Missionary Politics in Contemporary Europe (Religion and Politics)


Besides, it is clear from the occasion when this map was published and from the Catholic character of the newspapers which published it, that this "Christian Europe" had to be understood as being "Roman Catholic. In addition, these figures are open to criticism because they force the issue in taking as "Christians" people who in fact are so at best only nominally.

The case of Belgium clearly illustrates this abuse. Today one may even observe that consciousness of the Catholic origin of its culture is becoming blurred. For example, fewer and fewer people know what Pentecost signifies. There are still fewer who remember at all the role the Catholic Church played in the very creation of Belgium as a country, in drawing up its constitution, in developing its school and hospital system. Perhaps above all, they forget its role in its "politics of compromise" which resulted in instituting in Belgium a unique mode of conflict management, in virtue of which it is often consulted by various countries needing to solve cultural, i.

The memory of all this seems to be largely erased, and declarations of membership in the Catholic Church ought not to be assumed to imply strong religious conviction and still less to presuppose confessional allegiance and obedience to the institutional Church. For that matter, one may ask oneself what are the chances of the survival of that connivance once the references and "emblems" to which it clings, become more and more exhausted within the younger generations: One thing is obvious: What is of interest for our purposes is that this map exists as such and that it is being propagated.

What is important is that it exists before and after other manifestations, all, in our opinion, fitting into one and the same logic. For example, one need only think of the great gatherings of youths convened by John-Paul II. The latest took place in September in Loreto Italy which is an important pilgrimage place. Indeed, a cathedral was built there around the house where it is said, an angel announced to the Virgin Mary that she would become the mother of God.

The story recounts how this house was rebuilt there with the stones that the Crusaders brought back with them from the Holy Land. This gathering was called "Eur-Hope for the youth" and the Pope insisted on the fact that Loreto and the Holy House were in a place which was exactly the centre of the European Continent, between West and East, i. There the Pope told the thousands of young people who were present: During the week of the visit of the Pope to Loreto, many things were proposed to underline the close connection existing between the Catholic Church and Europe.

First of all, people were reminded of the many illustrious European personages who had come to Loreto: As each of the many chapels within the Cathedral of Loreto is dedicated to an European Nation England, France, Germany, Greece, Spain , the sanctuary was described as "a kind of sacred European mausoleum. During the most important evening meeting of the pilgrimage, the Pope clearly underlined the Christian character of Europe: For if it is true that European civilization has different roots, it is also true that it first of all existed and grew from Christian root.

Besides the repeated insistence on the Christian character of European culture, this last sentence is also of great interest. Indeed it defines Europe as different from perhaps even opposed to other parts of the world and, more specifically, to the Islamic and oriental worlds. The transfer of the Holy House from Palestine to Italy offers an opportunity to insist on that point. In the booklet published for the visit of the Pope to Loreto, this fact is expressly mentioned: The evocation of this crossing of the sea and the fact that the story claims that the stones of the Holy House were brought to Europe by the Crusaders who went to the Orient to take back the Holy Tomb from the Muslims is certainly more than an insignificant anecdote.

Effectively, although less explicitly, the old conflict between Europe and the Islamic world had already been evoked in another important gathering of European youth which took place in Santiago di Compostella Spain in On that occasion, the Pope delivered a memorable message: The pilgrimage of Santiago constituted one of the strong points which encouraged the mutual understanding of the European peoples, as diverse as they are: The pilgrimage brought them into closer contact and linked them with all peoples who, touched by the preaching of the witnesses of Christ, accepted the Gospel, and were born as peoples and nations" Catholic Documentation, no.

This message is clearly at the heart of the Pope's two main concerns: This message also embodies another meaning. It takes on a quite particular connotation at this moment of European construction and at the very time when changes occurring in the East might modify the contours of Europe. It also takes on another particular significance, pronounced in the city of Galicia, where, in the face of the "infidel" menace, lie the remains of the patron Saint of the Reconquest at a moment when the revival of Islam troubles many. Considering these different facts, proposed here as examples among others that are possible, two things are to be underlined.

First of all, this Christian Europe is specifically a "Catholic" Europe and, secondly, the interlocutor is indeed the unified Europe and not the States who compose it. We have already mentioned that what the Pope has in mind when he is speaking of a "Christian" Europe is in fact a "Catholic" Europe.

How, indeed, might one imagine that the Protestants will recognize themselves under the banner of the Holy Virgin, proposed by the Pope! But there is more than that. If, as we have seen, the Roman Catholic Church as such is very positively concerned about the construction of Europe, the same is not absolutely true for the other branches of Christianity. Certainly each of them says that it sees in a unified Europe a greater chance for peace and an opportunity to develop ecumenism although fearing that in the perspective of the Catholic Church, ecumenism signifies a reunification under the authority of the Pope.

But at the same time, these Churches develop an ambiguous feeling when they consider the connotations attached by the Catholic Church to its vision of Europe. Let us see some of their reservations related to this. Since the beginning, the Protestants have had a relatively skeptical and distant attitude towards Europe. Three main concerns motivate this difference with the Catholic Church. First of all, as Willaime indicates This is conforted and reinforced by the fact that there exists no one central and hierarchical authority in Protestantism as there is in Roman Catholicism.

These differences between the Catholic Church and the Protestant Churches are certainly an element in explaining the "reticence" of the latter and, on the contrary, the support coming from the Catholic Church toward the unification of Europe.

In effect, the Church does not intend so to dominate evil by making appeal to its own doctrine, to the Gospel, but indeed rather to human rights! Some religious parents of children in public schools see the teaching of evolution as a direct threat to their faith, insofar as it implies the falsity of their biblical-literalist understanding of the origins of life. The first is mostly oriented to leadership in Europe. A church may simply have a privileged role in certain public, political ceremonies for example, inaugurations, opening of parliament, etc. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.

The reservations of the Protestant Churches are all the more pronounced because economical and political Europe in its first stage is essentially a "Catholic" Europe. At the origin of the project were catholic social-democratic figures the Italian de Gasperi, the French Schuman, the German Adenauer and among the twelve first countries involved were seven quasi-exclusively Catholic ones Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain while two others were mixed Germany and the Netherlands.

This quantitative domination easily induced the image of a Vatican Europe. Last but not least, Protestants appear to disagree with the Pope's proposal to "re-christianize secularized Europe" as it has been explicitly stated. The documents published after the European Protestant Assembly which took place in Budapest in clearly show a significant difference on this point.

Indeed, as is underlined by Willaime For this religion, the differentiation between State and Church is seen as valuable, and the church recognize that the Enlightenment permitted the manifestation of essential values found in the Gospel. Besides this, it is pointed out that Christianity is only one of the different strands that are concerned in the construction of Europe: Islam and Judaism in particular also have a history that is partly rooted in some European Countries. This insistence on the pluralism of the religious and philosophical heritage of Europe differs dramatically from the view of the Roman Catholic Church which defines Europe as a Christian Continent, and in its mind, as a Catholic Continent, since other Christian religions are seen as dissentient and are expected to return to the Roman Church.

As with the Protestant Churches, the Orthodox Church is also more or less reluctant to see Europe going, as the Pope puts it, "from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains" because the Orthodox Church considers this Europe as being essentially managed by Catholic and Protestant countries, according to a liberal and materialist model.

Besides this, the leaders of the Orthodox Church do not very much appreciate that, since the fall of the Berlin wall, Catholic priests and Protestant ministers have gone to Eastern Europe with a kind of missionary project. This is all the better so that the Orthodox Church considers itself as invested with the moral duty to entertain and protect the specific "Russian soul" and to control the functioning of the new so-called democratic governments to avoid the materialist drift experienced by the West.

A problem of the same kind appears in the Anglican Church: The European field is thus free for the strategy of the Catholic Church which, as we have seen, clearly occupies it. It is all the more likely that the European authorities appear to regard positively the Church's repeated affirmations of the Christian Character of Europe.

Different facts testify to the sympathy which they manifest to this assertion. Naturally we have to take into account that the Pope is also a head of State, which is not the case of other religious leaders. Let us simply recall the different official visits of the Pope to the European Parliament and to the different seats of European authority, in Brussels, Luxemburg and Strasbourg.

Let us also mention that the main ceremonies of the youth gathering in Loreto were transmitted on Eurovision and by the network "Europe by satellite" freely put at the disposal of the organizers by the European Commission. It is nevertheless important not to misunderstand this acceptance of Catholicism as the cultural background of Europe. First of all, the European Community began as an economic unit and is still essentially perceived as an entity motivated by a project of internal economic regulation, designed to establish Europe as a serious partner in the context of the economical globalization.

So defined, Europe is confronted with serious difficulties when it attempts to develop a European consciousness among the populations of the different constituent countries. Not all these countries have the same measure of conviction regarding their participation within a unified Europe some of them in fear at a high level of losing prerogatives such as the control of their borders, and the emission of their own money.

And the people, who for ten to fifteen years have experienced serious economical crisis, are tempted do attribute responsibility for such problems to Europe and the rules of exchange which are being imposed. In the face of this skepticism and this reluctance, the Catholic Church appears to offer new perspectives, capable of solving these difficulties. First, it seems likely that while maintaining pastoral and diplomatic relations with the different states of Europe, it is not the states as such which the Catholic Church regards as valuable interlocutors. Inside the Europe that is being constructed, the interlocutors are essentially not the states but the "nations" of which they are composed and which are sometimes settled across state borders.

For various reasons, the Church undoubtedly feels more at ease on this geo-political level. First, in some way the modern state doubtlessly retains a memory of itself as the child of the Enlightenment with its anti-religious rationalism. The state is the actor which has substituted itself for the earlier structures within which the Church occupied a privileged place: The simple idea of Europe may, on the contrary, remind the Church of the time of its glory: Furthermore, the model of the Church's hierarchic structure is certainly better suited to Europe than it is to states.

In fact, this structure recognizes only two principal authorities: With Europe, and the regions to which Europe may be able to give preference to the detriment of states, the Catholic Church may perhaps be able to rediscover two places of anchorage more in correspondence with its own structure: Just as in earlier, immobile societies the parish was the locate around which the structure of daily life was organized, the region-diocese may become the decisive level of pastoral organization for a society which lives on a larger scale, thanks to expanded possibilities of mobility and the positive evaluation of this mobility.

Finally, one should not neglect the fact that the Catholic Church is an organization whose hierarchy is capable of working out strategies Remy, In this sense, one can reckon that it is no stranger to the globalization process which is at present reorganizing the economy and the polity on the basis of vast "world-regions. In fact, it is on this scale that the stakes must be defined, the solutions found, and the decisions taken.

Therefore, the Church, too, must position itself on this level if it wants to demonstrate its existence and express its point of view on the public scene. For that matter, the Church has that much more reason to assert itself on this level in that, whatever the image of the Europe of tomorrow might be, many expectations are being invested in this Europe. We still have to ask ourselves: After having long played a direct political role in many Western European countries, the Catholic Church has been practically reduced to silence on the public scene.

If it wants to reappear there and to play a role at the new pertinent political level which, as we have seen, is Europe the Church has to be recognized as to put it in the terms of Luhmann a resource for other systems.

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What, then can be the "performance" of the Catholic Church, i. According to Beyer, there exist two possibilities for religion to enter the public essentially political arena: Let us see what in Europe is the double strategy of the Catholic Church confronted with this exigency. As we have already said, if the fathers of the European idea had first of all in mind the preoccupations of peace after the two dramatic wars which had vigorously shaken it, very quickly the process of constructing Europe focused on an economical perspective.

Such a purpose, however, is not very readily able to mobilize citizens, most of all if it is practically developed in an economically troubled period as the one existing now in Europe. Consciously or not, it is clearly evident that the Catholic Church proposes an alternative image of Europe and offers its services to design it. This image is of a Europe of human rights, the Catholic Church presenting itself as "an expert in humanity," able to help in fulfilling this aim. In the following pages, we provide a few examples to illustrate the sense of this role that the Church is attributing to itself.

Let us make it clear that we shall not give priority to the Pope's discourses ; not, certainly, because they are not important, but rather because we prefer to show how they analyzed for example in "The Dream of Compostella" are to be found again in the mouths or acts of other prominent personalities of the Church in Europe, confirming the existence of the project that we feel we see taking shape.

It needs it because of the evil to be found to some extent everywhere. Will humanity be one day capable of freely consenting to such an authority? As a Christian, I would say that the sole authority capable of doing it is God and a little bit insofar as it remains faithful to God the Church. This discourse, pronounced by one of the most influential Cardinals and one closest to the Pope, is of great interest. In our opinion it clarifies the role that the Church intends to perform on the public scene in Europe.

Four elements seem particularly noteworthy of attention. First, when one studies this discourse, the Church is placing itself in the role of a "third-party. It is even more exact to say that the Church is placing itself above and beyond all states. This exteriority thus permits it to present itself as being beyond all conflicts and thus as neutral and more competent to evaluate and counsel. Subsequently, it may be observed that the Church sees its mission as "help ing on the practical level in reaping the advantages from mutations and changes in order to move towards an increasingly happier world.

This project's immanent dimension is relatively new and, as such, undoubtedly reveals that the Church is increasingly anxious that its values should correspond with those which Europeans espouse, as revealed by the European Values Studies. Furthermore, it is striking to note that this discourse is intended to be valid for all, Christians and non-Christians alike. Thus, when evil is spoken of here it is clearly pointed out that limiting it to "sin" as defined by the Church is out of the question: All of this evil must be confronted by "human rights.

In effect, the Church does not intend so to dominate evil by making appeal to its own doctrine, to the Gospel, but indeed rather to human rights! Observing that the Pope also often makes reference to human rights, they point out that it is to the Universal Declaration of to which he makes appeal and not to the Declaration, to which the Catholic hierarchy was violently opposed at the time.

Elsewhere, these authors agree with us that the Church today is placing itself on the side of the civil society and against the depreciated state. They say that today "human rights cease to be the critical reference to positive law within the state or states and tend rather to be the individual's recourse against the state.

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Kantian philosophy, to which on this point modern society is heir, based the dignity of the person on his autonomy, that is on his capacity to provide himself with his own laws, as imperatively and objectively imposed upon his will, through reason, while reason itself was systematically submitted to critique. The dignity which the Pope talks about is foreign to this conception of autonomy.

It seeks to found itself upon the biblical idea of man in the image of God a message pronounced in Austria in September Defining itself as a "third-party," and assigning itself the mission of aiding in the attainment of happiness in this world for all men, whether they be Christian or not, the Church in the words of Danneels specifies that its role is to be situated "neither in politics nor in economy," and that "it is not up to it to determine the means of action in a concrete manner.

Its ascendancy is not based on constraint, but on respectability. The Church is not in the first place dependent on disciplinary force, but on a legitimacy which it claims is granted to it, and which in fact is hardly contested, except perhaps by a portion of those who declare themselves most involved in the Christian project and who professionally or otherwise invest the most in institutions bearing the Christian Catholic label.

Let us make this point quite clear. To say that the Church is trying to assert itself as a moral authority rather than as a disciplinary authority in no way signifies that it renounces its second role. Quite the contrary, as testified to, for example, by recent "instructions": But the Church knows that this disciplinary role concerns only a small minority of people, the majority not even being conscious of the existence of such "instructions. In effect, it is a question of touching the masses on the symbolic level by taking advantage of the atmosphere of doubt and uncertitude that "advanced modernity" post-modernity is experiencing.

This atmosphere is notably linked to "the end of great narratives," to refer to Lyotard Indeed, the collapse of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the failure of the Welfare State in Western Europe seem more and more to witness that socialism has, until now, been an unrealistic project. On its side, science is less and less considered capable of solving all man's problems and today its "nefarious effects" are ceaselessly brought to light. If rationality, the key project of modernity, is not abandoned, none the less, it unceasingly witnesses its own incapacity to meet all human expectations.

Conflicts concerning religion and politics arise outside of curricular contexts, as well. For example, in France, a law was recently passed that made it illegal for students to wear clothing and adornments that are explicitly associated with a religion. This law was especially opposed by students whose religion explicitly requires them to wear particular clothing, such as a hijab or a turban. The justification given by the French government was that such a measure was necessary to honor the separation of church and state, and useful for ensuring that the French citizenry is united into a whole, rather than divided by religion.

However, it is also possible to see this law as an unwarranted interference of the state in religious practice. If liberty of conscience includes not simply a right to believe what one chooses, but also to give public expression to that belief, then it seems that people should be free to wear clothing consistent with their religious beliefs.

Crucial to this discussion of the effect of public policy on religious groups is an important distinction regarding neutrality. The liberal state is supposed to remain neutral with regard to religion as well as race, sexual orientation, physical status, age, etc. In one sense, neutrality can be understood in terms of a procedure that is justified without appeal to any conception of the human good.

In this sense, it is wrong for the state to intend to disadvantage one group of citizens, at least for its own sake and with respect to practices that are not otherwise unjust or politically undesirable. Thus it would be a violation of neutrality in this sense and therefore wrong for the state simply to outlaw the worship of Allah. Alternatively, neutrality can be understood in terms of effect. The state abides by this sense of neutrality by not taking actions whose consequences are such that some individuals or groups in society are disadvantaged in their pursuit of the good.

For a state committed to neutrality thus understood, even if it were not explicitly intending to disadvantage a particular group, any such disadvantage that may result is a prima facie reason to revoke the policy that causes it. The attendance requirement may nevertheless be unavoidable, but as it stands, it is less than optimal. Obviously, this is a more demanding standard, for it requires the state to consider possible consequences—both short term and long term—on a wide range of social groups and then choose from those policies that do not have bad consequences or the one that has the fewest and least bad.

For most, and arguably all, societies, it is a standard that cannot feasibly be met. Consequently, most liberals argue that the state should be neutral in the first sense, but it need not be neutral in the second sense. Thus, if the institutions and practices of a basically just society make it more challenging for some religious people to preserve their ways of life, it is perhaps regrettable, but not unjust, so long as these institutions and practices are justified impartially.

In addition to examining issues of toleration and accommodation on the level of praxis , there has also been much recent work about the extent to which particular political theories themselves are acceptable or unacceptable from religious perspectives. Rather than requiring citizens to accept any particular comprehensive doctrine of liberalism, a theory of justice should aim at deriving principles that each citizen may reasonably accept from his or her own comprehensive doctrine. The aim, then, for a political conception of justice is for all reasonable citizens to be able to affirm principles of justice without having to weaken their hold on their own private comprehensive views.

One such argument comes from Eomann Callan, in his book Creating Citizens. If Rawlsian liberalism requires acceptance of the burdens of judgment, then the overlapping consensus will not include some kinds of religious citizens. Thus, a religious citizen could feel an acute conflict between her identity qua citizen and qua religious adherent. One way of resolving the conflict is to argue that one aspect of her identity should take priority over the other. For many religious citizens, political authority is subservient to—and perhaps even derived from—divine authority, and therefore they see their religious commitments as taking precedence over their civic ones.

But this tendency makes it more challenging for liberals to adjudicate conflicts between religion and politics.

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One possibility is for the liberal to argue that the demands of justice are prior to the pursuit of the good which would include religious practice. If so, and if the demands of justice require one to honor duties of citizenship, then one might argue that people should not allow their religious beliefs and practices to restrict or interfere with their roles as citizens. One recent trend in democratic theory is an emphasis on the need for democratic decisions to emerge from processes that are informed by deliberation on the part of the citizenry, rather than from a mere aggregation of preferences.

As a result, there has been much attention devoted to the kinds of reasons that may or may not be appropriate for public deliberation in a pluralistic society. While responses to this issue have made reference to all kinds of beliefs, much of the discussion has centered on religious beliefs. One reason for this emphasis is that, both historically and in contemporary societies, religion has played a central role in political life, and often it has done so for the worse witness the wars of religion in Europe that came in the wake of the Protestant Reformation, for example.

As such, it is a powerful political force, and it strikes many who write about this issue as a source of social instability and repression. Another reason is that, due to the nature of religious belief itself, if any kind of belief is inappropriate for public deliberation, then religious beliefs will be the prime candidate, either because they are irrational, or immune to critique, or unverifiable, etc. In other words, religion provides a useful test case in evaluating theories of public deliberation.

Since citizens have sharp disagreements on comprehensive doctrines, any law or policy that necessarily depends on such a doctrine could not be reasonably accepted by those who reject the doctrine. A prime example of a justification for a law that is publicly inaccessible in this way is one that is explicitly religious. For example, if the rationale for a law that outlawed working on Sunday was simply that it displeases the Christian God, non-Christians could not reasonably accept it.

Since only secular reasons are publicly accessible in this way, civic virtue requires offering secular reasons and being sufficiently motivated by them to support or oppose the law or policy under debate. Religious reasons are not suitable for public deliberation since they are not shared by the non-religious or people of differing religions and people who reject these reasons would justifiably resent being coerced on the basis of them. Others try to show that religious justifications can contribute positively to democratic polities; the two most common examples in support of this position are the nineteenth-century abolitionist movement and the twentieth-century civil rights movement, both of which achieved desirable political change in large part by appealing directly to the Christian beliefs prevalent in Great Britain and the United States.

A third inclusivist argument is that it is unfair to hamstring certain groups in their attempts to effect change that they believe is required by justice. Many—though not all—who defend the pro-life position do so by appealing to the actual or potential personhood of fetuses.

Religion in Modern Europe: Pertinence of the Globalization Theories?

Consequently, on some versions of exclusivism, citizens who wish to argue against abortion should do so without claiming that fetuses are persons. To ask them to refrain from focusing on this aspect of the issue looks like an attempt to settle the issue by default, then. Instead, inclusivists argue that citizens should feel free to introduce any considerations whatsoever that they think are relevant to the topic under public discussion. Even the most secularized countries Sweden is typically cited as a prime example include substantial numbers of people who still identify themselves as religious.

Religion and Politics

These people are often given substantial democratic rights, sometimes including formal citizenship. And the confrontation between radical Islam and the West shows few signs of abating anytime soon. Consequently, the problems discussed above will likely continue to be important ones for political philosophers in the foreseeable future. Religion and Politics The relation between religion and politics continues to be an important theme in political philosophy , despite the emergent consensus both among political theorists and in practical political contexts, such as the United Nations on the right to freedom of conscience and on the need for some sort of separation between church and state.

Establishment and Separation of Church and State While the topic of establishment has receded in importance at present, it has been central to political thought in the West since at least the days of Constantine. These arrangements include the following: A church may be supported through taxes and subject to the direction of the government for example, the monarch is still officially the head of the Church of England, and the Prime Minister is responsible for selecting the Archbishop of Canterbury.

Particular ecclesiastical officials may have, in virtue of their office, an established role in political institutions. A church may simply have a privileged role in certain public, political ceremonies for example, inaugurations, opening of parliament, etc. Toleration and Accommodation of Religious Belief and Practice As European and American societies faced the growing plurality of religious beliefs, communities, and institutions in the early modern era, one of the paramount social problems was determining whether and to what extent they should be tolerated.

Liberalism and Its Demands on Private Self-Understanding In addition to examining issues of toleration and accommodation on the level of praxis , there has also been much recent work about the extent to which particular political theories themselves are acceptable or unacceptable from religious perspectives. Religious Reasons in Public Deliberation One recent trend in democratic theory is an emphasis on the need for democratic decisions to emerge from processes that are informed by deliberation on the part of the citizenry, rather than from a mere aggregation of preferences.

References and Further Reading Audi, Robert. Religious Commitment and Secular Reason.

Cambridge University Press, Audi, Robert, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. Religion in the Public Square: An accessible, well-reasoned exchange between an inclusivist Wolterstorff and an exclusivist Audi , with rebuttals. Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences School Choice and Social Justice. Oxford University Press, Portions of this book deal with education for autonomy and religious opposition to such proposals. Callan, Eomann, Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy.

An exploration of civic education in light of Rawlsian political liberalism. The Culture of Disbelief: Religion and Democratic Citizenship: Inquiry and Conviction in the American Public Square. Princeton University Press, A collection of essays on political topics from a wide array of Christian traditions.

Religion in the Liberal Polity. University of Notre Dame Press, A collection of essays on religion, rights, public deliberation, and related topics. Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. Book 3 of this work concerns the relation and division between Church and State.

Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics. Cambridge University Press, A thorough critique of the varieties of exclusivism. Faber and Faber, An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory. Religious Convictions and Political Choice. Private Consciences and Public Reasons. Includes a helpful chapter on religious identity in politics.

A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. A fine introduction to the field, useful for beginners but detailed enough to interest experienced readers. Patterns of Moral Complexity. A Letter Concerning Toleration. Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy. Harvard University Press,