break from the structure of the outline, keeping with his general trajectory of departing from what is customary.

Whatever interpretation one holds to, the subject matter of the book seems to be arranged into roughly four parts: Chapters treat principalities with the possible exception of Chapter 5 ; Chapters treat the art of war; Chapters treat princes; and Chapters treat what we may call the art of princes. In Chapter 12, Machiavelli says that he has previously treated the acquisition and maintenance of principalities and says that the remaining task is to discourse generally on offensive and defensive matters.

Similarly, in Chapter 15, Machiavelli says that what remains is to see how a prince should act with respect to subjects and friends, implying minimally that what has come previously is a treatment of enemies. Almost from its composition, The Prince has been notorious for its seeming recommendations of cruelty; its seeming prioritization of autocracy or at least centralized power over more republican or democratic forms; its seeming lionization of figures such as Cesare Borgia and Septimius Severus; its seeming endorsements of deception and faith-breaking; and so forth.

Indeed, it remains perhaps the most notorious work in the history of political philosophy. But the meaning of these manipulations, and indeed of these appearances, remains a scholarly question. Interpreters of the caliber of Rousseau and Spinoza have believed The Prince to bear a republican teaching at its core. Some scholars have gone so far as to see it as an utterly satirical or ironic work. Others have insisted that the book is even more dangerous than it first appears. There is reason to suspect that Machiavelli had begun writing the Discourses as early as ; for instance, there seems to be a reference in The Prince to another, lengthier work on republics P 2.

And since the Discourses references events from as late as , it seems to have still been a work in progress by that point and perhaps even later. Evidence suggests that manuscript copies were circulating by and perhaps earlier. It bears no heading and begins with a paragraph that our other manuscripts do not have. It is typically retained in English translations. As with The Prince , there is a bit of mystery surrounding the title of the Discourses.

The book appeared first in Rome and then a few weeks later in Florence, with the two publishers Blado and Giunta, respectively seemingly working with independent manuscripts. Machiavelli refers simply to Discorsi in the Dedicatory Letter to the work, however, and it is not clear whether he intended the title to specifically pick out the first ten books by name. Today, the title is usually given as the Discourses on Livy or the Discourses for short. This is a curious coincidence and one that is presumably intentional. But what is the intent? Scholars are divided on this issue.

A second, related curiosity is that the manuscript as we now have it divides the chapters into three parts or books. However, the third part does not have a preface as the first two do. As with the dedicatory letter to The Prince , there is also a bit of mystery surrounding the dedicatory letter to the Discourses. It is noteworthy that the Discourses is the only one of the major prose works dedicated to friends; by contrast, The Prince , the Art of War , and the Florentine Histories are all dedicated to potential or actual patrons.

However, it is a strange kind of commentary: At the end of the first chapter D 1. He further distinguishes between things done by private and public counsel. Finally, he claims that the first part or book will treat things done inside the city by public counsel. The first part, then, primarily treats domestic political affairs. Machiavelli says that the second book concerns how Rome became an empire, that is, it concerns foreign political affairs D 2.

If Machiavelli did in fact intend there to be a third part, the suggestion seems to be that it concerns affairs conducted by private counsel in some manner. It is noteworthy that fraud and conspiracy D 2. At first glance, it is not clear whether the teaching of the Discourses complements that of The Prince or whether it militates against it. Scholars remain divided on this issue.

Some insist upon the coherence of the books, either in terms of a more nefarious teaching typically associated with The Prince ; or in terms of a more consent-based, republican teaching typically associated with the Discourses. The Discourses nevertheless remains one of the most important works in modern republican theory.

It had an enormous effect on republican thinkers such as Rousseau, Montesquieu, Hume, and the American Founders. The Art of War is the only significant prose work published by Machiavelli during his lifetime and his only attempt at writing a dialogue in the humanist tradition. It was probably written in It takes the literary form of a dialogue divided into seven books and preceded by a preface. The action of the Art of War takes place after dinner and in the deepest and most secret shade AW 1. Bernardo filled the gardens with plants mentioned in classical texts AW 1.

They are substitutes of the concepts of acti ve and passive'. Leonardo O lschki , Machiavelli rhe Sciemisr Berkeley, , pp. It should be remarked that, quite apart from the reader 's attitudes on 'machismo', Machiavelli 's choice of the analogy of fortune as a woman is principally motivated by his desire to make a point abollt fortune. Pilkin has confu sed the analogisr with the analogy.

Let us suppose that male readers of Machiavelli did not regard women to be sexual objects. Thi s wou ld in no way change Machiavelli's concept of poLi tics , but would on ly mean th at a different an alogy was required. Fortune is in point of fac t neither a river no r a women. These are mere literary images suitable to the mentality of Machiavelli 's contemporaries. Were Machiavelli speaking to feminists, he m ight have described fortune as, say, an impetuous man who, when turbulent, destroys, plunders and creates disorders ; every one flees before him, and everything yields to his fu ry without bein g able to oppose it; and yet though he is of such a kind, still when he is quiet, women can make provisions against him, so that when hi s fury is roused again , he will not be so wild and dangerou s cf.

Pitkin is therefore criticizin g not Machi avelli 's poli tical theory, but o nl y hi s analogy. Flanagan is right in observing that Machiavelli 's comparison of fortune to a woman is an ' obvio us literary device' Flanagan , 'The Concept of Fortuna ', p. BALABAN themselves, their masculinity, their autonomy, and the achievements of civili- zation, against almost overwhelming odds.

For him, according to Pitkin,fortuna ' does not represent any transcendent order. Rather, she acts on the basis of famili ar human motives, impulses, and desires'.

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She can give or deny a man good " judgmen t" and "sense". According to Pitkin, what defines events as fortuna for Machiavelli ' is not their inexplicability or mysteriousness of the apparent need for supernatural explanation of them, but simply that they could not have been foreseen by the actors involved in the particular situation Machiavelli has been describing'. If certain consequences of actions and events are absolutely impossible to foresee, thenjortuna would be independent of will and Machiavelli 's view of it would therefore be naturalistic.

If, on the contrary, such consequ ences were merely unforeseen but might nevertheless have been anticipated, then in Machiavelli's view fortuna would have a will-dependent nature. What is lacking in Pitkin 's approach, in my opinion, is a critical explanation of the concept.

That is to say, she fails to address herself to the question of why the unexpected should supervene. I, on the other hand, shall argue thatjortuna does not merely consist in unexpected turns of events; but in those events which are the by-product of action, and that as an unintended result of action it assumes a nature-like guise. Flanagan critically examines the approaches of each opposing interpretation of Machiavelli 's use of fortuna.

According to Flanagan, fortuna is immanent in human activity, in the sense that man 'can transcend Fortune through refusing to play her game '. Indeed, he takes issue with the extreme will-dependent interpretation of Charles Tarlton, who asserts that fortuna can be 'completely overcome'. We live in an unpredictable world, and so our actions often do not turn out as we planned. What is common to all of the interpretati ons offortuna in Machiavelli is that they treat as self-evident what in fact needs to be explained; that is, they fail to distinguish between fortuna and what men do intentionally.

The situation is accurately summed up - although unaccounted for- by Robelt Orr, who observes thatfortuna 'appears to humans always as the producer of what they have not foreseen ' Y Orr is not speaking here aboutfortuna, but about the manner in which it is grasped by human consciousness. III Textual evidence may be found in Machi avelli 's work to support both the interpre- tation thatfortuna is governable, and the opposite view. There is no decisive evidence favouring either of the interpretations, and there is some evidence for rejecting both.

Consequently there is room for considering a third interpretation in which these contradictions might be mitigated to the point of insignificance or altogether elimi- nated. Thus rather than ask if the 34 Flanagan, 'The Concept of Fortuna', p. BALABAN actions of men can counteractfortuna or alter its course in order to accommodate it to, say, the requirements of political power, we have to address ourselves to a more fundamental issue. Doesfortuna transcend human activity and represent a kind of 'destiny' or 'chance' , or is it the fruit of human action?

I will try to show that in Machiavelli's view men createfortuna, although only indirectly and unintentionally. I will now propose a model by which the apparent disparity in Machiavelli between fortuna and human action can be accounted for. In doing so I hope to resolve the difficulties created by Machiavelli's apparently contradictory assertions in regard to fortuna. For this purpose I have chosen only those types of human activity which are conscious and voluntary, and which are directed towards a particular goal. I call such goal-directed actions 'teleological activities'.

Moreover, in addressing myself to Machiavelli 's concept of fortuna, I consider these activities only from the point of view of their results. There are two aspects to teleological activity: Teleological activity produces two kinds of results: I refer to the fonner a as goals, and to the latter b as the by-products. For the moment I wi ll deal with the results of teleological activity, and will consider the aspects at the conclusion of this discussion.

In goal-directed activities it is the goals that define, and bestow meaning upon, the activities. They are the necessary conditions of action. The will is mobilized in behalf of an activity - that is, there is a disposition to employ means if and only if the goal is consciously intended. Given the will to achieve an end, once it is achieved we regard the activity to have been concluded. This we take as manifest evidence that the activity was undertaken in regard to the goal.

When the goal is achieved there is nothing mysterious about the result, since the process that led to it was wholly conscious. The carpenter, for example, knows that the table is a product of his own activity, and considers there to be no other cause for its existence. The table, insofar as it is a consciously achieved product, will not be defined as the result offortuna. I call these kinds of results 'purposeful' results, since they depend directly upon human will.

However, a teleological activity also produces results that are unrelated to its goal, although they may arise out of the nature of the activity. Thus, when the muscles in a carpenter's arms grow stronger in the course of his work, this may be counted as a result of his activity, but only as a by-product and not as its goal. Such by-products of teleological activity that are independent of the goal I call ' unintended' results or 'by -products '. Every human activity involves by-products of this S An example in kind is furnished by so-called ' natural' languages - as distinct from scientific or logical languages, which are intentionally created with a specific goal in mind.

N aturallanguages are not natural in the sense of existing from the beginning of time. Rather they arise out of men's need to communicate in order to accomplish an end that is different from communjcation per se; as , for instance, when a group of men must coordinate their actions in a hunt and like activities. The same may be said of natural disasters. Further, when settlements are established in the vicinity of a volcano, vulcanic eruptions are treated as disasters. However, when such an event occurs at a place remote from human habitation, its human significance is reduced to that of a natural phenomenon which is of concern to no one but a small circle of geologists.

For them, a volcanic eruption is far from being a disaster, but is a perfect opportunity for advancing our knowledge about nature.

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469—1527)

Men tend not to regard such by-products as the result of their own activities, but as the work of transcendent factors. That phenomena of this kind are called 'natural' as in ' natural' language, ' natural ' disasters, and the like is the consequence of their being thought extrinsic to human intentions. But they are no less human for being called natural , since they owe their existence to goal-directed human activities. However, although these by-products owe their existence to the pursuit of an end, they do not necessarily serve the end, nor need they be in harmony with it.

Once by-products come into being, they assume an independent existence of their own. These unanticipated and unintentional results are of tlu'ee kinds in respect to goals: That is to say, they may suit the goal, oppose it, or affect it for neither bener nor worse.

Furthermore, when an end is successfully accomplished , the attendant by-products may be harmful to the subject. On the other hand, a by-product may be advantageous even if the goal has not been achieved. So, a carpenter may ruin the table he is making, but this does not mean that the muscles in his arms have not grown stronger in the course of his work. In explaining how fortuna as a by-product of goal-directed activity may frustrate conscious goals, Machiavelli makes the following observation: Nature bas created men so th at they desire everything, but are unable to attain it; desire being thus always greater than the faculty of acquiring, discontent with what they have and dissatisfaction with themselves result from it.

This causes the changes in their fortunes [my italics]; for as some men desire to have more, whilst others fear to lose what they have, enmities and war are the consequences; and this brings about the ruin of one province and the elevation of another. Although men create their own fortunes, they do so indirectl y and unintentionally. This model of the three kinds of relationship between by-products and goals may be of use in helping us to understand Machiavelli's concept offortuna.

Machiavelli's awareness of the mutual independence of the goal and the by-product is revealed when he says, for example, that there are defeats that result in advantages to the loser and victories that are ruinous; or that fortuna can turn friends into enemies and 38 Machiavelli, Discorsi, Book I, ch. Since such by-products are not a part of the conscious goal, the subject initially perceives them not as the results of his own activity, but as independent phenomena pertaining to destiny, external nature, accident or chance - in shOlt, as good or bad fortuna.

In other words, they appear to him under a guise alien to him , as something transcendent that is not of his own making. Moreover they are not the consequences of an error of judgment that can be conected merely by becoming aware of them. These by-products are transcendent because they are unintentionally produced and without any regard for the goal. They therefore take on the appearance of being moved by their own force, so that the subj ect tends to perceive them as not pertaining to himself, and is even surprised to learn of their existence.

The same approach to the by-products of man is evident in Aristotle, who observes: Instead of explaining this by-product by means of the activity, he explains the activity by means of the by-product, which has assumed the status of a natural event. Umeflective consciousness, since it is attentive to the goal of teleological activity, does not take these by-products into accou nt. Awareness about the existence of such by-products is attained only upon reflection. Awareness of the goal does not require self-consciousn ess - that is to say, consciousness about all of the results of one's own activity, whether these had been intentional or not.

The goal exists a priori in the consciousness in the form of an idea, scheme or plan. By contrast, the unintended result only exists a posteriori in the consciousness, although not by necessity and only under certain conditions. Such unintended consequences need not be defined in reference to consciousness. They will be recognized by consciousness if they have relevance, whether favourable or unfavourable, to the goal. Only when fortuna, or the by-product of an activity, is out of kilter with the pl'oper course of human affairs is it taken into account.

However, Machiavelli is putting the case of reflective consciousness - as can be verified if we properly interpret the penultimate chapter of Il Principe. In Chapter 25 of his book Machiavelli compares fortuna to 39 cf. And although they are like this, it is not as if men, when times are quiet, could not provide for them with dikes and dams so that when they rise later, either they go by a canal or their impetus is neither so wanton nor so damaging.

However, although fortuna strikes where it is least expected, the true cause of its onslaught is want of virtue. If it had been diked by suitable virtue, like Germany, Spain, and France, either this flood would not have caused the great variations that it has, or it would not have come here. Theriver's impetuosity standing for the rush of events overtaking Italy does not originate in the liver acting independently of the conduct of human affail's, but is rather the consequence of conditions that have been created by men in the valley.

Machiavelli's example therefore does not refer to disasters in nature, but to the economic and social condi tions produced by hum an activity. But these social and economic conditions which were created in the valley were not intentionally created. What men consciously sought to do was to achieve their goals by taking advantage of the fertility of the Valley. However men remain at the mercy of the river's fury as a by-product of these goal-oriented activities. Otherwise we should have to argue that men settled the valley for the purpose of being threatened by the river.

In other words, human affairs are not subject to natural events. It is the events of nature which in their significance, scope and limiting capacity are a part of human affairs. That is to say, nature is taken to be an object of human action - an aspect of teleological activity. It is made use of by the subj ect in a way that would favour the goals that he wishes to accomplish. Fortuna thus becomes a manipulable datum, the very material of human action. A disaster like that caused by a river overflowing its banks is not natural, but is properly speaking human in three respects.

First, the establishment of human settlements in a river valley is the consequence of a historical rather than a natural process; it is only in this regard that we can assert that a disaster takes place. Second , the disaster brought about by the river depends upon the failure 42 Machiavelli, The Prince, eh. BALABAN of men to anticipate the unwanted by-products of their teleological activity by taking timely measures against them.

Third, as Machiavelli explicitly tells us,fortuna can be avoided altogether and is therefore different from either chance or divine provi- dence. The undesired by-products of goal-directed actiwity can be wholly averted by either eschewing the activity itself or by taking appropriate preventive measures against them. By asserting that nature is subject to human teleological activity, Machiavelli is by no means discounting the influence of natural events like that of the flooding of the river in the example we have just been considering.

He is merely denying that they have a direct influence on human affairs. Indeed the very same natural circum- stance can provoke different and even opposite results in various social and economic situations. Another example cited by Machiavelli in which fortuna has nothing to do with natural events, but is relevant only to human activity, concell1S the death of Rinaldo degli Albizzi, quoted in PaIt I. Note that Machiavelli does not say that death was a personal misfortune for Rinaldo, but rather 'an instance of fortune's favor '! That is to say, Machiavelli does not treat Rinaldo's death in respect to its character as a natural event, as one might have ordinaI'i!

To summarize, therefore, in Machiavelli's view fortuna owes its existence not to natural but to artificial events, since it is a result of human teleological activity. On the other hand, it is not artificial in the same sense in which goals that are intentionally achieved are artificial. IV Finally we should consider whether fortuna - as I believe Machiavelli to have conceived of it - is govell1able. It seems to me that the failure of others satisfactorily to resolve this issue is the consequence of their not having first considered fortuna within the context of human activity.

It would seem to me, therefore, that the problem of whether Machiavelli conceived offortuna as being govell1able can be dealt with only in the light of the conclusions that derive from the foregoing discussion. Fortuna is governable once we clearly grasp its specific meaning - by becoming aware that although fortuna is beyond our control, it is nevertheless the outcome of a conscious act even when the outcome is not the intended one and is therefore conditioned by our consciousness.

Once we become aWaI'e of the relationships between the goals and the by-products of our deeds, we are in a position to avoid or alter the effects of the by-products. The by-products are extell1al to our will only so long as we remain unaware of their existence. However consciousness alone is not enough. It is not enough to be aware about such unwanted by-products, there is a need to be ready to act in order to eliminate them.

Earlier I asserted that there are two aspects to teleological activity: I would now like to submit this distinction to further analysis.

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