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Supposedly Dyer went to the Jallianwala Bagh completely unprepared, and when he realised the composition and size of the gathered crowd he had to fire, which he did within 30 seconds of entering the enclosure. As appears in the above-quoted report, however, Dyer clearly did not believe he was faced by a crowd of more than 5, It is no mean feat that Lloyd manages to make Niall Ferguson seem like a tree-hugging leftie by comparison. His argument rests entirely on the premise that British police reports and official records can be taken at face value as accurate representations of fact.
The pitfalls of such an approach should be obvious and Lloyd never gains sufficient distance from his source-material to be anything but a spokesperson for the British involved in putting down the unrest in Punjab. There is nothing inherently wrong about historical revisionism of course — most historians can attest to the value in reassessing longstanding myths and popular misconceptions.
The problem is that self-proclaimed revisionism tends to be motivated by highly politicised agendas of varying denominations and to operate within a narrowly Manichean world-view, where angry polemics take the place of constructive debate. This book was not written with a view to understanding the events of the past as much as to exculpate the British Empire in the present. Wagner repeatedly attacks me for not swimming with the tide, for having a different view than people like himself, for being out of step with the mainstream.
It is not the duty of historians to consolidate and repeat the prejudices of a current generation, but to investigate the past objectively and honourably. That Wagner can only respond to challenging new research with insults and disparaging comments indicates how prejudiced and reactionary he is; part of an academic clique that is not committed to uncovering the truth about Indian history, only reinforcing a highly dubious orthodoxy.
Wagner allies himself with those who have for 60 years legitimised and defended the power of the winning side, the Congress Party, in India, and demonised anyone who dissents from this. That Wagner has absolutely nothing to say about the violence directed against the Indian people by the successor state since , including the massacre at the Golden Temple in and the introduction of a form of martial law far worse than anything seen in , tells us everything about his political sympathies as well as his selective historical amnesia.
Wagner is the reactionary defender of an out-of-date ideology, not me. Wagner is beside himself that I have looked at members of the ICS in India in and argued that their story deserves to be told; that by and large they did their jobs with competence and responsibility throughout a very difficult period. It is certainly the case that my ideas are unfashionable at least within certain history departments , but it does not follow that they are wrong. The ICS are worthy of study and should be treated with respect and objectivity. Because it has simply been assumed that these people have no story to tell, they have been airbrushed from history in a determined campaign of censorship.
My book is the only account to look at what they actually did, without pre-judging them.
Furthermore, the contention that my book is nothing more than a highly politicised whitewash is simply not true. It was, in some respects, written as a reaction to earlier works for example by B. Horniman, Raja Ram and Helen Fein that were grossly inaccurate and highly politicised themselves. To imply, as Wagner does, that previous works on the subject were not politicised is absurd: Had they not been so, there would have been no need for my book which, in any case, is based on a far greater range of evidence than any previous history.
It is true that Dyer claimed 5, people were present in the Bagh, but this does not — as Wagner breathlessly claims — invalidate my argument. My research has indicated that there were probably many more people upwards of 20, present. Nevertheless the point in question is that even if only 5, people were there, this was still at least five times bigger than Dyer had expected, hence his surprise at what he found. Before going to the Jallianwala Bagh, Dyer had been told that a crowd of 1, people had gathered and then decided to take only a small party of soldiers with him. Not everyone will accept this interpretation, but it is, in my opinion, far more likely — certainly when compared with the old idea that Dyer knew exactly what was going on and everything went according to his grand design.
Ian Colvin defended Dyer because he believed his actions were correct. I make no assumption. I claim that Dyer did not know what he was doing, panicked and then lied about it afterwards.
This is a completely different explanation — something that Colvin would have fervently disagreed with — the subtlety of which seems to have been lost on Wagner. Another criticism made in the review is my reliance on material gathered during the official inquiry into the disorders the Hunter Committee which is unreliable and should therefore be discounted.
Again, this is a response typical of those who have not read the Hunter Report or delved into the seven huge volumes of transcripts compiled on the disorders. This was demonstrably not some sort of official whitewash a point dealt with at length in my book , but an open inquiry where nationalist lawyers — some very hostile to the British — were able to question officials and officers at will; even Gandhi thought their questioning was at times too severe.
This resulted in a number of bitter stand-offs and arguments that have been recorded for posterity, thus providing an invaluable source that provides a full range of views, both pro- and anti-government. That Wagner, like generations of Indian historians, has never bothered to read these papers, says much about his lazy assumptions and casual arrogance. When this report is used in conjunction with a variety of other sources, which I have done, a much fuller picture of the disorders of can emerge. My book is the only one to draw from all seven volumes of material, making it the most comprehensive and detailed history of the disorders ever written.
Yet armchair historians like Wagner still noisily pontificate on how the British should have responded, as if their views can tell us anything. I claim that Dyer did not know what he was doing, panicked and then lied about it afterwards. Wagner allies himself with those who have for 60 years legitimised and defended the power of the winning side, the Congress Party, in India, and demonised anyone who dissents from this. Furthermore, the contention that my book is nothing more than a highly politicised whitewash is simply not true. There is nothing inherently wrong about historical revisionism of course? According to the official figures people were killed and wounded, although the actual casualties were probably much greater.
Simply ignoring a mass of evidence because you have deemed it unreliable is arrogant and dangerous. Denouncing those who take the time to look at it is even worse. A related point in the use of language. Wagner criticises my failure to reference an article by Ranajit Guha, and also decries my use of allegedly Raj-era terms in my book.
The reason why I did not reference Guha was very simple. Nothing that Guha has written has been of any use in addressing the questions my book seeks to answer: No amount of post-colonial theory can answer these questions, only extensive research in the archival record. The point here is that, no matter what descriptions were used by the British or by me , there were mobs and violent rioters in They burnt banks, ripped up telegraph poles, wrecked railway lines, and killed Europeans in racially-motivated murders. These agitators, those who urged crowds to violence or committed it themselves, were wholly responsible for the bloodshed that followed, not the British.
To deny this, or to hide behind theoretical deconstructions of language, is both pointless and factually incorrect. The British did not imagine the crowds in Amritsar or think they were worse than they really were. They did not suffer from some kind of mass hysteria or information panic. They encountered violent crowds and had to deal with them as best as they could. Yet armchair historians like Wagner still noisily pontificate on how the British should have responded, as if their views can tell us anything.
It was, in some respects, written as a reaction to earlier works for example by B. Horniman, Raja Ram and Helen Fein that were grossly inaccurate and highly politicised themselves. To imply, as Wagner does, that previous works on the subject were not politicised is absurd: Had they not been so, there would have been no need for my book which, in any case, is based on a far greater range of evidence than any previous history. It is true that Dyer claimed 5, people were present in the Bagh, but this does not — as Wagner breathlessly claims — invalidate my argument.
On 13 April , a fateful event took place which was to define the last decades of the British Raj in India. At pm on that day, Brigadier-General 'Rex' Dyer. On April 13, , a fateful event took place which was to define the last decades of the British Raj in India. At pm on that day, Brigadier-General ""Rex"".
My research has indicated that there were probably many more people upwards of 20, present. Nevertheless the point in question is that even if only 5, people were there, this was still at least five times bigger than Dyer had expected, hence his surprise at what he found. Before going to the Jallianwala Bagh, Dyer had been told that a crowd of 1, people had gathered and then decided to take only a small party of soldiers with him.
Not everyone will accept this interpretation, but it is, in my opinion, far more likely — certainly when compared with the old idea that Dyer knew exactly what was going on and everything went according to his grand design. Ian Colvin defended Dyer because he believed his actions were correct. I make no assumption. I claim that Dyer did not know what he was doing, panicked and then lied about it afterwards. This is a completely different explanation — something that Colvin would have fervently disagreed with — the subtlety of which seems to have been lost on Wagner.
Another criticism made in the review is my reliance on material gathered during the official inquiry into the disorders the Hunter Committee which is unreliable and should therefore be discounted. Again, this is a response typical of those who have not read the Hunter Report or delved into the seven huge volumes of transcripts compiled on the disorders.
This was demonstrably not some sort of official whitewash a point dealt with at length in my book , but an open inquiry where nationalist lawyers — some very hostile to the British — were able to question officials and officers at will; even Gandhi thought their questioning was at times too severe. This resulted in a number of bitter stand-offs and arguments that have been recorded for posterity, thus providing an invaluable source that provides a full range of views, both pro- and anti-government. That Wagner, like generations of Indian historians, has never bothered to read these papers, says much about his lazy assumptions and casual arrogance.
When this report is used in conjunction with a variety of other sources, which I have done, a much fuller picture of the disorders of can emerge. My book is the only one to draw from all seven volumes of material, making it the most comprehensive and detailed history of the disorders ever written. Simply ignoring a mass of evidence because you have deemed it unreliable is arrogant and dangerous.
Denouncing those who take the time to look at it is even worse. A related point in the use of language. Wagner criticises my failure to reference an article by Ranajit Guha, and also decries my use of allegedly Raj-era terms in my book. The reason why I did not reference Guha was very simple. Nothing that Guha has written has been of any use in addressing the questions my book seeks to answer: No amount of post-colonial theory can answer these questions, only extensive research in the archival record.
The point here is that, no matter what descriptions were used by the British or by me , there were mobs and violent rioters in They burnt banks, ripped up telegraph poles, wrecked railway lines, and killed Europeans in racially-motivated murders. These agitators, those who urged crowds to violence or committed it themselves, were wholly responsible for the bloodshed that followed, not the British. To deny this, or to hide behind theoretical deconstructions of language, is both pointless and factually incorrect. The British did not imagine the crowds in Amritsar or think they were worse than they really were.
They did not suffer from some kind of mass hysteria or information panic. They encountered violent crowds and had to deal with them as best as they could. Yet armchair historians like Wagner still noisily pontificate on how the British should have responded, as if their views can tell us anything. As such he confuses victims with aggressors and acts as an apologist for that violence. Whatever terms I use have been based upon eyewitness accounts, statistical data, and more importantly, actual evidence of what those crowds did. Again, this is not history, it is politically-motivated censorship.
Readers will have noticed that Wagner's piece is peppered with personal insults and slanders against me.
This is staggeringly unprofessional. These criticisms are, frankly, ridiculous and reeking of desperation. He even finds time to pour bile on my choice of dedication. It is unfortunate and regrettable that Wagner should have to be reminded that a dedication is a personal choice of the author and is not subject to any form of politically-correct vetting. Wagner has absolutely no right to criticise this. It is highly-offensive and grossly-disrespectful to do so. Such personal slanders are deeply shameful and thus totally unworthy of inclusion in a civilised piece of academic discourse.
My book does not sit comfortably within South Asian historiography. It is a challenge to that historiography. Indian nationalists and their post-colonial supporters in western universities have had their ideas unchallenged for too long. Time will tell whether other historians and readers treat this book with the same level of selectivity, narrow-mindedness, intolerance and hysteria that Wagner has shown.
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